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Thesis Summary 
This thesis examines household behaviour at the intersection of natural disasters and 
conflict. I structure this research around four distinct analytical chapters that use 
empirical microeconomic analysis to study household-level decisions and outcomes in 
the year following the 2010 floods in Pakistan.  
I first examine how does conflict affect household access to cash transfer programmes, 
and what mechanisms explain such effects. Using IV estimation to overcome 
endogeneity of conflict exposure and cash transfer receipts, I find that conflict reduces 
household and community level access to two large cash transfer programmes in 
Pakistan. The effects are driven by the likely presence of armed rebel groups who 
possibly resent state-led efforts to win legitimacy through social protection programmes.  
Next, I examine the effect of conflict on household access to remittances. I use IV 
estimation to overcome the endogeneity of conflict and remittance receipts and find that 
conflict exposure reduces household remittance receipts. This effect is driven by security 
threats associated with armed group presence, which threatens the operations of 
informal money transfer agents. Further, I find evidence for conflict negatively affecting 
investment-focused remittances as the effects of conflict are strongest among households 
more likely to use remittances for investment, than for consumption. These findings are 
in contrast to the macro literature that tend to view conflict as a factor that affects 
altruistic motives of remittances but has not examined investment motives in detail.  
 
In my third analytical chapter I examine the unintended effects of household aid receipts 
on violence through a mechanism that has not been studied in much detail: civilian 
militarisation through the purchase of guns. Using propensity score matching to 
overcome selection bias, I find that overall, flood relief cash transfers did not lead to any 
increases in household gun ownership. However recipients who own large tracts of land 
and live in conflict-affected areas were 8.3% more likely to acquire a gun, compared to a 
matched group of non-recipient households. The effects are driven by households that 
lived in displacement camps, which may have enhanced security concerns and the need 
for guns. This suggests that for groups that have low material but high security needs, 
exogenous increases in cash, through cash transfers, can increase the likelihood of 
acquiring guns for use, or for signalling, as a safety good.  
 
Finally, I examine the under-studied role of uncertainty of disasters in affecting post-
disaster short-term migration decisions. I find that while flooding exposure increases the 
propensity to migrate, a higher level of uncertainty, represented by more anomalous 
floods (compared to recurring floods), decreases migration. I also develop a measure of 
flooding anomaly, based on the likely past exposure to floods at the community level, 
using satellite data on long term precipitation levels, and distance to the nearest rivers.  
 
My research examines important, but hitherto under-studied and challenging 
relationships that play out in complex emergencies, where many households 
simultaneously face flooding and violent conflict shocks. The findings are relevant for 
economic theory, empirical analysis and for policy.  
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Thesis Summary .......................................................................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................................... iv 
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. vi 
Glossary of Local Terms .......................................................................................................... viii 
Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Academic, and Personal Motivations............................................................................ 1 
1.2 The Overarching Approach ............................................................................................ 3 
1.3 Understanding the Context: Pakistan Before and During the 2010 Floods ............. 7 
1.4 Thesis Organisation: Research Questions and Chapter Outlines ........................... 10 
1.5 Connecting the dots: What does this thesis reveal about household behaviour in 
the aftermath of the 2010 floods in Pakistan? .................................................................. 17 
Chapter 2. Sub-national Conflict in Pakistan 2001-10: Overview and Empirical Insights 
from the South Asia Terrorism Portal ................................................................................... 23 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 23 
2.2 Violent Conflict in Pakistan: Historical Development and Contemporary 
Manifestations ...................................................................................................................... 24 
2.3 Conflict Incidence and Location in Pakistan: Data Sources and Issues ................. 37 
2.4 SATP Conflict Event Data: Definitions, Methodology and Analysis ..................... 46 
2.5 Results .............................................................................................................................. 49 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................... 64 
Chapter 3. Calamity, Conflict and Cash Transfers: How Violence Affects Access to Aid 
in Pakistan ................................................................................................................................. 67 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 67 
3.2 Empirical Setting and Context ..................................................................................... 73 
3.3 Empirical Approach and Identification Strategy ....................................................... 78 
3.5 Results .............................................................................................................................. 84 
3.6 Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 104 
3.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 106 
ii 
 
Chapter 4. Informal Finance, Investment, and Insecurity: How Violent Conflict Affects 
Access to Remittances in Pakistan ....................................................................................... 110 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 110 
4.2 Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 114 
4.3 Data Sources and Context ........................................................................................... 119 
4.4 Empirical Approach ..................................................................................................... 122 
4.5 Results ............................................................................................................................ 127 
4.6 Summary of Results and Conclusions ...................................................................... 141 
Chapter 5. Unintended Consequences of Aid? Conflict, Cash Transfers and Gun 
Ownership in Pakistan .......................................................................................................... 145 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 145 
5.2. Conceptual Framework and Literature Review ..................................................... 149 
5.3 Data Sources and Empirical Strategy ........................................................................ 160 
5.4. Results ...................................................................................................................... 168 
5.5. Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................ 184 
Chapter 6. On the Off-Chance: Flood Anomaly and Short-term Migration in Pakistan
 .................................................................................................................................................. 188 
6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 188 
6.2 Natural Disasters and Migration: The Evidence so far ........................................... 193 
6.3 Background to the 2010 Floods in Pakistan .............................................................. 198 
6.4 Data and Identification Strategy ................................................................................ 200 
6.5 Results ...................................................................................................................... 213 
6.6 Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 231 
Chapter 7. Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 234 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 239 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 268 
Appendix 1. Household Survey Dataset Access .................................................................... 269 
Appendix 2. Summary Statistics – by Chapter ...................................................................... 271 
Appendix 3.1. IV Estimates of effect of Conflict on Access to Aid: Distance from nearest 
official border crossing as IV for conflict [log (1+n) killings at sub-district level] ................. 288 
Appendix 3.2. IV Estimates of effect of Conflict on Access to Aid: Proportion of Pashtu 
speakers at community level as IV for conflict [log (1+n) killings at sub-district level] ........ 291 
Appendix 3.3. IV Estimates of effect of Conflict on Access to Aid: Nearest distance to 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border as IV for conflict [dummy for conflict-affected sub-district - 
tehsil] .................................................................................................................................... 294 
iii 
 
Appendix 3.4. Estimation of Community-level Female Primary School Enrolment and Primary 
Schooling Gender Gap (M – F) rates ..................................................................................... 297 
Appendix 3.5. Sub-samples based on residuals of the community-level gender gap in primary 
schooling ............................................................................................................................... 299 
Appendix 3.6. IV probit coefficients from alternate sub-samples: Checking if likely/ less likely 
Taliban presence (based on Appendix 3.4) is a chance division ........................................... 301 
Appendix 3.7. Conflict and Eligibility for BISP and CDCP – I ................................................. 307 
Appendix 4.1. Estimates of effect of Conflict on Access to Remittances: Distance from 
nearest official border crossing as IV for conflict [log (1+n) killings at sub-district 
level] ..................................................................................................................................... 308 
Appendix 4.2. Sub-samples based on residuals of the community-level gender gap in primary 
schooling ............................................................................................................................... 312 
Appendix 5.1. Household and Community correlates of Non-Response on Household Gun 
Ownership: Probit estimates ................................................................................................ 314 
Appendix 5.2: Correlates of the community-level share of households that own guns ...... 316 
Appendix 5.3. Robustness check: Alternate estimation of Covariate Balanced Propensity 
Score among households with > 1.5 acres of land and who did not own guns before the 2010 
floods .................................................................................................................................... 317 
Appendix 5.4 – Differences (on observable characteristics) between Households that 
acquired guns before and after the 2010 floods .................................................................. 319 
Appendix 6.1. Causal Effects of Flood Exposure Index (Linear transformation) on Household 
and Individual Migration ....................................................................................................... 321 
Appendix 6.2. Causal Effects of Flooding Exposure sub-Indices [Community-level Depth and 
Duration (of floodwater) scores] on Household and Individual Migration .......................... 325 
Appendix 6.3. Causal Effects of Flood Exposure Index (Household Level) on Household and 
Individual Migration .............................................................................................................. 330 
Appendix 6.4. Causal Effects of Flooding Anomaly sub-Indices (Standardized Rainfall 
Deviation and Standardized Nearest Distance to River) on Household and Individual 
Migration .............................................................................................................................. 334 
Appendix 6.5. Causal Effects of Flood Exposure Index, Flooding Anomaly Index and Flooding 
Anomaly Index-Squared on Household and Individual Migration ........................................ 339 
 
iv 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors at the Institute of Development Studies, Patricia 
Justino, Jean-Pierre Tranchant, and Jaideep Gupte for their unstinting support, encouragement, 
patience, and indulgence at all times over the last four years. I deeply appreciate how much, and 
how well they pushed me to do better. Their unwavering faith in my work (and through that, in 
me), at several moments when I saw little reason for it, played no small part in getting this thesis 
to a satisfactory completion. I am also grateful to Papa, Kaku, and the rest of my family, between 
Delhi, Dubai and Cupertino for their love and support at all times.  
I gratefully acknowledge the financial support I received during my PhD from TAMNEAC, a 
Marie-Curie Initial Training Network of the European Commission’s Seventh Framework 
Programme. TAMNEAC was the perfect platform to connect with other researchers on the 
microeconomics of conflict, and I benefitted immensely from the many travel and learning 
opportunities it provided. I am grateful for a doctoral student fellowship from the Institute of 
Development Studies, which enabled me to write Chapter 5 of this thesis and was supported 
through a sub-award from the University of Maryland as part of a grant from the Air Force Office 
of Scientific Research (#FA9550-14-1-0353), funded by The Minerva Initiative of the U.S. 
Department of Defense. Debbie West, Becky Mitchell, and Marion Clark provided amazing 
administrative support; I thank them for their help at every point.  
I thank Oxford Policy Management Ltd., in particular Simon Hunt, Tom Newton-Lewis, and Sean 
O’Leary for providing me access to household survey data for analysis, and for patiently 
responding to my many requests for guidance. I would like to thank Dr. Ajai Sahni at the Institute 
for Conflict Management, New Delhi for his patient guidance, and encouragement, which helped 
me access and use data from the South Asia Terrorism Portal.  
As part of the TAMNEAC fellowship, I spent an instructive year as a visiting research fellow at 
the Development Strategy and Governance Division at the International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Washington, D.C.  I thank Paul Dorosh and Sohail Jehangir Malik for providing me this 
opportunity. I am indebted to colleagues and friends at IFPRI, in particular Katrina Kosec and 
David Spielman, who provided critical inputs and feedback that tremendously helped improve 
my research. I am also thankful to Valerie Muller, Jean-Francois Maystadt, Neha Kumar, Syed 
Hamza Haider, Fatima Zaidi, Madeeha Hameed, Madiha Afzal, and Purnima Menon for their 
enabling engagement with my work.  
At the University of Sussex, I thank Vikram Pathania and Catherine Muller for their feedback on 
my work, and for their friendships. I thank Sanchari Roy for her helpful comments on Chapter 6.  
Not being able to visit Pakistan whilst writing a PhD thesis on the country could have been as 
academically damaging as it has been personally dispiriting; but for the generosity with which 
many knowledgeable scholars of Pakistan, at IDS and beyond, provided me invaluable 
information and insight, forging deep friendships in the process. I remain indebted to Shandana 
Mohmand, Mujtaba Piracha, Haris Gazdar, Rehan Rafay Jamil, Aimen Majeedullah, Mir Dosteen 
Hoth, Miguel Loureiro, Muhammad Rahimuddin, and Ammar Rashid, for giving me the 
opportunity to listen. 
v 
 
I wouldn’t have been able to complete, or at least enjoy (as much as I have), this PhD without the 
company, affirmation, humour, and levity that my partner-in-crime (and conflict), Alia 
Aghajanian brought to the last four years. I am so glad we went through this together!  
I also thank the many friends I made over the years at IDS, who ensured that the PhD process 
remained such a lively experience. I sincerely thank Eric Kasper, Aditya Vansh Bahadur, Ana 
Solorzano-Sanchez, Aparna John, Nikhil Wilmink, Hani Morsi, Maysa Shqerat, Hadeer El Shafie, 
Maria-Teresa Armijos, Syed Shahid Abbas, Rachel Godfrey Wood, Elizabeth Mills, Shilpi 
Srivastava, Marika Djolai, Ricardo Santos, Aaqib Khan Khetran, Katia Taela, Ewan Robinson, Kas 
Cascant-Sempere and Sophie Valeix. I also thank Angela Dowman for her excellent support to all 
PhD students at IDS. At the Economics Department, I would like to thank Mattia di Ubaldo, 
Marco Carerras, Matteo Sandi, Subhani Jinasoma Keerthiratne, Egidio Farina, Francisco Cabrera, 
Javier Lopez-Gonzalez, Lee Crawfurd, Amrita Saha, Cecilia Poggi, Eva-Maria Egger, Ani Rudra 
Silwal and Nihar Shembavnekar. Within the TAMNEAC programme, Juan Carlos Munoz-Mora 
and Kari Lipschultz have been particularly helpful colleagues and are great friends.  
I am glad that many of my former colleagues and mentors have remained in contact. I 
acknowledge with deep gratitude, the guidance I have received even during these PhD years 
from Puja Vasudeva Dutta, Bart Minten, Vegard Iversen, Arjan Verschoor, Kunal Sen, Pooja 
Sharma (Womslet Shilla), Sanjay Kaul, Sangeeta Goyal, and Madhulika Sen.  
The last four years have thrown up many challenging and even difficult moments, for which, in 
hindsight, I am grateful. Through all of this, and more, the friendships that I deeply value have 
helped me stay collected and retain a sense of balance. Nivriti Butalia has constantly and 
simultaneously been sounding board, contrarian and echo chamber, as required, and otherwise. 
I marvel at her compassion and perspicacity, which egg me on to try to live a fuller life. I deeply 
thank my close bunch of college friends, the Rawalpindi Express – in particular, Uday Bhatia, 
Supriya Bhutani, Shruti Rajagopalan and Ruchika Khattar. I feel deep gratitude for the support 
of several friends at critical times over this PhD process, some of whom I have named already; 
and among the rest: Niharika Pande, Vidur Chopra, Louise Cornell, Shivani Mathur, Karan 
Budhiraja, Arjun Sagar Gupta, Amit Agarwal, Jaydeep Dharap, Prasad Gadgil, Richa Singhal, 
Amruta Patil, Amit Kanvinde, Madhav Raina-Thapan, Paul Clist, Paroma Mukherjee, Aditi 
Thorat, Owen Mortimer, Swapna Kona-Nayudu, Sakshi Bhalla, Trishima and Ben Mitra-Kahn, 
Siddharth Garg, Varun Khemka, Zhen Liu, Vivek Mansukhani, Arunaman Sharma, Simi Batra, 
and Nandakumar Rajagopalan.  
I am grateful to Mick Moore at IDS, and Manjula Kumar at the Smithsonian Institution for giving 
me the opportunity to pursue my passions, tennis and theatre, during this PhD. I thank Rohini 
Prasad for hosting me so graciously for several weeks in Paris this summer (when my thesis 
finally came together), and for her stellar friendship.  
I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my mother, Poonam Ghorpade, who would have been so 
happy to see me here today.  
Yashodhan Ghorpade 
October, 2015 
vi 
 
Abbreviations  
 
ATET Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
BISP Benazir Income Support Programme 
CBPS Covariate Balanced Propensity Score 
CDCP Citizens Damage Compensation Programme 
FAI Flooding Anomaly Index 
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FEI Flood Exposure Index 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GoP Government of Pakistan 
GW Giga Watt 
ID Identification Document 
IDP Internally Displaced People/ Persons 
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence 
IV Instrumental Variable 
KM Kilometre 
KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
ln Natural logarithm (base = e) 
NADRA National Database Registration Authority 
NASA National Aeronautical and Space Agency 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
vii 
 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NWFP North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Paktunkhwa) 
ODA Overseas Development Assistance 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
PKR Pakistani Rupee 
PPP Pakistan People’s Party 
PSM Propensity Score Matching 
PSU Primary Sampling Unit 
TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban) 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
US United States (of America) 
USD US Dollars 
 
  
viii 
 
Glossary of Local Terms  
 
Hawala Informal money transfer system prevalent across much of South Asia, 
Middle-East and East Africa 
Hawaldar Hawala (informal money transfer system) operator 
Hundi Same as Hawala (used in South Asia) 
Jihad Holy War 
Mohajir/ Muhajir Immigrant, used to refer to (the largely Urdu-speaking) Muslim 
communities that migrated from India into Pakistan during the 
partition of India in 1947 
Mujahideen One engaged in Jihad (plural of mujahid) 
Pashtun Pashtun ethnicity, often coinciding with speaking Pashto language 
Pathan Same as Pashtun 
Tehsil Sub-district, unit of administration between District and Union 
Council 
Watan Popular name of the Citizens Damage Compensation Programme 
Flood Relief Cash Transfers, or the card used to access it.  
Literal translation – Nation  
1 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
This thesis examines household behaviour at the intersection of natural disasters and 
conflict. While existing branches of development microeconomics literature have 
examined, in detail, the effects of exposure to natural disaster shocks, and to violent 
conflict on households, few studies have examined the overlap of these sources of 
vulnerability – which is acutely felt at the household level.  In 2010, much of Pakistan 
witnessed intense and unprecedented flooding, even while several parts were reeling 
under a decade-long exposure to varying levels of violent conflict. Pakistan, in the year 
following the 2010 floods, offers a unique empirical setting in which to study the overlap 
of conflict and natural disasters, and what it implies for households. Making use of this 
opportunity to learn more about the intersection of vulnerabilities, I structure this 
research around four distinct analytical chapters that use empirical microeconomic 
analysis to study household-level decisions and outcomes in the year following the 2010 
floods in Pakistan.  
The remainder of this introduction is organised as follows: Section 1.1 describes the 
academic and personal motivation for this thesis; 1.2 outlines the overarching analytical 
approach; 1.3 provides context to discussions of the Pakistani economy and state during 
and prior to the floods; 1.4 describes each of the research questions that this thesis seeks 
to answer as sequential chapter outlines; and finally, 1.5 makes connections across the 
chapters to crystallise the broader contributions of this thesis into a better understanding 
of economic relationships in the aftermath of the 2010 floods in Pakistan.  
 
1.1 Academic, and Personal Motivations 
 
I started this PhD in the autumn of 2011, a year after enormous and devastating floods 
hit Pakistan, the worst the country had experienced in decades. The research consultancy 
I was working for then had been commissioned by a consortium of multilateral donor 
agencies to conduct a rapid assessment of the effects of the floods on household welfare, 
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and of the immediate relief operations of the Government of Pakistan. I expressed a 
desire to be part of the project because of my keen interest in studying household 
behaviour under duress and in Pakistani society, culture and politics. I was eager to use 
the opportunity to contribute meaningfully, even if modestly, to the unfolding crisis in 
the only way I could: with some analytical skills, and a passion for strengthening the 
evidence base for on-ground action. My previous work at the World Bank on social 
safety nets in South Asia had given me a flavour of the rapidly transforming political 
economy of social protection in Pakistan, following the restoration of democratic rule in 
2008 after nearly a decade under military dictatorship. I believed that such work 
experience, a short research and publication record on coping strategies in response to 
economic shocks, and a familiarity with the language, culture and politics would hold 
me in good stead to be deployed for the rapid assessment. I had, of course, naively 
underestimated the effect of carrying an Indian passport.  
No sooner had I started looking at flight connections between New Delhi, India and 
Multan, Pakistan, was I told that the project could not risk taking an Indian national on 
board, for security reasons. The indulgence of the visa gods could hardly be expected in 
a humanitarian crisis requiring an immediate despatch of evaluation teams. More 
generally, I was advised that as an Indian I would never really be able to research 
Pakistan. Never intending for it to be so, this thesis is perhaps my (slightly delayed) 
response to the genuinely well-meant advice.  
Obstinacy, to some degree may be necessary, but is certainly not sufficient for motivating 
(and completing) a PhD thesis. As I settled into my PhD at the Institute of Development 
Studies at Sussex University, I savoured the academic space and freedom to determine 
my own research agenda, rather than following the diktats of a Terms of Reference to 
which I had grown to be accustomed. This freedom enabled me to engage with a vast 
evidence base in the development economics literature on the impact of natural disasters 
on household behaviour, welfare and human development. My involvement as a 
research fellow with the Training And Mobility Network for the Economic Analysis of 
Conflict (TAMNEAC) also introduced me to a nascent but rapidly growing body of 
literature on the economic impact of violent conflict on households. As my engagement 
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deepened, I recognised the importance of both these lines of inquiry, but was also 
increasingly cognisant of the silence that marked the conversation between them. I 
recalled that in Pakistan, even as the global media had reported that militant groups 
were stepping in to provide relief and assistance to flood-hit communities, the national 
and international post-disaster response followed a usual pattern, as though operating 
in a completely peaceful country. This had serious policy implications, as disaster relief 
efforts faced challenges peculiar to a conflict setting, that standard disaster response 
approaches did not countenance: limited reach, physical threats to aid workers and 
competition from militant groups to reach populations, to name a few. I became 
interested in how conflict affects the actions of households, the state and non-state 
groups in the aftermath of natural disasters and found the extant academic engagement 
with the intersection of such vulnerabilities inadequate.   
This reflection motivated me to pursue my research on the intersection of economic 
shocks and exposure to conflict, and further, in examining how such an intersection 
shapes the actions of public and private actors. The context of the 2010 floods in Pakistan, 
still very fresh in my mind, against the backdrop of the country’s decade-long and 
continuing tryst with very high levels of violent conflict across vast areas, was a ready 
and familiar, yet challenging case study to situate my research in.  
 
1.2 The Overarching Approach 
 
This research is situated in the field of development microeconomics. I focus on the 
empirical analysis of household survey data to answer distinct questions on household 
decision-making and welfare, simultaneously engaging with the microeconomic theory 
and seeking to draw lessons for policy.  
In my thesis I examine household behaviour in the year following the 2010 floods in 
Pakistan. I attempt to engage with this topic beyond the more common focus on coping 
strategies alone; using the episode of the flood shock as a snapshot view of how 
household behaviour was determined not only by the risk and uncertainty of flooding 
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exposure, but also by the political and institutional environment, policy interventions 
and the historical and cultural predispositions of households and communities. 
Keeping the household (and in some cases the individual) as the central unit of analysis, 
I attempt to study economic behaviour and decision-making at the intersection of the 
actions, inactions, and the interactions of, chiefly among others, the forces of nature, the 
welfare state, armed rebel groups, and historical socio-economic and political 
trajectories. Equally important is how households’ own characteristics – income, wealth, 
occupational status, demographic composition and social identity, influence their 
response to external stimuli, and their interaction with the economic and socio-political 
environment in a post-flood setting.  
There is a co-dependence between the effects of natural disasters, aid programmes, and 
the (often violent) interaction between state and non-state actors, on households – 
indicating a complex structure of mechanisms that determine household decisions and 
welfare. Some of these inter-relationships are better understood than others. For 
example, a vast literature examines how households cope with shocks induced by 
natural disasters using a wide array of coping strategies (Fafchamps, 2003; Dercon, 2002), 
and invoking the role of public policy to support household coping, in the form of social 
protection and disaster relief. Yet other studies examine how households cope with 
direct exposure to conflict (Verwimp et al., 2009; Ibanez and Moya, 2006; Brück, 2004a,b). 
I attempt to go beyond this well-trodden ground and focus on four distinct critical but 
under-studied mechanisms that operate at the intersection of natural disaster and 
conflict.  
In my first analytical chapter (Chapter 3) I examine the causal effect of conflict on 
households’ access to aid in the aftermath of the 2010 floods, and the channels through 
which conflict affects such access. While aid is important from a human development 
standpoint for households facing shocks, and is seen as politically important for the state 
in a conflict-affected setting, there is no evidence on whether and how conflict may 
undermine the household-level provision of aid.  
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Next, in Chapter 4, I examine how conflict affects household access to private transfers 
in the form of remittances, which can offer critical support in times of calamity. Country-
level studies view conflict as a source of hardship and therefore a propeller of altruistic 
remittances. However, there is no microeconomic evidence to examine if conflict 
exposure at the local level, by sending a negative signal to investment-focused 
remittances, can potentially reduce remittance receipts at the household level. I 
specifically examine this question to assess whether conflict tends to isolate households 
from private transfers.  
In my third analytical chapter (Chapter 5), I examine whether aid can unintentionally 
increase the likelihood of future violence through a route that has not been explored 
previously – civilian militarisation through household purchases of guns.  
Finally in Chapter 6, I examine whether the likely past exposure to floods affects the 
propensity to migrate in the aftermath of floods. Coping strategies may often develop in 
response to previous shock exposure and therefore a known level of shock risk. 
However, there is no evidence on whether the degree of uncertainty – distinct from risk 
– in the form of the extent of flooding anomaly (or the novelty of flooding exposure in 
2010 relative to the past) affects coping behaviour – in this case, the propensity to 
migrate.  
The four chapter motivations above highlight important gaps in the microeconomic 
literature on household behaviour in complex emergencies – where households face 
multiple sources of vulnerability. The aim of the thesis is not to lay bare the entire web 
of connections between all actors, but to focus on specific research questions that can 
potentially shed light on some of the more interesting, hitherto under-studied, and 
challenging relationships. The rationale for focusing on specific causal relationships, 
sequentially, is echoed in noted economist Dani Rodrik’s recent reflections on the elusive 
quest for the definitive/ right model to explain the complexity of the social world, 
prevalent among many contemporary economists and social scientists: 
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“… [U]nderstanding requires simplification. The best way to respond to 
the complexity of social life is not to devise ever-more elaborate models, 
but to learn how different causal mechanisms work, one at a time, and 
then figure out which ones are most relevant in a particular setting.” 
Prof. Dani Rodrik1 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 
 
I therefore structure my thesis around four distinct but inter-related analytical chapters 
(Chapters 3 – 6), which enables the necessary analytical breadth to study distinct causal 
links that simultaneously operate in a complex setting. I also include a detailed 
descriptive chapter, outlining data sources and trends of conflict in the years preceding 
the 2010 floods in Pakistan (Chapter 2).  
Each of the four analytical chapters (Chapters 3 – 6) is intended to stand on its own, as a 
coherent, complete and cogent work of research that addresses a specific gap in the 
literature, and then goes on to employ empirical analysis to establish causal 
relationships. The structure of each chapter is intended to lend itself to eventual 
publication as a paper in academic journals. Each chapter has a distinct analytical focus, 
empirical approach to causal identification, conceptualisation of the mechanisms 
underlying the causal relationships, and theoretical and policy implications. However, 
the chapters also work together to provide a more complete understanding of 
intersecting, simultaneous and sometimes complementary causal mechanisms that link 
extraneous and pre-flood economic, political and social factors, and post-flood 
household behaviour.  
The four chapters have much in common: they are centred on the empirical analysis of 
household behaviour in the year following the 2010 floods in Pakistan. They make use 
of a common household survey dataset, the baseline household survey for the 
Government of Pakistan’s Citizen’s Damage Compensation Programme – Phase II 
transfers which was conducted between December 2011 – February 2012, and that is 
                                                          
1 Economists v/s Economics. Blog post for Project Syndicate. Published and Accessed online at 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economists-versus-economics-by-dani-rodrik-2015-
09#jp3xcglCZio2jOrQ.99 on 10 September, 2015 
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representative of all flood-affected areas in Pakistan’s four main provinces (OPM, 2013).2 
Before describing each of these analytical chapters in some detail, I first provide a brief 
background to the economic, political and historical features of Pakistan following the 
2010 floods that are germane to the subsequent analysis.  
1.3 Understanding the Context: Pakistan Before and During the 2010 Floods 
 
Geography: Pakistan is home to nearly 180 million people and is the sixth most populous 
country in the world. Covering an area of just under 800,000 square Kilometres, the 
country is divided into four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa – formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province) and four federal 
territories (Islamabad Capital Territory, Gilgit-Baltistan, the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas – FATA, and the disputed Azad Jammu and Kashmir). There are three tiers 
of sub-provincial local government: the district, the Tehsil (sub-district), and the Union 
Council. Over 62% of the population lives in rural areas, and about 45% of the labour 
force are engaged in agriculture. The population is diverse along ethnic and linguistic 
lines, with at least 27 distinct ethnic groups and several languages and dialects.  
Fig. 1 Political Map of Pakistan 
 
                                                          
2 Described in further detail in Chapters 3 – 6  
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Source: World Trade Press Inc. at 
http://www.bestcountryreports.com/Political_Map_Pakistan_Provinces.php  
 
Demography and Economy: Pakistan is a young country with 68% of the population 
below the age of 30 and the median age of the population being 22. Poverty remains a 
key challenge for the country; while the share of population below the official poverty 
was 13.6% in 2011, the share of population just above the poverty line and vulnerable to 
poverty was as high as 60%, indicating a large population clustered around the poverty 
line, as well as a considerable rich-poor gap (World Bank, 2014). In Pakistan, although 
poverty reduction has been found to be strongly correlated with growth, progress on the 
Millennium Development Goals and the Human Development Index remains low, 
particularly on gender, health, nutrition and population indices (ibid.). Economic 
activity is dominated by agriculture as industrial activity and growth have been heavily 
constrained by emerging as well as structural problems including power shortages and 
low productivity.  
Political Structure and History:3 For much of its history since its creation following the 
partition of India and independence from British rule in 1947, Pakistan has alternated 
between democracy and military dictatorship. The most recent period of military 
dictatorship that began with General Parvez Musharraf’s coup d’état in October 1999 
ended in 2008, following the assassination of the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, 
and the victory of the Pakistan People’s Party that she led until her death in December 
2007. With her widower, Asif Ali Zardari assuming office of the President of Pakistan 
and a multi-party consensus in parliament, the newly elected democratic government 
passed the historic 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan which fortified the 
powers of elected governments and parliament, and devolved greater fiscal and 
legislative powers to provincial governments under Pakistan’s federal structure (NAP, 
2010).  
The transition to democratic rule under a new government also brought renewed 
attention to Pakistan’s social protection landscape. The government, supported 
                                                          
3 Conflict is a critical part of Pakistan’s recent political history and is described in much detail in Chapter 2 
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technically and financially by donors including the World Bank launched the country’s 
first ever nationwide cash transfer-based safety net programme: the Benazir Income 
Support Programme (BISP) to provide cash transfers to women recipients in the poorest 
households. Targeting was based on a Proxy-Means Tested poverty scorecard developed 
by the World Bank, another first for the country which had previously relied on 
discretionary quotas of elected representatives for beneficiary selection. When the 2010 
floods hit Pakistan, the government responded by launching a cash-transfer based flood 
relief programme, the Citizen’s Damage Compensation Programme, also the first time 
that cash transfers were used to provide flood relief in Pakistan.  
 
The 2010 Floods: Pakistan experienced its most severe flooding in recorded history in 
2010-11 which started during the monsoon season in July-August 2010. This was caused 
by exceptionally heavy rainfall, which inundated much of the Indus river basin, and also 
led to severe flash flooding in many areas not directly linked with major river systems. 
The volume of rainfall in Pakistan as a whole was 87% above normal in the year 2010. 
The meteorological causes for this exceptionally high rainfall is a subject of some debate, 
and scientists assessments attribute it to La Nina on the one hand (NASA 2010), and the 
freezing of jet streams on the other (Marshall, 2010; Houze et al., 2011). The official death 
toll due to the floods was about 2,000. However, according to Government of Pakistan 
estimates, about 20 million people were affected by the floods through displacement and 
damages to land, property and livestock. In addition to the displacement of entire 
populations, there was large scale destruction of at least 69,000 square KMs of fertile 
agricultural land, an estimated loss of 200,000 units of livestock, losses to power 
generators and transmission systems that caused shortages of about 3.153 GW of power, 
as well as the outbreak of several diseases such as malaria, gastroenteritis, cholera and 
diarrhoea.  
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Fig. 2 Flood Affected Districts in Pakistan – 2010  
 
Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmintdev/615/61504.htm and accessed on 21 
September, 2015.  
1.4 Thesis Organisation: Research Questions and Chapter Outlines 
 
I now describe each of the constituent chapters of my thesis, highlighting the academic 
and wider motivation for the chapter, the empirical approach adopted and the main 
results of analysis.  
 
Chapter 2: Mapping the Spatial and Temporal Variation in Violent Conflict in 
Pakistan 2001-10: Results from the South Asia Terrorism Portal Conflict Event 
Timeline 
How did Violent Conflict vary spatially and over time in the decade preceding the 2010 
floods in Pakistan? 
Observing and identifying the micro-level variation in exposure to conflict is critical for 
understanding its local effects. Doing so, however, is often hampered by the lack of 
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credible, systematic and consistent granular data that covers a long period of time. 
Chapter 2 of my thesis is a descriptive account of violent conflict in Pakistan over the 
decade of the 2000s. I begin with an analysis of the historical and political origins of 
violent conflict in Pakistan. I describe the main militant groups operating in Pakistan 
over 2001-10, and sketch the evolution of the Pakistani state and military’s attitude 
towards the militants, and thus also the contours of political contestation.  I use the South 
Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) conflict events timeline for Pakistan to develop district and 
tehsil-level indices of conflict, and describe the process of data entry, tabulation and 
analysis.  
My analysis of the SATP data shows a dramatic increase in killings due to violent conflict 
over the 2001 – 10 period, particularly pronounced in the post-2007 phase. I find 
considerable spatial heterogeneities in the exposure to violence over this period as high 
conflict provinces contain districts and tehsils that are relatively very peaceful, further 
strengthening the case for disaggregated and micro-level analyses of the effects of 
conflict. I also find evidence for the improved capacity of security forces and their more 
vigorous pursuit of militant targets starting 2007.  
A vast literature has examined the direct effects of conflict on household welfare and 
human capital (Justino, 2011; Justino et al. 2013; Akresh and de Walque, 2008; Ibanez and 
Moya, 2006; Alderman et al., 2006). I therefore focus attention to the comparatively 
under-studied indirect effects. The covariance of suffering at the community level in the 
aftermath of a natural disasters in which most households are hit, to at least some extent, 
compromises the efficacy of intra-community support. It also makes outside help, 
through public and private channels, critical to household well-being. I therefore focus 
on how conflict affected households’ access to cash transfer programmes (as examples 
of public transfers) and remittances (a form of private transfers) in the aftermath of the 
2010 floods in Pakistan, in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.  
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Chapter 3: Calamity, Conflict and Cash Transfers: How Violent Conflict Affects 
Access to Aid in Pakistan 
 
How does conflict affect household access to cash transfer programmes, and what 
mechanisms explain such effects?  
 
There is a growing interest among the international donor community, and governments 
to devote more aid to conflict affected and fragile states/ areas. In much of the literature 
examining the relationship between aid and conflict, variables indicating the receipt of 
aid are typically on the right hand side of an estimation equation, as they are framed as 
causal factors of the intended political or economic outcome on the right hand side. 
(Justino, 2011; Crost and Johnston, 2014; Beath et al., 2009; Khanna and Zimmerman, 
2014). But does the existence of conflict not affect the provision of aid in the first place?  
 
I use the community-level distance to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border – a correlate of 
Taliban strongholds, areas of regrouping and militant operation in Pakistan following 
the War on Terror in Afghanistan, as an Instrumental Variable for exposure to violent 
conflict, and control for a wide range of potential confounders to identify the causal 
effect of conflict on household access to cash transfers. I find that a 10% increase in the 
number of people killed in the tehsil (sub-district) over 2001-10 reduces household access 
to two large government-run aid programmes – the Citizens Damage Compensation 
Programme (CDCP)4 and the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP)5 by 5.2% and 
4.4%, respectively.  
 
I also exploit the Taliban's avowed opposition to girls' schooling and their ability to 
reduce female primary enrolment in areas of their presence to identify areas likely to be 
under Taliban influence – not always the same as areas where violent contestation may 
occur (Kalyvas, 2006). I examine residuals from the community-level estimation of 
female primary enrolment rates after including a wide range of supply and demand side 
                                                          
4 A one-time lumpsum flood relief cash grant 
5 An unconditional monthly/ quarterly cash transfer programme for women recipients in poor households 
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determinants of girls school enrolment in order to isolate the effect of the influence of 
the Taliban – otherwise an omitted variable. Using such residuals to mark out areas with 
more/ less likely Taliban presence, I find that the presence of the Taliban and its affiliate 
groups drives the negative effect of conflict on aid access. The ability of the state to use 
cash transfers to provide economic support, regain legitimacy and establish writ is 
therefore subject to the extent to which the cash transfer programmes are not blocked by 
militant groups. This is particularly valuable to Pakistan as several policy 
pronouncements indicate that the Government of Pakistan views social protection 
programmes, and cash transfers in particular, as tools of nation building and means to 
re-establish legitimacy in conflict-affected areas.  
 
Chapter 4. Informal Finance, Investment and Insecurity: How Violent Conflict Affects 
Access to Remittances in Pakistan 
 
How does exposure to conflict affect household access to private remittances, and what 
mechanisms explain such causal effects? 
 
In Chapter 4 I examine how conflict may affect households’ receipt of private transfers 
in the form of remittances, by altering the incentives for remittances, or by affecting the 
modes through which remittances are paid.  
The literature on the links between conflict and remittances, consisting mostly of 
country-level case studies, finds that remittances tend to increase in response to conflict 
as the latter evokes altruism among remitters abroad who send money to family and 
relatives back home to cope with the hardships and (economic) losses caused by conflict. 
It does not, however, sufficiently engage with the microeconomic effects of conflict on 
the motives for sending and receiving remittances. Specifically, while studies have 
shown that remittances arise from both altruistic and investment purposes, the country-
level studies tend to focus on how conflict affects altruism-driven remittances, but not 
on how conflict may affect the signal on returns to investments and therefore 
investment-focused remittances. Further, the country-level studies ignore sub-national 
and micro-level variation in exposure to conflict, focus only on international remittances 
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and take a relatively shorter-term assessment of conflict exposure (over 1-2 years). The 
subject of remittance responses to conflict has not yet been critically studied in a 
microeconomic framework, with due attention to the channels through which conflict 
may potentially impede private remittance flows.  
 
I examine the causal effects of long-term exposure to conflict, measured at the micro 
level, on the receipt of remittances by households affected by 2010 floods in Pakistan 
over a year following their onset. Using IV estimation to overcome the endogeneity of 
conflict exposure and remittance receipts, as employed in Chapter 3, and controlling for 
a range of confounding factors, I find that, contrary to the literature from country-level 
case studies, long-term exposure to conflict reduces the likelihood of households 
receiving remittances, as well as the amount of remittances. I find that an increase in the 
number of killings due to conflict at the tehsil level over 2001 – 2010 by 10% would cause 
a reduction in the likelihood of a household receiving any remittances by about 4% and 
a reduction in the amount of remittances received by about PKR 2,835 (US$ 33) over the 
period of one year. The likely presence of Taliban-affiliate armed groups, estimated in 
Chapter 3, which is associated with the lower security of financial transactions, 
particularly when money moves through informal channels, reduces remittance receipts 
at the household level. The remittance receipts of households that have formal bank 
accounts are, however, insulated from the effects of conflict. I also find that the negative 
effect of conflict on remittances is stronger for groups that are more likely to use such 
receipts to invest, rather than for consumption. This highlights how conflict operates on 
the investment motive to reduce household-level receipts of remittances. 
 
Chapter 5. Unintended Consequences of Aid? Conflict, Cash Transfers and Gun 
Ownership in Pakistan 
Can disaster relief cash transfers lead to household acquisition of guns? If so among 
which groups, and under what circumstances? 
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Chapter 5 of my thesis examines how aid could, somewhat unintentionally, create the 
conditions for future violence. In recent years, this causal link has been of much interest 
in the political science literature as scholars have examined whether aid can quell or fan 
future violence. The chief mechanisms through which aid has been found to have any 
significant effect on violence include the facilitation of intelligence sharing (Berman et 
al., 2011; Khanna and Zimmerman, 2014), sabotage by rebel groups (Crost and Johnston, 
2014), and the redress of grievances (Justino, 2011). However, no studies have examined 
whether aid may result in civilian militarization, a factor that can potentially increase 
violence in the future.  
 
For certain groups that have lower material vulnerabilities (the rich and wealthy, or 
those who have not suffered much in the floods), but who face high security threats (in 
conflict affected areas, for example), the immediate security needs may be greater than 
material ones. In such a situation, the exogenous injection of (fungible) cash, through 
flood relief, can be used to acquire guns to fulfil a security need. This possibility has not 
been examined in any empirical setting thus far.  
 
I examine the effect of the CDCP – Phase I transfers on gun purchases in the aftermath 
of the floods in Pakistan in 2010. Using covariate balanced propensity score matching to 
overcome selection bias in treatment assignment, I find that for the population as a 
whole, the cash transfers did not have any significant effect on the likelihood of buying 
guns. However, for households with 1.5 acres or more of land (the rural elite) and 
residing in conflict-affected areas, the transfer increased the likelihood of acquiring a 
gun by 8.3%. This effect is driven by the wealthy households that suffered displacement 
and had to live in flood relief camps – often marked by criminal acts including extortion, 
theft, robbery and assault. Such households that have low material but high security 
needs may have found it optimal to use cash transfer receipts to bolster their sense of 
security by acquiring guns.  
 
 
16 
 
Chapter 6: The Effect of Disaster Uncertainty on post-Disaster Coping: How Flooding 
Anomaly affects the propensity to Migrate 
 
Does the extent of flooding uncertainty – measured as the degree to which floods in 2010 
were anomalous compared to the past – affect household and individual migration? 
The microeconomic literature on natural disaster impacts has focused, in large part on 
the risk of disaster exposure and on how households respond to such risks, by adopting 
a number of risk coping strategies. However, a related but distinct concept in economic 
theory – uncertainty (first discussed in Knight, 1921), and its effect on coping strategies 
remains under-studied. Risk pertains to factors whose probabilities are known, or can 
be estimated (known unknowns – according to Dercon, 2003); whereas uncertainty refers 
to ‘unknown unknowns’, i.e. factors for which households do not know the probability 
of occurrence.  
I examine the role of uncertainty in determining migration decisions by relating a greater 
degree of uncertainty of flooding with more anomalous episodes of flooding. In other 
words, the less anomalous the episode of flooding in an area was in 2010, compared to 
past years, the lower is the degree of uncertainty of flooding shocks. I develop a proxy 
measure of the extent of flooding anomaly, compared to likely past exposure to flooding, 
based on satellite data on community-level daily precipitation levels for the last 30 years, 
as well as community distances to the nearest river. I find that while flooding exposure 
increases the propensity to migrate (in line with the global literature, comprehensively 
surveyed by Belasen and Polachek, 2013, and Drabo and Mbaye, 2011), more anomalous 
flooding (a proxy measure for the realisation of a more uncertain shock) in fact lowers 
this propensity. This is possibly because households and individuals less exposed to 
floods in the past may lack the social connections, mental preparedness or the 
wherewithal required to migrate when they are hit by a flood. On the other hand, more 
regular flooding exposure may have equipped households with the material, social and 
psychological resources required to migrate after the floods in 2010.  
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1.5 Connecting the dots: What does this thesis reveal about household 
behaviour in the aftermath of the 2010 floods in Pakistan?  
 
The analysis presented in this thesis seeks to contribute meaningfully to deepen the 
understanding of microeconomic dynamics that play out in complex emergencies, 
particularly in the context of the 2010 floods in Pakistan, which covered large parts of 
the country, including areas that had been exposed to varying degrees of violent conflict 
prior to the onset of the floods. While each chapter of this thesis has a specific focus, to 
allow in-depth analysis, a synthesis of the findings from all the chapters helps paint a 
more complete picture of the effect of the 2010 floods on households in Pakistan. I recap 
the contributions of each chapter individually, and then identify the contributions and 
themes that emerge across chapters.  
 
At the time of commencing this thesis (and until now), there was no singular and ready 
resource available to provide both contextual and empirical background to the spatial 
and time variation in violent conflict in the period immediately preceding the 2010 
floods. Chapter 2 makes two prominent contributions. First, it assimilates narrative and 
empirical accounts of contemporary and recent historical causes and patterns of political 
violence in Pakistan, consulting sources across history, security studies, political science 
and international relations disciplines, as well as presenting results from descriptive 
statistical analysis. Secondly, it presents results analysis from the first-ever compilation 
of sub-national and motivationally-disaggregated data on conflict events in Pakistan 
using the South Asia Terrorism Portal conflict events timeline for the period 2001-10.  
 
The findings of Chapter 3 compel researchers to appreciate the two-way character of the 
aid-conflict relationship, and caution policymakers on the limitations and challenges of 
aid in conflict-affected settings. I also contribute to the economic analysis of conflict by 
devising and applying a unique empirical method that attempts to identify areas with 
the presence and control of the Taliban and affiliate militant groups in Pakistan – distinct 
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from areas which they attack, which is a big challenge across many politically contested 
spaces globally.  
 
Chapter 4 contributes to the knowledge of the relationship between conflict and 
remittances by bringing a micro-perspective to a field that is so far dominated by 
country-level analysis. By highlighting the security link between conflict and 
remittances – in terms of the possible threats and dangers faced by informal money 
transfer agents by Taliban-affiliate armed groups, as well as the negative signal that 
long-term conflict exposure sends to investment-focused remitters, I outline the 
mechanisms due to which the broad findings from country-level analysis may not hold 
at the micro level. The findings also seek to temper expectations that remittances from 
outside can be leveraged to support growth and development in conflict-affected 
settings, by bypassing on-ground security concerns.  
 
Chapter 5 examines and finds evidence for an important but hitherto ignored 
mechanism through which aid may lead to violence in the future – civilian militarisation 
through the purchase of guns. This has important implications for policy – making a case 
for the tighter targeting of cash transfers, particularly in conflict-affected areas to deter 
gun purchases, but also drawing attention to the need for the government to provide 
better security in flood relief camps, failing which, at least the materially better off 
households may divert aid money to the provision of private security. The chapter also 
identifies the household and community-level correlates of gun ownership in Pakistan, 
providing multivariate quantitative analysis of a subject of much importance to local 
politics, criminology, and sociology in Pakistan, but which has thus far only been 
commented upon anecdotally and non-systematically 
 
In addition to making an empirical contribution in terms of developing a proxy measure 
for the extent of flooding anomaly – as an indicator of uncertainty – and demonstrating 
its causal effect on the propensity to migrate, Chapter 6 highlights the need for 
researchers and policymakers to consider how (the lack of) shock recurrence can affect 
the ability and form of coping. It emphasises the need to consider not just the extent of 
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shock severity, but also the degree of shock anomaly as a strong predictor of post-shock 
choices. Households and individuals who were less likely to have encountered flooding 
before 2010, and therefore had not invested in the material and non-material resources 
to migrate in response to floods were not as mobile as those who faced flooding more 
recurrently in past years. Therefore, when groups are affected by a shock whose 
expectation is unknown, they may become more isolated in situ. Such an outcome, 
caused by the realisation of an uncertainty, could have potentially lasting consequences 
for human survival and development, and is therefore relevant also to the policy 
implications of development microeconomics research.  
 
Some contributions and common themes also emerge from the findings across chapters.  
 
First, across all analytical chapters, I find that the relationship between flooding 
exposure and household behavior is not always direct but is mediated by several factors 
– both within and beyond the control of the household in question. The attitude and 
capacity  of state institutions that determine actions and public interface, the prevailing 
political and security situation, the motivations and actions of rebel groups, the historic 
trajectories of flooding exposure, the nature of the informal economy and reliance on 
customary social institutions, all determine how flooding shocks affect households. 
Equally, households’ and individuals’ own characteristics, including, and not limited to, 
wealth and land ownership, ethno-linguistic identity, demographic make-up, access to 
migration and remittance networks, and gender, were shown to be critical for 
determining how they fared in the year after the floods. This thesis highlights the sources 
of variation of the household-level effects of natural disasters and conflict.  
 
Secondly, I find that micro-level variations in pre-flood characteristics are critical to post-
flood outcomes. Chapter 6 shows that the extent and type of exposure to flooding itself 
varies considerably, between as well as within communities. Chapter 6 also highlights 
how community-level variations in the likely past exposure to floods determined the 
propensity to migrate. Chapter 2 shows that violent conflict, which often characterizes 
Pakistan as a whole, in media and other narratives, varies considerably at the sub-
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national – including district and tehsil levels. Subsequently, Chapters 3 and 4 exploit the 
micro-level variation in exposure to conflict and show it to reduce household access to 
both public and private transfers. Finally, Chapter 5 shows that even the household-level 
effects of flood relief cash transfers on (in this case) the propensity to purchase guns, 
vary across household and community characteristics – high land ownership and 
conflict exposure, respectively. In this research I attempt to exploit micro-level variations 
in social, political and economic steady states to explain their differential effect on 
households in the aftermath of flooding shock.  The salience of the variation in local-
level economic, social and political features determining household behavior in response 
to shocks is prominent across Chapters 3 – 6, re-emphasizing the importance of 
microeconomic analysis.  
 
This thesis also finds that the extent of flooding anomaly (treated in Chapter 6 as an 
indicator of the uncertainty of shocks) is a crucial determinant of household choices and 
welfare. The likely past exposure to shocks is a determinant of households’ and 
individuals’ propensity to migrate (explored in Chapter 6), and is also possibly a factor 
that signals the need for altruistic support from outside – remittance receipts are 
significantly and positively associated with more anomalous episodes of flooding, and 
have no significant relationship with the extent of flood exposure per se (an additional 
finding in Chapter 4). This thesis makes a case for according greater importance to the 
historical experience of shock exposure as a factor that determines post-shock responses.  
 
Among thematic findings, Chapters 3 and 4 highlight that security concerns are rather 
intractable, and that they limit the reach of both public and private transfers in conflict-
affected settings. Neither public transfers, in the form of cash transfer programmes, nor 
private remittances are solutions that can be parachuted into conflict-affected areas to 
provide a modicum of support to households, bypassing security threats from rebel 
groups. The chapters highlight the increasing financial isolation of households, from 
both public and private sources, as a consequence of long-term exposure to violence and 
of rebel control. This is particularly worrisome in the context of a covariate shock which 
places limits on intra-community insurance mechanisms, and invokes a greater need for 
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outside help, through transfers. Such isolation resulting from conflict, if continued over 
a long period of time could lead to local economic stagnation and the further 
impoverishment of households and communities. 
 
Importantly, the findings of this research compel a careful examination of the potential 
and the limitations of aid programmes in conflict-affected settings. The security risks 
associated with violent conflict and rebel control limit the household-level coverage of 
two large cash transfer programmes, questioning therefore the efficacy of the state using 
aid as a means to counter the effects of conflict and win populations over. Furthermore, 
as Chapter 5 shows, it is possible for aid programmes to unintentionally contribute to 
processes of violence. Far from conclusively quelling grievance and strife, aid 
programmes may unwittingly lead to the escalation of violence at least at the local level 
via civilian militarization (the purchase of guns).  
 
Aid programmes are not a silver bullet that can overcome the institutional frailties 
associated with conflict. They must be carefully designed and targeted to overcome 
potential threats of under-coverage, exclusion and misuse. The findings also suggest that 
the wider development objectives of aid programmes can only be realized with sufficient 
and effective attention to improving the security climate. This requires wide-ranging 
political interventions requiring strategic and operational convergence among national 
and local administrative, police, military and welfare state institutions, and for the 
international development and donor community to be cognizant of the need for such 
convergence.  
 
To summarize, this thesis draws attention to salient relationships that researchers, 
governments, and aid agencies must be more cognizant of while working in a complex 
emergency setting, of which the 2010 floods in Pakistan, spanning conflict-affected and 
peaceful areas is a prime example. At the intersection of such vulnerabilities, governance 
must additionally respond to a multiplicity of challenges – the isolation of communities 
from transfers, rebel group presence and security threat, the uncertainty embodied in 
anomalous shocks that limits households’ and communities’ adaptive capacities, and the 
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potential misuse of aid. The thesis concludes with a stronger reiteration of its motivation 
at inception: the need to engage with the intersection, rather than the singularities of 
vulnerability that large numbers of people across the world, illustratively in Pakistan, 
continue to face.  
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Chapter 2. Sub-national Conflict in Pakistan 2001-10: Overview and 
Empirical Insights from the South Asia Terrorism Portal 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of violent conflict in Pakistan between 2001-10, 
examining the nature and historical development of violence in the country, and 
focusing on sub-national patterns and trends of violence using data from the South Asia 
Terrorism Portal. Right from its creation in 1947 and through decades alternating 
between military rule and democracy, Pakistan has witnessed various forms of conflict, 
external and civil alike. The period following the 9/11 attacks and the US-led War on 
Terror, however, has been the bloodiest and most enduring spell of strife. Violence is 
widespread; from districts and villages bordering Afghanistan, and the metros of 
Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad, to the vast restive province of Balochistan. It strikes 
luxury hotels as well as cattle fairs, churches as much as cinemas; high profile politicians 
in the heart of cities as also tribal communities in mountainous villages.  
A commonplace association of high intensity violence with Pakistan as a whole nation 
glosses over the multiple dimensions and motivations of conflict, and its disaggregated 
concentration across the country. An analysis of only national and aggregate trends of 
violence in Pakistan is especially limiting to a deeper engagement of its relationship with 
microeconomic outcomes. While the scale of violent activity has been high in the country 
as a whole, there also exist conspicuous islands of calm and insulation among areas that 
have witnessed very high levels of violence. These differences are bound to alter the 
course of economic development, social order, household behaviour and individual 
action at the local level, and are therefore critical to both academic understanding of the 
economics of conflict, and to policy institutions working in Pakistan. Yet, the topic of the 
micro-level exposure of the various forms of violent conflict, and how these are changing 
over time in Pakistan remains under-researched. It is to this critical gap that this chapter 
addresses itself.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a background 
to the various forms of conflict in Pakistan and outlines its manifestations. Section 3 
assesses the main sources of publicly available data on conflict incidence and location in 
Pakistan, discussing their relative strengths and limitations, and the concerns pertinent 
to comparability across sources.  Section 4 presents the methodology employed in the 
author’s original exercise to tabulate conflict event data from the South Asia Terrorism 
Portal. Section 5 presents key descriptive results on the spatial and time trends of violent 
conflict in Pakistan over 2001-10. In addition to summarising the key findings, section 6 
concludes.  
2.2 Violent Conflict in Pakistan: Historical Development and 
Contemporary Manifestations 
 
2.2.1 Historical Context and Development  
Pakistan has witnessed high levels of conflict at several junctures during its volatile 
history. Its creation in 1947, resulting from the partition of India, was accompanied by 
the large-scale migration of communities, and also communal rioting, killing and other 
violence. The partition itself was born out of heightened misgivings over the security 
and status of Muslims in a Hindu-majority India, setting the stage for strong Islamic 
overtones to alter the course of Pakistan’s institutional development,6 over the decades 
to come.  
From the onset of independence, Pakistan was faced with its most compelling and 
enduring territorial dispute with its larger neighbour India; over the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. The dispute remains unresolved to date and has been a continuing cause for 
regional militarization. This has manifested in, among countless skirmishes and tense 
border deployments, three wars between the two countries. The legacy of these conflicts 
includes the securitized focus of regional and international relations. Furthermore, it has 
placed emphasis on building and maintaining a large security apparatus to ward off any 
threats, both real and perceived. Bokhari (2011) argues that the experience of partition 
                                                          
6 Even though the founding leaders of the country, particularly Mohammad Ali Jinnah were committed to 
a secular state 
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heavily influenced the conceptualization of the state; emphasizing Islam and eventually 
allowing the Army to operationalize “jihad” to motivate war against India.  
Over decades, the Pakistani state has struggled to find the rightful place of Islam in 
national life; whether it should be a cultural unifier or source of theocratic order, a matter 
of citizen’s private faith or the primary marker of the state, a monolith with a strict 
interpretation or one that incorporates multiple traditions in its fold. The sufficiency of 
Islam in defining a national identity has been challenged, most visibly during the 1971 
India-Pakistan war which led to the creation of Bangladesh. Islam by itself had proven 
unable to forge a national character, one that would override the cleavages of ethno-
linguistic identity. As tensions between East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and West (present-
day) Pakistan grew, India intervened militarily in support of Bangladeshi freedom 
fighters. The victory of Indian forces led to the independence of Bangladesh. The Indian 
intervention in Bangladesh, however, only increased Pakistan’s focus on the threat of 
external aggression, at the cost of emerging domestic cleavages. This implied a relative 
inability to tackle home-grown and civil war situations viz. confrontations on the border 
(Jones and Fair, 2010).   
Pakistan’s alternating trysts with fledgling democracy and military dictatorship since its 
creation further entrenched an external security focus, one that subsequent democratic 
administrations have struggled to fully shake off. The period of Zia-ul-Haq’s military 
dictatorship in the 1980s coincided with the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan. This 
development in the peak of the Cold War perplexed and agitated the US, which 
responded by seeking to arm rebel fighters of the Afghan Mujahideen (including Osama 
bin Laden), through active support and involvement of Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq’s military 
regime in neighbouring Pakistan found this a timely and favourable lease of life to 
simultaneously obtain international legitimacy, negotiate aid and financial support for 
both military and civilian purposes, as well as extend influence over Afghanistan and 
ingratiate itself with the US as a means of achieving “strategic depth” in the region to 
thwart any attempts by India at military adventurism (Jones and Fair, 2010; Gul, 2010). 
Within Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq undertook policies that curtailed individual freedoms, 
suppressed dissent and encouraged the influence of Islamist groups on matters of 
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jurisprudence, education and public religiosity. By pandering to such groups Zia-ul-Haq 
achieved their allegiance to bolster the legitimacy of his reign, and also attempted to 
forge an Islamist national identity.  These calibrations effected a definite turn in 
Pakistan’s political trajectory towards a distinct iteration of an Islamic state and fortified 
the entrenchment of religious groups and their ideology in the establishment. The war 
in Afghanistan also put strain on Pakistan’s economy as the country hosted over 3 
million Afghan refugees and also saw the proliferation of the illegal arms and narcotic 
drugs economy (Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2011).  Subsequent democratic governments in 
the 1990s (often short-lived due to political manipulations of the security establishment) 
were unable to fully undo the influence of extremist and security-centric paradigms, and 
often found their authority circumscribed by the military. Indeed, they also felt the need 
to demonstrate their own commitment to the priorities of strategic depth and the support 
for some degree of the Islamic character of the state in order not to fully antagonize the 
recently overthrown and covertly powerful military. This extended to supporting the 
establishment’s designs to install the Taliban government in Afghanistan in the 1990s 
and to supporting certain jihadi groups (Fair, 2011). The strategy was driven by 
Pakistan’s strong desire to install a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul, despite the Taliban’s 
promotion of terrorism and the growth of arms and ammunition which was a direct 
fallout of the anti-Soviet War in Afghanistan during the 1980s.  
All along, the persisting intractability of the Kashmir dispute, despite diplomatic 
engagement on the one hand, and outright war on other occasions, led Pakistan to 
encourage and support Kashmiri separatists, through both open and covert means, 
including the incubation of militant training camps on Pakistani soil. Pakistan’s status 
as a nuclear power, pursued and achieved determinedly in the 1970s, emboldened it to 
pursue such “asymmetric warfare” as it was confident of no major military retaliation 
(Jones and Fair, 2010; Rashid, 2012). The patronisation of non-state armed actors to 
further foreign policy objectives, in the case of Kashmiri militants, as well as the 
Mujahideen (religious fighters – who would go on to become the Taliban) to fight the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, along with the growing strength and 
influence of Islamists at home would set the stage for Pakistan’s most enduring and 
deadly confrontation within. The concatenation of certain political events, both local and 
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global, would soon be reflected in the Pakistani state’s greatest battle to assert its writ, 
in response to the actions of groups that it once spawned.  
2.2.2 Multiple dimensions of violent conflict in Pakistan 
While the focus of contemporary analyses of conflict, both academic and otherwise, in 
Pakistan tends to be on militant and terrorist violence (justifiably, given its scale and 
death toll, as will be shown later on in this chapter), it is important to bear that there 
have been several motivations and forms of political violence in Pakistan over the last 
many decades.  
Among the most enduring intra-state conflicts in Pakistan is the prolonged insurgency 
in the vast and restive province of Balochistan. Led initially by traditional tribal leaders 
(sardars), the movement is increasingly represented by the middle class (Grare, 2013). In 
the 1970s the insurgency was sought to be crushed by the use of brute force by the Army 
under the democratically elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. More recently, the 
years under the dictatorship of General Musharraf in the 2000s saw the tactics change to 
targeted killings and forced “disappearances” of key leaders and insurgents, many of 
whom now emerged from educated middle-class backgrounds.  The economic, political 
and cultural subjugation of the Baloch people within the Pakistani mainstream, 
particularly the unfairness in the appropriation of mineral and other resources by the 
non-Baloch is critical in fuelling the sense of alienation, and in garnering support for the 
insurgency. Many Baloch separatist/ insurgent groups adopt violent means of protest 
and agitation, which forms part of a cycle of violence between the Pakistani state/ 
military and several Baloch nationalist groups.  
Sectarian violence has been a growing phenomenon in Pakistan. In the 1980s, following 
the Iranian Revolution, sectarian violence was conflated with a peasant-led class struggle 
as groups such as the (now banned) Sipah-e-Sahba that mobilized the vast Sunni Muslim 
peasantry to revolt against the few but wealthy Shi’a landlords. The encouragement of 
radical Sunni Muslim groups by Zia ul Haq (Jones and Fair, 2010; Zaman, 1998) led to a 
deepening of the sectarian conflict as Shi’a groups began to retaliate violently. In recent 
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years targeted attacks on Shi’as have intensified, particularly in larger cities including 
Karachi, Quetta and Lahore.  
Another important group that is often subject to identity-based violence is the Ahmadiya 
community. While the community consider themselves Muslims, they were officially 
deemed to be non-Muslim by Prime Minister Bhutto’s government in the 1970s, owing 
to certain beliefs that are deemed to be antithetical to Islam by many Shi’a and Sunni 
groups. Recent years have also witnessed an escalation in violence against religious 
minorities including Christians and Hindus, in forms such as targeted killings, 
abductions and allegations of acts of blasphemy.7 
The bustling urban centre of Karachi, Pakistan’s largest and most cosmopolitan city has 
had steady and sustained exposure to violence since the 1980s. Starting with a phase of 
high antagonism between the Urdu-speaking Mohajir community that had migrated 
from India and Sindhi, Punjabi and Pashtun ethnic groups (among several others), the 
city also bore the brunt of inter-gang violence over the control of resources in the 
sprawling metropolis, as well as the stranglehold of a land mafia. In more recent years 
the vast influx of the Pashtun population from Afghanistan, border areas in the FATA 
and several districts of KPK in the North-West, owing to violence and insecurity in and 
near Afghanistan has further complicated the ethnic make-up of the city and has posed 
several challenges to the ability of the state to assert control and check the regrouping of 
violent elements. More generally, Nawaz (2011) draws attention to Pakistan’s 
burgeoning cities where crime and bad governance are likely to be very serious 
challenges in the years to come.  
2.2.3 9/11, “War on Terror” and their violent fallout in Pakistan  
The post-9/11 period in Pakistan has witnessed a spurt in militant violence, spreading 
from Afghanistan to well within the geographical boundaries of Pakistan. Yusuf (2014) 
divides this time period into two distinct phases: 2002 – 2007, and post-2007. This 
distinction is made on the basis of a sharp difference in the scale and degree of 
permeation of violence in the country, the attitude of the Pakistani state and the resultant 
                                                          
7 Which has become a very controversial and sensitive subject in recent years 
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strategy for fighting militants before and after 2007. Below, I discuss the main features 
of the form and trajectory of militant violence and the state’s response over these two 
time periods.  
2.2.3.1 Phase I: 2002 – 2007   
The 9/11 terror attacks on the US and the ensuing “War on Terror” to dismantle the 
terrorist architecture of the Al Qaeda, centred in Afghanistan had a direct and lasting 
impact on Pakistan. First, Pakistan’s (then) newly installed military dictatorship under 
General Musharraf leveraged the country’s geo-strategic advantage to further US 
military interests in the region by allying with the US-led War. In doing so, it abandoned 
the Taliban regime and allowed the US the use of its air bases and land routes for troop 
deployment, in exchange for greater military aid and the tacit conferment of legitimacy 
on the military rule. The fallout of the war in Afghanistan was enormous; Afghan 
refugees, in the millions, entered Pakistan through the highly porous international 
border and settled all across the country, from the adjoining and culturally 
indistinguishable areas of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) to the bustling 
southern port city of Karachi. This represented a formidable humanitarian crisis at the 
outset which placed a strain on existing resources and led to overcrowding in particular 
settlements.  
The porousness of the border also facilitated the escape and regrouping of militant 
elements in Afghanistan in areas such as Waziristan and adjoining agencies in the FATA 
(Brown and Rassler, 2012; Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2011). Pakistan’s support to the US in 
tackling such groups, particularly the Taliban, viewed by many as a betrayal of the 
regime in Afghanistan made it a target of attacks itself. Assassination attempts on the 
President and Chief Executive, General Musharraf were among the first and most 
audacious attacks on the Pakistani establishment. Their regrouping manifested in acts 
not only against the symbols of the Pakistani state, but increasingly local populations 
too, in the form of strict enforcement of Wahabi8 Islam  through what Constable (2011) 
                                                          
8 A sect of Sunni Islam drawing from the interpretations of Islam offered by Mohammed ibn Abd al-
Wahhab of Saudi Arabia in the 1700s, and his adherents. Wahhabism emphasises an ultra-conservative 
and puritanical practice of Islam.  
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terms their “reign of terror”  - the  banning of music, attacks on girls’ schools, 
enforcement of other censures, as well as presiding over an extraction economy. In 
return locally powerful militant groups such as the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-
Muhammadi (TNSM) provided quick and speedy resolution of disputes including the 
enforcements of punishments in accordance with provisions of Sharia law as well as in 
keeping with customary tribal law, and also incubated a terrorist economy through 
poppy cultivation fiefdoms and trade with Afghanistan, often in banned items ranging 
from opium to illegal weapons and ammunition. As the activity spread well beyond the 
borders into the Pakistani heartland, insecurity and the tightening grip of extremism 
were all too palpable even in the hitherto insular and prosperous urban centres.  
While the strength and violent activity of many such militant groups increased 
dramatically after 9/11 and the War on Terror, it is important to note that the political 
ideology that several of these groups espouse is often much older. These groups draw 
inspiration from several scholars and political activists including the medieval scholar 
and theologian Ibn Taymiyyah (1263 – 1328),9 Jamaludin al-Afghani (1838/9 – 1897),10 the 
Egyptian political activist, Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 1966),11 and the South Asian scholar and 
Islamist Activist Maulana Abul A’la Mawdudi (1903 – 1979).12 Jalal (2009) notes that 
‘Taymiyya, Mawdudi and Qutb are considered the intellectual forbears of “Muslim 
fundamentalism”.’ 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror therefore does not represent 
the emergence of any new political ideology/ies, rather is a historical event that may well 
have brought about their strongest and most visible manifestation in Pakistan. Locally, 
the acceptance for such ideological groups and their vision of an Islamic state among 
several sections of the population stemmed also from the successive failures of the 
Pakistani state and society in spheres of criminal justice, law and order, and economic 
and social justice.  
                                                          
9 who propagated jihad against the (non-Muslim) Mongol invaders of the Mamluk sultanate in present-
day Turkey, and a return to Sunni Islam (and whose teachings also had a profound impact on Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab, progenitor of Wahhabi Islam) 
10 Led an anticolonial movement and advocated pan-Islamic unity 
11 He rejected western thought and society and the idea of the secular Western state, and instead 
advocated for violently fighting Western forces to establish an Islamic state. 
12 Mawdudi stressed the return to Sunni Islam, strict adherence to Sharia and opposed the secular state 
and western democracy (Nasr, 1996).  
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In the 2002-07 period, the Pakistan state’s strategy towards militancy was a “mix of 
military action, peace deals, and relative neglect” (Yusuf, 2014). As an ally of the US in 
the War on Terror, Pakistan went after Al-Qaeda operatives and Arab and Central Asian 
militants closer to the Afghan border, but not the Afghan Taliban and various Pakistani 
extremist groups. The belief was that these groups would pose no major threats to 
mainland Pakistan and could be controlled by the Pakistan Army. The state did not 
realise the full extent of the penetration of extremist groups within Pakistan, and their 
ability to function independently, and even against the state (Yusuf, 2011). Where it did 
act against mostly foreign militants, in the North-West of the country, it often lacked 
capacity to fight against the gradually coalescing groups. In other instances the state 
sought peace deals with various militant groups across parts of the FATA. These 
militants groups used such peace deals to build their own capabilities to challenge and 
subvert the writ of the state in the future. While the relative levels of violence in this 
period were lower than in the years to come, the counter-militancy strategy was 
criticised for failing because of “an approach alternating between excessive force and 
appeasement” (ICG, 2006).  
2.2.3.2 Phase II: post-2007 
The gradual emergence of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in the heart of the national capital 
Islamabad as the hub of terrorist activity, including the amassing of weapons, 
recruitment and indoctrination of fundamentally motivated foot soldiers, and the 
printing and promotion of literature espousing extremist and violent ideology was an 
alarming development that severely embarrassed, if not completely threatened, the 
image of the military regime as able and committed to fighting terrorism. Owing to 
international, as well as domestic pressure from some quarters, as much as out of an 
instinct for assertiveness and self-preservation, General Musharraf ordered a military 
operation against the mosque-cum-seminary in August 2007. The bloody operation left 
scores killed (including many civilians) and many others captured, and achieved a 
modicum of sanitization of the premises of the terrorist blot that they had come to 
embody. Strategically though, the operation proved a disaster as it led to a sympathetic 
undercurrent for the victims and disdain for the regime that had, after all, ordered an 
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attack on a mosque. Indignation was particularly rife in Chitral and Swat districts where 
students of the seminary came from.  
Aside from demonstrating the regime’s ruthlessness and limited options, the move led 
to the unification of the disparate terrorist outfits under the umbrella of the Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) against the common enemy, which the US-supported Pakistani 
government had now come to symbolize. Several of these groups were in control of vast 
areas in the North West and constituted what Jones and Fair (2010) term an “archipelago 
of microemirates”, loosely united under a type of “Al Qaedaism” where the terrorist 
outfit provided an inspirational template to motley groups acting in its name (Burke, 
2004). The TTP under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud would go on to confront 
Pakistan in its bloodiest military campaigns across large swathes of KPK, FATA over 
which they held sway, as well as cities including Islamabad, Lahore and Peshawar where 
they launched daring attacks on state and civilian targets alike. Unlike conventional 
warfare which the Army is used to, this confrontation involved guerrilla fighting in the 
highlands where the TTP enjoyed a natural advantage. Table 1 below lists the main 
terrorist groups operating in Pakistan during this time and provides an overview of their 
objectives, tactics and areas of operation.  
Table 1. Major Terrorist Organisations in Pakistan in 2007 
Terrorist Group Aim/ Objective Main Target Year 
Created 
Areas of 
Operation 
Ansar-ul-Islam Enforcing Deobandi 
Islamic code but 
distinct from LI, 
sectarian 
Lashkar-e-
Islam militias 
2006 Khyber 
Agency 
Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-
Islami (HuJI) (also 
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen 
al Almi) 
Waging war against 
all non-Islamic states 
Govt. targets 
in Pakistan, 
Central Asia; 
armed forces 
in India 
Unclear, 
during 
Soviet-
Afghan 
War  
Trans-
national: 
Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, 
Chechnya, 
Uzbekistan, 
Xinjiang 
China 
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Jaish-e-Muhammad 
(JeM) 
Liberation of Kashmir 
from Indian rule, ruin 
of US/ India 
High profile 
Indian state 
symbols 
2001 Jammu and 
Kashmir, 
Indian cities 
Jundullah (Army of 
God) 
Opposing US-led War 
on Terror, targeting 
non-Muslim 
occupation of land 
Pak Army and 
government 
establishments 
2002 Karachi, 
Balochistan, 
parts of FATA 
Lashkar-e-Islam 
(Mangal Bagh group/ 
Tanzeem) 
Enforcing strict 
Deobandi Islamic 
code  
Barelvi 
adherents, 
landlord class 
NA  Khyber 
Agency 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 
(LeJ) 
Establishing a Sunni 
Islamic State in 
Pakistan 
Shi’a leaders 
and civilians 
in Pakistan 
1996 Across 
Pakistan 
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba 
(LeT) (renamed 
Jamaat-ud-Daawa – 
JuD in 2003) 
Liberation of Kashmir 
from Indian rule 
Indian 
establishments 
(army and 
civilian) 
1987 Kashmir, 
major Indian 
cities (based in 
Muridke) 
Muqami Tehrik-e-
Taliban 
Resisting NATO/ US 
troops in Afghanistan, 
Pak Army if attacked 
NATO/ US 
Forces and 
Pak Army 
Allies 
2008 North and 
South 
Waziristan, 
border regions 
in 
Afghanistan  
Sipah-e-Muhammad 
Pakistan (SMP) 
Protecting Shi’as from 
attacks by Sunni 
terrorists, retaliatory 
attacks, Consolidating 
Shi’a majority areas 
Sunni Islamist 
leaders, clerics 
and 
congregations 
1993-94 Jhang, 
eventually 
across 
Pakistan 
Sunni Tehrik Attacking Deobandi 
outfits and 
establishing Ahl-e-
Sunnat order 
SSP and LeT 
cadres, 
leadership 
1990 Karachi, other 
cities in Sindh 
Tanzeem Amar Bil 
Maarouf Wa Nahi 
Munkar (Organisation 
for the Promotion of 
Virtue and Prevention 
of Vice) 
Implement strict 
social code based on 
Salafi Islam 
Local 
populations, 
NATO troops 
2003 Khyber 
Agency 
Tehrik-e-Islami 
Lashkar-e-
Muhammadi (TILM) 
Opposing US-led War 
on Terror, 
establishing Islamic 
state 
Civilian 
targets in 
Pakistani cities 
2002 Karachi, 
Lahore,  
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Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-
Shariat-e-Muhammadi 
(TNSM) 
Establishing Islamic 
State based on 
Wahabi Islam 
Local 
populations, 
NATO troops 
1992 Swat, 
Malakand 
Source: Gunaratna and Iqbal (2011) 
The years following the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) operation saw an escalation in terrorist 
attacks on the one hand, and counter-terrorism/ counter-insurgency by state forces on 
the other. In particular, the areas of Swat and Malakand in KPK and all the constituent 
agencies of the FATA region emerged as the battlegrounds of armed struggle, leading to 
a protracted Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) crisis in many areas. In other areas, 
particularly in the KPK, that were not as intensely embroiled in the conflagration, the 
security situation remained uneasy and the influence of terrorist groups, in terms of 
monopolizing justice and security provision, economic extraction and the articulation 
and implementation of a fundamentalist diatribe was all too clear. In the larger cities, 
bomb blasts, suicide bombing, targeted killings, and kidnappings/ abductions became a 
reality of life leading to perilous effects on social and economic life. Through all the 
turmoil, a major political change was effected after the National elections in 2008 (the 
run-up to which saw the assassination of the former and only woman Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto in the last days of 2007, arguably Pakistan’s most popular democratic 
leader at the time) which saw the victory of Bhutto’s Pakistan’s People’s Party led by her 
widower, Asif Ali Zardari.  
The Pakistani government under both the military regime of General Musharraf and 
after the 2008 elections, the elected Pakistan People’s Party government led a long-drawn 
military campaign against terrorist forces across the country through focused military 
operations in Swat, Malakand, Bajaur, Kurram and Orakzai areas. North and South 
Waziristan, followed by their neighbouring semi-autonomous agencies in FATA, posed 
the greatest danger to the War on Terror as this is where Beitullah Mehsud, the leader of 
the TTP, was believed to be hiding, and was effectively the headquarters of the TTP. 
Following the stand-off between the militants and the Army during the Red Mosque 
operation, it became clear that the groups of militants that had coalesced under the TTP 
were unwilling to negotiate with the government, leaving little option other than a 
military confrontation.  
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The change in attitude towards militancy, and counterterrorism operations on part of 
the state in the period after 2007 is due to a number of reasons. First, by this time, the 
hitherto ignored militant groups had by now acquired, and begun asserting power and 
capability to take on the Pakistani state, which in fact had nurtured the Mujahideen 
fighters (who eventually became the Taliban) during the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan in the 1980s. The change in attitude of the extremist groups and the state of 
Pakistan is encapsulated in the following quote by the then President: 
“Let’s be truthful to ourselves and make a candid admission of the realities. 
The terrorists of today were the heroes of yesteryears. But they began 
haunting Pakistan in the post-9/11 era.” 
Asif Ali Zardari, President of Pakistan, 07 July, 2009 
(Quoted in Mir, 2009, pp.5) 
 
Secondly, greater pressure from the US to “do more” and demonstrate greater will, also 
played a role in stepping up military action (Mir, 2009). Further, the failure of peace deals 
and a sharp increase in violent acts by militant groups within Pakistan and specifically 
on army and government targets brought the two sides in direct confrontation. This led 
to a strategic shift on part of Pakistani state and army; from selective confrontation and 
engagement, to taking on all the extremist groups that had attacked, or were able to 
attack Pakistani targets. The Pakistani Army launched multiple military campaigns 
against the TTP and its affiliates. Many of these operations have been intense, long-
drawn out and trying; for the armed actors on both sides, as well as civilians caught in 
the crossfire. Table 2 below lists the main military operations of the Pakistan Army 
against terrorist outfits in KPK and the FATA.13 
Table 2. Key Military Operations against Terrorist/ Militant Groups in North-West 
Pakistan 
Name of Operation Dates Areas 
Enduring Freedom 2001 – 2002  Along Af-Pak Border 
Al Mizan 2002 – 2006  South Waziristan 
                                                          
13 For more details on the goals and operational effectiveness of these operations see Jones and Fair (2010) 
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Kaloosha II 2004 South Waziristan 
Zalzala 2008 South Waziristan Agency 
Sher Dil 2008 – 2009  Bajaur Agency 
Rah-e-Haq 2007 – 2009  Swat district 
Sirat-e-Mustaqeem 2008 – 2009  Khyber Agency 
Eagle Swoop 2008 – 2009  Kohat district 
Mountain Scanner 2008 – 2009  North Waziristan Agency 
Mountain Sweep II 2008 – 2009  South Waziristan Agency 
Rah-e-Raast 2009 Swat district 
Rah-e-Nijat 2009 – 2010  South Waziristan Agency 
Zarb-e-Azb a 2014 –  North Waziristan 
Source: Jones and Fair, 2010; a: Thompson, 2014 
The on-ground capabilities of the Pakistani Army were relatively low in such terrain. All 
this led the US to pursue a strategy of counter-terrorism, particularly for high-value 
targets through a heightened use of military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)/ drones. 
While the number of people killed by drones was a fraction of the overall fatalities due 
to terrorism and counter-terrorism operations, its unprecedented use, especially through 
less-specifically targeted “signature strikes” became a rallying point, against the War on 
Terror that it had come to symbolise. As drone attacks entered the lexicon of Pakistani 
political and popular discourse, it raised several questions on the rules and methods of 
war, both within Pakistan and globally, polarising the debates within the security 
community, academia and the public. All along, the military campaign has not fully 
enjoyed the trust of the US as misgivings over the bona fides of elements within the 
military establishment, with regard to the support of militant groups persist. Cohen 
(2011) argues that the Army, and its all-powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) 
in fact views militant groups in operational terms, as instruments to achieve certain goals 
(Haqqani 2005). This chequered history traces its roots back to the Afghan Soviet war in 
the 1980s when allegations of the ISI appropriating CIA money meant for the Mujahideen 
did the rounds (Rashid, 2012) and resonates with more recent misapprehensions over 
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support to the regrouping Al Qaeda through the Haqqani Network (Brown and Rassler, 
2012; Gul, 2010). Many have reiterated such concerns in light of the discovery that Osama 
bin Laden had been living in a safe house in Abbottabad, a garrison town with a strong 
presence of the Pakistan Army, as well as allegations of deliberate inaction against the 
alleged perpetrators of the terror attacks in Mumbai, India in November 2008 (Fair, 2011; 
Murphy, 2013).   
2.3 Conflict Incidence and Location in Pakistan: Data Sources and Issues 
 
The previous sections have underscored the importance of studying the patterns and 
trends of the various forms of conflict. This section assesses the available public data 
sources on conflict incidence and location, and examines how comprehensive and 
comparable they are. In doing so an attempt is made to identify the challenges in 
constructing and using event datasets and the caution that they portend, for drawing 
conclusions and wider implications from such data. I begin with a critical analysis of the 
building blocks of datasets on conflict events.  
 
2.3.1 Defining Incidents of Violent Political Conflict 
 
In this chapter the focus of study is on violent political conflict, i.e. those acts of violence 
which are motivated and sustained by a need to assert, exercise or seize power over 
groups. This is distinct from criminal violence (which is not motivated by the aim to 
capture or assert power), as well as non-violent political agitation. Yet, there can be much 
variation in what is considered as violent political conflict. This invokes the role of 
discretion and judgment in classifying acts of violence as related to political conflict, and 
the need for codified, even if subjective,  means to assess violent incidents. Clearly such 
assessments must be informed by a deep understanding of the historical, sociological 
and political context of Pakistan. Equally, the markers for classification must be well-
defined; measurable; easily distinguishable from their conceptual opposites (for 
example a criterion that is clearly an indicator of violence, and not non-violence, for 
example); and follow an internal logic. The process of evolving guidelines for such 
categorisation is essentially an exercise in balancing an objective and comparable 
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estimation (of scale, size and location) with a discriminating understanding (of intent, 
consistency and pragmatism).  
 
Definitions of violent political conflict14 vary considerably across sources and user-
groups. The most influential definitions that dominate international legal practice, and 
to a large extent public discourse, are derived from the main sources of international 
law. These include international treaties and conventions, customary international law15 
- specifically the rules of jus cogens16, as well as, to a lesser extent, the general principles 
of law, and judicial decisions/ juristic writings. In order to illustrate the international-
legal approach to defining specific acts of violence, Box 1 presents the definition of acts 
of terrorism (as an example) in key international conventions and national statutes.  
 
Box 1. Definitions of Terrorism in International Conventions and National Laws 
The proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism of the United Nations 
General Assembly (as proposed in 2002, without prejudice to objections raised by several member 
states, particularly to distinguish the activities of armed forces and movements for self-
determination) defines a terrorist act as one that: 
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or 
government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the 
environment; or 
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of this article, 
resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act." 
 
The United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the International 
Financing of Terrorism defines terrorism as an act “intended to cause death or serious bodily 
injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation 
of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act." 
 
The UN Security Council Resolution No. 1566 defines terrorism as "criminal acts, including 
against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of 
                                                          
14 Hereafter conflict, or violent conflict will refer to violent political conflict, unless otherwise specified 
15 Customary international law is in turn informed by judicial practice by international organisations and by 
states 
16 A peremptory norm in customary international law is a principle that overrides other sources of 
international law, and includes in its ambit the prohibition of acts such as war, war crimes, torture, crimes 
against humanity and genocide.  
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hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within 
the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, 
are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, 
racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature," 
 
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Regional Convention on 
Suppression of Terrorism, Article I (e) defines terroristic [sic] acts to include “Murder, 
manslaughter, assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping, hostage-taking and offences relating to 
firearms, weapons, explosives and dangerous substances when used as a means to perpetrate 
indiscriminate violence involving death or serious bodily injury to persons or serious damage to 
property.”  
 
The United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as the use or threat of action where: 
(a) the action falls within subsection (2), (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the 
government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and (c) the use or threat is made 
for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. 
Further, an action falls within Subsection (2) if it: (a) involves serious violence against a person, 
(b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the 
person committing the action, (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a 
section of the public or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system 
 
The US National Counter Terrorism Center [based on the United States Code 22 USC § 
2656f(d)(2)] defines a terrorist act as one "premeditated; perpetrated by a sub-national or 
clandestine agent; politically motivated, potentially including religious, philosophical, or 
culturally symbolic motivations; violent; and perpetrated against a noncombatant target." 
 
 
As the examples above indicate, despite a general agreement over what constitutes acts 
of terrorism, the specific definitions vary across organisations. They may include or 
exclude certain acts or aspects of violence as necessary to qualify as terrorism. Similarly, 
databases that track and record conflict events do so based on implicit or explicit criteria 
that inform their event coding practices. These may be critical to bear in mind 
particularly when comparing estimates/ trends of conflict across data sources.  
 
2.3.2 Primary Data Sources 
 
This section assesses the main sources of conflict events in Pakistan pertaining to the 
years 2000 – 2010. I first present an overview of the features of these sources and then 
compare the broad estimates of conflict as defined and measured by each of them.  
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1. WITS: The Worldwide Incident Tracking System database of the US National 
Counterterrorism Center. The dataset tracks terrorist incidents between 2004 and 
2009 and includes data on the type of attack, and numbers of people killed, 
wounded and kidnapped. Geo-locators of the events are recorded down to the 
district level.  
2. BFRS: The BFRS Dataset, housed at the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project at 
Princeton University, is based on an extensive coding of all events of political 
violence reported in the “Dawn”, a leading newspaper of Pakistan, from 1988 to 
2010. The authors include a comprehensive codebook and methodology notes 
which indicates that the coding undertaken has been rather detailed, and 
includes data on groups behind the violence, motives/ motivation, numbers of 
people killed and wounded and geographic identifiers. The event-wise dataset is 
publicly available and aggregate figures and trends have been provided by the 
authors in a working paper (Shapiro et al., 2012).  
3. SATP: The South Asia Terrorism Portal, run and maintained by the Institute of 
Conflict Management, New Delhi compiles conflict event data through a daily 
scan of seven leading Pakistan newspapers. Data are available in narrative 
format since 2001. The narrative summary contains details of event site (traceable 
in most cases to the sub-district level), number of fatalities (by type of victim – 
civilian, military and militant) and people wounded, and the motivation for the 
attack. SATP apply definite criteria for including and narrating conflict events in 
their database but do not provide any tabulated versions of the events’ 
summaries.  
4. PIPS: The Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, tracks conflict events 
in the news media and through their own researchers in the field. Data are 
available since the year 2005 and include the number of fatalities (by type), 
motivation of attack, groups involved and geographic locators down to the 
district level.  
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5. ACLED: The Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset portal provide a list 
of conflict events in Pakistan relying mainly on news reports of international 
press agencies, chiefly the AFP, BBC and the CNN.  
 
Table 3 below, adapted from de Mesquita et al. (2013) compares the chief attributes of 
these datasets and their estimates of conflict incidence and impact.  
 
Table 3. Comparing Conflict Event Datasets, 2004 – 2008  
Attribute WITS BFRS SATP PIPS ACLED 
Total Incidents 3268 3686 -   
Total Killed 3823 4567 6991   
Includes non-terrorist 
violence? 
No Yes Yes  No 
Includes Geographical 
indicators? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lowest level of location 
data 
District - Sub-district District  
Methodology provided Yes Yes Yes* No No 
Source NCTC Dawn 
Newspaper 
Nine 
newspapers 
(incl. 
Dawn) 
Not 
clear 
Foreign 
Press 
Total time period 2004 to 
2009 
1988 to 
2010 
2001 
onwards 
2005  
onwards 
 
Status of victim 
indicated? 
No No Yes No No 
Groups identified No Yes Sometimes Yes No 
Source: de Mesquita et al. (2013), author’s assessments 
* Although the SATP does not provide the recording and coding methodology used by them on 
the portal’s website, it was made available to the author privately 
 
As table 3 above indicates, there is considerable variation in the estimates of the total 
number of incidents recorded as well as the total number of people across the datasets 
available. This partly results from the difference in definitions of conflict events used by 
the alternate sources, as well as the fact that their primary data sources vary. The spatial 
non-comparability of data due to differences in the lowest level at which conflict events 
are geo-coded proves another challenge. Such variations, though hardly unexpected 
given the difficulties in obtaining precise reporting of every violent act in Pakistan, is 
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non-trivial when generalising results from one data source without considering how 
sensitive they may be to changes in measurement/ definition/ location markers.  
 
On the positive side, the availability of alternate data sources can enable researchers to 
compare at least some trends and patterns in the manifestation of violence. On the other 
hand, differences in definitions chosen, recording and coding methodologies employed, 
primary sources used, geographical units identified and time periods considered make 
it exceedingly difficult to study very wide-ranging and alternate aspects of violence 
whilst retaining comparability across sources. All this means that the limitations of the 
existing data sources would invariably lead researchers to adopt a more restricted/ 
cruder operational measure of conflict than what would be ideal, based on a fuller 
academic understanding of the concepts of violence, has to be used.  
 
With the exception of the Worldwide Incidents Tracking Survey (WITS) dataset 
compiled by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that uses intelligence reports 
as the primary data source, available conflict event datasets in Pakistan rely on news 
media reports as their primary source of data. Identified news publications are 
continually monitored, and relevant conflict reporting is summarized and coded to 
record pre-determined details. This is broadly the methodology adopted by leading 
conflict event datasets on Pakistan, namely the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the Pakistan 
Institute of Peace Studies and the BFRS project of the International Growth Centre, 
London.  
 
The limitations of such sources need to be acknowledged. First, by its very nature, news 
reportage tends to pay more attention to larger and more severe forms of violence than 
lower intensity ones. For example it is much more likely that a lone incident of killing 
would receive greater media attention than periodic eruptions of violence where 
communities come to blows but violence does not result in fatalities. While the two levels 
of violence intensity may indeed show strong temporal and spatial correlation, by 
relying only on media sources we tend to focus more on acts of high intensity violence.  
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Another likely bias in reportage could arise from the proclivity of media agencies to 
report on incidents that occur in urban centres and well-connected areas. The reason for 
this bias need not only be because of a greater demand from readers of events closer to 
them, but also because media houses may have a weaker network of correspondents in 
more remote and isolated areas. It is only after violence reaches a certain level in isolated 
area in a particular conflict theatre that there may be a need for media groups to station 
permanent correspondents who report from near the conflict-affected areas. Then too, 
the ability to collect news may be somewhat limited resulting in under-reporting.  
 
Security risk can directly make accurate reportage more dangerous and therefore less 
likely than in other settings. Journalists face serious security threats from parties in a war 
which can deter access and continuity of coverage over the course of an unfolding war.  
 
Thirdly, news media often themselves rely on official press briefings (of the Inter 
Services Public Relations, the main Information office of the Army in Pakistan), or 
statements issued by spokespersons or representatives of the Taliban. Relying only on 
such sources may be problematic as they may for instance have the incentive to under-
report deaths of their own and claim higher killings of their adversaries. Journalists as 
such may have little opportunity to validate claims and numbers and conduct their own 
investigative operations in areas where violence is very high and journalists’ security is 
not easily assured.17 
 
Often the motives of violence are not clear. What may appear to be a terrorist attack on 
a girls’ school in an area dominated by a Shi’as may in fact be a sectarian attack meant 
specifically against the group, or it could be an attack motivated by an opposition to 
girls’ schooling. The motive for violence is problematic to disentangle as there is an 
inherent chance of confounding simultaneously existing constituents of people’s 
identities and also because violence can have multiple motives.  
                                                          
17 It is noteworthy that for the years 2008 – 2012 Pakistan has consistently been regarded as one of the most 
dangerous country for journalists – both national and foreign – in the World Press Freedom Review.  
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Finally the geographic location of conflict events is not always clear in media reports. 
Press reports often do not mention the names of villages/ sub-districts where events have 
occurred and there is often no way to trace these back. For example when landmine 
explosions take place on roads connecting two district capitals, news reports often 
mention only the name of the highway, and not where exactly the attack occurred. 
Consequently it would not be possible to determine which district the event occurred in.  
 
The remarks above provide the necessary reason for caution in using conflict event 
datasets and drawing conclusions from them. The fact remains that these are the best 
available sources of data on conflict events in the country. Despite the many 
shortcomings of using media reports as primary data, it must be noted that Pakistan has 
a high number of media agencies and that conflict reportage is considerable, and has 
been growing over the last decade. Further, given the low level of Information 
Technology penetration in rural areas and the absence of agencies that record and 
monitor direct reports of conflict from households using telephone/ internet connections, 
print media reports are likely to be the most broad-based and comprehensive source of 
events available.  
 
I choose to use the SATP dataset among all the datasets mentioned above for the analysis 
in this and subsequent chapters due to key advantages:  
i. Comprehensiveness and clarity of sources:  SATP collates reports from nine leading 
Pakistani newspapers – this approach relies on open source data and the veracity of 
SATP’s conflict event timelines can be immediately established by checking the conflict 
event summary in the SATP timeline against the original source of the news item online. 
This eliminates the scope of any systematic doctoring while going from independent 
news reports to documented conflict event summaries on the SATP website 
ii. Time Period covered: The SATP timeline for Pakistan begins in 2001 and continues 
to this date, which allows a meaningful compilation of conflict events and fatalities over 
a long time period and since conflict in Pakistan escalated following the 9/11 attacks and 
the US-led War on Terror.  
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iii. Consistency: The SATP have used a uniform and consistent approach in recording 
conflict events over the 2001-10 period, which enables making comparisons over time, 
as well as correctly aggregating the number of events of conflict and the number of 
people killed in attacks.  
iv. Precise geographical identifiers: SATP attempts to locate the most precisely 
available location where the particular conflict event occurred. This allows a higher 
majority of incidents to be located to the tehsil (sub-district) level than any other source 
v. Details of victims’ identities: To the extent possible, and as has been noted above  that 
this is not always accuarately possible, the SATP timeline attempts to provide  
disaggregated counts of fatalities in conflict across civilian, military and militant 
categories, for example. 
 
All these factors were key in selecting the dataset best suited for conducting disaggregate 
and sub-national level analysis of conflict.  
 
There may be a valid concern for neutrality given that the SATP is hosted at the Institute 
of Conflict Management, an India-based think tank which, to some minds, may have 
implications especially for reportage on the disputed territory of Kashmir. While I have 
been able to ascertain that the sources and methodology used by the SATP for recording 
violent incidents in Kashmir is the same as in the rest of Pakistan, for the current analysis, 
I expressly exclude all incidents in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit 
Baltistan (GB) provinces, restricting the analysis therefore to Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, 
KPK and FATA. For the rest of Pakistan, the concerns of the lack of neutrality are less 
serious18 especially as Pakistani newspapers are consulted, and conflict event summaries 
on the SATP timeline can immediately be matched and verified against the original news 
reports that form the source of the dataset. Secondly, in order to be sure of no systematic 
spatial and time-varying biases, a spatial and time correlation of district-wise fatality 
estimates between SATP and BFRS datasets19 was conducted.  
                                                          
18 An assessment shared by several country and subject experts with the author in discussions 
19 The two sources differ slightly in terms of the breadth of sources consulted and definitions used to 
include incidents; yet as subsequent sections will show, the broad trends of the BFRS data are reflected in 
the SATP 
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2.4 SATP Conflict Event Data: Definitions, Methodology and Analysis 
 
This chapter presents the first ever estimates of conflict incidence at and location at sub-
provincial levels using the South Asia Terrorism Portal conflict events timeline for 
Pakistan. The SATP conflict events timeline has been used as the main source of conflict 
data in a small but growing body of empirical work on spatially disaggregated conflict 
analysis in South Asia, particularly India (Tranchant et al., 2014; Eynde, 2011; Khanna 
and Zimmerman, 2014; Fetzer, 2014), but also including Nepal (Williams et al., 2012). Its 
use for Pakistan, however, has been more limited and only restricted to provide 
aggregate national-level statistics (such as Rakisits, 2012; Khan and Mussarat, 2014). 
 
The SATP define terrorism in broad terms, to include a broad range of acts of political 
violence that go beyond other, stricter definitions of terrorism employed by other 
sources, such as those listed in Box 1. Specifically, the SATP made available the following 
definition and explanation of the criteria they employ for recording conflict events: 
 
"Terrorism is an act or acts of criminal violence, or the sequence of actions 
leading to such an act or acts, which is/are intended to intimidate the public, 
coerce or unduly compel a Government or public authority to perform or 
abstain from performing any act; or to destabilize or destroy the 
fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a 
country; or to overawe any public functionary or Government agency." 
 
Further, they state that: “We [SATP] recognize various limitations in this 
definition, particularly in grey areas involving the increasing overlap 
between insurgency and terrorism. However, neither these difficulties, nor 
this definition itself, have any significant bearing on our database. Our data 
is compiled from multiple open sources, and while some effort at verification 
from local sources is exerted where conflicting reports on a particular 
incident appear, the casualty/fatality data overwhelmingly accepts the 
categorization - terrorist, civilian and security force - indicated in the various 
open sources on which we rely. There is no attempt to reconcile each listed 
incident with any consistent definition of terrorism. Further, we include 
security force and terrorist/militant fatalities in our database as well, on the 
grounds: 
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i.    That such data is of immense importance in trend analysis and 
assessment of the activities and operational potential of terrorist groups; 
ii.   Terrorism is not just the final act of criminal intimidatory violence alone; 
it is a complex and continuous chain of events leading up to the act of terror; 
and this chain includes, inter alia, the killing of security force personnel and 
other public functionaries.” 
 
While analysing the SATP conflict event timeline it was evident that the timeline 
recorded violence of several forms in Pakistan. As such, it is not restricted to recording 
conflict events pertaining only to militant and counter-militant violence involving the 
TTP and affiliate groups (which I go on to characterise as terrorist and counter-terrorist 
violence). The SATP definition of terrorism, and consequently their timeline records, are 
therefore broader than this more precise form of terrorist violence (limited to TTP 
affiliates and jihadi militants), and also distinctly includes events pertaining to sectarian, 
communal, ethnic, insurgent and tribal violence. I define each of these motivations of 
violence while classifying the conflict events in the SATP timelines under these 
categories and state the operational definition used for this in the following section.  
 
2.4.1 Methodology 
 
The SATP website does not clearly mention the methodology used to identify and then 
collate the event timeline, and this may be problematic for research quality. In order to 
be sure of the methodology employed, I personally contacted the Institute of Conflict 
Management, New Delhi to obtain details of the steps and procedures followed.  
 
The analysis in this chapter is based on an extensive coding and tabulation of the 
narrative report of conflict incidents recorded by the SATP and made publicly available 
on their website. Prior to this no known exercise to codify and tabulate this data has been 
undertaken and existing briefing reports/ summaries by the SATP team only provide 
aggregate(national), provincial and thematic (again at the national level) analysis of 
conflict trends. The SATP conducts a detailed media scanning exercise to build the 
conflict event timeline for Pakistan that is subsequently made available on their website 
www.satp.org. The conflict timeline was accessed on the website in August 2012. The 
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media monitoring conducted by SATP includes nine leading English language 
newspapers in Pakistan. These are:  
1. Daily Times 
2. Dawn 
3. The News 
4. The Express Tribune 
5. The Nation 
6. Pakistan Observer 
7. Frontier Post 
8. Pakistan Today 
9. Central Asia Online 
 
The SATP research team conduct a daily scan of news articles pertaining to violent 
conflict – defined by events involving fatalities or others of very serious nature20 (such 
as attacks on convoys of trucks to supply items to NATO forces) – in  these newspapers 
and triangulate details (of location, number of fatalities etc.) across the newspapers. They 
conduct checks with local affiliates in Pakistan and employ a defined decision rule to 
tackle cases with varying estimates and often report such variance within their timeline 
summaries as well. The narrative description provides details of the numbers of people 
killed (typically including a break-up to indicate civilian, military and militant/ 
insurgent fatalities), numbers wounded, geographical location as reported in the news 
item, and where available, the motivation for the attack and the main initiator. Based on 
the narrative summary, I developed my own criteria for assessing the motive of 
particular conflict events, and present these working definitions later in this section.  
 
The conflict timeline for the period under consideration is 01 January 2001 – 31 May 2010. 
Details recorded include the date and location of the attack, the profile of the dead, the 
motivation for the attack, event location to the lowest level possible, the initiator of the 
attack, and dummies to indicate drone strikes, suicide bombings and failed attacks. Once 
the data were entered, the geographical location of the conflict sites was reconfirmed 
                                                          
20 Significantly, it does not systematically record instances of kidnappings unless the hostage is killed 
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using the 2012 Pakistan Census Office classification of Provinces, Districts, tehsils (sub-
districts) and union councils/ villages. All tehsils and districts were located for incidents 
in Punjab and Sindh. In Balochistan tehsils could not be identified for 8 of 160 incidents 
that accounted for 3.43% of total fatalities. For KPK tehsils could not be identified for 110 
of 769 incidents, accounting for 17.83% of total fatalities. Table 4 below shows the status 
of district and tehsil identification in the conflict events under consideration. For a 
random selection of 105 of the total 1,051 incidents recorded, I conducted a back-check 
to ascertain accuracy in entry and minor changes were made to entries for two incidents. 
Estimates of conflict incidence and intensity were computed at the national, provincial 
and district levels. These are summarised in the following section. 
 
Table 4. Non-Identification of Districts and Tehsils, by Province 
  Incidents* Fatalities     
Province 
District Not 
Identified 
(%) 
Tehsil Not 
Identified 
(%) 
District 
Not 
Identified 
(%) 
Tehsil Not 
Identified 
(%) 
Total 
Incidents* 
Total 
Fatalities 
Balochistan 1 (0.63) 8 (5) 4 (0.39) 35 (3.43) 160 1,019 
KPK 7 (0.91) 110 (14.3) 65 (0.8) 1,443 (17.83) 769 8,095 
Punjab 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 66 1,055 
Sindh 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 56 495 
Total 8 (0.76) 118 (11.27) 69 (0.65) 1,478 1,051 10,664 
* Incidents only refer to those involving fatalities of one or more person(s) 
 
2.5 Results 
 
2.5.1 Aggregate Results 
 
I first analyse broad nationwide trends in conflict between 2001 and 2010. Table 5 below 
shows the break-up of the province-wise total number of fatalities due to conflict. This 
includes deaths of civilians, militants/ insurgents, security forces and police combined. 
These figures represented graphically in Fig. 1.  
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Table 5. Total fatalities due to Conflict in Pakistan: Jan 2001 – May 2010  
Year Balochistan KPK FATA Punjab Sindh TOTAL 
2001 0 0 0 18 1 19 
2002 5 6 4 25 35 75 
2003 67 0 14 20 13 114 
2004 78 0 34 86 64 262 
2005 61 12 31 14 9 127 
2006 204 112 198 0 66 580 
2007 137 714 1441 106 151 2,549 
2008 207 1987 3113 197 38 5,542 
2009 186 4637 4930 391 57 10,201 
2010* 74 627 2446 198 61 3,406 
TOTAL 1,019 8,095 12,211 1,055 495 22,875 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on South Asia Terrorism Portal conflict timeline for Pakistan 
 
Fig 1. Fatalities due to Conflict in Pakistan: Jan 2001 – May 2010 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on South Asia Terrorism Portal conflict timeline for Pakistan 
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The inter-province distribution of deaths due to violence is noteworthy. In initial years 
Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh account for the highest concentration of conflict-related 
deaths while the frontier areas of the FATA and KPK are noticeably peaceful. However 
after 2005, not only does the scale of deaths counted magnify, the regional patterns also 
seem to have been reversed. FATA and KPK account for the majority of deaths and also 
show the fastest growth of the body count among the provinces. The data confirm a 
plausible expectation of contagion of conflict into Pakistan through the Durand Line21 as 
the US-led war on terror in Afghanistan intensified and groups affiliated to the Taliban 
moved into Pakistan, regrouped and were buttressed by local groups in Pakistan who 
were opposed to the Pakistani government’s support to the US.  
 
It is clear from the table and graph above that there has been an astounding increase in 
the fatalities from conflict since the year 2006, in varying degrees across the provinces. 
The years preceding 2006 had relatively low levels of violence, and typically 
concentrated in urban centres. 2006 shows a massive jump which is accelerated in the 
following years. This finding is also reflected in work by Shapiro and Gulzar (2012) using 
the BFRS dataset. Fatalities from violence peak in the year 2009. The concentration of 
several military operations, described in Table 2, in 2009 perhaps indicates both the high 
number of fatalities in that year, as well as a slight dip thereafter as many of the 
operations ended successfully, even if at a huge cost to lives, by 2010. Fig. 2 below 
compares the trends in total fatalities over the period between the SATP and BFRS 
datasets. While the overall trend is similar in the two sources, the total numbers varies 
due to differences in both definitions of incidents to be included to measure fatalities, as 
well as the range of sources used.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 The Durand Line is a historic border created by the British during their colonization of India to separate 
India from Afghanistan. While the cartographic record of the Line has a long history, it has in fact always 
been a highly porous, and therefore nominal border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
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Fig 2. Fatalities due to Conflict in Pakistan 2001 –2010: BFRS and SATP data 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on South Asia Terrorism Portal conflict timeline for Pakistan, BFRS 
(2013) 
*SATP figures for 2010 are only until 31 May  
 
On the whole, the BFRS records 3299 more fatalities than the SATP for the entire period; 
the average district has 22.75 more fatalities than the SATP as per the definitions adopted 
and sources used. In terms of fatalities per 10,000 of population, the SATP dataset 
records 6.34 more fatalities per 10,000 of the population than the BFRS for the entire 
period. For the average district, the SATP estimate of fatalities/10,000 is 0.04 more than 
the BFRS estimate. Over the 2001-10 period Estimates of fatalities due to conflict are 
higher in the SATP dataset for FATA and KPK (by approx. 84 and 78 fatalities, 
respectively) compared to the BFRS. In contrast it appears that SATP considerably 
underestimates fatalities in Sindh (by about 132 fatalities). We now examine the profile 
of the dead across six distinct categories: civilians, security forces, police, militants/ 
terrorists, militia fighters and insurgents. Table 6 below provides the percentage 
distribution of fatalities by these categories over the years 2001-2010.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
BFRS SATP
53 
 
Table 6. Percentage Distribution of Fatalities Due to Conflict, by type of victim 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 All  
Civilians 94.7 77.3 74.6 82.4 84.3 37.4 41 20.1 16.9 23.2 23.5 
Security 
Forces 
0 9.3 2.6 13.7 3.9 22.1 12.3 5.4 6.2 4.1 6.9 
Police 0 4 11.4 1.5 0 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.6 
Private 
Militia* 
0 0 0 0 7.1 2.1 2.4 3.5 1.1 0.5 1.7 
Militants/ 
Terrorists 
0 8 11.4 2.3 1.6 19.8 34.5 60.2 66.7 69.2 59.1 
Insurgents 0 1.3 0 0 0 16.2 0.2 0 0 0 0.4 
Unknown 5.3 0 0 0 3.1 0 7.4 9.1 7.6 1.9 6.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on South Asia Terrorism Portal conflict timeline for Pakistan 
*locally known as lashkar 
 
We observe that over the years as the scale of violence has gone up dramatically, the 
share of civilian fatalities has reduced. For all the years combined, the average 
percentage of civilian deaths in total deaths in conflict is 23.5%. Security forces accounted 
for high proportion of fatalities in 2006 and 2007 but this share has been much lower in 
more recent years. On the other hand, the share of militants/ terrorists in the body count 
has been increasing. Insurgents, members of lashkars (private militias) and police account 
for a very small share in total killings.  
 
2.5.2 Conflict Incidence by Motivation  
 
As discussed earlier in this paper, there are several on-going conflicts in Pakistan that 
manifest in acts of violence and killings. These include terrorist/ militant violence, 
sectarian strife, and insurgency/ separatism. I identified and recorded the motivation for 
all the acts of violence in the SATP conflict event timeline based on rough decision rules 
and operational definitions for the alternate motivations of violence. The classification is 
therefore based on my assessment of the narrative description of conflict events based 
on the broad definitions stated below, and is not an artefact of the SATP timeline itself. 
The alternate motivations for political violence in Pakistan considered in the subsequent 
analysis include: 
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i. Terrorist/ counter-Terrorist: This refers to the use of force by militant groups 
affiliated to the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban/ TTP, other (non-sectarian) jihadi 
groups, and acts of confrontation and military operations by the security forces 
(including the Army and the Frontier Corps and the police) against such groups, 
or (in very few cases) the targeting of such militant groups by para-military 
groups led by tribal leaders.  
ii. Communal: This refers to clashes between religious communities, particularly to 
attacks on Christians, Hindus and Ahmadiyas. 
iii. Sectarian: This refers to violence between Shia and Sunni groups, or any targeting 
of groups/ individuals primarily because of their sectarian identity. 
iv. Insurgent: While some affiliate groups of the TTP claim to be freedom fighters 
and to overthrow the Pakistani state, in this classification, insurgency is used to 
refer exclusively to the Balochistan insurgency, which seeks to break Balochistan 
away from Pakistan and which often takes on violent forms in terms of attacks 
on the Pakistani state and institutions, as well as involves attacks by the Pakistani 
Army on rebels to crush the insurgency.  
v. Tribal Rivalry: This refers to instances of fighting between different tribal groups 
for political power, or due to local disputes, but expressly not involving any 
terror groups, or any sectarian motive.  
vi. Ethnic: This refers to violence between individuals/ groups along ethnic lines 
 
Table 7 below examines the main motivations for violence across the provinces to locate 
concentrations/ dispersions in the types of conflict that afflict particular provinces.  
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Table 7. Fatalities in Conflict by Motivation of Incident and Province: Jan 2001 – May 
2010 
Motivation Balochistan KPK FATA Punjab Sindh Total % 
Counter/Terrorist 461 7,767 11,758 783 363 21,132 92.38 
Communal 0 0 2 45 0 47 0.21 
Sectarian 189 278 425 223 132 1,247 5.45 
Insurgent 335 0 0 0 0 335 1.46 
Tribal Rivalry 0 48 8 0 0 56 0.24 
Ethnic 8 0 0 0 0 8 0.03 
Unknown 26 2 18 4 0 50 0.22 
Total 1,019 8,095 12,211 1,055 495 22,875 
 
% Counter/Terrorist  45.24 95.95 96.29 74.22 73.33 92.38 
% Sectarian 18.55 3.43 3.48 21.14 26.67 5.45 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on South Asia Terrorism Portal conflict timeline for Pakistan 
 
Table 7 reveals dispersions in the motivations underlying conflict-related fatalities 
across provinces in Pakistan. First, we observe that violence by and against militants/ 
terrorists is responsible for the greatest share of deaths across all provinces. The extent 
of predominance, however, ranges from about 45% in Balochistan to as high as a little 
over 96% in the FATA. While the conflict in KPK and FATA stems mainly due to the 
prevailing terrorism and militancy, in Balochistan we observe that sectarianism and 
insurgency are also compelling motivations underlying conflict-related deaths.  
 
However as FATA and KPK account for the highest levels of violence in the country, the 
dominance of counter/terrorist violence in Pakistan is absolutely clear; 92.38% of all 
conflict-related fatalities in Pakistan are due to terrorist violence and counter-terrorism 
operations.  The next highest category is that of sectarian violence which claimed 5.45% 
of the lives lost to conflict over the period under consideration. Sectarian conflict is more 
important in the comparatively more peaceful provinces of Punjab and Sindh.  
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I now turn attention to the specific case of civilian deaths in conflict events to examine 
which types of violent conflict affect the common population (and not everyone 
including armed groups), and if this varies across the provinces. 
 
Table 8. Civilian Fatalities in Conflict by Motivation of Incident and Province: Jan 2001 – 
May 2010 
Motivation Balochistan KPK FATA Punjab Sindh Total % 
Counter/Terrorist 238 1892 1168 523 312 4,133 76.76 
Communal 0 0 0 44 0 44 0.82 
Sectarian 168 252 395 192 125 1,132 21.03 
Insurgent 47 0 0 0 0 47 0.87 
Tribal Rivalry 0 0 3 0 0 3 0.06 
Ethnic 8 0 0 0 0 8 0.15 
Unknown 10 0 7 0 0 17 0.32 
Total 471 2,144 1,573 759 437 5,384 
 
% Counter/Terrorist  50.53 88.25 74.25 68.91 71.40 76.76 
% Sectarian 35.67 11.75 25.11 25.30 28.60 21.03 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on South Asia Terrorism Portal conflict timeline for Pakistan 
 
Table 8 above indicates a slightly different pattern of vulnerability to death from 
alternate types of conflict for civilian populations, compared to totals including armed 
groups22. Most visibly, while terrorist/counter-terrorist acts continues to be the highest 
claimant of civilian lives (accounting for almost 77% of all civilian deaths due to conflict, 
nationally), sectarian violence plays a larger role than it does in total killings. About 21% 
of civilian deaths were due to sectarian violence. This was a particularly high-proportion 
claimant of civilian lives in Balochistan. Other types of conflict claim very small shares 
of civilian fatalities across the provinces, with the exception of insurgent violence in 
Balochistan which was responsible for about 10% of civilian deaths caused by violence 
in the province.  
                                                          
22 This includes militants, security forces, police, insurgents and militia 
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2.5.3 District and tehsil-level conflict incidence 
 
I measure conflict exposure at the district level as the total number of conflict-related 
fatalities per 10,000 of the population, by the SATP and BFRS datasets respectively. This 
is based on an extensive exercise of mapping conflict incidence at the district (agency) 
level for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the four major provinces 
of Pakistan: KPK, Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. Note that the two sources use different 
time periods and slightly different definitions to count “total fatalities”. District-wise 
population figures are based on the 1998 census estimates, the latest available official 
census figures for Pakistan. The Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient between the total 
fatalities per 10,000 of the population at the district level between the SATP and BFRS 
data sources was calculated to be +0.96, which shows a very strong positive association 
(The corresponding coefficient for total fatalities by district was +0.91, which is also 
considerably high). As the BFRS dataset does not extensively identify tehsils for the 
violent conflict events recorded, and owing to the high number of fatalities and incidents 
in the SATP dataset for which the tehsil cannot be identified, it is not possible to provide 
similar estimates of correlation at the tehsil level. However, in later chapters (3 – 5), I 
measure conflict incidence at the tehsil level as the natural log of 1 + n, the total fatalities 
due to conflict in the tehsil, according to the SATP. All the primary sampling units in the 
household survey dataset used in Chapters 3 – 5 lie in districts where tehsils were 
identified for all incidents. This ensures that the tehsil-level measure of conflict exposure 
is not affected by the non-identification issue.  
 
Based on the district-level exposure of conflict (measured as the fatalities due to conflict, 
per 10,000 of population), I represent the concentration and spread of violence in 
Pakistan over the period 2001 – 10. Maps 1 and 2 below compare the district-wise 
incidence of fatalities due to conflict according to the SATP and BFRS datasets, 
respectively.  
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Map 1. District-wise Total fatalities per 10,000 of population due to Conflict in Pakistan: 
Jan 2001 – May 2010: SATP  
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using SATP data 
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Map 2. District-wise Total fatalities per 10,000 of population due to Conflict in Pakistan: 
Jan 2001 – May 2010: BFRS  
 
Source: Author’s calculations using SATP data 
 
I now depict the year-wise (and cumulative)Total number of people Killed per 10,000 of 
(1998) population in Political Violence in Pakistan from 2001 –  May 2010 in Maps 3 – 12, 
based on data from the SATP conflict event timeline. 
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Map 3. 2001 
Map 4. 2001 - 02 
Map 5. 2001-03 Map 6. 2001-04 
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Map 7. 2001-05 Map 8. 2001-06 
Map 10. 2001-08 Map 9. 2001-07 
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I now depict the year-wise (and cumulative) Total number of Civilians, and Women and 
Children Killed per 10,000 of (1998) population in Political Violence in Pakistan from 
2001 –  May 2010 in Maps 13 and 14, respectively, based on data from the SATP conflict 
event timeline. 
 
 
Map 11. 2001-09 Map 12. 2001-10 
Map 13. 
Civilian 
Fatalities 
2001-10 
Map 14. 
Women/ 
Children 
Fatalities 
2001-10 
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I now depict the district-wise intensity of Combatants, including, both, Security Forces 
(Army, Frontier Corps and Police), and Armed non-State Actors (militants and 
insurgents) Killed per killed between 2001 – May 2010 in Maps 15 and 16, respectively.  
  
Finally, Map 17 below shows the number of people killed in sectarian violence per 10,000 
of the (1998) population over the period 2001 – May 2010.  
 
Map 16. 
Armed non-
State Actors 
Fatalities 
2001-10 
Map 15. 
Security 
Forces 
Fatalities 
2001-10 
Map 17. 
Fatalities in 
Sectarian 
Violence 
2001-10 
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2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter has attempted to provide a broad overview of the trends and patterns of 
violent conflict in Pakistan in recent years. While violent conflict has afflicted Pakistan 
since its creation in 1947, it has intensified since 2004-05, resulting in a very steep 
escalation of the incidence of violence as well as its toll on life and property.  
 
In large measure, this intensification has been due to the raging War on Terror in 
neighbouring Afghanistan, and its spill over into Pakistan. Terrorist attacks in Pakistan 
have been motivated by the resentment of Pakistan’s support to the US-led offensive 
against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Local extremist groups have also gained strength 
and have demonstrated the ability to strike with impunity. These groups have exercised 
violence to seize control of areas and subsequently enforce diktats on social order as well 
as secure their base for extraction. They also attack members of specific communities 
such as Hazara Shias. In other instances the targets have been large crowds and 
gatherings in Pakistani cities or specific symbolic targets – the aim appears to be to 
challenge the Pakistani state’s writ and rebel against its anti-Taliban policy in 
Afghanistan and the FATA; and not for directly usurping power and control of the cities 
per se. In addition to violence from these terrorist activities which has intensified in 
recently, the long-standing issues of sectarianism, ethnic strike, gang wars (especially in 
Karachi) and insurgency in Balochistan and Waziristan have been continuing.  
 
The Pakistani state’s response to terrorism has been motivated primarily by the political 
alliance with the US in the aftermath of 9/11. Starting with support to the US-led war 
through supply routes and access to airbases, Pakistan undertook military campaigns in 
the FATA area bordering Afghanistan, and subsequently in many districts in KPK and 
Balochistan. Many of these campaigns have come at a huge cost in terms of the number 
of civilian and military deaths. They have achieved modest success in wresting areas 
from militant control even as the war continues in several parts. The longest drawn-out 
military campaign was in the Swat and Malakand districts in KPK in the year 2008-09.  
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Systematic and sub-regional analyses of the incidence and impact of conflict are few. 
This chapter has reviewed the chief data sources on conflict in Pakistan and has noted 
several limitations. Existing data sources typically rely on news media reports that are 
in the public domain. In addition to the inherent limitations of using news reports as a 
primary source of conflict event data, comparing data across sources is somewhat 
problematic. Some of this stems from the different focus of various agencies that compile 
such data, in terms of the definitions and recording methodologies employed – this 
automatically renders data not strictly comparable across sources. Additionally, 
agencies place different levels of emphasis on collating and storing location data. This 
chapter seeks to make a substantial contribution to the analysis of conflict even trends in 
a manner that emphasises a relatively less narrow definition of fatalities of conflict as 
well as disaggregated and sub-district estimation of incidence and intensity.  
 
A descriptive analysis of conflict incidence and location using the SATP dataset reveals 
compelling findings:  
1. The level and scale of violence in Pakistan increased alarmingly since 2004 and 
peaked in 2009. The total number of deaths from conflict appears to be reducing 
since 2009. These trends are especially true for terrorist violence, but also in the 
case of sectarian violence.  
2. While various types of violence exist in Pakistan, deaths due to conflict are 
highest in acts of terrorism and counter-terrorism; as high as 92% of total deaths. 
This is true even for civilian casualties although sectarian attacks account for a 
much larger share of civilian deaths than total deaths.  
3. About a fourth to a fifth of total deaths from violence has been that of civilians. 
Militants/ terrorists account for the largest share of deaths over the years. While 
security forces’ deaths were a higher proportion of total deaths in 2006 and 2007, 
this seems to have gone down subsequently.  
4. The spatial spread of violence shows contagion from the border districts to the 
interior of Pakistan. FATA and KPK have the highest incidence of violent attacks, 
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followed by Balochistan, and these provinces far exceed Punjab and Sindh. In the 
latter, violence is mainly concentrated in cities.  
5. It is noteworthy that violence is often concentrated in particular districts/ sub-
districts and that even within conflict-affected provinces of KPK and Balochistan 
there are many districts that record no or very low levels of violence. This further 
encourages the case for a disaggregated analysis of the impact of conflict as 
aggregate/ provincial narratives may tend to gloss over underlying 
heterogeneity. 
 
In conclusion, a detailed micro-level analysis of violent conflict is essential for 
understanding its impact, across areas and over time. The mapping of exposure to 
violence down to the sub-district level using the SATP conflict event timeline, the key 
contribution of this chapter, will enable a more systematic and detailed microeconomic 
examination of some of these possible causal effects of conflict on household-level 
decisions and outcomes in the following chapters. Future research should focus on 
collecting and using data on conflict incidence and impact at more granular levels of 
analysis.  
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Chapter 3. Calamity, Conflict and Cash Transfers: How 
Violence Affects Access to Aid in Pakistan 
 
ABSTRACT: This chapter examines how conflict affects households’ access to aid 
programmes in the aftermath of the massive 2010 floods in Pakistan. Using IV-
estimation to correct for the endogeneity of conflict exposure and access to aid, I find 
that conflict reduces household access to two large government-run cash transfer 
programmes – the Citizens Damage Compensation Programme (CDCP) and the Benazir 
Income Support Programme (BISP). I make a novel attempt to determine the presence 
of Taliban-affiliate armed groups, and find that the presence of such groups drives the 
negative effect of conflict on aid access. The historical weakness of formal and modern 
institutions, proxied by areas being part of independent princely states, rather than 
under direct British Rule at the time of the creation of Pakistan in 1947 also emerges as a 
significant mechanism explaining how conflict reduces access to state aid. The lower 
access to aid in conflict-affected areas translates as the complete exclusion of villages 
from the programmes, as well as lower rates of intra-village coverage.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Cash transfers are often seen as valid and effective instruments to counter conflict. This 
is based on an understanding of conflict as partly the outcome of grievances which may 
compel people to voice dissatisfaction, support rebels or to resort to violence. Cash 
transfers or broader social protection measures are then seen as ways of redressing (often 
historical) grievances. This in turn is seen to make the populace more sympathetic to 
governments, facilitate a sharing of information and intelligence and thus increase the 
state’s ability to crack down on rebels (Berman, Shapiro and Felter, 2009; Khanna and 
Zimmermann, 2014). The role of cash transfers in reducing future violent conflict can 
also arise from their ability to address horizontal inequalities between 
groups/communities which may have initially caused resentment, animosity and violent 
contestation. Finally, from a microeconomics perspective, increasing the returns to 
peaceful activities (through redistribution or otherwise) is seen to increase the 
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opportunity costs of taking up arms (Collier and Hoffler 2004, Dube and Vargas 2007, 
Miguel et al., 2004). Redistribution is therefore viewed as an effective means to quell 
violent upheaval and rebellion.  
 
One stream of the literature examines how cash transfer programmes, service provision 
and redistribution can affect future political outcomes, including violent conflict. At the 
country level, Nielsen et al. (2011) find that reductions in aid receipts lead to increases in 
conflict in recipient countries and therefore aid can play a stabilising role in war-torn 
countries. In contrast, Nunn and Qian (2014) find that US food aid led to increases in the 
incidence and duration of civil conflict in recipient countries but had no effect on inter-
state conflict.  Justino (2011), in a study of a panel of Indian states, finds that social 
spending reduces the occurrence of riots, whereas increase in policing does not have any 
sustained impact on future violence. Berman, Shapiro and Felter (2009) find that 
increased spending through the US Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 
(CERP)23, when combined with increased troop strength, led to reduced violence in Iraq. 
In contrast, Crost and Johnston (2014) find that the KALAHI–CIDSSS programme24 in 
the Philippines in fact increased civil violence. Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2012) 
find that the National Solidarity Program25 in Afghanistan was able to create a 
favourable attitude among beneficiaries regarding their economic wellbeing, and 
towards the government, but did not have any discernible impact on violence.  
 
Another stream of literature views conflict as a mediator or source of heterogeneous 
impact of cash transfer programmes on household outcomes. Bozzoli and Wald (2011) 
examine the heterogeneous impacts of the Familias en Accion programme in Colombia 
across high and low conflict areas and find that the programme was significantly more 
successful in increasing enrolment in conflict-affected areas than in others, but children 
from no-conflict areas did more homework and missed fewer days at school. Mesnard 
                                                          
23 A programme rolled out as part of the US counterinsurgency operations for urgent humanitarian relief 
and rehabilitation 
24 A Community-Driven Development aimed at restoring basic social services and rebuild communities 
after Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) 
25 A community-Driven Development programme that sought to foster community participation for local 
development and human security projects 
69 
 
(2009) finds that the same cash transfer programme in Colombia was able to prevent 
migration and encouraged people to stay in their villages. However, as the level of 
conflict intensified, access to the programme enabled households to migrate outside.  
 
Both these lines of enquiry do not directly address the fundamental question of how 
conflict affects access to social protection in the first instance. In other words, while there 
is mixed evidence on the implications of expanding social protection on future conflict 
and violence as well as a nascent literature on how conflict affects programme impact 
(given programme rollout), we do not sufficiently understand how conflict affects the 
implementation of aid programmes. This may be an overlooked but critical step between 
a government/development agency’s desire to establish writ and quell strife, and its 
ability to do so on the ground. From the policymaker’s perspective, ignoring the 
economic, political and logistical challenges to providing access to aid during conflict 
can very quickly become the proverbial spoke in the wheel of the intended virtuous cycle 
of redistribution, decreasing violence, development, and lasting peace.  
 
The challenges that conflict imposes on development and state-led activities is often 
recounted in anecdotal accounts such as the targeting of social service/NGO offices and 
staff, bombing of social and infrastructure facilities and (in Pakistan) the specific 
targeting of immunisation camps. Such targeting, far from being incidental, is often a 
calibrated measure on the part of armed groups to stem the growing presence of 
governments and aid agencies. Armed groups may resent efforts by the government to 
win over political support by instrumentalising aid to threaten their base (Gompert et 
al., 2009). They may respond either by targeting the people who are thus swayed, for 
example those who serve as informants to governments (Eynde, 2011), or by 
opposing/stalling the aid programmes themselves, thereby reducing both the demand 
and the supply of state aid. In explaining their results on how social protection in fact 
led to an increase in violence in the Philippines, Crost and Johnston (2014) argue that 
armed groups have an incentive to stall such projects (through violence) precisely 
because they threaten the support their movement enjoys. They formalise this in a model 
which shows that development programmes will be targeted with violence if (a) they 
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can potentially tilt the balance of support in favour of the government, (b) armed groups 
have the capability to violently attack and thus derail the programme, and (c) the 
government is not able to “pay off” the armed groups/rebels to allow safe rollout of the 
programme.  A combination of these three conditions can therefore mean that expanding 
social protection can exacerbate strife, and instead of conclusively winning hearts and 
minds, widen the development gap, making future conflict more likely. While Crost and 
Johnston (2014) show that the programme led to a higher number of insurgent-initiated 
attacks during its preparation phase and interpret this as an indication of insurgents’ 
motives to scuttle the programme, they do not specifically examine how and to what 
extent such motives may affect the actual receipts of aid at the household and 
community levels.  
 
In Pakistan in particular, the state seeks to extend cash transfers programmes in conflict 
affected areas in order to reclaim legitimacy and establish its writ. This is reflected in the 
following text from the Planning Commission of Pakistan’s Report of Economists 
outlining the Medium Term Development Framework:  
 
Conflict in NWFP [old acronym of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province], 
FATA and Balochistan has severely challenged the ability of the state as 
well as the legitimacy of the idea of a functioning state in Pakistan. Social 
protection must be part of the strategy to reclaim the space and legitimacy 
for the state in Pakistan, through protection to the basic entitlements of 
people in the conflict-affected areas. 
 
…  Expanded social protection programmes, particularly directed at the 
conflict-affected areas are essential to protect innocent victims of conflict, 
and to regain legitimacy for the idea of a functioning state through creating, 
expanding and ensuring the delivery of citizenship-based entitlements. 
- GoP (2010), pp. 145 
 
However there is no evidence on whether (or how) the government’s ability to 
implement and extend such programmes is itself compromised by conflict.  
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This chapter examines how violent conflict26 affected households’ access to aid 
programmes in the aftermath of the 2010 floods in Pakistan; a time of heightened 
suffering and vulnerability when the need for social protection and relief was most 
acute. Specifically, I separately examine the effect of conflict on access to two 
programmes: the Citizens Damage Compensation Programme (CDCP)27 – Phase I, and 
the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). 28 The dataset used for analysis is 
representative of all flood-affected areas – the universe for the CDCP. The BISP however 
has a wider (nationwide) intended coverage – for which the current dataset is not 
representative. The BISP is included in the analysis to indicate the extent to which access 
to such regular social protection programmes is affected by conflict, in a time of hardship 
precipitated by floods. The results on the effect of conflict on access to these cash 
transfers in the present analysis will therefore be representative, for the programmes as 
a whole, only for the CDCP, and not for the BISP. However, since I estimate and present 
the causal effect of conflict on these programmes separately (and not together/ 
combined), I ensure that the inferences drawn from the results will not be driven by the 
unsuitability of the sample for the intended analysis.   
 
Access to social protection is determined by demand and supply factors, and both of 
these can be affected by conflict. The demand for social protection receipts at the 
household level would typically depend upon the need for such programmes, as well as 
the ability of households to obtain information on such programmes, mobilise, comply 
with administrative requirements for accessing state transfers, undertake any travel and 
produce documents to establish eligibility, and to collect disbursements. These factors 
are largely unobservable but highly likely to be correlated with household 
demographics, education and wealth levels, and in the case of the need for aid, with the 
extent of flooding damages. On the supply side, the provision of social protection 
transfers will depend on community-level characteristics such as the presence and 
strength of state institutions, infrastructure necessary to rollout payments and the 
                                                          
26 Measured as the natural log of (1 + n), where n is the number of people killed in conflict in the tehsil over 
2001 – 2010 
27 An unconditional flood damage compensation paid in cash to flood-affected households 
28 An unconditional cash transfer paid to women recipients in the poorest households 
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availability of administrative staff. In section 3.3 I describe in detail how I measure and 
control for the effect of the demand and supply-side enablers of access to social provision 
to ensure that the estimated causal effect of conflict on social transfer access is not 
conflated with them. 
 
 
I use the community-level distance to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a strong 
correlate of exposure to violence in Pakistan following the US-led War on Terror in 
Afghanistan and its subsequent repercussions on Pakistan, as an instrument for 
exposure to violence over 2001-10, and control for a wide range of confounding factors 
that can potentially violate the exclusion restriction. I find that conflict reduced 
household access to the two large government-run aid programmes. These results are 
robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls, a discrete measure of the endogenous 
conflict variable, and the use of an alternate Instrumental Variable. At the community 
level, the negative effect of conflict on access to the cash transfer programmes manifests 
as the complete exclusion of villages from the programmes, as well as lower average 
rates of within-village coverage. 
 
I distinguish between violent activity and rebel control and make a novel attempt to 
determine the presence of Taliban-affiliate armed groups. I treat Taliban presence and 
control as an unobserved, omitted variable that lowers the community-level girls’ 
primary school enrolment rates.29 I then use the residuals of the community-level 
estimation of female primary enrolment rates based on a wide array of demand and 
supply-side determinants of girls’ schooling to proxy Taliban presence and find that the 
presence of such groups drives the effect of conflict on aid access. The historical 
weakness of formal and modern institutions, indicated by areas being part of 
independent princely states, rather than under direct British Rule at the time of the 
creation of Pakistan in 1947 also emerges as a plausible mechanism explaining how 
conflict reduces access to state aid.  
 
                                                          
29 Owing to the Taliban’s avowed opposition to girls’ schooling 
73 
 
Section 3.2 describes the case study setting, detailing the context of the 2010 floods and 
the two main cash transfer programmes analysed in this paper. Section 3.3 describes the 
data sources used and, along with a historical description of recent political violence in 
Pakistan. Section 3.4 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 3.5 presents results on the 
causal link between conflict and household/village level access to cash transfers, and 
analyses mechanisms. Section 3.6 discusses the empirical results to better understand 
how conflict affects aid access and targeting in Pakistan. Section 3.7 concludes with notes 
for policy.  
 
3.2 Empirical Setting and Context  
 
3.2.1 The 2010 Floods in Pakistan  
 
Pakistan experienced the most severe flooding in its recorded history in 2010, which 
started during the monsoon season (June – August). This was caused by exceptionally 
heavy rainfall, which inundated much of the Indus river basin and also led to severe 
flash flooding in many areas not directly linked with major river systems. An estimated 
one-fifth of the total land area of Pakistan (796,095 square kilometres) spread across its 
four large provinces: Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa was flooded. 
The official death toll due to the floods was approximately 2,000. However, according to 
Government of Pakistan estimates, about 20 million people were affected by the floods 
through displacement and damages to land, property and livestock. The intensity of the 
flooding has had perilous consequences for life, property and the economy in Pakistan. 
In addition to the displacement of entire populations, there has been large scale 
destruction of homes and other buildings,  agricultural land, livestock, power generators 
and also led to the outbreak of several diseases such as malaria, gastroenteritis and 
diarrhoea. 
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3.2.2 Cash Transfer Programmes in Pakistan 
 
In order to provide relief and aid rehabilitation for victims of the massive flooding, the 
Government of Pakistan announced a massive cash transfer-based flood relief 
programme (CDCP), in two phases. Phase I comprised a payment of PKR 20,000 to each 
eligible household. Eligibility in Phase I was defined as (a) every household residing in 
a deemed “flood-affected” village/urban centre (subject to exceptions for households 
with a foreign bank account and having undertaken foreign travel) in Punjab, Sindh and 
Balochistan, (b) households identified as flood-affected based on a house-to-house 
damage assessment exercise conducted in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Phase II comprised a 
larger (between PKR 20,000 – 40,000), but more delayed pay-out to a subset of the most 
badly affected households. In this chapter, I only examine access to the CDCP Phase I 
transfers (as the survey data used was collected between the rollout of Phases I and II).  
 
Additionally, the Government of Pakistan, upon transitioning from military to 
democratic rule, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto 
and the victory of her party in the national elections of 2008 launched the Benazir Income 
Support Programme (BISP). This is an unconditional cash transfer programme targeted 
at women recipients in chronically poor households, identified using a Proxy Means Test 
developed in collaboration with the World Bank. The programme has an elaborate 
eligibility determination process, based on poverty scores calculated by a centralised 
database authority from a household-level poverty census conducted in 200830 and 
makes monthly payments of PKR 1,000 – 1,200 to eligible households.  
 
The CDCP and the BISP were the two largest public cash transfer programmes in 2010-
11 and are therefore the focus in this paper. Further, the CDCP – Phase I and BISP 
transfers differ in terms of frequency (one-off transfer v/s recurrent), monetary value 
(one-time value of PKR 20,000 v/s monthly payments of PKR 1,000 – 1,200), aim (disaster 
compensation v/s regular income support to the chronic poor) and intended beneficiary 
                                                          
30 And is a departure from previous targeting mechanisms used for social protection in Pakistan that were 
based largely on the discretionary assessments by elected representatives (World Bank 2007, Sanchez-
Paramo et al. 2010).  
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profile (flood-affected populations v/s the chronic poor). The differences can potentially 
affect the ways in which conflict affects cash transfer access and I therefore examine 
effects on both programmes, separately, to potentially allow me to identify if any specific 
design features of these cash transfer payments make them more or less sensitive to 
violent conflict.  
 
3.2.3 Data and Methodology 
 
For my analysis I use the baseline cross-section of the CDCP Impact Evaluation dataset 
(National Database and Registration Authority, Government of Pakistan). This dataset 
is representative of all flood-affected areas of the four major provinces of Pakistan: 
Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The dataset comprises 7802 
households across 498 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), including 448 rural, and 50 urban 
communities. The survey for the baseline was conducted during December 2011 – 
February 2012, after the rollout of the first phase of the CDCP flood relief transfer.31 The 
survey comprised detailed questionnaires for male and female respondents at the 
household level, and a detailed community-level module.  
 
Conflict data, covering incidents of terrorism, counter-terrorism, insurgency, sectarian 
violence, were collected from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, a leading conflict news 
media monitoring agency that conducts a detailed scan of 9 leading Pakistani 
newspapers and provides a summary record of conflict events. Conflict events over the 
period January 2001 – May 2010 (just before the onset of the 2010 floods) were coded to 
the lowest administrative level possible and indices of conflict exposure at the tehsil (sub-
district) level – measured as the natural log of (1 + n, the number of people killed in 
conflict events) – were calculated (as described in Chapter 2).  
 
 
                                                          
31 The cross section serves as a baseline for Phase II of the CDCP transfers; it, however, contains 
retrospective questions on the receipt of CDCP Phase I, BISP and other non-public transfers that I use for 
my analysis. 
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3.2.4      Historical background to violence in Pakistan 
Pakistan has witnessed high levels of conflict at several junctures during its history. Its 
creation in 1947, resulting from the partition of India, was accompanied by the large-
scale migration of communities, and also communal rioting and killing. In subsequent 
decades Pakistan witnessed several forms of intra-state political violence, driven by 
motivations including sectarianism (Nasr 2002), ethnic factionalism (Alavi 1988; Cohen, 
2004), insurgency in East Pakistan leading to the creation of Bangladesh (Jaffrelot, 2002; 
Bose, 2011), in Balochistan (Grare, 2013), and gang warfare in cities, particularly Karachi 
(Gayer, 2007; Waseem, 2002). The most pronounced focus on violence in Pakistan, 
however, has been over the past decade that has seen a dramatic rise of Islamist 
militancy. The US-led War on Terror in Afghanistan, following the September 11, 2001 
terror attacks in the US led to the movement of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters across the 
porous border into Pakistan’s territory (Yusuf, 2014; Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2011; Gul, 
2009; Rashid, 2008,2012). The border areas of Pakistan owing to their geographical 
continuity with Afghanistan allowed the Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters space to hide 
and regroup to launch counter-attacks on US and later Pakistani forces to resist the 
Western occupation of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s logistical and military support to this 
campaign (Yusuf, 2014). This resulted in counterterrorism military campaigns by the 
Pakistani Army (listed in Chapter 3) and the ensuing clash between terrorists and the 
Pakistan Army led to the largest numbers of killings due to conflict over 2001-10.  Table 
1 shows the fatalities due to conflict by motivation and province over January 2001 – 
May 2010.  
Table 1. Fatalities in Conflict by Motivation of Incident and Province: Jan 2001 – May 2010 
Motivation Balochistan KPK FATA Punjab Sindh Total % 
Counter/Terrorist 461 7,767 11,758 783 363 21,132 92.38 
Communal 0 0 2 45 0 47 0.21 
Sectarian 189 278 425 223 132 1,247 5.45 
Insurgent 335 0 0 0 0 335 1.46 
Tribal Rivalry 0 48 8 0 0 56 0.24 
Ethnic 8 0 0 0 0 8 0.03 
Unknown 26 2 18 4 0 50 0.22 
Total 1,019 8,095 12,211 1,055 495 22,875 
 % of Counter/Terrorist  45.24 95.95 96.29 74.22 73.33 92.38 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on South Asia Terrorism Portal conflict timeline for Pakistan 
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With the exception of Balochistan (where insurgency accounts for a very high share of 
total deaths), terrorism/counter-terrorism operations account for the highest share of 
lives lost in conflict across the provinces. This emphasises the centrality of terrorist 
violence32 in shaping the conflict environment in Pakistan. Finally, Fig. 1 below depicts 
the spatial concentration of violent conflict in Pakistan at the district level.  
Fig. 1. District-wise Total fatalities per 10,000 of population due to Conflict in Pakistan: 
Jan 2001 – May 2010: SATP  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using SATP data 
The map above depicts (a) the vast spread of violence across the territory of Pakistan, 
and (b) its greater concentration in areas closer to the Afghan border, towards the North-
West.  
 
 
 
                                                          
32 in large part involving the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliate groups 
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3.3 Empirical Approach and Identification Strategy  
 
I attempt to study the causal link between conflict exposure and access to cash transfers 
using a cross-sectional dataset. Any OLS estimates for such analysis would be biased 
because of the endogeneity of conflict and programme access, as unobservable factors 
that cause chronic poverty and enhance vulnerability to shocks (and therefore increase 
programme eligibility) may also be responsible for conflict. Also, factors associated with 
the ability of communities to demand and secure government programmes, such as 
social cohesion, can potentially also enable them to resist the control of armed groups, 
and the spread of violence. To overcome these endogeneity concerns, I use an 
Instrumental Variables (IV) approach to identify the causal impact of conflict on 
programme access. Based on an examination of the historical evolution and context of 
political violence in Pakistan, described in detail in Chapter 3, I find that the Distance to 
the infiltration routes used by the Taliban from Afghanistan is a strong correlate of 
violence in Pakistan. This is because areas closer to infiltration routes along the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border became militant strongholds and eventually the 
battleground of terrorist and counter-terrorist activity. However, since it is not possible 
to identify the exact points of infiltration used by militants across the long and porous 
border, I use the nearest distance to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as the IV for 
exposure to violent conflict. To compute this, I identify the community centroid from the 
household survey and calculate the shortest distance to the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border.  
 
I use the distance to official border crossings on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (in fact 
relatively seldom used by Taliban fighters to infiltrate into Pakistan compared to the 
numerous unofficial border crossings) and the community-level share of Pashto 
speakers (proxied by the language of the household interview) as the measure of 
Pashtun population, a factor that facilitated the entry and regrouping of the Taliban from 
Afghanistan into Pakistan, as IVs for conflict exposure as robustness tests. I find that my 
main results are robust to these two IVs (Appendices 3.1 and 3.2, respectively).  
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In estimating the impact of conflict on aid receipt at the household, the causal 
relationship of interest is given by Equation (1) below: 
 
   𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗     … (1) 
 
Where 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗  is the likelihood of household i in Primary Sampling Unit (PSU), or community j 
receiving the aid programme.  
X is the matrix of household /community-level control variables.  
P represents the matrix of k Province dummies.  
CON is the measure of conflict exposure at the sub-district level, and is assumed to be 
the same for all households/communities in the sub-district.  
 
Owing to the endogeneity of CON with 𝑌𝑖𝑗, the coefficient 𝛽2  in Equation (1) is biased. I 
therefore estimate an IV probit model, represented by the following two-stage equations 
(2 and 3).  
 
First stage Equation: 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾2𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑗 + 𝛾3𝑃𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗    … (2) 
 
Where DISTANCE represents the distance between community j and the international 
border with Afghanistan.  
 
The second stage equation is given by (3) below, where 𝛽2
′  now reflects the causal effect 
of CON on  𝑌𝑖𝑗. 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1′𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2′𝐶𝑂?̂?𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3′𝑃𝑘 +  𝜀′𝑖𝑗     … (3) 
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I now discuss the potential threats to the exclusion restriction for my IV (Nearest distance 
to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border) as well as the measures I take to mitigate any threats 
to causal identification.  
 
IV Estimation: Justification, Potential Threats and Mitigation 
 
3.4.1 Justification 
Over the 2001-10 period in Pakistan (over which I measure conflict), as Table 1 showed, 
more than 92% of deaths due to conflict were in terrorism and counterterrorism 
operations involving militants - from and sympathetic to the regrouping Taliban from 
Afghanistan. The regrouping Taliban were stronger in areas closer to the border and 
proximity to the border would come to imply a greater extent of Taliban operation and 
therefore greater retaliation from the Pakistan Army over the 2000s. As such, proximity 
to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is a strong correlate of violent conflict involving 
Islamist militant groups associated with the TTP between 2000 and 2010.33 As this form 
of violence accounts for the overwhelming share of deaths in conflict during this period 
in Pakistan, the distance to Afghanistan is therefore also a strong statistical correlate of 
violent conflict in Pakistan as a whole. Further, the locally-driven forms of conflict in 
Pakistan over this period, including the Baloch insurgency and sectarian attacks by 
groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba/Laskhkar-e-Jhangvi, together account for less than 
10% of deaths in conflict and bear no spatial association with the Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border. 
 
3.4.2 Threats to the Exclusion Restriction and Mitigation 
The community-level distance to the Afghan border can, in addition to predicting the 
onset and intensity of violence, also be correlated with several variables that directly 
determine programme access and coverage. Unaddressed, this can pose threats to the 
validity of the instrument and bias the causal estimate of violence on programme access. 
I identify a multitude of possible factors correlated with distance to the border with 
                                                          
33 So too with the community-level share of the Pashtun population, a correlate of likely Taliban presence, 
operation and confrontation in Pakistan over 2001-10, and hence also used as an additional IV for 
robustness.  
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Afghanistan that also determine programme eligibility access, and control for potentially 
confounding factors that affect the supply and demand for cash transfers.   The 
assumption is that after controlling for the factors listed below, the distance to 
Afghanistan does not predict cash transfer receipts, except through violent conflict. 
 
The following controls are necessary not only for ensuring that the IV is valid, but also 
to estimate the effect of conflict on access to cash transfers over and above the effect of 
factors that directly affect the supply and demand of cash transfers. Among the  sets of 
controls identified and explained below, 3.4.2a and b (accessibility and institutional 
factors, respectively) pertain to the supply of cash transfer programmes, while 3.4.2c 
(household characteristics) comprises the enablers of household-level demand for cash 
transfer receipts.  
 
3.4.2a Potential Accessibility Confounders 
 
Remoteness: Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan forms the North-Western boundary of 
the country. Greater proximity to an international border also reflects a greater and 
considerable distance from the hinterland34 and in the case of a country as large as 
Pakistan this magnitude can be considerable. Areas close to the Afghan border are 
generally remote, and therefore harder for bureaucrats and aid workers to reach. The 
disbursal of aid is made from the central government to the provinces (province 
capitals), then from province capitals to district headquarters, and finally from district 
headquarters to villages/cities.  In order to ensure that the distance to Afghanistan does 
not simply reflect communities’ remoteness from centres of aid disbursal, I include, as 
controls, (a) province dummies to capture a wide range of unobservable and province-
wide characteristics, including remoteness from the national capital and location vis-à-
vis Afghanistan; (b) the shortest distance to the provincial capital, and finally (c) the 
shortest distance to the district headquarters.  
 
                                                          
34 Speaking directly to Ahmed’s exposition on the tensions between the core and the periphery in modern 
Islamic countries, including Pakistan (Ahmed, 2013) 
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Geography: In addition to remoteness, the terrain and topography, arguably associated 
with distance to Afghanistan, also affects the ease with which aid administrators can 
reach communities. I include community level controls for topography. While about 85% 
of all communities in the sample are inland plains alone, I control for each the following 
types of topography through dummy variables: inland plains, coastal plains, plateaus, 
hills, valleys, mountainous areas, deserts and “other” topography.  
 
Army Proximity: In Pakistan, the role of the armed forces can be critical for many 
governance activities, including aid disbursement. This may be because of two reasons. 
First, having been directly under military rule for a large part of its history, the Pakistani 
armed forces are deeply entrenched in several spheres of public life and areas closer to 
their bases may be better served by public goods and services (Siddiqa, 2007). Secondly, 
and pertaining more to the case of the CDCP transfers, in the aftermath of massive 
flooding there were several logistical challenges in reaching flood-hit communities 
which were overcome only with the Army’s technological and human resources. 
However, this potentially enabling role that the armed forces can play in ensuring access 
to aid can be less effective in areas further away from the bases of the armed forces, 
particularly the Army. In order to ensure that the IV is not confounded with the ease of 
access by the Pakistan Army, I calculate and control for the distance between the 
community and the nearest armed forces’ cantonment.  
 
3.4.2b Potential Institutional Confounders 
 
Infrastructure: Areas closer to the Afghan border such as the FATA have low levels of 
public infrastructure at the community level. Although poor community-level 
infrastructure is found across several parts of Pakistan, beyond the North-West, 
including Balochistan, inner Sindh and parts of southern Punjab, it is imperative that the 
measure of proximity to Afghanistan does not proxy a lack of infrastructure. 
Infrastructure, such as road connectivity, transport access, the presence and functioning 
of markets, and connection to telephone and electricity lines is directly required for the 
rollout of the two cash transfer programmes under consideration.  I therefore control for 
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community-level infrastructure by developing a count variable-based additive index of 
various types of physical infrastructure facilities, as suggested by Case et al. (2004). These 
include dummy variables for whether or not the community has a bus/wagon stop, 
railway station, shop, wholesale market, bank, flour mill, tractor rental centre, fertiliser 
depot, motor-able approach road, and electricity, gas and drainage connectivity.  
 
State Presence: Areas with lower state presence, in terms of state-run institutions and 
public services are less able to rollout state aid programmes. This may be because of the 
lack/weaknesses of existing administrative economies of scale that create a need to 
establish new systems, rather than piggy-back on existing ones. In such areas there is 
additional need for local bureaucrats and administrators to familiarise populations with 
bureaucratic procedures, provide necessary paperwork, develop effective ways to relay 
messages and roll out aid, and gain community trust. In areas that have a low interface 
with state-run bodies, these challenges can be onerous and can reduce the reach of state 
aid programmes, as well as reduce local citizens’ demand for state services. I therefore 
measure and control for state presence using an additive index of government bodies at 
the community level. Specifically, this includes government schools, health facilities, 
state-run immunisation camps, presence of community health workers, post offices and 
Union Council, Tehsil and District-level administrative headquarters. 
 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalisation: Greater linguistic fractionalisation within 
communities, reflecting deeper cleavages between groups can make access to aid more 
difficult (Alesina et al., 1999). This may be because deeper social cleavages involve higher 
transactions costs for communication between groups and entail a reduced ability to 
impose penalties for a failure to cooperate (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Miguel and Gugerty, 
2005). This may also prevent effective local coordination for pressuring government 
agencies to deliver aid. In a situation of conflict (which may itself be more likely to arise 
in more deeply divided communities), such between-group differences may result in 
lower local coordination and a lower demand for/pressure to ensure access to aid. Based 
on data on the language in which the survey interview was conducted and given that 
the survey fieldwork teams were proficient in the use of Pakistan’s major languages 
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(including Urdu, Sindhi, Punjabi, Balochi, Pushto, Brahvi, Saraiki, Hindko and a few 
other languages35) to conduct interviews, the language of interview can be a good proxy 
of the respondent household’s linguistic identity. I use this information to calculate an 
index of Linguistic Fractionalisation at the community (Primary Sampling Unit – PSU) 
level, according to the formula36 developed by Alesina et al. (2003) to ensure that, if 
associated with the distance to Afghanistan, linguistic fractionalisation does not drive 
the IV results.37 
 
3.4.2c Cash Transfer Demand Confounders 
 
In order to ensure that the instrumental variable does not pick up the effect of factors 
(which may be associated with the distance to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border) that 
increase households’ eligibility for and access to cash transfers I also control for key 
factors that determine either eligibility for the programmes (flood exposure index for 
CDCP and correlates of chronic poverty for the BISP – including land ownership, wealth, 
sex of household head), as well as factors that enable households to demand and access 
cash transfers in Pakistan (number of adult males in the household, adult education, 
household size). Eligibility/ need and ability to access comprise two dimensions of 
household demand for cash transfers.  
  
3.5 Results 
 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 below shows the coverage of both cash transfer programmes for the full sample 
as well as for the following sub-groups: no-conflict areas, Low/Medium/High38 conflict 
                                                          
35 Which ensures that the language of the interview was not constrained/affected by the survey teams’ 
knowledge of languages 
36 This is defined as “One minus the Herfindahl Index of Ethnolinguistic group shares”, and indicates the 
“probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belonged to different groups” 
(Alesina et al., 2003) 
37 Ethnicity, though often correlated with linguistic identity in Pakistan is not explicitly available for the 
respondent households 
38 classified based on terciles of communities by the value of  log (1+n) of the number of people killed in 
conflict in the sub-district 
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areas, and all conflict-affected areas combined. While 61.34% of the sample received the 
CDCP – Phase I transfer, 15.44% received the BISP. The coverage of both programmes is 
lower in conflict-affected areas as a whole, compared to peaceful areas.  
 
Table 2. Coverage of CDCP – I and BISP: Full sample and sub-groups based on 
Conflict Exposure 
  CDCP – Phase I  BISP  
 Total No. of 
HHs 
No. of HHs 
Receiving 
CDCP – I 
transfers 
Share of HHs 
Receiving 
CDCP – I 
transfers (%) 
No. of HHs 
Receiving 
BISP transfers 
Share of HHs 
Receiving 
BISP transfers 
(%) 
No conflict  4736 2963 62.56 869 18.35 
Low conflict  1,256 751 59.79 104 8.28 
Med conflict  817 585 71.60 93 11.38 
High conflict  993 487 49.04 139 14.00 
All conflict-
affected areas 3,066 1,823 59.46 336 10.96 
Total 7,802 4786 61.34 1,205 15.44 
 
The difference in coverage rates (share of households receiving the transfer) of the CDCP 
– I between no-conflict and conflict-affected areas is of 2.75 percentage points, while that 
for the BISP is 8.87 percentage points. Simple t-tests shows that these differences are 
significant at p < 0.001, indicating that the coverage of both programmes is significantly 
lower in conflict-affected, viz. peaceful areas.  
 
3.5.2 IV First Stage Results 
 
Table 3 below show the IV first-stage results for the instrumentation of conflict (log [1+n] 
deaths due to conflict between 2001-2010) with the distance to the Afghan border.  
Table 3. Conflict and the Nearest Distance to the Afghan Border: IV First-Stage Results 
 (1)^ (2)^ (3)^ 
Distance to Afghan Border -0.877*** -0.341*** -0.269*** 
 (-63.01) (-14.56) (-12.11) 
N 7802 7802 7767 
Province dummies No Yes Yes 
Controls No No Yes 
Partial F-statistic 160.93 29.71 14.58 
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3373 0.4731 0.5673 
t statistics in parentheses 
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^Standard errors are clustered at the PSU (community) level39 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Community-level controls: urban/rural dummy, community-level flood exposure index, distance to 
province/district capitals and army cantonments, indices of community-level infrastructure, state presence 
and linguistic fractionalisation, topography dummies. 
Household level controls: household size, number of males, number of members aged 14 and above, 
female-headed household dummy, no of males and females with primary and secondary schooling, value 
of livestock owned (pre-flood), acres of farm land owned, dummies for land ownership categories and 
owning non-agricultural enterprises.  
 
As we see in Table 3 above, as expected, conflict has a significant and strong negative 
association with the distance to the Afghan border. Further the values of the F-statistic 
are sufficiently high to indicate a strong instrument as per Stock and Yogo (2005). This 
is robust to the inclusion of controls and province dummies.  
 
3.5.3 Causal effects of Conflict on Access to Aid Programmes 
 
Tables 4 and 5 below show the estimates of the marginal effects of the level of violence 
at the sub-district level (measured as the log of (1+n) killings due to political violence in 
the sub-district over 2001-201040) on the likelihood of receiving CDCP Phase I and BISP 
transfers, respectively. I first present simple probit estimates, followed by the IV probit 
(second stage) estimates to address endogeneity concerns.  
 
Table 4. Access to CDCP - I: Probit and IV Probit Estimates – Marginal Effects 
 Probit IV Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log (n+1) killings 
at tehsil level 
-0.019*** -0.000 0.007 -0.237*** -0.455*** -0.512*** 
 (-3.14) (-0.01) (0.83) (-7.75) (-4.30) (-3.60) 
Province 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
N 7802 7802 7767 7802 7802 7767 
                                                          
39 Although I measure conflict exposure at the tehsil level, I cluster standard errors at the PSU level 
because of the relatively lower number of tehsils in the sample (92, as against 498 PSUs), and because the 
intra-cluster correlation of CDCP – I is higher in PSUs (0.26) than in tehsils (0.20). For BISP the intra-cluster 
correlation in PSUs is 0.12, and in tehsils it is 0.08. 
40 I also repeat this and subsequent analysis of the causal effect of conflict on access to aid using a discrete 
measure of conflict; i.e. a dummy to identify sub-districts with any deaths due to violence over the 2001-
2010 period as per the SATP conflict events timeline. These results are presented in Appendix 3. 
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Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the PSU (community) level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Community-level controls: urban/rural dummy, community-level flood exposure index, distance to 
province/district capitals and army cantonments, indices of community-level infrastructure, state presence 
and linguistic fractionalisation, topography dummies. 
Household level controls: household size, number of males, number of members aged 14 and above, 
female-headed household dummy, no of males and females with primary and secondary schooling, value 
of livestock owned (pre-flood), acres of farm land owned, dummies for land ownership categories and 
owning non-agricultural enterprises.  
 
Table 5. Access to BISP: Probit and IV Probit Estimates – Marginal Effects 
 Probit IV Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log (n+1) killings 
at tehsil level 
-0.011*** 0.003 0.001 -0.205*** -0.261*** -0.444*** 
 (-2.98) (0.67) (0.29) (-7.36) (-2.67) (-3.54) 
Province 
Dummies 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
N 7802 7802 7767 7802 7802 7767 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the PSU (community) level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Community-level controls: urban/rural dummy, community-level flood exposure index, distance to 
province/district capitals and army cantonments, indices of community-level infrastructure, state presence 
and linguistic fractionalisation, topography dummies. 
Household level controls: household size, number of males, number of members aged 14 and above, 
female-headed household dummy, no of males and females with primary and secondary schooling, value 
of livestock owned (pre-flood), acres of farm land owned, dummies for land ownership categories and 
owning non-agricultural enterprises.  
 
The IV probit estimates in Tables 4 and 5 above clearly indicate a negative effect of 
conflict on the likelihood of receiving both CDCP Phase I and BISP transfers.41 The mean 
value of killings per tehsil in the sample is 30.96.  The coefficient -0.512 in table 4 means 
that a 10% increase in the number of killings in the tehsil (from 30 to 33, for instance), 
would cause a [ln(1.1)*0.512] 4.9% reduction in the likelihood of receiving CDCP – Phase 
I transfers. Similarly, the IV coefficient of log(1+n) killings in Table 5 of -0.444 means that 
                                                          
41 The simple probit estimates do not indicate any clear effect on the whole, due to potential endogeneity.  
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an increase in the number of killings at the tehsil level by 10%  would decrease the 
likelihood of receiving BISP transfers by [ln(1.1)*0.444] 4.2%.42  
 
3.5.4 Mechanisms 
 
3.5.4.1 Mechanism 1: Historical Presence of Modern and Formal Institutions  
 
The long standing presence of formal and modern institutions such as formalised land-
tenure systems, modern education, (relatively more) formalised property rights, surplus 
and export-generating market orientation (often through the introduction of cash crops), 
and modern administrative bodies including the police, the judiciary and administrative 
services (ranging from public works and irrigation to horticulture) enables the 
administration of state aid. In several developing countries, including Pakistan, these 
institutions were formally introduced during the process of colonisation. Direct rule by 
the British Crown, rather than an indirect control through the erstwhile independent 
princely states of British India ensured a deeper penetration of modern institutions, 
which could potentially have a lasting influence even after six decades of independence 
(Mohmand, 2011). People living in areas with a history of direct colonial rule may also 
be better placed to demand more and better quality of government services, which 
public service providers may be more able and better disposed to provide, because of a 
longer history of exposure to formal administrative services. Further, the absence or 
relatively weaker entrenchment of such institutions in some areas make them less likely 
to fully integrate with other territories. Mamdani (1996) and Boone (1994) argue that 
indirect colonial rule in Africa (i.e. through local chieftains/rulers, and not under the 
British Crown) empowered local chiefs and resulted in a weaker state capacity in the 
postcolonial future, a phenomenon Lange (2003b) describes as “decentralised 
despotism”. Further, as Lange (2003, a and b) and Kohli (2004) show, in areas under 
direct colonial rule the exposure to formal institutions of administration through colonial 
                                                          
42 These findings do not seek to be a commentary on the effects of conflict on BISP as a whole because the 
sample is limited to flood-affected areas, whereas the BISP has wider and national intended reach. The 
results are included to indicate the extent to which access to regular social protection programmes such as 
BISP is affected by conflict, in a time of hardship precipitated by floods.  
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rule created the conditions for post-colonial state-led development, including the 
provision of public goods. On the other hand, as the establishment of these institutions 
in the historical setting was essentially to serve the extractive aims of a colonial force, the 
state in such areas may be poorly equipped to effectively play a welfare role such as 
through disaster relief and other cash transfer programmes. Banerjee et al. (2005) and 
Iyer (2010) find that in the case of India, colonial rule reduced the availability of public 
goods such as health, education and public infrastructure, even decades after 
independence.  
 
While there is reason to consider the institutional legacy of former colonial rule, it is not 
clear prima facie, which type of colonial exposure, direct (under the British Crown), or 
indirect (through the rule of princely states) is more conducive to the delivery of cash 
transfer programmes in the distant future. When the chasm between areas in terms of a 
political and wider institutional base (required for implementing programmes) widens 
because of continuing, or even increasing neglect of the historically backward areas, 
conflict, separatism and violence can erupt. This may further slow down the pace of an 
already lagging process of institutional development. 
 
Alternatively, the former princely states of Pakistan that are currently part of Balochistan 
province (and account for the major part of the princely states areas in this household 
sample – mainly in the former princely state or Khanate of Kalat) experienced delayed 
and incomplete integration with Pakistan. These may also be areas where the popular 
sentiment of insurgency is stronger than in other parts of Balochistan. The princely 
states’ areas in the sample are therefore also likely to have stronger active insurgency 
(not always manifesting in violence), and the presence of insurgent groups who may be 
resentful of the state, and therefore its aid programmes. In such an interpretation, the 
princely states in Balochistan are really a proxy for the presence, control and possibly 
also appeal of insurgents. To test this channel, I re-run the IV estimation presented in 
tables 3 and 4, and include a dummy for areas part of princely states in 1947.   
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Table 6. Access to Aid: Princely States Mechanism (IV Estimates) 
 CDCP – I  BISP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log (n+1) killings at 
tehsil level 
-0.512*** -0.317** -0.444*** -0.380*** 
 (-3.60) (-1.96) (-3.54) (-3.07) 
     
Princely states 
dummy 
 -1.098***  -0.397** 
  (-4.63)  (-2.56) 
N 7786 7786 7786 7786 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Community and Household level controls same as in tables 3 and 4 
 
The effect of the former princely states in Table 6 above is pronounced. The princely 
states dummy is a strong and significant negative determinant of access to both 
programmes. Further, introducing the princely states dummy considerably reduces the 
magnitude of the IV coefficient of violent conflict for both programmes. 
 
3.5.4.2 Mechanism 2: Presence of Armed Non-state Groups 
 
The presence, influence and control of armed groups is a potential channel through 
which conflict may limit the access to cash transfer programmes. This may be because 
state-run and state-branded43 programmes may be a potent signal of the expanding reach 
of the government to arguably hitherto neglected areas that are likely to have welcomed 
the growing influence of armed non-state actors. Non-state armed actors who compete 
with the state for legitimacy of control over the local populations are resentful of, and 
therefore likely to block the coverage of state aid in areas of their control/influence.  
This plausible channel is mentioned in several anecdotal accounts by commentators, 
journalists and aid agencies that operate in conflict-affected areas (Gul, 2010; Jones and 
Fair, 2011; Gunaratna and Iqbal, 2010). Specifically, the abduction of and assaults on aid 
                                                          
43 Both programmes under consideration bear a strong image of the Pakistani state and political leadership 
in their name; the CDCP was locally known as Watan, meaning Nation; whereas the BISP is explicitly 
named after, and to honour Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister and assassinated leader of the then-
incumbent Pakistan People’s Party 
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workers and local bureaucrats, as well as targeted attacks on aid missions and offices44 
reflect the real threats of implementing aid programmes in conflict-affected areas of 
Pakistan. 
Measuring the influence of the control or relative strength and influence of armed 
groups is not very straightforward. This is because areas affected by violence, are often, 
but not always areas of rebel control (Kalyvas, 2006; Justino and Ibanez, 2014). Violence 
erupts where there is a live contestation; when either armed groups demonstrates a 
degree of temerity in attacking civilian areas, or when state forces intrude areas occupied 
by non-state armed groups to regain control. In several other areas where the non-state 
armed groups are in greater/complete control, state forces may be unwilling and unable 
to enter and therefore no instances of violence may be reported in these areas. While 
violence can be observed and reported in government and media open source outlets, 
there is no such available source for data on areas under effective control of armed 
groups.  
Estimating Taliban Presence through its Effect on Girls’ Schooling 
As the direct observation of the areas of armed group control is almost impossible, I 
attempt to find a proxy measure for the degree of armed group influence in Pakistan. 
Several observers and aid agencies, as well as direct sources of the Tehrik-e-Taliban 
Pakistan have referred to the direct targeting of girls’ schooling in areas of the TTP’s 
presence (Constable 2011; Rashid 2008, 2009; Gul 2009). These groups reject the concept 
of modern (seen as Western and un-Islamic) education, particularly girls’ schooling and 
have specifically attacked girls school buildings to enforce their agenda. This manifests 
in the direct targeting of school buildings, particularly for girls’ schools, as well as other 
forms of threat, pressure and moral policing they are able to impose which deters girls’ 
school attendance and enrolment. The ICG (2013) reports that before the Swat military 
operation in 2009 when the valley was under the effective control of the Taliban, nearly 
400 of the total 1600 schools had been attacked and that about 70 percent of the schools 
attacked were girls’ schools. According to the Global Coalition to Protect Education from 
                                                          
44 Such as a targeted attack on the Turbat, Balochistan office of the BISP in August 2010. Dawn, 09 August 
2010. 
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Attack (2014), militants carried out anywhere between 838 and 919 attacks on schools 
across Pakistan, between 2009 and 2012 alone.  
I exploit this stylistic fact to identify the degree of control of non-state armed groups, 
mainly the TTP affiliates, by treating such control/influence as a latent (omitted) variable 
in the production function of girls’ primary school enrolment. The guiding assumption 
for the following analysis is that after controlling for all plausible demand and supply-
side factors that determine the rate of girls’ enrolment in primary schooling at the 
community level,45 the presence of Taliban-affiliate groups would decrease the 
enrolment rate. 
Using data on girls’ primary school enrolment and a range of household and 
community-level characteristics that reflect demand and supply-side determinants of 
girls’ schooling, I estimate a model to determine girls’ primary school attendance at the 
community level. After including a vast number of control variables, I argue that the 
residuals from such an extensive estimation consist essentially of (a) the influence of TTP 
and affiliate groups, which is an important omitted variable that determines girls’ 
schooling, and (b) the (usual) stochastic error term. This is laid out formally below: 
𝐹_𝐸𝑁𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑋𝐷𝑐 + 𝛾2𝑋𝑆𝑐 + 𝛾3𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑐 + 𝑒𝑐 
… (4) 
Where 
 
F_ENROL is the rate of female primary enrolment in community C 
XD is the matrix of demand side factors that determine female primary enrolment at the 
community level including adult male and female education, average household 
income/wealth indicators, community infrastructure, community ethnicity 
characteristics, community-level linguistic fractionalisation, displacement status of 
community (due to flood) 
                                                          
45 Including adult female educational attainment that controls for attitudinal drivers of the gender bias in 
primary schooling 
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XS is the matrix of supply-side determinants of female enrolment including the presence 
of primary girls’ schools in the community, access to electricity, community-level state 
presence 
ANSA is the extent of the control of Armed Non-State Actors (more specifically the TTP 
groups). This is not observed in the data. 
e is the random error term 
As ANSA is not observed, an econometric estimation of F_ENROL will essentially 
determine:  
𝐹_𝐸𝑁𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑋𝐷𝑐 + 𝛾2𝑋𝑆𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐 
… (5) 
Where u is the error term that contains the omitted ANSA variable 
𝑢𝑐 = 𝛾3𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑐 + 𝑒𝑐 
… (6) 
If XD and XS sufficiently control for the main determinants of female primary enrolment, 
the residual uc in Equation (5) above therefore will follow the same distribution as/will 
reflect the (omitted) ANSA variable (as the true error, ec  is randomly distributed).  
Girls’ schooling in Pakistan faces several hurdles and much resistance, in no small part 
from conservative social attitudes against girls’ schooling and mobility. Such 
unobservable factors could well be important determinants of girls schooling. In order 
to control for this, I specifically include community-level measures of adult female 
educational attainment to capture the effect of attitudes/biases against girls’ schooling 
and to ensure that the residual term is not conflated with attitudinal resistance to girls 
schooling, and is therefore a closer approximate of the presence of the TTP groups. It is 
important to note that Equation 5 above is not a causal estimation of female primary 
enrolment rates; I recognise that the control variables may indeed be endogenous. The 
attempt however, is to estimate equation 5 as a type of decomposition exercise to isolate 
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the residual uc. This approach is inspired by macroeconomic analyses of Total Factor 
Productivity growth through the ‘Solow residual’ (Solow: 1956, 1957).  
I use the residuals from Equation 5 above (uc) to proxy the presence of the TTP46 (results 
of the full estimation are presented in Appendix 3.4). As per the assumptions of the effect 
of armed non state actors’ control on girls’ primary enrolment, 𝛾3 should be negative, 
exerting, therefore an overall negative effect on 𝑢𝑐. In order to test for any effect of the 
presence of armed groups, I divide the sample into two sub-samples:  
(i) where 𝑢𝑐 > 0, i.e. areas with less likely presence of Taliban-affiliate groups 
(ii) where 𝑢𝑐 < 0, areas where armed non state groups are more likely to be 
present.  
I then test if the effects of conflict are driven by/are stronger in sub-sample (ii) viz. sub-
sample (i). In case the armed non state groups are not in fact an omitted variable in the 
estimation of female primary enrolment rates, the residual 𝑢𝑐 should be a pure, unbiased 
error term. In such a case the value of the coefficient of IV estimate of conflict on access 
to aid should not be substantially different between the two sub-samples (as the division 
of the sample along the 0 value of a random error term is essentially, random).  However, 
in case there is an omitted variable (i.e armed groups control is an omitted determinant 
of female primary enrolment), and the presence of armed groups does indeed explain at 
least part of the effect of conflict on access to aid, the coefficient values between the two 
sub-samples should vary substantially.   
I now present results of the IV estimation of the effect of conflict on access to the two 
cash transfer programmes at the household level across the two sub-samples that are 
respectively less and more likely to be characterised by the control/presence of TTP-
affiliate groups, based on the residuals analysis of the community-level estimates of 
girls’ primary school enrolment rates described above. Results of the community-level 
regressions for the rate of girls’ primary school enrolment in order to derive residuals to 
                                                          
46 Henceforth TTP presence is used to refer to presence of the TTP as well as its affiliates 
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identify areas with the more/less likely presence of the TTP are presented in Appendix 
3.5.  
 
Table 7. CDCP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed Groups (IV 
estimates) based on Primary Female Enrolment Residuals 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings -0.512*** -0.064 -0.760*** 
 (-3.60) (-0.27) (-6.03) 
N 7767 3313 3552 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Community and Household level controls same as in table 3  
 
Table 7 above clearly shows that the negative effect of conflict on the receipt of CDCP is 
driven by the sub-sample that is more likely to contain communities where Taliban-
affiliate groups are present. In this sub-sample, the coefficient of conflict is statistically 
significant and larger in magnitude than for the full sample. While the IV estimate of 
conflict is still negative in the sub-sample with lower likelihood of the presence of the 
TTP, it is of smaller magnitude and is not statistically significant. Such a sharp 
divergence in coefficient values and significance between the two sub-samples provides 
some support for the hypothesis that TTP presence limits access to aid. While overall a 
10% increase in the number of killings at the sub-district level reduced the likelihood of 
a household receiving CDCP – I transfers by 4.9%. According to table 7, this effect is as 
strong as 7.2% in areas with the more likely presence of the Taliban, and only 0.01% in 
areas with less likely Taliban presence. I now examine similar effects for the BISP. 
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Table 8. BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed Groups (IV 
Estimates) based on Primary Female Enrolment Residuals 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings -0.444*** -0.398*** -0.628*** 
 (-3.54) (-2.72) (-3.07) 
N 7767 3313 3552 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Community and Household level controls same as in table 3b 
 
In Table 8 above the magnitude of the effect of conflict is stronger in the sub-sample with 
the more likely presence of the TTP. In the division of sub-samples based on the residuals 
of the female primary enrolment estimation, in the areas with less likely TTP control, 
conflict also has a negative and significant effect of the likelihood of receiving BISP. Yet, 
this magnitude is smaller than in the sub-sample with more likely TTP control. For the 
full sample, a 10% increase in the number of killings at the sub-district level reduced the 
likelihood of household BISP receipt by 4.2%. According to Table 8, this effect is 6% in 
areas with the more likely presence of the Taliban, and 3.8% in areas with less likely 
Taliban presence. This indicates that the presence of the TTP is at least a partial 
explanation for how conflict reduces access to BISP.  
The above analysis links the presence of non-state armed groups with access to aid by 
making use of one feature of the Taliban worldview: their avowed opposition to girls’ 
schooling. Table 1 showed that the overwhelmingly large part of political violence in 
Pakistan over the 2000s was in fact due to terror and counter-terror operations that in 
large part involved the TTP. However the presence of other (i.e non-TTP) non-state 
armed groups, in particular insurgents is significant in Balochistan. Their presence is not 
captured in the analysis above (Tables 7 and 8) as they do not share the TTP’s doctrinaire 
opposition to girls schooling.47 The analysis therefore specifically examines the 
                                                          
47 Baloch society in general is marked by the presence and persistence of strong structural and attitudinal 
barriers to girls’ schooling and empowerment;  opposing girls’ schooling as a tactics of asserting control in 
the TTP fashion, however, is not on the Baloch insurgents’ agenda 
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presence/control of the TTP and affiliates as a mechanism for the effect of conflict. In 
order to ensure that the results above are not contaminated by areas where violence is 
motivated by the Baloch insurgency, I present estimates from the analysis done after 
excluding the Balochistan province. I would ideally have liked to exclude only the 
instances of insurgent violence in Balochistan (and retaining TTP-linked violence, which 
is present in much of northern Balochistan), but owing to difficulties in identifying the 
motive in several acts of violence based on the SATP conflict events timeline, I examine 
the effects of armed group presence by excluding Balochistan altogether.  
Table 9. CDCP - I Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed Groups 
(IV estimates) based on Primary Female Enrolment Residuals: Excluding Balochistan  
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings 0.110 0.322** -0.340 
 (0.89) (2.06) (-1.64) 
N 6246 2741 2872 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Community and Household level controls same as in tables 3 and 4 
 
Table 10. BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed Groups (IV 
estimates) based on Primary Female Enrolment Residuals: Excluding Balochistan  
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings -0.201** -0.201 -0.333* 
 (-2.05) (-1.61) (-1.67) 
N 6246 2741 2872 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Community and Household level controls same as in tables 3 and 4 
 
The main results in tables 7 and 8 are also visible after excluding Balochistan (even 
though the statistical significance is reduced, possibly because of the reduced sample 
size). Based on the residuals from the community-level estimation of girls’ primary 
schooling rates, we see that in areas with the less likely presence of the TTP outside 
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Balochistan, conflict in fact increases the likelihood of receiving transfers, while it has 
the opposite effect in areas with the higher likelihood of TTP presence. This is significant 
as it suggests a more aggressive rollout and/or uptake of flood relief transfers in conflict-
affected areas where the security threat from TTP presence is lower, alluding to the 
government’s aim to use transfers to win support in conflict-affected areas, combined 
with the effective ability to do so when not faced with threats from the TTP. In contrast, 
in areas with the higher likelihood of TTP presence conflict has a more pronounced 
negative effect on flood relief receipts. In the case of the BISP as in Table 8, it appears 
that the negative effect of conflict on BISP is stronger in areas with the more likely 
presence of the TTP. 
Varying coefficients in sub-samples: Chance division or likely link with Taliban-
presence? 
I critically examine the likelihood of obtaining sub-samples that yield coefficients of such 
varying magnitudes as are visible in Tables 7 – 10. In order to establish that the strong 
differences in the IV probit coefficients in the sub-samples with more and less likely 
presence of the Taliban are not driven by a ‘chance’ division of the sample, I compare 
the IV probit coefficients from the sub-samples identified above (more/less likely Taliban 
presence) with the distribution of IV probit coefficients from a random division of 
communities. I draw 1000 random combinations of communities into two groups, run 
the IV probit estimation over both, and then plot the coefficients from the two randomly 
drawn sub-samples, f and f’ in a graph (Fig. 3 below). I also mark the IV probit 
coefficients from my initial estimation for the entire sample (-0.512), and the sub-samples 
with less (-0.064) and more (-0.760) likely presence of the TTP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
Fig. 3 IV probit estimates of the effect of conflict on likelihood of receiving CDCP-I 
transfers from 1000 random divisions of communities  
 
As is to be expected, the distributions of coefficients from the two randomly-assigned 
sub-samples (f and f’) are normally distributed around the coefficient from the full 
sample (-0.512). As the coefficients are from randomly drawn sub-samples f and f’ also 
overlap quite closely. It is significant that the coefficients from the specific cut of the 
sample that I argue demarcates more/less likely Taliban presence lie towards the far left 
and right ends of the distributions f and f’. In fact, I find that only 4.8% of the sub-samples 
pertaining to f and 4% of the sub-samples pertaining to f’ have coefficient values equal 
to or lower than my estimate of the sub-sample with more likely presence of the Taliban. 
Similarly, 0.2% of the sub-samples pertaining to f and 0.3% of those pertaining to  f’ have 
coefficients that are higher than my estimate from the sub-sample with more likely 
Taliban presence.  
Finally, I find that in none of all the 1000 random divisions of the sample is the estimate 
from f lower than or equal to -0.760 and that from f’ is greater than or equal to -0.064 (or 
vice versa, i.e. from f’ and f respectively). This suggests that it is extremely unlikely to 
randomly draw combinations of sub-samples that yield such divergent estimates of the 
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effect of conflict on the receipt of CDCP-I transfers as arise from the sub-samples in Table 
7 with higher/lower likelihood of community-level Taliban presence.  
Similarly, I repeat this exercise for the BISP, as well as for both programmes with the 
sample excluding Balochistan, using coefficients from the IV linear probability model 
estimations.48 I find that for the BISP in only 10.5% of 1000 draws is the coefficients from 
the linear probability model estimation from f lower than or equal to the LPM coefficient 
for the sub-sample with more likely Taliban presence (-0.178) and that from f’ is greater 
than or equal to -0.084, the LPM coefficient from the sub-sample with less likely Taliban 
presence (and 11.3% vice versa, i.e. from f’ and f respectively). This further suggests the 
low likelihood of obtaining such a sub-sample from a random draw. I replicate this 
exercise for the sample after excluding Balochistan (as with Tables 9 and 10) and find 
that the likelihood of obtaining such divergent coefficients between the sub-samples is 
rather low compared to sub-samples from repeated random draws (15.9% and 12.4% for 
BISP in both combinations of f and f’, and in none of the combinations – of f and f’ and f’ 
and f – for CDCP - I). Full details of these workings and the distribution of IV LPM 
coefficients from repeated random draws are presented in Appendix 3.6.  
 
3.5.5 Unpacking under-coverage due to conflict: The extensive and intensive margins 
of programme (in)accessibility 
 
I now examine the patterns in which conflict reduces households’ access to the two state 
aid programmes. Specifically, conflict may result in two sources of under-coverage of 
programmes. First, entire communities affected by conflict may be excluded from 
programme rollout due to security-related, institutional or other factors. In a second 
possible modus, conflict may reduce the community-level rate of coverage of the 
programmes; i.e. ceteris paribus, a smaller proportion of the population in conflict-
                                                          
48 While I present IV probit estimates in earlier sections of this chapter for interpretational ease, for the 
simulations I deploy a linear probability model because the IV probit estimation failed to converge for 
several of the 1000 attempted simulations. To ensure a distribution of coefficients from a truly random 
division of the sample into sub-samples, I generate the distribution of coefficients from a Linear 
probability model and compare the LPM coefficients from the specific sub-samples associated with 
more/less likely Taliban presence to such a distribution. 
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affected areas receives aid. This second effect may be because even after being able to 
enter/access a conflict-affected community, there may be factors related to both, security 
concerns and institutional quality that may limit aid workers from thoroughly reaching 
intended beneficiaries. Both of these (community isolation from, and limited reach of 
state aid) are important from the standpoint of delivering aid in a conflict-affected 
setting, and may require potentially very different approaches to overcome on the 
ground. In addition to conflict affecting the supply of aid programmes, it may also affect 
the demand. Some or all households in a community may, owing to security concerns, 
be unwilling, or unable to fulfil the necessary bureaucratic procedures or access local 
bureaucrats/offices. Both demand and supply side factors may therefore result in the 
complete isolation from, or the limited spread of aid programmes in violence-affected 
settings.  
 
I now examine whether conflict (a) increases the likelihood of the complete exclusion of 
communities from the coverage of programmes, and/or (b) results in lower average 
coverage rates, even conditional on the programmes being present in the community at 
all. Recall here that differences in coverage are not driven by differences in eligibility for 
programmes, as the variables that determine programme eligibility (flood exposure and 
chronic poverty) were included as regressors in all the IV estimates presented so far.49  
 
I conduct this analysis at the community level, as both dependant variables, a 
community without any sample household receiving the programme (= 1, else 0), and 
the average rate of coverage across the community (continuous between 0 and 1) are 
community-level indicators.  Table 11 below shows the IV probit estimates of the 
determinants of the complete absence of the two programmes from the community. In 
the case of CDCP – I, two additional regressors, community-level flood exposure index, 
and the share of households that were displaced by flooding (that affected eligibility) are 
included. I also include a dummy variable for communities in a district classified as a 
                                                          
49 To ensure that such differences are not driven by differential eligibility between conflict and non-conflict 
areas, I regress a series of variables that proxy eligibility for CDCP – I and BISP on conflict (using a similar 
IV approach as above) and suitable control variables and the measure of conflict does not significantly affect 
any of the indicators of programme eligibility. These results are presented in Appendix 7. 
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“Nation Building District” by the Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan (GoP, 
2010). This refers to districts with lagging development indicators (Ibid. pp. 211), and are 
described as “breeding grounds of alienation and conflict.”50 Further, the report calls 
upon the Government of Pakistan to prioritise these districts for aid receipts. It states, 
“[T]hese regions should be designated as Nation-Building Regions of Pakistan, which 
must receive priority support in social protection programmes and policies.”51 Province 
dummies, the distance of the community from the province and district capital, 
dummies for topography and for areas being part of former princely states, the distance 
to the nearest armed forces cantonment, and indices of the presence of state institutions, 
community infrastructure and linguistic fractionalisation are also included as controls.  
 
Table 11. IV probit estimates of the total absence of CDCP – I and BISP in the 
community (Marginal effects) 
 CDCP - I BISP 
Log (1+n) killings - tehsil 0.188** 0.613*** 
 (2.16) (3.88) 
N 497 497 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
We see in Table 11 above that violence increases the likelihood of complete exclusion of 
villages from the programme. The effects are stronger in case of the more targeted BISP, 
compared to the near-universal (excluding in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) CDCP 
Phase I transfers.  
 
Does conflict also reduce community-level access to cash transfers at the intensive 
margin, i.e. the rate of community-level cash transfer coverage? In order to examine this, 
I use an IV Tobit model in which I model the average coverage rate of a programme in a 
community (simply, the share of households in the community that receives the transfer) 
as a continuous variable censored between 0 (indicating complete absence of the 
programme), and 1(full community-level coverage), as outlined in Long (1997). As the 
                                                          
50 Ibid. pp. 145 
51 Ibid. pp. 145 
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CDCP – I is designed to be near-universal, unlike the BISP, the right-censoring of the 
coverage rate variable is effectively relevant only for the CDCP. 
 
Table 12. IV Tobit estimates of the community-level rates of coverage: CDCP – I and 
BISP  
 CDCP - I BISP 
Log (1+n) killings - tehsil -0.256** -0.156** 
 (-2.30) (-2.48) 
N 497 497 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Dependent variable censored between 0 and 1 
24 left-censored observations and 13 right-censored observations for CDCP – I   
129 left-censored observations and 0 right-censored observations for BISP 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
As we see in Table 12 above, conflict also reduces the average coverage rates of CDCP – 
I and BISP at the community level.  This is significant as it shows that conflict reduces 
programme access at both, the intensive and the extensive margins of community 
coverage. As mentioned earlier, these effects may operate through both demand and 
supply side factors affecting programme coverage.  
 
3.5.6 Robustness Checks 
 
I test whether the results presented in this chapter are robust to alternate specifications. 
First I consider two alternate Instrumental Variables for conflict, the community distance 
to the nearest official border crossing, and the share of Pashtun population in the 
community (proxied by the share of survey interviews conducted in Pushto). I present 
the causal estimates using these two IVs in Appendices 3.1 and 3.2 and find that the main 
results are robust to the choice of IV, with the same direction and level of significance of 
coefficients, but with slightly varying point estimates.  
 
While this chapter measures conflict as a continuous variable, the natural log of 1 + n, 
the number of people killed in conflict in the tehsil over 2001-10, as a robustness test I use 
a dummy measure of conflict exposure that indicates whether or not the tehsil 
104 
 
experienced any violence over the period. Results are presented in Appendix 3.3, and 
echo the findings presented in this chapter.  
 
In 3.4.3.2 I determine likely Taliban presence based on residuals from the community-
level estimation of female primary enrolment rates. I additionally compare these results 
with sub-samples of likely Taliban presence based on residuals from the community-
level estimation of the gender gap in primary school enrolments (Male – Female 
enrolment rates). I find that the main results follow the same pattern as those based on 
residuals from the estimation of female primary enrolment rates.  
 
3.6 Discussion 
 
This chapter has shown that conflict reduces household access to the CDCP – I and BISP 
programmes in Pakistan. This is visible at the level of household access, as well as the 
more aggregate community level. The results are strongly significant and are robust to 
the choice of the measure of conflict (discrete v/s continuous), and to the use of alternate 
IVs. 
 
While the Pakistani state seeks to concentrate social protection efforts in conflict-affected 
areas, the actual access to aid is shown to be reduced by exposure to conflict. This 
suggests, therefore, that while the intention of the state may be to reach out to people in 
conflict-affected areas, the ability of state programmes to reach populations, or for local 
populations to demand and access state aid,  may fall short. This may be because of 
several reasons, some of which I explore in this paper.  
 
The institutions associated with indirect colonial rule in the former princely states that 
are part of Pakistan reduce the access to aid, at the household level, as well as in terms 
of the presence of programmes in communities at all, as well as the coverage rates in 
communities. This is significant and holds even after controlling for the presence of state 
institutions as well as infrastructure at the community-level. It is also noteworthy that 
this feature is common to both cash transfer programmes, regardless of their beneficiary 
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profile, degree of intended targeting, recurrence/frequency of payment and amount of 
financial assistance provided. The specific ways in which the legacy of princely rule 
entails lower access to aid are not immediately clear. There could be direct institutional 
effects; for instance the history of “decentralised despotism” alluded to earlier and 
described by Lange (2003b) may mean that a populace long used to customary 
institutions of patronage-based relief and assistance from local chiefs may be less able to 
pressure /demand access to aid programmes from the state. However, this may also 
reflect a hidden factor. Most of the princely states in the sample are part of the 
Balochistan province. These areas in Balochistan are also the areas which have not fully 
integrated with independent Pakistan, and where the insurgency movement enjoys 
greater popular support. This also means that areas in the princely states of Balochistan 
are likely to have a greater presence and control of insurgent groups, and regardless of 
the actual incidence of violence (which need not overlap exactly with areas of rebel 
control, as fighting takes place in contested areas), and either a resistance to allow the 
entry of aid programmes, on reluctance/hesitation on the part of households to access 
state aid in the presence of insurgents. This could operate through covert and overt 
threats to local bureaucrats and local populations alike. It is hard to disentangle any 
institutional effects associated with princely state rule from the conflation of incomplete 
integration with Pakistan and the presence (not always manifesting in violence) of 
insurgents in these areas. This requires further exploration in future research.  
 
I also provide evidence for the effective control of TTP-linked armed groups being a 
plausible mechanism that explains why conflict reduces access to the two cash-transfer 
programmes at the household level. The effective control of militant groups is hard to 
observe from published sources of data, or household surveys. This chapter makes an 
attempt to proxy such presence based on the TTP’s relentless opposition of girls’ 
schooling, and their effective ability to enforce their writ in areas of their control. I find 
that the effect of conflict on access to aid is driven largely by areas with a greater 
likelihood of the presence of the TTP-affiliate groups.  
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The (perceived or real) threat to state officials’ security, or to potential beneficiary 
households could well be the reason that causes conflict to reduce access to aid, and this 
chapter provides suggestive evidence for this thesis. This is also expressed in several 
news reports covering the targeting of aid programmes, both Pakistani and foreign-
funded, state and private (Gul, 2010; Constable, 2011). This fact is also acknowledged by 
the Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan:   
 
“The challenge in NWFP [North-West Frontier Province, now called 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] and FATA comes from groups that seek to 
impose their own vision of society on the majority. They violate 
democratic norms, actively and violently oppose social policy and 
development initiatives such as girls’ schooling, immunization 
campaigns, and even income transfers to women. The armed activities of 
militants and the state’s armed response has led to large-scale loss of life, 
displacement, and destruction of infrastructure, particularly social 
infrastructure. There has been massive disruption to livelihoods and 
economic activity.” 
- (GoP 2010), pp. 145 
 
Such targeting of aid workers and bureaucrats by militants, also confirmed in informal 
interviews with Pakistani bureaucrats and NGO workers about the challenges in 
administering programmes in conflict-affected areas, is a non-trivial factor.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explores the responsiveness of aid programmes to violent conflict in 
Pakistan and finds significant results. Aid programmes are viewed as instruments for 
the state to reach out to people living in conflict-affected areas, in order to both redress 
historical neglect which may have created conditions for conflict in the first instance, as 
well as to win over people’s loyalties and thus attack the support base of armed groups.  
 
It appears that in Pakistan, exposure to violence indeed reduces access to two state aid 
programmes, analysed separately. These results are representative for the CDCP 
programme, for which the household survey dataset is representative. While the dataset 
used is not representative of the intended coverage of BISP, the results presented for the 
BISP follow the same direction. This suggesting that though not valid as a commentary 
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on the BISP as a programme on the whole (which has larger, nationwide intended 
coverage), for the population studied in this analysis – i.e. the flood–affected areas of 
Pakistan, access to regular the BISP was negatively affected by exposure to conflict.  
 
The results indicate the salience of aid programmes in the contest for popular support 
between the state and armed groups, the effective capabilities of armed groups to 
prevent the distribution of aid, the greater (perceived) threat of households accessing 
state aid in the presence of non-state armed groups, and the absence of a means that 
allows the state to buy-off rebels to permit aid disbursement. For these reasons, such 
programmes are resented and resisted by armed groups, and become a bone of 
contention between them and the state. As a result of this tussle, households in conflict-
affected areas have, after controlling for other factors, lower access to aid programmes 
because of violent conflict. In some cases, this manifests as the complete absence of 
programmes from villages/cities, indicating a sort of isolation of such communities from 
the redistributive role of the state. In other instances, it results in lower rates of coverage 
within communities, reflecting a curtailed connect between citizens and the state. The 
reduced access to aid because of conflict is channelled not through the absence of state 
institutions or physical infrastructure, but more through institutional factors. 
Specifically, I find that conflict may be able to exacerbate historical institutional frailties 
associated with indirect colonial rule through the former princely states (that joined 
Pakistan in 1947 or after). The likely presence of armed groups, indicative of a distinct 
institutional set-up, also plausibly reduces access to aid. Physical threats to aid workers 
and local-level bureaucrats, as also to local populations, associated with the 
unobservable presence and control of armed non-state groups is also an important 
mechanism linking conflict with lower aid receipts.  
 
The present analysis has not engaged with whether conflict reduces access to aid 
through demand or supply channels. While security concerns may be operating on both, 
recipient households and on aid workers/bureaucrats, it is not clear which side is more 
directly/heavily constrained by conflict. Further exploration could potentially help 
identify ways in which delivery mechanisms can be altered to reduce the security threat 
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in providing/receiving aid; for instance through the use of Information Technology. This 
is an important topic for future research, in Pakistan and beyond.  
 
This chapter also calls for a closer and more critical examination of the potential of aid 
programmes in conflict. The somewhat simplistic assumption that aid can achieve peace 
and prosperity in conflict-affected settings papers over the many difficulties that, as this 
chapter has shown, impede the rollout of aid in areas ridden with strife. The risk of using 
aid as a political instrument is that it can then become a political target itself. 
Governments and donors must therefore be very measured in prescribing aid as a 
remedy to conflict.  
 
Another message from this chapter pertains to the branding of aid. The two programmes 
examined here bear the strong mark of the Pakistani state and political establishment. 
This is understandable, particularly given that these were rolled out soon after Pakistan’s 
most recent democratic transition under a new government determined to make its 
presence felt, including perhaps, by sending a political signal of the presence of a welfare 
state in a fraught environment. While there is no counterfactual available to examine if 
less nationalistic naming/packaging of such programmes would make them less 
susceptible to targeting by armed groups, it can be argued that a conspicuous stamp of 
the state is more likely to matter in violently contested political space, compared to in 
more peaceful areas. Policymakers must perhaps consider more carefully whether some 
kinds of symbolic messaging makes programmes more vulnerable, and therefore less 
accessible in conflict-affected areas.  
 
Aid is not a silver bullet for buying peace. As this chapter has shown, its ability to reach 
intended beneficiaries is compromised by conflict, particularly in the presence of non-
state armed groups. Any political, or human development aims of aid programmes, 
ranging from marginal income support to nation-building, therefore continue to 
necessitate the more conventional and structural solutions. In an excellent review of 
Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts, Yusuf (2014) identifies the key challenges of 
overcoming terrorist conflict in Pakistan to include the persistence of outdated laws, 
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policies and jurisdictions, the absence of a coordinating counterterrorism body that can 
effectively integrate the currently disparate actions, insufficient improvements in the 
capacity of the local police and the state to track and freeze militant funding, the 
continuing civil-military imbalance in Pakistan’s politics, and the insufficient public 
support and pressure for counterterrorism. All these point to the salience of deep 
structural factors that either give rise to conflict or allow it to fester. Combating conflict, 
or seeking to promote human development in areas affected by it cannot skirt these 
pertinent aspects of governance. Aid may be too feeble an instrument to achieve such 
ends without substantial governance reform and strengthening. Governance reforms 
can also be addressed to reducing historical weaknesses of institutions that I have shown 
exacerbate the effects of violent conflict on access to aid.  
 
On the whole, conflict has a profound impact on the social protection and disaster relief 
landscape in Pakistan, with serious implications for access and targeting. These factors 
reemphasise the need for conflict-sensitive analyses to inform the rollout and assessment 
of aid programmes. They also underscore the insufficiency of development programme 
design and administration “as usual”, in the distinct political and institutional settings 
created, and marked, by violent conflict. 
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Chapter 4. Informal Finance, Investment, and Insecurity: 
How Violent Conflict Affects Access to Remittances in 
Pakistan 
 
ABSTRACT: I examine the causal effects of long-term exposure to conflict, measured 
at the micro level, on households’ receipt of remittances. Using IV estimation to 
overcome the endogeneity of conflict exposure and remittance receipts, and controlling 
for a range of confounding factors, I find that, contrary to the literature from country-
level case studies, long-term exposure to conflict reduces households’ receipts of 
remittances. Informal modes of money transfer (as against formal banking), the likely 
presence of Taliban-affiliate armed groups, and more strongly, the overlap of these two 
factors, likely explain why conflict exposure leads to lower remittance receipts in 
Pakistan. This suggests that remittances are lower in conflict-affected areas in response 
to the higher risk and insecurity; which is confirmed by the fact that the negative effects 
of conflict on remittances are also stronger for groups that are more likely to use such 
receipts to invest, rather than for consumption.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been a sharpened focus on the role and potential of remittances 
in spurring growth, promoting development and establishing new terms of North-
South, and also South-South economic engagement. A growing global migrant worker 
population, estimated to surpass 250 million in 2015, is responsible for remittance flows 
to developing countries as high as US$ 436 billion in 2014 (World Bank, 2015a). For 
several countries, including Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Nepal, remittance receipts are a 
very large part of the GDP (World Bank, 2015b) and for several others, including 
Pakistan, international remittance receipts far exceed inflows of foreign exchange from 
other sources, namely Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI; source: Ahmed and Zorzoso, 2013).  
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The discussion on the role of remittances in promoting development is particularly 
interesting. While even the supporters of remittances caution against viewing them as a 
panacea, or as a replacement for development assistance and aid programmes (Ratha, 
2007; Savage and Harvey, 2007), remittances can be a very effective complement to 
official aid flows for development due to several reasons. Remittances flow directly from 
migrant workers to recipient households without incurring the heavy administrative 
and bureaucratic costs that state-run cash transfer programmes do.52 Remittance 
receipts, unlike FDI flows, are also often counter-cyclical; they tend to increase in times 
of economic crisis, and thus help retain foreign exchange reserves to secure financial 
stability at the macroeconomic level. At the household level, remittances can respond to 
idiosyncratic or covariate shocks, including financial, humanitarian and political crises; 
affected households often draw on greater outside assistance when the local means of 
livelihood and survival are hit. Further, remittances are used by households not only for 
financing consumption requirements, but also for investment purposes. Such 
investments from external receipts into the local economy can improve productivity, and 
accelerate economic activity, beyond its multiplier effects on the local economy from 
increases in consumption demand financed by remittance receipts (Ahmed, 2000; 
Lindley, 2007; Maimbo, 2006).  
 
Violent conflict can create a set of conditions which may simultaneously accentuate the 
need for remittances and encumber its reach. Existing studies on remittances in conflict-
affected countries have focused on national data and have found that the onset of conflict 
is accompanied by higher receipts of remittances in countries such as Somalia, Sri Lanka 
and Nepal. Some studies have also found that conflict does indeed help households 
weather economic hardship in conflict-affected areas, by extending a ‘lifeline’ to those in 
dire need and preventing them from adopting costly coping strategies. Yet, the context 
of a protracted conflict can lead to heightened risk of investments in the area, as well as 
raise concerns of short-term, or even longer-term security of life and property. These 
factors may dampen investment-focused remittances and also lead many remitters to 
reconsider their longer-term economic interest in conflict-affected communities. Armed 
                                                          
52 even as the costs of transferring and receiving money may be significant to households 
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groups may pose direct or indirect threats to movements of money into areas under their 
control, through loot or taxation. This is likely to be higher when remittances pass 
through informal conduits that can be intercepted, rather than the formal banking 
system in which money transfers are less conspicuous. Violent conflict can also create 
logistical difficulties as border closures, destruction of infrastructure and the loss of 
documentation/IDs resulting from conflict can make it harder for households to access 
remittances. Owing to these factors, conflict may in fact reduce household access to 
remittances, even as it accentuates economic hardship and the need for remittances in 
the first place.  
 
Perhaps encouraged by findings from country-level studies focusing on altruistically 
motivated international remittances, policymakers often call for increasing the potential 
of remittances in conflict-affected countries such as Pakistan, by leveraging them for 
investment (World Bank, 2014; IGC, 2015). Such enthusiasm is not sufficiently informed 
by evidence on whether or how conflict may worsen the investment climate at the micro 
level, and therefore deter remittances.  
 
The relationship between conflict and remittances is not direct or simple, and can 
potentially vary across a range of household and community-level characteristics. 
Current analysis has not specifically explored how the local level exposure to violent 
conflict causes differences in remittance receipts, and how these may vary across 
households and groups. This chapter specifically examines: 
(i) Does exposure to violent conflict affect household-level remittance receipts? 
(ii) What mechanisms explain such links? 
 
I situate the above questions in the context of the massive 2010 floods in Pakistan that 
hit both, conflict-affected and non-conflict areas. This is a unique and valuable setting to 
study these questions, as several areas of Pakistan that were flooded in 2010 had also 
been exposed to growing and varying degrees of violent conflict over the preceding 
decade, and because the post-flood context means that household distress and the need 
for external help in the form of remittances were high. I use a large household dataset 
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representative of all the flood-affected areas of Pakistan in 2010 and develop sub-district 
level indices of violent conflict exposure over the 2001-2010 period. To address the 
endogeneity issue between conflict exposure and remittance receipts, I exploit variations 
in community-level distances to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, a correlate of 
proximity to the Taliban’s infiltration into Pakistan following the War on Terror, and 
thereafter of areas of militant operation and, eventually, confrontation with the Pakistani 
state to instrument conflict exposure (as in Chapter 3). I also control for a range of 
potentially confounding factors.  This empirical strategy allows me to estimate the causal 
relationship between violent conflict and remittance receipts, and to examine 
mechanisms and underlying heterogeneities.  
 
In this analysis, remittances are defined as cash and in-kind transfers received by the 
household from other individuals/ households residing outside their community 
(regardless of distance, potentially allowing transfers received from neighbouring 
communities to be classified as remittances) over a period of 12 months preceding the 
survey. I measure remittances received at the extensive (whether or not the household 
received any remittance) as well as intensive (monetary value of remittances received in 
cash and in kind, combined) margins. Unfortunately, the data used does not allow me 
to distinguish between domestic and foreign remittances.  I find that conflict reduces the 
receipt of remittances, at both the extensive and intensive margins. This is partly because 
non state armed groups (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or the TTP, and its affiliate groups) 
are likely able to threaten and disrupt the informal modes of money transfer. Having 
bank accounts, and therefore access to formal means of money transfers, insulates 
recipient households from the negative effects of conflict on remittances, regardless of 
the presence of armed groups. Further, the effects of conflict on remittances are driven 
by groups that are more likely to use remittance receipts to invest, rather than for 
consumption. The negative signal of long-term exposure to violent conflict on 
investments, i.e. greater business risk and uncertainty, is potentially another factor 
explaining why long term exposure to violent conflict reduces remittance receipts.  
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview of the 
literature on conflict and remittances, highlighting crucial gaps. 4.3 discusses the history 
of violent conflict in Pakistan in the decade before the 2010 floods, as well as the context 
of remittances in Pakistan, and the sources of data used. Section 4.4 outlines the 
Instrumental Variables estimation strategy, and discusses potential threats and the 
means of mitigating against them. Results are presented in Section 4.5, while 4.6 
discusses the findings in relation to the existing literature and concludes with notes for 
policy.  
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
4.2.1 Motives for Sending Remittances 
 
Remittance flows can arise out of two distinct motives. The first is what Lucas and Stark 
(1985) term as altruism, i.e. transfers driven by the need to help recipient households in 
times of hardship. Remittances are then seen as extending a ‘lifeline’ of support to 
recipient households that often choose to diversify household income and send members 
to work outside in order to be able to depend on remittances from them in times of need. 
Savage and Harvey (2007) review several studies (IOM, 2003; Connell and Brown, 2005, 
Meyers, 1998) and conclude that remittance receipts are mainly spent on consumption 
needs such as food, clothing, and transportation and health expenses. Remittances may 
also be used for consumption ends that pertain to social obligations. Carling et al. (2012) 
find that among remittance-sending Pakistanis in Norway, transfers are often made for 
wedding expenses, religious donations and humanitarian causes.  
 
Another motive for sending remittances is that these are seen as investments made by 
remitters in their areas of origin for an expected future return. Ahmed and Zorzoso 
(2013) term this the ‘portfolio approach’. Studies across countries have found that 
remittances are also sent to finance investments in real estate (Ballard, 2005), enterprises 
(Carling et al., 2012; McCormick and Wahba, 2002; Horst, 2006; Campbell and Kakusu, 
2006; IOM, 2005) and in agriculture (Ballard, 2005).  
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4.2.2 Remittances in Financial Crises and Natural Disasters  
 
Many studies have examined the relationship between remittances and the incidence of 
economic crises and natural disasters. Spatafora (2005) shows that remittance receipts 
increased considerably in response to financial crises in Indonesia in 1997, Ecuador in 
1999 and Argentina in 2001. Similarly, studies have found that remittance receipts at the 
country level increased in the aftermath of natural disasters. Using a cross-country 
dataset, Yang (2005) finds that remittances increase following hurricane events. Yang 
and Choi (2005) find that remittances were able to partially offset weather shock-induced 
losses in the Philippines. Other studies have also found that remittances increase in 
response to particular natural disaster events in several countries including the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti (World Bank, 2006), Bangladesh (Clay and Benson, 2006; 
World Bank, 2006), Jamaica (Clarke and Wallston, 2004), Guatemala (Gellert, 2006) and 
Grenada (World Bank, 2005). 
 
Investment-focused remittances respond to (changes in) the expected returns in the 
receiving country (El-Sakka and McNabb, 1999; Hysenbegasi and Pozo, 2002). Ratha 
(2003) finds that remittances were volatile in the Philippines, and declined in Turkey 
following financial crises in the late 1990s, and notes, more broadly, that investment-
focused remittances tend to be more volatile than those meant for consumption.  
 
Given that crises can increase altruistic remittance flows but decrease investment-
focused remittances, the aggregate effect of crises on remittances depends on the relative 
strengths of the two motives for remittances: altruism and investment. In other words, 
the effect of crises on remittance receipts is essentially an empirical question that 
depends on remitters’ motives for transferring money as well and how these are shaped 
by the characteristics of the remittance-receiving area.  
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4.2.3 Remittances and Conflict 
 
A growing number of studies is taking a closer look at remittance patterns in conflict 
and post-conflict settings. One strand of this literature has focused on the direct link 
between remittances and the conflict itself; by examining how remittances can be used 
to finance armed group activity in general and rebel groups in particular, as well as how 
they can contribute to future peacebuilding efforts (Collier, 2000; Ballentine and 
Nitzschke, 2003; Horst, 2008; Orjuela, 2008).  
 
Other studies come from country-level case studies that have found that remittances rise 
during conflict as some individuals migrate out of communities to other locations 
(usually abroad) and send back remittances to look after family members and relatives 
left behind. Seddon (2005) finds that remittances helped sustain the economy of Nepal 
over the long period of conflict and political upheaval in the 2000s even as local economic 
activity suffered. Lindley (2007) and Maimbo (2006) find micro-level evidence of the 
positive effects of remittances on households in Somalia; remittances that increased 
during conflict helped households cope better with losses and also encouraged a 
modicum of private sector growth, largely around the ‘remittance economy’, while the 
state collapsed. Monsutti (2006) finds that conflict-induced migration also led to the 
formation and operation of transnational remittance networks after the US-led War on 
Terror and the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the early 2000s. Other studies have 
examined remittance receipts and uses among war refugees from Somalia (Horst, 2006; 
Campbell and Kakusu, 2006; Lindley, 2009; Gundel, 2002), Sri Lanka (Orjuela, 2008; 
Erdal and Stokke, 2009), Afghanistan (Schutte, 2004; Fagen and Bump, 2006), and Eritrea 
and Bosnia (Al-Ali et al., 2001).  
 
Some studies have examined how violent conflict can impede access to remittances, i.e. 
potential routes through which money transfers are affected by violence. Fagen and 
Bump (2006) identify specific problems that remittances are likely to face in conflict-
affected countries: poor/weak financial institutions and investment opportunities, 
difficulties in implementing financial innovations and improving financial literacy, the 
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absence of government policies that encourage migrants and support migrant rights 
(unlike in more stable contexts), and global scepticism and discouragement of migration 
from, and financial transactions with many conflict-affected countries that are also 
centres of illicit trade and terrorism,. Savage and Harvey (2007) find that border closures 
between Sudan and Libya during conflict led to decreases in all economic transactions, 
including remittances, in Darfur. They note, more broadly, that damages to 
infrastructure in banking and communications as well as decisions to close borders and 
block or suspend mobile phone networks can, at least in the short run, disrupt remittance 
flows. They also note that the absence or collapse of the banking system can lead to 
greater reliance on informal mechanisms of money transfer. 
 
4.2.4 Contributions to the literature  
 
There remain several gaps in the literature on the links between conflict and remittances. 
First, there is limited causal evidence on how varying degrees of conflict exposure 
explain within-country variation in remittance receipts. This is important because there 
can be considerable divergence (or non-overlap) of conflict exposure and remittance 
receipts at the local level, that country-level case studies may miss. A more micro-level 
approach, as is attempted here, can potentially identify areas where conflict levels are 
too high for remittances to effectively reach populations, thus enabling a fuller 
understanding of these links which need not be linear or straightforward.  
 
Secondly, while some studies have identified the modes and mechanisms through which 
conflict may impede remittance flows (such as border closures, weaker 
telephone/banking connectivity), there is no causal empirical evidence linking conflict 
exposure with remittance receipts which is explained by the operation of such 
mechanisms.  
 
Thirdly, the literature on remittances in conflict focuses on conflict as a crisis event that 
entails greater hardship and therefore the need for remittances. Remittances in conflict 
are therefore seen to arise mainly from the altruism motive. However, there is no 
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evidence of the effect of conflict on investment-focused remittances, or on groups that 
are more likely to use remittances for investment rather than for consumption or basic 
survival. Conflict can potentially weaken institutions, impose barriers that hamper 
market integration, dampen economic activity, increase uncertainty about the future and 
thus increase the risk to business investments. In cases where more prosperous people 
are targeted in conflict, even building an asset base by acquiring large and conspicuous 
assets can increase conflict risk, and may therefore reduce investments in durable assets. 
Maimbo (2006) notes that remittances are effective in spurring investment and private 
sector growth only to the extent that there is a functioning government and basic public 
goods. No studies have specifically examined how conflict, which can affect both, 
governance and public goods provision, affects investment-focused remittances. While 
I do not have data on the actual use of remittances received (consumption v/s 
investment), I attempt to proxy this by assuming that households in higher per adult-
equivalent monthly food consumption expenditure quintiles are more likely to use 
remittances for investment than households in lower quintiles. I then examine whether 
the causal effect of conflict on remittance receipts varies across these quintiles, and 
therefore across groups more/less likely to use remittances for investment rather than 
consumption.  
 
Fourthly, academic literature has tended to focus on international remittances. While the 
impacts of foreign transfers on communities and countries may be larger, remittances 
arising from within the country can be considerable (Deshingkar, 2006; Castaldo et al., 
2012), and in any case, still of great importance to recipient households, many of whom 
may not have the means to undertake international migration. The data used for this 
chapter covers remittances from within the country and from abroad (but not separately, 
unfortunately), and therefore allows me to examine the effect of conflict on remittances, 
regardless of their source.  
 
Finally, existing studies tend to view conflict among crises as yet another type of shock 
to households, such as natural disasters or financial crises. While certain conflict events 
such as the sudden outbreak of war, or terrorist activity can indeed be seen as shocks, 
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the prevalence of violent conflict over a longer period of time indicates a changed 
institutional landscape rather than an anomalous, one-time event. This steady 
transformation calls for viewing conflict instead more as a state of nature; a setting in 
which household priorities, preferences, expectation and decisions (regarding 
investments, for example) may be very different from more peaceful areas. Savage and 
Harvey (2007) state (but do not sufficiently explore why, and how) that in long-running 
conflicts, it can be hard for remitters to continue sending money back home. People who 
have migrated out of areas that have been exposed to/continue to reel under conflict for 
long periods of time may reconsider their longer term pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
interest in origin areas, much more so than in peaceful and stable areas, and in response 
to most types of shocks. Faced with uncertain financial returns and prospects in native 
areas that are affected by violence and instability, migrants may choose instead to build 
a future in the destination area, and cut their future losses in the more insecure origin. 
This changed priority resulting from conflict can also affect the quantum and purpose of 
remittance flows. I therefore specifically examine the impact of longer-term exposure to 
conflict on remittances to understand how conflict affects remittances arising out of both, 
altruistic and investment motives.  
 
4.3 Data Sources and Context 
 
4.3.1 Data Sources 
 
For my analysis I use the baseline cross-section of the CDCP Impact Evaluation dataset 
(OPM, 2013). This dataset is representative of all flood-affected areas of the four major 
provinces of Pakistan: Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The 
dataset comprises 7802 households across 498 primary sampling units, including 448 
rural, and 50 urban areas. The survey for the baseline was conducted during December 
2011 – February 2012. The survey comprised detailed questionnaires for male and female 
respondents at the household level, and a detailed community-level module. The 
household questionnaire contains detailed modules on demographics, asset ownership, 
occupation, and the receipt of transfers including remittances and state cash transfers.  
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As mentioned in section 4.1, in this chapter remittances are defined as cash and in-kind 
transfers received by the household from other individuals/ households residing outside 
their community (regardless of distance, potentially allowing transfers received from 
neighbouring communities to be classified as remittances) – both within and outside 
Pakistan, over a period of one year preceding the survey. 
 
Conflict data were collected from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, a leading conflict 
news media monitoring agency that conducts a detailed scan of 9 leading Pakistani 
newspapers and provides a summary record of conflict events. Conflict events over the 
period January 2001 – June 2010 (just before the onset of the 2010 floods) were coded to 
the lowest administrative level possible, and indices of conflict exposure at the tehsil 
(sub-district) level were calculated (as described in Chapter 2 and used in Chapter 3).  
 
4.3.2 Trends and Practices of Remittances in Pakistan 
 
Remittances are a large part of the Pakistan economy. International remittances using 
official channels alone amounted to US$ 14 billion in the year 2012-13, accounting for 5 
percent of the country’s GDP and about half the value of total exports (World Bank, 
2014). The Middle East, followed by North America and Europe, is the leading region 
from where international remittances to Pakistan originate (Ahmed and Zorzoso, 2013). 
The quantum of domestic remittances in Pakistan is also very high; while no official data 
on domestic remittances are available, Nenova et al. (2009) estimated these to be roughly 
90 percent of the value of international remittances.  
 
Remittances in Pakistan are meant for both consumption and investment purposes. The 
Household Survey on Overseas Migration and Remittances (2009) found that food 
consumption expenditure alone accounted for about 40 percent of remittance spending 
among households with at least one migrant worker in Saudi Arabia, while 28 percent 
was used for the purchase of real estate and agricultural implements (IGC, 2015). In 
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contrast Gioli et al. (2013) found that among households in the Lower Dir and Swat53 
districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province 63 percent of remittance receipts were spent 
on real estate, construction and business investments. Expenditure on social ceremonies 
accounted for 17 percent of expenditures from remittances. According to the World Bank 
(2014), about 72% of international remittance receipts went to rural areas.  
 
Remittance transfers are made through both formal and informal channels. Formal 
channels include banks, money transfer companies, and in the case of domestic 
remittances, post offices. Informal channels include sending money in cash through 
visiting friends/relatives, hand transfers through human couriers, exchanges through 
money changers and travel agents, and most importantly the extensive 
unregulated/unsupervised hawala54 system (Nenova et al., 2009). The hawala system, 
present across many countries in South Asia, the Middle-East and East Africa, is based 
on a network of money transfer agents, or hawaldars, and depends on trust, between 
hawaldars across countries, as well as between hawaldars and remittance-
receiving/sending households and individuals. Operators depend on trust and 
reputation for conducting ‘money transfers without money movement.’ They are thus 
able to circumvent official financial transfer channels. Hawala operators, through a 
network of sub-agents (and sub-sub-agents), have a wide and diverse reach, deep inside 
communities that are often out of the ambit of formal banking (see Rodima-Taylor, 2013; 
Afram, 201255 and Ballard, 2003 for a detailed review of the hawala system). The hawala 
system has many advantages from the perspective of remittance receiving and sending 
households; it is convenient, has a wide reach right to the doorstep of the recipients, 
many of whom may otherwise have limited ability to go out of the house to collect 
                                                          
53 Where the massive Operation Black Thunderstorm ended Taliban control in 2009 
54 Also known as Hundi 
55 Afram (2012, p. 43) explains how the informal hawala or hundi market operates: “A typical hawala 
transaction consists of a remitter, a recipient, and two intermediaries, that is, hawaladars. When transferring 
the funds to the home country, the migrant-remitter makes payment to an intermediary hawaladar in the 
remitting country. The hawaladar then contacts their partner service provider in the recipient country who 
then arranges for the payment in local currency to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is required to present a 
pre-agreed identification document or code. When this transaction is conducted, the agent in the remitting 
country is indebted to the agent in the recipient country. Their transactions are settled through similar 
transactions going in the opposite direction, cash payments, or bank account transfers. In some cases, their 
positions also can be transferred to other intermediaries.” 
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money, and is able to offer competitive exchange rates (often better than formal channels; 
Nenova et al., 2009) and low transactions costs (Amjad et al., 2013). In addition, it does 
not require extensive documentation and paperwork for conducting transactions, unlike 
the formal banking system. These are important reasons for the persistence and salience 
of the hawala channels despite the expansion of formal banking in Pakistan. Amjad et al. 
(2013) find that migrant skill levels and most socio-economic characteristics do not 
significantly determine the choice of hawala v/s formal banking as the means of 
transferring remittances; intrinsic beliefs and personal preferences based on convenience 
appear to play a big role in the continuing reliance on hawala channels.  
 
4.4 Empirical Approach 
 
4.4.1 Approach to Causal Identification 
 
I attempt to study the causal link between conflict exposure and remittance receipts 
using a cross-sectional dataset. Any OLS estimates for such analysis would be biased 
because of the endogeneity of conflict and remittance receipts, as unobservable factors 
that cause chronic poverty and enhance the need for remittances may also be responsible 
for conflict. Also, factors associated with the ability of households and communities to 
send migrants out and to receive remittances can potentially also enable them to resist 
the control of armed groups, and the spread of violence. To overcome these endogeneity 
concerns, I use an Instrumental Variables approach to identify the causal impact of 
conflict on remittance receipts, similar to the approach in Chapter 3 that examines the 
impact of conflict on access to cash transfer programmes.  
 
Based on an understanding of the historical evolution and context of political violence 
in Pakistan, discussed in detail in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3), I use the nearest distance to 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as an IV for conflict. The underlying assumption of 
course is that distance to infiltration routes, after controlling for potentially confounding 
factors, predicts remittances only through its correlation with conflict and not directly.  
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As in Chapter 3, I use the distance to official border crossing points as an IV only for 
robustness checks and find that my main results are robust to the choice of IV (Annexe 
4.1). In Chapter 3 I also use the community-level share of Pashtun population as an IV 
for conflict for robustness checks. However, this may not be suitable for the current 
chapter as ethnic identity can be strongly correlated with a history of migration and 
access to migration and remittance networks, which can directly affect remittance 
receipts, thus violating the Exclusion Restriction. 
 
I now discuss the formal estimation procedure employed in this chapter, using the 
nearest distance between the community and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as the IV 
for conflict exposure – measured as the natural log of 1 +n, the number of people killed 
in conflict in the tehsil over 2001-10.  
 
In estimating the impact of conflict on remittance receipts at the household level the 
causal relationship of interest is given by Equation (1) below: 
 
   𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗    … (1) 
 
Where 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the likelihood of household i in PSU j receiving remittances (or later the Amount 
of remittances received in Pakistani Rupees, PKR) 
X is the matrix of household /community-level control variables.  
P represents the matrix of k Province dummies.  
CON is the measure of conflict exposure at the tehsil level, and is assumed to be the same 
for all households/communities in the tehsil.  
 
Owing to the endogeneity of CON with 𝑌𝑖𝑗, the coefficient 𝛽2 is biased. I therefore 
estimate an IV probit and IV tobit models, represented by the following two-stage 
equations (2 and 3).  
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IV First stage Equation: 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾2𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑗 + 𝛾3𝑃𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗   … (2) 
 
Where DISTANCE represents the distance between community j and the international 
border with Afghanistan. The second stage equation is given by (3) below, where 𝛽2
′  now 
reflects the causal effect of CON on  𝑌𝑖𝑗. 
IV Second stage Equation: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1′𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2′𝐶𝑂?̂?𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3′𝑃𝑘 +  𝜀′𝑖𝑗    … (3) 
 
4.4.2 IV Estimation: Potential Threats and Mitigation 
 
Chapter 3 (section 3.3.3.1) discusses why the distance to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border 
is a strong correlate of violence exposure in Pakistan over 2001-10. However, in order to 
be considered a good IV, I must ensure that the exclusion restriction is not violated, by 
controlling for any potential confounders. The community-level distance to the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border can, in addition to predicting the onset and intensity of violence, 
also be correlated with several variables that directly determine remittance receipts. I 
identify a multitude of such factors and devise means to measure and control for their 
effects.  The assumption is that after controlling for the factors enlisted below, the 
distance to Afghanistan does not predict remittance receipts, except through its 
association with violent conflict.  
 
4.4.2.2 Potential Accessibility-related Confounders 
 
Remoteness: Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan forms the North-Western boundary of 
the country. Greater proximity to an international border also reflects a greater and 
considerable distance from the hinterland.56 Areas close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
                                                          
56 Speaking directly to Ahmed’s exposition on the tensions between the core and the periphery in modern 
Islamic countries, including Pakistan (Ahmed, 2013) 
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border are generally remote, and therefore more likely for communities to be isolated 
and excluded from trans-regional/national migration/remittance networks. In order to 
ensure that the distance to Afghanistan does not simply reflect communities’ isolation, I 
include, as controls, (a) province dummies to capture a wide range of unobservable and 
province-wide characteristics, (b) the shortest distance to the provincial capital, and 
finally (c) the shortest distance to the district headquarters.  
 
Topography: Terrain and topography may affects the ease with which populations are 
likely to move out, develop migration networks and send remittances, as well as the ease 
of operation of financial operatives. To ensure that distance to the Afghan border is not 
conflated with topographic characteristics, I include community level controls for 
topography. While about 85% of all communities in the sample are inland plains alone, 
I control for each the following types of topography through dummy variables: inland 
plains, coastal plains, plateaus, hills, valleys, mountainous areas, deserts and “other” 
topography.  
 
Proximity to Army: In Pakistan, the role of the armed forces can be critical for many 
governance activities, including remittance receipts. This may be because the presence 
of the army can, to some extent, allay fears among the local population about the safety 
of their family members when they decide to undertake migration which would 
eventually enable them to remit money back. However, this potentially enabling role 
that the armed forces can play in encouraging migration and future remittance access 
can be less effective in areas further away from their bases. In order to ensure that the IV 
is not confounded with greater distance from the Pakistan Army, I calculate and control 
for the distance between the community and the nearest armed forces’ cantonment.  
 
4.4.2.3 Potential Institutional Confounders 
 
Infrastructure: Areas closer to the Afghan border such as the FATA have low levels of 
public infrastructure at the community level. Although poor community-level 
infrastructure is found across several parts of Pakistan, beyond the North-West, it is 
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imperative that the measure of proximity to Afghanistan does not proxy a lack of 
infrastructure. Infrastructure, such as road connectivity, transport access, the presence 
and functioning of markets, and telephone and electricity connectivity is directly 
required receiving remittances, particularly through formal channels.  I therefore control 
for community-level infrastructure by developing a count variable-based additive index 
of various types of physical infrastructure facilities, as described in section 3.3.3.2b. 
 
State Presence: Populations in areas with lower state presence, in terms of state-run 
institutions and public services are possibly less attuned to formal procedures of banking 
and finance, and may lack the necessary identification documentation to access formal 
remittance channels. I therefore measure and control for state presence using an additive 
index of government bodies at the community level (see section 3.3.3.2b). 
 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalisation: Greater linguistic fractionalisation within 
communities, reflecting deeper cleavages between groups, can make access to 
remittance networks more difficult. In a situation of conflict (which may itself be more 
likely to arise in more deeply divided communities), such between-group differences 
may be exacerbated, resulting in lower local coordination and access to both, formal and 
informal (trust-based) modes of accessing remittances. Based on data on the language in 
which the survey interview was conducted, and given that the survey fieldwork teams 
were proficient in the use of Pakistan’s major languages (including Urdu, Sindhi, 
Punjabi, Balochi, Pushto, Brahvi, Saraiki, Hindko and a few other languages57) to conduct 
interviews, the language of interview can be a good proxy of the respondent household’s 
linguistic identity. I use this information to calculate an index of Linguistic 
Fractionalisation at the community (PSU) level, as described in Chapter 3, section 
3.3.3.2b, to ensure that if associated with the distance to Afghanistan, linguistic 
fractionalisation does not drive the IV results.58 
 
                                                          
57Which ensures that the language of the interview was not constrained/affected by the survey teams’ 
knowledge of languages 
58Ethnicity, though often correlated with linguistic identity is not explicitly available for the respondent 
households 
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4.4.2.4 Other Controls 
In order to ensure that the distance to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, as an IV for 
conflict exposure, does not pick up the effect of factors it may be correlated with that 
affect households’ ability to receive remittances, I add controls, including: age and sex 
of the household head, household size, number of male members in the household, and 
a measure of social connections of the household outside the community.  
 
4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
About 12% of all households in the sample report receiving remittances. This share is 
higher for Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab compared to Sindh and Balochistan. The 
average amounts of remittances received by a household that receives any remittances 
at all is Pakistani Rupees (PKR) 41,730.38 (roughly US$ 463 at US$ 1 = PKR 90.1919 as on 
01 January, 2012). The average amounts of remittance money received were also higher 
in KPK and Punjab. Table 1 below provides descriptive summaries.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on Remittance Receipts: Any and Mean Value of Amounts 
Received (in PKR) 
 No. of HHs 
Receiving Any  
Remittances 
Share of HHs 
Receiving Any 
Remittances 
Mean Value of 
Remittances 
(all HHs) - 
PKR 
Mean Value of 
Remittances (Only 
HHs receiving 
remittances) - PKR 
Punjab  382 16.43% 6,639.92 40,680.47 
Sindh 165 7.55% 2,161.48 28,636.36 
KPK 326 18.48% 9,520.56 51,906.19 
Balochistan 58 3.80% 1,108.06 29,172.41 
Total 931 11.93% 4,950.70 41,730.38 
N 7802 7802 7796 925 
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4.5.2 IV First Stage Results 
 
Table 2 below show the IV first-stage results for the instrumentation of conflict (log [1+n] 
deaths due to conflict over 2001-10) with the nearest distance to the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border.  
 
Table 2. Conflict and the Nearest Distance to the Afghan Border: IV First-Stage Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Distance to Afghan Border -0.877*** -0.494*** -0.266*** 
 (-63.01) (-31.56) (-12.13) 
Controls no Yes Yes 
Province dummies no no Yes 
N 7802 7786 7786 
    
Partial F-statistic 160.93 101.82 14.99 
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3373 0.5393 0.5664 
t statistics in parentheses 
^Standard errors are clustered at the PSU (community) level 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Community Controls: Urban/Rural, topography, distance from administrative headquarters, intra-
community linguistic fractionalization, community-level presence of infrastructure and state institutions 
Household controls: Household size, Age of head, members’ education levels, Farmland ownership, pre-
flood livestock value, number of males, number of members over 14, household main occupation and 
enterprise ownership, female-headed (dummy), Flood-Exposure Index, Flooding Anomaly Index, No. of 
Contacts outside village (Social Connectedness), Received state transfers through CDCP – I and BISP 
programmes (dummies) 
 
As we see in Table 2 above, as expected, conflict has a significant and strong negative 
association with the distance to the Afghan border. This is robust to the inclusion of 
controls and province dummies. Further the values of the F-statistic are sufficiently high 
to indicate a strong instrument (Stock and Yogo, 2005).  
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4.5.3 Main Causal Results 
 
I first examine the effects of conflict exposure, measured as the sub-district-level value 
of log (1+n) killings over the 2001-10 period, on the (i) likelihood of receiving any 
remittances at all (using an IV probit model), and (ii) the amount of money received as 
remittances (using an IV tobit59 model). Remittances here include both domestic and 
international remittances and the data do not allow me to distinguish the source of such 
remittances.  
 
I control for a wide range of household and community characteristics, and include 
province dummies to capture unobserved heterogeneity at the province level. 
Community controls include distance to administrative capitals, the intra-community 
index of linguistic fractionalisation, the index of community infrastructure, index of the 
presence of state institutions, topography characteristics, and the distance from the 
nearest army cantonment. Household controls include markers of wealth, adult 
education, household demographics, access to household services, land ownership, 
occupational categories and enterprise ownership.  
 
Conflict may reduce remittance receipts through its association with weaker/less 
effective social networks. Conflict may either arise in areas where people are more 
isolated and have weaker social networks, or long-term exposure to violent conflict 
could itself increase the isolation of communities and cause the otherwise better-
connected households to completely move out, leaving behind populations with lower 
access to migration and remittance networks. To ensure that the causal effect of conflict 
on remittance receipts is not confounded by social networks, I control for household 
access to social networks by including a measure of the total number of contacts known 
to the household who could help the household (members) in cash/kind or in helping 
find a job in the IV estimation of the effect of violent conflict on remittances. 
 
                                                          
59 To account for the left-censoring of observed amounts of remittance receipts at 0 (Wooldridge, 2002) 
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A wide literature explores the relationship between public transfers and private 
remittances and finds mixed evidence on public transfers crowding out private ones 
(Albarran and Attanasio, 2002; Kazianga, 2006; Juarez, 2009). This effect of public 
transfers on reducing remittances may be conflated with the effects of conflict if in fact 
conflict-affected areas are more likely to receive public transfers.60 In Pakistan two large 
cash transfer programmes had been implemented around the time of the survey; the 
Citizen’s Damage Compensation Programme (CDCP) – Phase I, a flood relief cash 
transfer, and the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), an unconditional cash 
transfer paid to women recipients in chronic poor households. I include dummies for 
household access to the CDCP – Phase I and BISP transfers as controls in the IV 
estimation of the effect of conflict on remittance receipts, to ensure that the effect of 
conflict on remittances shown below, is not confounded by any selective access to public 
transfers caused by conflict.  
 
Table 3. Effect of Conflict on likelihood of receiving remittances: Probit and IV 
probit estimates 
 Probit Estimates IV Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log (n+1) 
killings at 
tehsil level 
0.009*** -0.005 -0.003 -0.006* 0.122*** -0.138 -0.268* -0.431*** 
 (3.15) (-1.64) (-0.90) (-1.88) (4.81) (-1.29) (-1.73) (-3.37) 
Province 
Dummies  
 Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Community 
Controls 
  Y Y   Y Y 
HH 
Controls 
   Y    Y 
N 7802 7802 7786 7767 7802 7802 7786 7767 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Standard errors clustered at the PSU (community) level61 
Community Controls: Urban/Rural, topography, distance from administrative headquarters, intra-
community linguistic fractionalization, community-level presence of infrastructure and state institutions 
Household controls: Household size, Age of head, members’ education levels, Farmland ownership, pre-
flood livestock value, number of males, number of members over 14, household main occupation and 
enterprise ownership, female-headed (dummy), Flood-Exposure Index, Flooding Anomaly Index, No. of 
Contacts outside village (Social Connectedness), Received state transfers through CDCP – I and BISP 
                                                          
60 Unlikely in this particular case, as Chapter 3 has shown 
61 Although I measure conflict exposure at the tehsil level, I cluster standard errors at the PSU level 
because of the relatively lower number of tehsils in the sample (92, as against 498 PSUs), and because the 
intra-cluster correlation of remittance receipts is higher in PSUs (0.081) than in tehsils (0.056). For the 
amount of remittances received, the intra-cluster correlation in PSUs is 0.063, and in tehsils it is 0.046. 
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programmes (dummies) 
 
Table 4. Effect of Conflict on Amount of remittances received (in PKR): Tobit and IV 
Tobit estimates 
 Tobit Estimates IV Tobit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log (n+1) 
killings at 
tehsil level 
5354*** -2171 -1837 -3195* 14746*** -978 -11461 -31298** 
 (3.22) (-1.17) (-0.87) (-1.89) (4.81) (-0.09) (-0.73) (-2.19) 
Province 
Dummies  
 Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Community 
Controls 
  Y Y   Y Y 
HH 
Controls 
   Y    Y 
N 7796 7796 7780 7761 7796 7796 7780 7761 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors clustered at the PSU (community) level 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table 2 above 
 
Tables 3 and 4 (col. 8) above show that after controlling for household and community 
characteristics, exposure to violent conflict has a strong negative effect on, both the 
likelihood and the quantum of remittance receipts for households. This is significant as 
it shows that even at the aggregate level, and immediately following devastating floods 
when the need for external support to households is high, households in areas with 
higher long-term exposure to violent conflict receive fewer and lower amounts of 
remittances.  
 
The mean value of killings in the sample is 30.96. The coefficient -0.431 in Table 3 means 
that an increase in the level of killings per tehsil by 10%, from 30 to 33, for instance, 
would lead to a decrease in the likelihood of receiving any remittance by [ln(1.1)*0.431] 
4.12%. Similarly, since the coefficient of log(1+n) killings in Table 4 is 31,298, an increase 
in the number of killings per tehsil by 10% would decrease the average amount of 
remittances received by [ln(1.1)*31298] PKR 2,983 (US$ 35 approx.62).  
 
 
                                                          
62 At Exchange Rate US$1 = PKR 86.0605 as on 01 July 2011 
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Remittance responses to Flooding Variables 
 
In the regressions above, the control variables include a measure of community-level 
flooding exposure as well as the degree of flooding anomaly, measured as described in 
Chapter 6. Interestingly, remittance receipts do not respond to the extent of flooding 
exposure per se, but are significantly higher in areas of more anomalous flooding, across 
both the intensive and extensive margins of remittance receipts.  
 
Table 5. Effects of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Remittance 
Receipts 
 Received Any Remittance Amount of Remittances 
Received 
 (IV Probit estimate) (IV Tobit estimate) 
Log (n+1) killings at tehsil level -0.431*** -31298** 
 (-3.37) (-2.19) 
   
Flooding Exposure Index -0.024 -3917.135 
 (-0.51) (-0.99) 
   
Flooding Anomaly Index 0.177*** 13661.406*** 
 (3.86) (2.82) 
N 7767 7761 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table 2 above 
 
4.5.4 Mechanisms 
 
I now examine what mechanisms likely explain the negative effect of conflict on 
remittance receipts. I consider three distinct possible mechanisms: the likely mode of 
remittance receipts (formal v/s informal channels), the presence of and threats from 
militant groups (linked to the TTP) and the likely motive for remittances (consumption 
v/s investment).  
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4.5.4.1 Mode of Remittance Receipt (Formal v/s Informal) 
 
As noted earlier, remittances in Pakistan are received through both, formal and informal 
means. Here I explore if either of these two channels is particularly susceptible to 
disruption or sabotage in conflict. On the one had the reach of formal systems may be 
more curtailed in conflict-affected areas (or conflict may anyway be more likely to arise 
in more backward areas less integrated with formal banking and finance); on the other 
hand violent conflict may pose significant security risks to the informal modes of money 
transfer such as hawala/hundi, which rely in large part on local sub-agents and human 
couriers to transport wads of cash. These informal modes of transfer may be less willing 
or able to operate in violence-infested areas due to higher security risks, and may 
demand higher margins for doing so, which may make the informal channel more 
expensive to the remitter or the recipient. As there is no available data on the actual 
mode of payment used by households to receive remittances, I proxy the likely mode 
using information on whether or not the household has a bank account; the underlying 
assumption being that households with access to formal banking are more likely to use 
formal modes of transfer, while households without access to banking are more likely to 
rely on informal ones. I fully recognise that having a bank account is not a random 
occurrence but is associated with observable and unobservable household 
characteristics, many of which may also make households more/less vulnerable to 
conflict. However, by disaggregating the IV analysis across these different types of 
households (with and without bank accounts), I only attempt to examine if the negative 
effects of conflict on remittances are more concentrated among households using formal 
or informal channels (for a variety of reasons), and not on the choice of channel alone. I 
compare the IV estimate of exposure to violent conflict on remittances across sub-groups 
of households with and without access to formal banking in Table 6 below. 
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Table 6. Formal/Informal Modes of Money Transfer as a Mechanism linking Violent 
Conflict and Remittances 
 Any remittance – IV probit estimate Remittance Amount – IV tobit 
estimate 
 Full 
Sample 
No HH 
Bank A/c 
HH has 
Bank A/c 
Full 
Sample 
No HH 
Bank A/c 
HH has 
Bank A/c 
Log (n+1) 
killings at 
tehsil level 
-0.431*** -0.472*** 0.231 -31298** -35400** 31159.107 
 (-3.37) (-3.80) -0.5 (-2.19) (-2.43) -0.57 
N 7767 6931 817 7761 6925 836 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 | Controls as in Table 2 above 
Table 6 clearly shows that the negative relationship between exposure to violent conflict 
and remittance receipts is driven by households without access to formal banking, i.e. 
those that are more likely to rely on informal modes of money transfer. Such households 
are less likely to receive remittances at all, as well as conditional on receiving at all, get 
lower amounts. In contrast, conflict does not appear to have any effect on remittance 
receipts for households with formal bank accounts. This suggests that informal modes 
of payment may be more susceptible to disruption/reduced access with increasing levels 
of violence exposure, while the formal banking system is more resistant. The choice of 
mode of money transfer therefore emerges as a plausible mechanism linking conflict 
exposure with remittance receipts.  
 
4.5.4.2 Security Risk: The Presence/Control of TTP-linked militant groups 
 
The presence and control of militant groups, particularly the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP) in Pakistan, can pose a security threat to economic activity in general, but the 
movement of physical sums of money in particular. The discussion on formal/informal 
modes of payment above suggests that informal means of transfer are more likely to be 
affected by violent conflict. Remittance flows may be hampered in areas of TTP 
presence/control if the TTP operatives on the ground are able to intercept and 
subsequently loot or tax the flows of money. Militants may also be suspicious of 
outsiders entering communities as human couriers of cash, and feel threatened that they 
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may use the cover of remittance transfers to conduct covert intelligence gathering 
operations. This could potentially increase the security risk involved in accessing 
remittances for both recipients, and intermediaries – principally informal hawala/hundi 
operators. Alternatively, the security threats imposed by militant groups could dissuade 
many intermediaries from even entering areas of militant control, or demand very high 
margins which could render informal remittance transfers more expensive.  For all these 
reasons the effects of conflict on remittances may be more pronounced in areas of TTP 
presence and control. 
 
The incidence of violence alone need not however precisely reflect the presence of armed 
groups. Violence may be used by militants strategically and often in areas of contestation 
rather than in their domains of uncontested dominance (Kalyvas, 2006). While it is nearly 
impossible to obtain publicly available data on militant presence rather than the 
outbreak of violence, I attempt to proxy the presence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) and its 
affiliate groups in Pakistan following the process outlined in Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.2, 
based on analysis of residuals from the community level estimation of girls’ primary 
school enrolment rates – which treats TTP presence63 as an omitted variable that lowers 
girls school enrolment, making communities with negative residuals more likely to be 
associated with TTP presence (and those with positive residuals less likely). This exercise 
results in the creation of sub-samples of greater and lesser likely TTP presence. In tables 
7 and 8 below, I present IV estimates of the effect of violent conflict exposure on 
remittances across sub groups of the sample with greater and lower likelihood of TTP 
presence.  
 
As an additional check, I also examine residuals from the estimation of the community-
level gender gap in primary schooling (simply measured as the difference in the shares 
of primary school age boys and girls enrolled in school at the community level) to proxy 
the likelihood of non-state armed group control. Results along the two sub-samples 
based on residuals from the estimation of the gender gap in primary schooling are 
                                                          
63 Henceforth TTP presence is used to refer to presence of the TTP as well as its affiliates 
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presented in Annexe 4.2, and broadly follow the same direction as from sub-samples 
based on residuals from the estimation of female primary enrolment rates. 
Table 7. Likely presence of TTP (affiliates) as a Mechanism linking Violent Conflict and 
the Likelihood of Receiving Any Remittances 
 Full sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
  TTP likely present TTP likely not 
present 
Log (n+1) killings at tehsil 
level 
-0.431*** -0.634*** -0.255 
 (-3.37) (-3.03) (-1.60) 
N 7767 3552 4215 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Controls as in Table 2 above 
 
Table 8. Likely presence of TTP (affiliates) as a Mechanism linking Violent Conflict and 
the Amount of Remittances Received 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
 TTP likely present TTP likely not 
present 
Log (n+1) killings at tehsil 
level 
-31298** -47555 -16103 
 (-2.19) (-1.48) (-1.02) 
N 7761 3547 4214 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Controls as in Table 2 above 
 
Table 7 shows that the negative effect of violent conflict on the likelihood of receiving 
remittances at all is much stronger in areas of more likely TTP presence, with stronger 
IV coefficients compared to areas with less likely Taliban presence. This suggests that 
armed group presence and threat is indeed a likely channel for the lower access to 
remittances in conflict-affected areas. However, as we see in Table 8, there are no 
significant differences in the effect of conflict on the quantum of remittance receipts 
between areas with greater/lower likelihood of TTP presence. While the magnitude of 
the effect of conflict on the quantum of remittances is higher in areas with more likely 
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TTP presence, this is not significant. This suggests that armed group presence reduces 
the initial access to remittances, perhaps by blocking/deterring remittance couriers from 
entering areas of their control at all, but if remittance intermediaries are able to enter 
such areas, it does not affect the quantum of remittances they transfer. This armed group 
presence appears to operate as a mechanism for violent conflict on the extensive margin 
of remittance receipts.  
 
4.5.4.3 Informal Money Transfer and Security Risks: The Overlap 
 
The findings in 4.5.2.2 connect with the earlier exploration of the effect of formal and 
informal modes of money transfer. Security risks from militant groups may be higher 
when households use informal modes of remittances, which potentially explains how 
conflict leads to lower remittances. I specifically explore the overlap of these two 
mechanisms, choice of mode of transfers (formal/informal), and the likely presence of 
TTP-affiliate groups to test if the negative effect of conflict on remittances is stronger 
when households do not have bank accounts (use informal modes), and are residing in 
areas with more likely TTP presence. Table 9 below presents the IV estimate of the effect 
of conflict on the extensive margin of remittance receipts among (i) household with/out 
formal Bank accounts, and (ii) in areas with more/less likelihood of TTP presence, based 
on residuals of community-level female enrolment rates.  
 
Table 9. IV estimate of Effect of Violent Conflict on likelihood of receiving any 
Remittances across Formal Bank Account Access and Likely presence of TTP 
 TTP likely present TTP likely not present 
 No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
Log (n+1) killings at 
tehsil level 
-0.629*** -0.204 -0.334** 0.572** 
 (-3.12) (-0.11) (-2.06) (2.25) 
N 3203 338 3728 466 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table 2 above 
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Table 9 provides interesting insights: the negative effect of conflict on receiving 
remittances is strongest among households without a bank account (using informal 
means) and in areas with more likely TTP presence. This suggests that armed groups are 
very likely to block or deter informal remittance payment operations. Conflict does not 
have any significant effect on remittance receipts on households who have bank 
accounts, even in areas with more likely TTP presence.  
 
Even in areas with the lower likelihood of TTP presence, violent conflict has a negative 
effect on households without bank accounts, suggesting that mechanisms other than 
militant interception/threat are responsible, albeit to a lesser degree as indicated by the 
smaller coefficient, for lowering access to remittances. In these areas conflict has a 
positive effect on remittance receipts among households that are part of the formal 
banking network. This may be because when remittance transfers are not affected by 
security threats, the altruistic motivations for remittances dominate in areas exposed to 
conflict. Finally, Table 10 below shows that the overlap of mechanisms does not appear 
to significantly affect the amount of remittances received.  
 
Table 10. IV tobit estimate of Effect of Violent Conflict on amount of Remittances 
received across Formal Bank Account Access and Likely presence of TTP 
 TTP likely present TTP likely not present 
 No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
Log (n+1) killings at 
tehsil level 
-45717 -47848 -25086 78623 
 (-1.53) (-0.23) (-1.51) (1.45) 
N 3198 349 3727 487 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table 3 above 
 
4.5.4.4 Likely Motive for Remittances: Consumption v/s Investment 
 
I have previously discussed how conflict may have opposite effects on remittance 
receipts depending on the motive for sending remittances. If conflict increases economic 
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hardship, remitters will seek to send money to help alleviate some of the suffering of 
family members left behind, thus resulting in increased remittance inflows into conflict-
affected areas. If, however, remittances are meant for investment purposes, in 
expectation of future returns, violent conflict can increase risk and signal uncertainty for 
the future, causing remitters to reduce their investments in conflict-affected areas. In the 
analysis so far we find that at an aggregate level, conflict reduces remittance receipts at 
both, the extensive and the intensive margins. Such effects may however vary across 
groups that receive remittances for alternate predominant purposes: consumption and 
investment. While it is not possible to identify what was the main motive behind the 
remittances received, I test the effects of conflict on remittances across groups that are 
likely to have different motives for receiving remittances. Specifically, I examine whether 
the effect of conflict on remittance receipts varies across monthly per adult equivalent 
food consumption expenditure quintiles, with the assumption that households in lower 
quintiles are more likely to receive remittances to support consumption, whereas those 
in higher quintiles are more likely to receive investment-focused remittances. The IV 
estimates of the effect of conflict on remittances across food expenditure quintile groups 
are shown in tables 11 and 12 below.  
 
Table 11. Effect of Conflict on Likelihood of Any Remittance Receipt: Across Food 
Consumption Expenditure Quintiles 
 Full 
Sample 
Monthly per Adult-equivalent Food Consumption Expenditure 
Quintiles 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Log (n+1) 
killings at 
tehsil level 
-0.431*** 0.543** -0.649*** -0.620*** -0.167 -0.440*** 
 (-3.37) (2.15) (-4.34) (-4.04) (-0.57) (-2.99) 
N 7767 1542 1558 1540 1550 1543 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table 2 above 
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Table 12. Effect of Conflict on Amount of Remittances Received: Across Food 
Consumption Expenditure Quintiles 
 Full 
Sample 
Monthly per Adult-equivalent Food Consumption Expenditure 
Quintiles 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Log (n+1) 
killings at 
tehsil level 
-31298** 64914 -64936* -57789** -11742 -29574* 
 (-2.19) (1.54) (-1.96) (-2.17) (-0.44) (-1.65) 
N 7761 1553 1556 1551 1549 1552 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table 2 above 
 
Tables 11 and 12 indicate that the aggregate negative effect of conflict on remittances 
does not operate for the lowest expenditure quintile, which is more likely to receive 
remittances meant to support consumption. In fact, conflict is likely to increase the 
likelihood of receiving any remittances even though the amount of remittances received 
by households in this quintile does not vary by conflict exposure. This suggests that for 
the lowest expenditure quintile the receipt of altruistic remittances increases with 
conflict, even as the amounts of money received do not. The aggregate negative 
relationship between conflict exposure and remittances, at both the extensive and 
intensive margins, however, appears to be driven by higher expenditure quintiles. These 
groups are less likely to be food insecure or struggling for survival and therefore more 
likely to use remittances for investment, compared to the lowest quintile. Conflict then 
has a negative effect on remittances in these higher food expenditure quintiles probably 
because remittances respond negatively to the higher risk and uncertainty that long-term 
exposure to conflict signals in these areas. Alternatively, this negative effect could be 
because, owing to security risk and dwindling economic prospects, remitting migrants 
from conflict-affected areas are reconsidering their long-term pecuniary interest in their 
native communities and do not envision a return to their native communities as much 
as remitting migrants from more peaceful areas may. For the bottom quintile, however, 
supporting survival, more than future investment is the primary motive for remittances.  
For this group, conflict therefore appears only as an additional cause of hardship rather 
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than an investment risk factor; compelling remitters to maintain (even increase, at the 
extensive margin) the modicum of support to households.  
 
4.5.5 Robustness checks 
 
I test whether the main causal relationships explored in this chapter are robust to an 
alternate Instrumental Variable, i.e. the distance to the nearest official border crossing 
on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. I find that the results are robust to this alternate IV, 
and present these results in Appendix 4.1. 
 
I also examine if the results on the effect of likely TTP presence on remittance receipts 
presented in Tables 8 – 11 are robust to the determination of likely TTP presence based 
on residuals from the community-level estimation of the gender gap in primary school 
enrolment. I find that the results follow the same direction as those presented above, 
based on residuals from community-level estimation of female enrolment rates, (see 
Appendix 4.2).  
 
4.6 Summary of Results and Conclusions 
 
This chapter has examined the causal effects of long-term exposure to conflict, measured 
at the micro level, on households’ receipt of remittances. Using IV estimation to 
overcome the endogeneity of conflict exposure and remittance receipts, and controlling 
for a range of confounding factors, I find that, contrary to the literature from country-
level case studies in the immediate aftermath of crisis events, long-term exposure to 
conflict reduces households’ receipts of remittances at both, the extensive and the 
intensive margins. 
 
This analysis would have benefitted immensely from the availability of data on 
remittances disaggregated by the source of such remittances – i.e. domestic vs. foreign. 
This is especially true given that since much of Pakistan was affected by the 2010 floods, 
the floods could have altered the migration trajectories and remittance-sending behavior 
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among sending households (not included/ observed in the dataset). International 
remitters, would however, be insulated from the floods. Exposure to floods may have 
reduced the ability to domestic remitters to send remittances to their families and 
relatives who were also affected by the floods. In the absence of data on the source of 
remittances and the identity/ location/ flood exposure of remitters, I am unable to factor 
in how flooding exposure may have affected domestic remittance receipts through 
effects of remitters. However, since the focus of this chapter is on the causal effects of 
conflict on households’ remittance receipts, I assume that the extent of flood exposure of 
remittance-sending households is not related to the extent of conflict exposure of 
receiving households (i.e. remittance receivers’ conflict exposure does not affect the 
extent to which remittance-senders are affected by flooding). The lack of data on 
remittance sources limits the scope of analysis in the chapter, and yet, under the 
assumption stated above, does not pose a fundamental threat to the main causal 
identification of interest.  
 
I find that informal modes of money transfer (rather than using formal banking), and the 
likely presence of Taliban-affiliate armed groups, and more strongly, the overlap of these 
two factors reduces remittance receipts in Pakistan. This suggests that the informal 
money transfer systems are perhaps more susceptible to interception, disruption and 
sabotage by militant groups.  
 
While existing studies have pointed out some security threats to remittance payments in 
conflict-affected settings, none have specifically explored this factor in much detail. I find 
that the mode of money transfers is an important channel through which conflict may 
impede access to remittances, particularly when militant groups are able to threaten and 
disrupt informal transfer channels, either to stop, loot or tax inflows of cash into areas 
under their control, or to prevent the entry of outsider money transfer agents due to 
suspicion or fear of covert intelligence gathering. On the other hand, conflict does not 
have any effect on the receipt of remittances by households that have formal bank 
accounts (and that are therefore more likely to rely on formal money transfer 
arrangements), regardless of the likely presence of the Taliban and affiliate groups. The 
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obvious policy implication is to expand, to the extent possible, the coverage of formal 
banking in conflict-affected areas, to insulate households from the intent and capability 
of militant groups to subvert the informal money transfer mechanisms and thereby 
reduce households’ access to remittances.  
 
Another key finding of this chapter is that the negative effect of conflict exposure on 
remittance receipts is driven by higher consumption expenditure quintiles. In the lowest 
food consumption expenditure quintile, conflict does not reduce the receipt of 
remittances. To the extent that the motive for remittances moves from consumption-
support (altruism) to investment as one moves to higher expenditure quintiles, it 
appears that conflict exposure does not appear to affect much the remittances directed 
to support the more needy households maintain consumption levels; but is likely an 
important consideration for investment-focused remittances. Long-term exposure to 
conflict may make investments less attractive due to dampened economic activity as a 
result of violence, security risk to (more conspicuous) investments and assets, or a 
changed preference and priority on part of remitters away from their conflict-infested 
origins to the relatively safer and more prospective (economically) migration 
destinations. I find suggestive evidence for conflict potentially affecting investment 
prospects and changing remitter households’ pecuniary interest in origin areas. This 
factor, hitherto ignored in country-level analyses, emerges as an important 
microeconomic insight into the link between long-term conflict exposure and household 
remittance receipts. The impact of long-term exposure to conflict, measured at the micro 
level, may be very different from what is often observed at the national level in response 
to particular and sharp outbreaks of violence. While the latter events have been 
associated with drawing in high levels of external help in the form of remittances, an 
environment that is steadily embroiled in deep strife and violence may, over the long-
term, have the opposite effect on remittances as communities may have to cut their 
economic associations with increasingly risky and unsafe areas.  
 
This analysis also underscores the importance of distinguishing immediate from long-
term effects, and compels a separate paradigm for examining long-term and persistent 
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conflict, distinct from short-term events of violence. Areas reeling under violent conflict 
for long periods of time have deep and often intractable economic and social problems. 
Remittances are not always a simple means of overcoming the challenges of supporting 
economic activity and human development in such areas over the long term. As such, 
policy initiatives must be cognisant of the limitations that remittances themselves are 
likely to face in such environments. Over the long term, remittances too suffer due to the 
institutional, infrastructural and market frailties that give rise to, or are exacerbated by 
violent conflict. 
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Chapter 5. Unintended Consequences of Aid? Conflict, Cash 
Transfers and Gun Ownership in Pakistan  
 
ABSTRACT: I examine the effect of unconditional flood relief cash transfers on gun 
ownership in the aftermath of the massive floods in Pakistan in 2010. Using propensity 
score matching to overcome selection bias in treatment assignment, I find that for the 
population as a whole, the cash transfers did not have any significant effect on the 
likelihood of buying guns. However, for households with 1.5 acres or more of land and 
residing in conflict-affected areas, the transfer increased the likelihood of acquiring a 
gun by 8.3%. This effect is more pronounced for the wealthy households that suffered 
displacement and had to live in flood relief camps. As the flood relief camps were often 
marked by criminal acts including extortion, theft, robbery and assault, living in a flood 
relief camp likely increased safety concerns. Given this background and the fact that 
wealthy households are less likely to have pressing material needs (viz. security needs), 
such households may have found it optimal to use cash transfer receipts to bolster their 
sense of security by acquiring guns. I also find that land ownership, elevated 
topographical features, and proximity to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border (a positive 
correlate of both, exposure to violence, and the availability of guns) have a significantly 
positive association with household gun ownership.  
5.1 Introduction 
 
Humanitarian aid during crises can help provide a modicum of support to the poor, 
prevent households and individuals from falling into poverty traps or below critical 
thresholds of poverty, enable people to invest in human and material capital required to 
move out of poverty, and potentially build resilience to weather economic shocks. Cash 
transfers, in particular, have been seen as an effective means to deliver such aid to the 
poorest and those in the greatest need of protection from economic shocks (Duflo and 
Banerjee, 2010; Blattman, 2014).  
The strong coincidence of conflict and poverty in many countries across the world 
(WDR, 2011), as well as a vast literature examining the links between conflict and 
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poverty (Justino, 2013) have generated much interest in the potential of aid programmes 
(in general, and cash transfers in particular) to reduce poverty, and therefore usher in 
peace. Yet, the enthusiasm over such potential has been subject to critical examination 
in recent years, as studies have shown that the presence of conflict may itself impede the 
rollout of aid programmes (as identified in Chapter 3 of this thesis, as well as by Crost et 
al. 2014, Beath et al. 2012), as well as perversely, increase the likelihood of violence, at 
least in the short run (Khanna and Zimmermann, 2014). The effects of aid therefore may 
vary considerably according to the prevailing security situation and political setting, 
invoking the need for cautious and careful planning while rolling out cash transfer 
programmes in conflict-affected areas.   
There also exists the possibility of recipient states diverting aid receipts towards building 
their own military capacity, or arming specific violent groups. This possible route of 
unintended militarisation through aid is often examined at the macro level, in terms of 
the direct diversion of funds by the recipient from budget heads related to the intended 
human development outcomes of the aid (education, health, infrastructure, social 
protection etc.) to military ones (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007; Kono and Montinola, 2012; 
Khilji and Zampelli, 1994). What has not sufficiently been studied, however, is the 
possibility of such diversions taking place at the local, and household levels. The 
profusion of guns and small arms in many countries, and their use and prominence in 
intra-state conflict, calls for a closer inspection of whether aid receipts in the form of cash 
may be used by households to arm themselves, either in support of local insurgent, 
militant or paramilitary groups, or to safeguard against them. Any likely militarisation 
attributable to the receipt of humanitarian aid (in the form of cash transfers) through an 
increased proclivity of guns’ and small arms’ ownership at the household and 
community level, could be an unintended consequence. This may be especially likely 
when aid receipts in the form of cash transfers can alleviate liquidity constraints of 
households that face security threats on the one hand, and have high levels of wealth 
and income, but insufficient liquid assets which they can use to respond to such threats 
(in the Pakistani context, likely through the acquisition of guns). 
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While the possession or acquisition of guns can lead to increased violence (Cook et al., 
2001; Hemenway and Miller, 2000; Small Arms Survey, 2001, 2002; Killias et al., 2001) 
resulting in greater homicide rates, brutalisation and fear, some studies also find that the 
possession of guns can, at the local (community/household/individual) level serve as a 
deterrent to being attacked and thus provide a sense of safety. To that extent, gun 
ownership need not always be a social or household ‘bad’, taking away from human 
development (if for example, it enables people to remain alive, at all). Yet the diversion 
of humanitarian aid money, (in the aftermath of natural disasters, for instance) for 
acquiring guns would mean lower expenditures on other inputs required for immediate 
relief, sustenance and building capacity to escape poverty. This can be a concern for 
human development outcomes.  
 
That the relative usefulness and need for guns will be higher in areas with greater 
exposure to, and expectation of violence, compared to tranquil areas is obvious. This 
would mean that households hit by a humanitarian crisis and living in conflict-affected 
settings may face a strong trade-off between short-term consumption goods (immediate 
relief materials, food, clothing and shelter) and durables replenishment (house and farm 
damage repairs for example) on the one hand, and security goods, such as guns, on the 
other. This can be particularly true when insecurity is rife, and the state is unable to fully 
provide security to all people, compelling households to take steps to ensure their own 
security. Upon receiving cash from humanitarian aid programmes, some households 
that face security threats and own wealth mostly in the form of immobile and illiquid 
assets may be likely to use the money to acquire guns – leading to higher local 
militarisation, as well as potentially lower recovery of lost human and physical capital, 
and therefore the persistence of poverty and underdevelopment.   
Against this background, I attempt to examine the effect of the receipt of unconditional 
flood relief cash transfers following the 2010 floods in Pakistan on the acquisition of guns 
at the household level, particularly in areas affected by violence. I situate this in a larger 
research question on what are the determinants of gun ownership in Pakistan in general 
and attempt to answer the following specific questions: 
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(i) What are the household and community-level correlates of gun-ownership 
in Pakistan? 
(ii) How does the receipt of unconditional flood relief cash transfers affect the 
likelihood of gun acquisition?  
(iii) What factors can suggest why particular households or groups may be likely 
to divert flood relief transfers away from relief and rehabilitation and 
towards buying guns?  
I use household-level survey data collected after the 2010 floods in Pakistan, which 
includes data on flood relief transfer receipts, gun ownership status and a wide range of 
socio-economic characteristics at the household and community levels. I first analyse the 
correlates of gun ownership at the household and community levels using a simple 
probit estimation of the likelihood of gun ownership at the household level, and a Tobit 
estimation for the rate of community-level gun ownership rates. Next, I attempt to 
examine whether the receipt of unconditional flood relief cash transfers increases the 
likelihood of acquiring guns. In order to do so, I only consider those households that did 
not own a gun prior to the 2010 floods and then examine the extent to which the receipt 
of the flood relief transfers is likely to have caused them to acquire guns in the year 
following the 2010 floods, using both simple probit estimation, as well as propensity 
score matching to calculate the average treatment effect on the treated. Finally, I attempt 
to examine if the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) is heterogeneous 
across particular groups/types of households and areas that differ in terms of exposure 
to conflict.  
I find that compared to a matched set of non-recipient households, flood relief recipients 
are no more likely to have acquired a gun in the year following the floods, across conflict-
affected and peaceful settings. However, when I undertake disaggregated analysis 
across specific groups of households, I find that in conflict-affected areas, large land-
owning households who receive flood relief transfers are significantly more likely to 
have acquired a gun in the year following the floods, compared to a matched set of non-
recipient large farmers. These effects are stronger when I restrict the analysis to larger 
land-owning households in conflict areas that had to live in displacement camps 
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following the flooding. This suggests that heightened security concerns in a new 
environment, such as the flood relief camps, where wealthy households possibly felt 
more vulnerable than in their communities before the floods, may have led them to 
acquire guns to feel more secure. This also highlights the role of cash transfers in 
providing wealthy land-owning households with the liquidity required to purchase 
guns (as their income and wealth may arise from highly immobile and illiquid assets).  
It is also important to note that for such wealthy households, economic sustenance is 
possibly ensured to a greater extent than is physical security, which may further suggest 
why security goods such as guns may have higher relative priority in any exogenous 
increases in their cash holdings.  
I also find that gun ownership is associated with male members’ primary education (viz. 
illiteracy), larger land ownings, enterprise ownership, household access to drainage 
facilities, and communities that are situated in plateaus, valleys and mountains, those 
that are close to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border,64  and are further from army 
cantonments.  
The following section reviews the literature on the links between gun ownership, use 
and human development and security, and on the extent of and practices relating to gun 
ownership in Pakistan. Section 5.3 outlines the data used and the empirical strategy. 
Section 5.4 presents results – including descriptive statistics, simple probit estimates of 
the correlates of gun ownership, and propensity score matching-based treatment 
estimates of flood relief receipts on gun acquisition for the whole sample and across sub-
populations. Section 5.5 summarises and concludes with notes for policy.  
5.2. Conceptual Framework and Literature Review 
 
5.2.1 Conceptual Framework 
This chapter focuses on gun ownership and the factors associated with it, including the 
receipt of aid in the form of cash transfers. From a security and development standpoint, 
                                                          
64 from where guns are smuggled into Pakistan, as well as a correlate of exposure to violence 
following the infiltration of the Taliban post 9/11 and the War on Terror 
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gun use can have grave direct and indirect implications on household and individual 
welfare (to be explored in greater detail in 5.2.2 below). Gun ownership per se, however, 
affects security and development largely through the use (misuse) of guns for 
perpetrating violence and as an instrument of threat. Some studies find that for 
particular groups or individuals, owning a gun can enhance security and deter attacks 
emanating from inter-personal crime (Kleck and Gertz, 1995; Lott and Mustard, 1997). 
Others show that access to small arms is positively associated with violent deaths and 
criminal activity (Cook et al., 2001; Hemenway and Miller, 2000; Small Arms Survey, 
2001, 2002; Killias et al., 2001). More recent studies in developed countries find much 
stronger evidence for gun ownership increasing, rather than deterring homicide, 
particularly firearm-related homicide (Bangalore and Messerli, 2013; Siegel et al., 2014).  
However since data on gun use for violent or criminal activity is seldom available at the 
household level, I focus on gun ownership. The Small Arms Survey (henceforth SAS) 
2003, recognises the distinction between gun ownership and gun use, and yet argues 
that “small arms availability is a predisposing rather than a fundamental cause of 
underdevelopment.”65 The following analysis is based on the premise that gun 
ownership predisposes households and communities to the security and human 
development consequences of gun violence.  
The recent emphasis on rolling out aid programmes in conflict affected and fragile states, 
as a means to achieve a reduction in violence has received critical attention (Berman et 
al., 2011; Crost et al., 2014, Khanna and Zimmerman, 2014).66 These studies have drawn 
attention to the potential of insurgents and rebel groups to scuttle programmes and limit 
the reach of the state in areas of their control – often through the exercise of violence. 
Yet, one possible route through which aid may increase the likelihood of violence –
civilian militarisation, remains under-studied.  
Conditional on receiving aid at all, it is likely that households living in conflict-affected 
areas may face a compelling trade-off between material well-being (as intended to be 
achieved by aid programmes, including cash transfers) and physical security. When 
                                                          
65 SAS, 2003. pp. 128 
66 And indeed Chapter 3 of this thesis 
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households in such areas have easy access to guns, which can enhance the sense of safety 
in an insecure setting, many may prefer to divert resources towards acquiring guns, even 
at the cost of other goods and services that directly increase consumption and welfare. 
The relative preference for security goods (guns) viz. consumption goods may be higher 
for groups that are further away from critical thresholds of survival, i.e. the rich and the 
wealthy – who in fact may also be at greater risk of becoming the targets of violence. For 
such groups, access to guns may be more curtailed by their own liquidity constraints (if 
wealth is held in land and other immovable assets, such as with large land-owning 
households), than by physical access to gun markets (as is the case in much of rural 
Pakistan). Justino (2009) examines households’ simultaneous vulnerability to violence 
and to poverty and argues that households that have low vulnerability to poverty and 
have high accumulated wealth, but face high exposure to violence may move to more 
secure areas to reduce exposure to violence. However, if their accumulated wealth is in 
the form of immobile assets such as land, such groups may not be able to leave their 
communities for safer destinations. I situate (Question No. 2 and 3 of) my research in 
this framework and examine whether land-wealthy households who are unable to move 
out even in the face of violence, use cash transfers to secure themselves within their 
communities – through the acquisition of guns.   
The role of cash transfers, rather than accumulated wealth/ income in financing the 
acquisition of guns is critical to this chapter. It can be argued that well-off households 
that face low material deprivations and high vulnerability to violence may not need (to 
wait for) exogenous cash transfers to purchase guns – they may have acquired them in 
the past, i.e. before the floods and the ensuing flood relief cash transfers, or alternatively, 
they may be able to buy them out of their own resources, rather than from state-funded 
transfers. In an alternate formulation, households that acquired guns after the 2010 
floods may be very different from those that did earlier, and so gun purchases from flood 
relief cash transfers may have been undertaken by a set of households that are very 
different from those who purchased guns earlier, i.e. out of existing (pre-flood) wealth 
and income. I address this concern in two ways. 
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First, I discuss liquidity constraints faced by large landowning households in Pakistan, 
and how cash transfers can enable gun purchases by alleviating such liquidity 
constraints. In rural Pakistan, despite being financially well-off, land-wealthy 
households may face severe liquidity constraints because the bulk of their wealth is in 
the form of immovable land and properties. In the aftermath of the floods, these 
households were more likely to have faced an acute shortage of cash (relative to earlier 
times, even if they had higher absolute amounts of cash compared to the poor/ landless, 
for example) as land holdings and immovable assets may have suffered damages, and 
their incomes from such sources may have been reduced or stopped. The exogenous 
infusion of cash through flood relief transfers could then have alleviated liquidity 
constraints, and in an insecure environment (marked by community exposure to violent 
conflict, and households’ experience of living in flood relief camps that were affected by 
crime and conflict), led such households to acquire guns.  
Secondly, I examine whether households that only acquired guns after the 2010 floods 
differ statistically from households who owned guns before (the 2010 floods, and the 
flood relief transfers) in terms of observable characteristics, and find that by and large, 
these sets of households do not differ significantly on observable characteristics 
(Appendix 5.4).  
5.2.2 Guns and Human Development 
This section draws heavily on the comprehensive review of the effects of small arms on 
human development by SAS (2003), which considers separately, the direct and indirect 
effects of small arms (mainly guns) on development.   
The most serious direct effect of gun ownership and use is the incidence of death. Unlike 
many other weapons, guns can cause immediate death, can be used by the shooter from 
a distance and without much strenuous effort. As such, the fatality rate in crimes 
committed with guns is particularly high compared to other weapons. It is estimated 
that over 500,000 people are killed because of small arms misuse in both conflict-affected 
and other countries (WHO, 2002; Muggah and Griffiths, 2002). 
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In addition to deaths, non-fatal injuries are a serious consequence of gun violence. These 
in turn result in lower productivity and reduced earnings for the survivors. Many people 
who are injured in gun attacks also go on to suffer from partial or complete disability 
(Ferriman, 2002; Kobusingye, 2002). Injuries and disability may in turn leads to higher 
medical expenses for the household and greater levels of debt.  
The indirect effects of gun violence pertain to heightened criminality, the rising costs of 
economic activity, declining investment and business climate, strained social cohesion 
and disruptions of social services and development interventions. In section 5.2.1 I have 
discussed the mixed evidence on the relationship between gun ownership and violent 
crime, identifying studies that indicate that guns can be used to both, perpetrate and 
deter violence in different settings. In addition to violent crime and homicide itself, gun 
use is also associated with other forms of crime such as drug trafficking (James, 2002), 
intimidation, kidnapping and disappearances (Muggah and Berman, 2001).  
Economic activity can suffer as a result of gun violence. This may be due to several 
factors, including: higher transaction costs to account for security – for example through 
increased transportation costs to avoid violence-affected routes (SAS, 2003), weak 
enforcement of rules and contracts that facilitate trade, the use of guns to swing the terms 
of trade in favour of local rebel leaders (Ross, 2002; Reno, 2002), the disconnection of 
transport and trade networks that reduce local producers’ access to markets, the erosion 
of profitability of several value-adding activities in agriculture leading communities to 
reduce marketable surpluses and move back towards subsistence farming (World Bank, 
2002; Goudie and Neypati, 1999), and the destruction of physical capital that 
complements or sustains private sector production and investment, caused by violent 
activity involving automated guns, for example (SAS, 2003).  
Gun violence can also dampen the investment climate and negatively affect specific 
industries such as tourism. James (2002) notes that concerns over crime are “as much 
about corporate survival as about personal safety.” According to the World Bank (2001), 
violence and insecurity were seen as the top source of business risk by investors. 
Although the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2002) found no significant relationship 
between gun crime and FDI inflows at the country level, they state that there may be 
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disaggregated effects across industries where the location of the investment site is 
flexible (as against mineral extraction industries, for instance).  
Furthermore, gun violence can affect the access to and the quality of essential services 
such as health and education. Chapter 3 of this thesis examines how exposure to violence 
in general can limit access to cash transfers in Pakistan. Social services staff such as 
doctors, teachers, immunisation workers, as well as educational and health facilities may 
be directly targeted (Muggah and Batchelor, 2002). The fear of being attacked can also 
deter households from seeking services; for instance, students’ school enrolment and 
attendance may decline (World Bank, 1996; Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2000; Luckham et al., 
2001) as a result of the threats of gun violence. An insecure environment may also cause 
international development agencies such as UN agencies and NGOs to scale back and 
withdraw from areas, especially when the safety of their staff members is likely to be at 
risk (SAS, 2003). Further, higher costs incurred by these agencies for providing security 
represents a diversion of resources away from development purposes (Muggah and 
Batchelor, 2002). All these factors can lead to under-investments in human capital, 
further impeding the progress on development targets and the fight against poverty in 
many countries.  
Finally, gun violence can harm social cohesion and affect other social dynamics. The 
environment of fear and insecurity created by gun violence can lower political 
participation at the community level as members may use violence and force, rather than 
collaborative problem solving mechanisms to resolve disputes. Access to guns can also 
overthrow traditional systems of social organisation pertaining to resource 
management, land-tenure and community security. Gun violence can also destroy social 
capital and community cohesion (SAS, 2003; Jefferson and Urquhart, 2002).  To the extent 
that these factors have a detrimental effect on human development, they are channels 
through which gun violence harms present and future prospects for development.  
5.2.3 Civilian Gun Ownership in Pakistan 
5.2.3.1 Estimates of Gun Ownership in Pakistan 
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It is estimated that civilians in Pakistan own up to 18 million guns, of which only 7 
million are licensed (Karp, 2007). This makes Pakistan the 6th highest ranked country in 
terms of the number of privately owned guns. The rate of total private gun ownership 
in the country is 11.6 firearms per 100 people. This is much higher compared to similar 
estimates from other countries in South Asia and Pakistan’s immediate neighbourhood, 
as shown in Table 1 below: 
Table 1. Rate of Private Gun Ownership per 100 people: Select South Asian countries 
Country Guns per 100 people 
Pakistan 11.6 
Afghanistan 4.4 
India 4.2 
Nepal 0.8 
Bangladesh 0.5 
Sri Lanka 1.5 
Maldives 6.4 
Bhutan 0.3 
Iran* 5.1 
S. Asia Average (excludes Pakistan, Iran) 3.7 
*Iran is not part of South Asia but is included as it neighbours Pakistan 
Source: Karp, 2007: Appendix 4 
 
Table 1 points to the high level of civilian militarisation in Pakistan, relative to its 
extended neighbourhood. The figures above are likely to be underestimates of actual 
small arms ownership owing to underreporting. According to Abbasi (2013), gun 
ownership is very likely underestimated in rural Pakistan. Further, the above statistics 
do not include assault rifles which abound across several parts of rural Pakistan. It is 
important to note that the above estimates are of the total licensed and non-licensed 
(illicit) guns owned by citizens. While this excludes guns owned by the armed forces and 
the police, these numbers do not pertain only to non-combatants. This is because many 
guns may be held by terrorist, militant, insurgent and criminal groups who are involved 
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in violent conflict. In practice it is virtually impossible to identify how many weapons 
are held by such groups viz. non-combatant civilians.  
 
5.2.3.2 The Regulatory Framework for Guns Production, Sales and Purchase/Ownership 
 
The high prevalence of small arms ownership among civilians in Pakistan is partly the 
outcome of an insufficient and ineffective regulatory framework. While the law in 
Pakistan requires that holders, producers and traders of guns acquire licenses, 
historically this has not been very strictly followed. In recent years, and under the aegis 
of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small and Light Weapons (UNPoA-
SALW), Pakistan has imposed a complete ban on new arms licenses since June 20th, 2013 
(Pakistan Mission to the UN, 2014), subject to certain exceptions. In practice however, it 
is still possible to obtain licenses by exploiting loopholes in the rules, as well as to acquire 
guns without a license, particularly from informal and unregulated arms workshops, 
and from arms traffickers who smuggle guns in using both land and sea routes. Political 
contacts are also very helpful in obtaining gun licenses, as elected representatives had 
the right to approve permissions for awarding gun licenses.67 While the more recent 
regulation has sought to limit the number of licenses issued to both buyers and 
manufacturers of guns, other aspects of regulation are not very strict. For example, there 
is no limit on the number of firearms or the quantity of ammunition a license-owning 
individual can possess, nor any requirements of references or of undergoing firearm 
safety training for being allowed to possess guns (Alpers and Wilson, 2015).  
 
Private gun sales are permissible under the law in Pakistan, and dealers are required to 
obtain a license to sell guns. However, gun shows and private firearm dealing events are 
not prohibited by law. There is a very large number of informal guns and small arms 
markets, selling both, locally manufactured guns, as well as guns imported and 
smuggled in from abroad. Dara Adam Khel, a small town in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) is a huge centre for illegal arms production and has a very large 
market for guns. According to a report published in The Express Tribune, workshops in 
                                                          
67 For Middle-Class Pakistanis, a Gun Is a Must-Have Accessory. The Wall Street Journal. 6 January, 2009. 
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the Dara Adam Khel area have the capacity to manufacture 100 AK-47s at a cost of under 
US$ 150 per weapon.68 The guns manufactured in Dara Adam Khel are typically not 
marked, and recent efforts by the government of Pakistan have sought to strictly 
implement a system of marking on all arms that are produced here, in accordance with 
the provisions of the UNPoA-SALW. The government has also sought to bring the local 
arms-smiths of Dara Adam Khel under the supervision of the (state-run) Pakistan 
Ordinance Factories (Pakistan Mission to the UN, 2013).  
 
The Dara Adam Khel region produces an estimated 20,000 types of weapons (including 
pistols, revolvers, shot guns, sniper rifles, carbines guns and copies of Kalashnikovs and 
AK-47s, as well as ammunition and explosives) making it the largest centre of private 
small arms manufacturing in Pakistan. Apart from Dara Adam Khel, guns markets are 
located at several locations in FATA and in several cities including Rawalpindi 
(bordering the federal capital, Islamabad), Peshawar (the provincial capital of KPK), 
Quetta (capital of Balochistan) and Karachi (capital of Sindh and Pakistan’s largest 
metropolis). In addition to locally made guns, weapons including pistols, rockets, 
grenades, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank shells are also smuggled into Pakistan from 
Afghanistan along the long border spanning parts of FATA, KPK and Balochistan. 
Weapons are also imported and smuggled in on sea from Arab and East African 
countries (Abbasi, 2013). These factors contribute to sustaining and intensifying ongoing 
conflict dynamics, as terrorist, sectarian and insurgent militants, as well as criminal 
gangs can acquire guns and other small weapons relatively easily.  
 
5.2.3.3 Social, Cultural and Security Motivations for Gun Ownership and Purchase in 
Pakistan 
 
Private purchases of guns are motivated by a number of factors. In many parts of 
Pakistan, particularly in villages, guns are seen as a status symbol, through which the 
traditional elite assert and display their superior social standing. Gun ownership invokes 
both, fear, and respect, thus fostering, in many cases, a subservient loyalty. According to 
                                                          
68 The Weapons Trail – part 1: Where do 20m illegal arms come from? The Express Tribune. 17 May, 2012.  
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Sifarish Khan, a gun-buyer interviewed by the Wall Street Journal in 2009, “A gun can 
be your friend… More bullets, more friends.”69 
 
Gun ownership and use also have cultural significance in many parts of Pakistan. In 
Pashtun and Baloch dominated areas, guns are used not only as weapons in inter-tribal 
rivalry or by and against terrorists and insurgents,  but also on festive occasions such as 
weddings (where celebratory shots are fired in the air), for hunting, and as sport.  
 
Bearing guns has become intertwined with cultural identity among many Pashtun and 
Baloch tribes, in depictions in popular culture as well as in news media articles (even as 
academic scholarship on cultural aspects of gun ownership – in the form of journal 
articles and also any grey literature, is unavailable, to the best of my knowledge at the 
time of writing this paper). According to Abbasi (2013), “In the tribal belt of the Pak-
Afghan border guns are part of the daily attire and no ‘self-respecting’ Pashtun would 
be seen without a visible weapon. For those who are less fortunate and cannot own a 
weapon, there are shops that offer weapons for hire on an hourly basis, charging a 
nominal fee.” The celebrated British television host, Michael Palin (2004), records in his 
travelogue spanning parts of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border the following comment 
made by his guide and informant on the prevailing ‘gun culture’ in Pakistan’s North-
West, “For them [the people who live on the North-West (Afghanistan-Pakistan) 
Frontier]… a gun is a social necessity. Pathans [Pashtuns] carry guns the way Londoners 
carry umbrellas.” He adds that the “existence of and respect for the gun has reduced 
crime and kept order.” While several accounts characterise the Pashtun (and indeed 
Baloch) groups as traditionally warring tribes (dating back to the Raj and earlier), their 
association with guns is a relatively more recent phenomenon. According to Abbasi 
(2013), the arrival of refugees from Pakistan as a result of the Afghan-Russian war in the 
1980s was the watershed in terms of introducing a weapon culture in Pakistan. The 
unfettered movement of populations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border also made 
any strict controls on weapons trade meaningless and as conflict spilled into Pakistan, 
the demand for and production of guns increased.  
                                                          
69 For Middle-Class Pakistanis, a Gun Is a Must-Have Accessory. The Wall Street Journal. 6 January, 2009.  
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While very little (or next to no) published material is available on gun culture in 
Balochistan, informal accounts from several residents and experts whom I contacted 
suggest that guns are a vital part of Baloch tribal identity. In Punjab and Sindh, much 
like the other provinces, guns are likely to be owned by the rural elite. According to the 
Wall Street Journal article cited above, “urban Pakistanis tend to shun the illegal arms 
bazaars, in an areas known for tribal codes, bandits and Islamic70 insurgents.” 
 
The concept of a ‘gun culture’ is not unique to parts of Pakistan, and has been studied in 
detail in several countries. Based on a detailed analysis of the gun culture in post-war 
Kosovo, and drawing on discussions on El Salvador, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, SAS (2005) concludes that gun-culture, being itself an outcome of historical 
and political processes, is erroneously identified as a cause of violent conflict; which in 
fact is a result of social, historical and political determinants. Further, gun cultures are 
not monolithic, and vary across age, gender, social status, and can also change over time. 
This is instructive while considering measures to reduce gun violence and indeed gun 
ownership in Pakistan, as it suggests that individual and group attitudes towards guns 
need not be immutable, and not necessarily at the cost of community identities.  
 
Finally, it is important to consider how the prevailing security situation affects the 
demand for civilian gun ownership. When confronted with the possibility of being 
attacked by armed assailants, many civilians, particularly the rich (who are more likely 
to be victims of targeted shootings) may consider obtaining guns to get a sense of safety, 
as well as to defend themselves against potential shooters, if required. Guns therefore 
can be a vital security good in a context of rampant crime and physical insecurity to 
individuals and groups that are more likely to be targets of violence. Prior to adopting a 
policy to limit the number of new guns’ licenses in 2013, the Government of Pakistan 
had in fact made it easier and quicker for traders and businessmen who were facing 
threats of extortion to obtain gun licenses for self-defence (Abbasi, 2013), indicating a 
                                                          
70 The quotation above has been taken verbatim from the original source. The author would, as in other 
chapters of this thesis, prefer to use the terms ‘Islamist’ or ‘Jihadi’, to ‘Islamic’ while describing the 
insurgent groups’ motivations.  
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tacit state approval of some forms of civilian militarisation as a means to respond to the 
threats of criminal intimidation and extortion.   
 
5.3 Data Sources and Empirical Strategy 
 
In order to examine the effects of aid receipts on the likelihood of gun acquisition, I 
specifically consider the Citizens Damage Compensation (CDCP) – Phase I transfer, an 
unconditional flood relief cash transfer paid by the Government of Pakistan to flood-
affected households in the aftermath of the massive 2010 floods. The Phase – I transfer 
comprised a flat and one-off payment to each eligible house of PKR 20,000. Eligibility in 
Phase I was defined as (a) every household residing in a deemed “flood-affected” 
village/urban centre (subject to exceptions for households with a foreign bank account 
and having undertaken foreign travel) in Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan, (b) households 
identified as flood-affected based on a house-to-house damage assessment exercise 
conducted in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.  
5.3.1 Data Sources 
For my analysis I use the baseline cross-section of the CDCP Impact Evaluation dataset 
(OPM, 2013). This dataset is representative of areas affected by the 2010 floods in 
Pakistan, across the four major provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 
Balochistan. The dataset comprises 7802 households across 498 primary sampling units, 
including 448 rural, and 50 urban communities. The survey for the baseline of Phase II 
transfers was conducted during December 2011 – February 2012, after the rollout of the 
first phase of the CDCP flood relief transfer.71 The survey comprised detailed 
questionnaires for male and female respondents at the household level, and a detailed 
community-level module.  
Notably, the questionnaire included a question on whether or not the household owned 
any guns, and also whether or not the household held any guns prior to the 2010 floods. 
This allows me to analyse, in addition to the correlates of owning guns at all, any new 
                                                          
71 The cross section serves as a baseline for Phase II of the CDCP transfers; it, however, contains 
retrospective questions on the receipt of CDCP Phase I transfers that I use for my analysis. 
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acquisitions of guns by households who did not possess guns before the 2010 floods in 
the period between the floods and the household survey, which coincides with the 
rollout of the CDCP Phase – I transfer. Further, the amount of the CDCP – Phase I 
payments (PKR 20,000) were sufficient to purchase any small, locally made guns 
(ranging from PKR 8,000 – PKR 20,000),72 as well as to contribute substantially towards 
guns priced in the PKR 20,000 – 40,000 price range.  
5.3.2 Empirical Strategy 
5.3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlates of Gun Ownership 
I propose to use descriptive statistics and simple probit estimates to examine the 
correlates of gun ownership in Pakistan. I include a range of household and community 
factors in the probit estimation of the likelihood of household gun ownership to identify 
variables that have statistically significant correlation.  
5.3.2.2 Using Propensity Score Matching to identify the causal effects of Flood Relief 
cash transfers on the Likelihood of buying Guns 
In order to identify the causal effect of the receipt of CDCP – Phase I transfers on the 
likelihood of purchasing guns, I restrict the analysis to households that did not possess 
any guns before the 2010 floods and then examine the effect of the cash transfer on the 
likelihood of purchasing a gun over the year following floods (i.e. anytime between the 
floods in 2010 and the household survey in December 2011 – January 2012). As the 
coefficient on the transfer receipt dummy in a simple probit estimation of the likelihood 
of gun purchase will be biased, owing to the endogeneity of gun acquisition and cash 
transfer receipts, and lacking a randomized experiment or a discontinuity in programme 
rollout, I attempt to identify the causal effect using Propensity Score Matching 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).  
The CDCP Phase I flood relief cash transfers were intended to be universal (subject to a 
few restrictive exclusion criteria) to all households in flood-affected villages in three of 
the four major provinces in Pakistan. In the fourth province, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
                                                          
72 Published sources for gun prices were not available; the prices mentioned here are based on estimates 
provided by Pakistani informants whom I interviewed 
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eligibility was determined based on a house-to-house damage assessment survey. In 
reality, however, not all households in the three large provinces, received the transfers 
owing to administrative delays, ineffective dissemination of information about the 
programme, cumbersome paperwork and bureaucratic procedures for accessing 
payment, travel, time and money required to reach centres of disbursement, corruption 
and extortion, and the lack of special arrangements for people with disabilities and 
women to access the transfers (UNHCR, 2011; Hunt et al., 2011; O’Leary et al. 2012). As 
such, close to 40% of the survey households (representative of all flood-affected areas of 
Pakistan in 2010 in the four large provinces) did not receive the flood relief transfers. The 
province-wise breakup of recipients and non-recipients is shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2. Share of recipients and non-recipients of CDCP – Phase I transfers in sample, by 
province (unweighted) 
 Punjab Sindh KPK Balochistan Total 
Non 
recipients 
1,063 467 777 709 3,016 
Recipients 1,262 1,719 987 818 4,786 
% Recipients 54.28% 78.64% 55.95% 53.57% 61.34% 
Total 2,325 2,186 1,764 1,527 7,802 
 
In the absence of a randomized allocation of flood relief, or an exogenous cut-off-based 
discontinuity to determine eligibility, the coefficient on a dummy variable that indicates 
flood relief receipts in a simple probit estimation will not yield unbiased estimates of 
programme impact. One way to overcome this challenge is to use Propensity Score 
Matching to control for the effects of observable characteristics that determine 
programme selection (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The aim of this method is to create 
a score based on observable pre-treatment exogenous attributes of households in 
treatment and control groups to find (statistically) similar households in the alternate 
group. This is done by comparing cash transfer recipient (beneficiary/treatment) 
households with a matched set of non-recipient (non-beneficiary/control) households 
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based on the (observable) determinants of selection. In this chapter I estimate a Covariate 
Balanced Propensity Score (CBPS), as propounded by Imai and Ratkovic (2014). As with 
any estimates based on propensity score matching, the method does not account for 
selection bias arising from unobservables. This remains a limitation of the subsequent 
analysis, even as I try my best to match on a wide variety of observable characteristics 
that are likely to be correlated with the leading unobservables that can introduce bias at 
the local level, such as political clout and connections. Programme impact estimates are 
then arrived at assuming that the non-observable determinants of selection also follow 
the distribution of the observable determinants of selection – such as wealth and 
linguistic identity, on which the matching is performed. 
The covariates used for matching CDCP – Phase I receipt include correlates of flood 
exposure, household demographics, education, pre-flood wealth and living standards, 
ethnicity as a likely indicator of exclusion and sex of the head of the household. Table 3 
below shows the covariates used for matching programme recipients with non-
recipients. The full details of the probit regression underlying the estimation of the 
propensity score are presented in the following sub-section, 5.3.2.3.  
Table 3. Indicators used for Propensity Score Matching for CDCP Phase I receipts 
Dimensions Variables 
Demographics Proportion of household in various age groups, household 
size, proportion of men in the household, age of household 
head 
Long-term wealth Acres of farmland, pre-flood livestock value, dummies for 
electricity, gas, landline connection, type of water access and 
toilet in household category, Mud House dummy 
Occupation Household runs non-agricultural enterprise, Landless 
households dummy 
Education No. of males and females in the household who can read 
Ethnicity (Proxied by) linguistic group dummies 
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Flooding exposure Household and village-level flood exposure index, index of 
house damage due to flood 
Other Rural dummy, Female-headed household, Dummy for 
Household with drainage access, Number of rooms in the 
house, Owner-occupied house dummy 
 
5.3.2.3 Covariate Balanced Propensity Score Calculation 
Table 4 below presents the results from the estimation of the Covariate Balanced 
Propensity Score (CBPS) calculated for CDCP – Phase I receipts across the 7,802 sample 
households. The CBPS is an improvement over standard Propensity Score Matching as, 
in addition to estimating the likelihood of treatment status, it also optimises covariate 
balance – which means that any two observations with roughly the same propensity 
score are also similar in terms of the variables used for matching, and not the overall 
score alone (see Imai and Ratkovic, 2014 and Friedman, 2012 for a discussion).  
Table 4. Estimation of Covariate Balanced Propensity Score Matching for CDCP – I 
Receipts. Probit Model Results. 
Independent Variables Coefficient z 
Flood Exposure Index (HH) 0.012 1.16 
Rural (dummy) 0.089 1.48 
Flood Exposure Index (Community) 0.070*** 5.40 
Share of HH 13 – 17 0.144 1.08 
Share of HH 18 – 25 -0.638*** -6.66 
Share of HH 26 – 40 -0.090 -0.80 
Share of HH 41 – 60 0.382** 2.46 
Number of Rooms -0.005 -0.33 
Acres of Farmland Owned 0.001 0.25 
Household Size 0.022*** 3.52 
Age of HH Head 0.011*** 9.07 
Drainage access in House (dummy) 0.063 1.36 
pre Flood Livestock Value -0.000** -2.18 
HH owns non-agricultural enterprise (dummy) 0.018 0.42 
Household Damage Severity Index 0.133*** 5.76 
No. of Men who can read 0.037** 2.40 
No. of Women who can read 0.038* 1.89 
Access to piped water (dummy) 0.091 1.38 
Access to Hand pump (dummy) 0.269*** 6.22 
Access to tube well (dummy) 0.078 1.33 
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Female headed HH (dummy) -0.391*** -7.24 
Landless HH (dummy) -0.133*** -3.60 
Flush Toilet access (dummy) 0.134*** 3.06 
Dry Latrine access (dummy) -0.076 -1.61 
Gas connection (dummy) 0.113* 1.81 
Electricity access (dummy) 0.217*** 5.23 
Landline Telephone (dummy) 0.124 1.14 
Mud Floor (dummy) -0.013 -0.31 
Owner-occupied house (dummy) 0.260*** 6.23 
Sindhi 0.352*** 5.12 
Punjabi -0.200*** -2.64 
Balochi -0.076 -0.77 
Brahvi -0.912*** -6.66 
Pushtu -0.190*** -2.64 
Saraiki -0.140** -2.09 
Hindko -0.000 -0.00 
Other Language 0.482*** 2.69 
Constant -1.608*** -10.56 
Number of observations 7785  
LR Chi-squared (37) 1280.26  
Prob. > Chi-sq. 0.0000  
Pseudo R-squared 0.1232  
Details of Propensity Score   
Sum of Weight 7785  
Mean 0.613  
Std. Dev. 0.192  
Variance 0.037  
Skewness -0.500  
Kurtosis 2.623  
 
The Covariate Balanced Propensity Score (CBPS) was calculated using the ‘pscore’ 
command in STATA 13 software. This resulted in creating an optimal 13 blocks; the 
CBPS ensures that the balancing property of the Propensity Score is satisfied in every 
block. Table 5 below shows the inferior bound, and the number of treated and the 
number of controls in each block.  
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Table 5. Nos. of Controls/Treated in each Block for PSM 
Inferior of Block of Propensity 
Score 
Non-recipients 
(Control) 
Recipients 
(Treated) 
Total 
0 34 12 46 
0.1 57 8 65 
0.15 94 29 123 
0.2 279 96 375 
0.3 374 218 592 
0.4 489 394 883 
0.5 289 298 587 
0.55 294 377 671 
0.6 296 494 790 
0.65 245 529 774 
0.7 388 1,078 1,466 
0.8 155 1,004 1,159 
0.9 22 249 271 
Total 3,016 4,786 7,802 
 
I use nearest neighbour matching, matching each treatment observation with the five 
control observations that have the closest propensity score as per the procedure outlined 
in Rao and Ibanez(2005) and Quisumbing et al. (2011). Dehejia and Wahba (1998) show 
that nearest neighbour matching provides results that are very close to those from 
random assignment. Figure 1 below depicts the kernel density of propensity scores for 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, indicating considerable overlap and common 
support between the two to enable meaningful matching across the parameters listed 
above.  
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Figure 1. Kernel Density of Propensity Scores by Treatment Status 
  
Programme impacts are measured as the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATET) based on actual receipts of CDCP – I transfers, using nearest-neighbour 
matching (to the five closest neighbours).  
5.3.2.4 Identifying Heterogeneous Programme Impacts 
Finally, I test for any heterogeneous treatment effects from the Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) across groups that may be more likely to use cash transfers to buy guns, 
and in conflict-affected and peaceful areas. I examine whether the receipt of cash 
transfers increased the likelihood of purchasing guns compared to a matched set of non-
recipients among sub-populations that are generally wealthy, and/or less likely to have 
suffered substantial damages in the floods, and therefore likely to divert flood relief cash 
transfer receipts to non-material uses, such as guns.73 Specifically I consider the 
following groups: 
i. Communities that faced low levels of flooding exposure 
ii. Households that were not exposed to any floodwater in the house 
iii. Households that suffered no house damages in flooding 
                                                          
73 I assume that the most deserving, i.e. severely flood-affected and poor households have pressing 
material needs, and may therefore be less likely to purchase guns. 
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iv. Medium and Large Farmer households (with land holdings of 1.5 acres or 
higher) – as groups that lack liquidity, and have to depend on cash transfers 
to acquire guns 
Further, as the relative need or attractiveness of buying guns with money provided by 
cash transfers depends on the prevailing security situation, I additionally examine 
heterogeneous treatment effects within these sub-populations listed above, across 
conflict-affected and peaceful areas, based on the South Asia Terrorism Portal conflict 
events timeline (described in detail in Chapter 2).  
Finally, for any groups for which flood relief cash transfer receipts increased the 
propensity of gun acquisition, I examine if this effect is explained by the amount of time 
spent displaced, in flood relief camps – as a factor that can potentially accentuate security 
concerns, and therefore the need for guns. I examine heterogeneous treatments effects 
for sub-populations with a propensity to use flood relief transfers to buy guns (identified 
as outlined above), across two groups: those who spent any time living in flood relief 
camps, and those who did not.  
5.4. Results 
 
5.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
5.4.1.1 Household Gun ownership 
I first examine the rate of gun ownership in the sample from the flood-affected areas of 
Pakistan, at the national and provincial levels. Survey-weighted estimates of gun 
ownership in Pakistan from the sample show that 7.04 % of households in Pakistan 
reported owning a gun. This figure is as high as 28.82% for the Balochistan province. As 
reported in 2.3.1, Karp (2007) estimates that there are 11.6 guns per 100 people in 
Pakistan. Unfortunately, the survey data used for the present analysis does not contain 
information on the number of guns owned.  
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Table 6. Percentage of Households that own a gun (using sampling weights) 
 Punjab Sindh KPK Balochistan TOTAL 
HHs Own Gun 4.01% 8.05% 1.02% 28.82% 7.04% 
HHs Do not own gun 95.91% 91.95% 65.22% 70.94% 87.64% 
No Response 0.08% 0% 33.77% 0.24% 5.32% 
Source: CDCP Baseline Survey, Dec 2011 – Jan 2012 
 
The percentages reported in table 6 above are likely to be an under-estimate of true gun 
ownership, particularly in KPK where the reported rate of gun ownership seems much 
lower than previous accounts have suggested. The underestimation of gun ownership 
through surveys is largely because many households are unlikely to either misrepresent 
gun ownership status (claim they do not own guns, when in fact they do), or simply not 
respond to the question during the survey. While 7113 households (out of the total 7802 
in the sample) responded to this question, 689 sample households (8.83%) either chose 
not to respond, or had no information.74 Further, the exceptionally high rate of non-
response to the question of gun ownership in KPK (nearly 34%) suggests that many 
households that probably own guns chose not to answer the question during the survey. 
This is interesting because they chose not to respond to the question on guns when they 
could have, in theory, very easily said they did not possess any guns if they did not want 
to admit to any possession of guns.  
It is noteworthy that the majority of the households that did not respond to this question 
lie in the conflict-affected district of the KPK province. In three communities no 
household responded to the gun question; of which two lie in high conflict and one in 
medium conflict sub-districts. This merits further exploration. I later examine if non-
response is systematically associated with any household and community 
characteristics, and with exposure to conflict.  
In addition to non-response, the problem of misrepresentation (i.e. claiming not to 
possess guns when in fact the household does) is another source of gun ownership 
                                                          
74 This is different from the figure on non-response in table 6 as the latter uses sample weights whereas 
here I only report the total number of sample households that did not respond to the question 
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under-estimation. Unfortunately these are real and intractable problems associated with 
any household survey-based approaches to estimating gun-ownership. Any survey-
based analyses of gun ownership have to contend with these concerns, and are therefore 
likely to under-estimate true ownership.  
A question in the household questionnaire asks whether or not the household possessed 
any guns prior to the 2010 floods, allowing an identification of households who 
possessed a gun at the time of survey (December 2011 – February 2012) but did not prior 
to the floods. These households acquired guns in the period following the floods and 
coinciding with the CDCP – I transfers. Of the total 777 households in the sample that 
possessed any guns at the time of the survey, 99 (12.7%) did not own any guns prior to 
the survey but acquired them thereafter (62 of these households were in Balochistan, 22 
in Sindh, 8 in Punjab and 7 in KPK).  
What household and community-level factors are associated with gun ownership? I now 
assess the correlates of household gun ownership using a simple probit model. In the 
following analysis I exclude all non-responses to the question on gun ownership. I 
examine the association of household gun ownership with demographic variables 
(household size, composition, number of males, gender of household head), education 
level (numbers of males and females with primary schooling), wealth status (land 
ownership, livestock ownership, enterprise ownership), access to drainage services, 
receipt of remittances, linguistic identity, and community characteristics (urban/rural 
status, topography, distance from administrative capitals and cantonments, index of 
presence of state institutions, community infrastructure, intra-community linguistic 
fractionalisation), and province dummies. Results are presented in Table 6 below.  
I also attempt to examine the relationship between conflict exposure and gun ownership. 
As this is likely to be endogenous, I cannot claim a causal effect of conflict on gun 
ownership rates and therefore restrict the analysis to simple correlations. In previous 
chapters of this thesis I have presented causal effects of conflict on variables of interest 
using two specific instrumental variables: the distance to Afghanistan, and the share of 
the Pashtun population. Both these potential instruments are unsuitable for identifying 
the causal effect of conflict on gun ownership. First, as discussed in section 5.2.3.3, the 
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distance to Afghanistan directly affects the availability (and probably the price) of guns 
– and therefore the likelihood of gun ownership. This is because many guns are 
manufactured close to the Afghanistan border, near Dara Adam Khel, and because guns 
are also smuggled in to Pakistan from Afghanistan. Secondly, the proportion of Pashtun 
population can also directly affect gun ownership due to cultural practices that have 
been created over time, which conflate gun ownership with notions of Pashtun identity. 
Lacking any strong instrument to overcome the endogeneity of conflict exposure and 
gun ownership, I only present simple probit estimates in table 6 below. In the first 
specification (column 1) I include a dummy variable for whether or not the community 
is located in a tehsil (sub-district) that witnessed any violent conflict between January 
2001 and June 2010 as per the South Asia Terrorism Portal conflict events timeline for 
Pakistan (explained in detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis). I then also attempt to examine 
if gun ownership is associated with the distance to Afghanistan, being a correlate of both, 
exposure to conflict in the 2001-2010 period, and the availability of guns. The results 
from this estimation are presented in column 2.  
Table 7. Correlates of Household Gun Ownership: Probit estimates 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient z Coefficient z 
Household Size -0.001 -0.30 -0.000 -0.19 
Urban 0.010 0.64 0.017 1.07 
No. of males with primary Education 0.008** 2.34 0.007** 2.19 
No. of females with primary Education 0.005 1.10 0.004 0.94 
No. of HH members above 14 0.004 1.44 0.004 1.56 
Value of livestock before floods (PKR) 0.000*** 5.97 0.000*** 5.85 
Age of HH Head 0.000 1.27 0.000 1.26 
Total number of Male members in HH 0.001 0.16 0.000 0.15 
Female headed HH (dummy) -0.021 -1.45 -0.021 -1.45 
Landless HH (dummy) -0.033** -2.30 -0.032** -2.28 
Marginal farmer (<1.5 acres of land) -0.022 -1.10 -0.022 -1.09 
Medium Farmer (1.5 – 12.5 acres of land) 0.012 0.82 0.013 0.90 
Large farmer (12.5 acres of land) 0.050** 2.21 0.049** 2.17 
HH owns non-agricultural enterprise 0.012 1.27 0.013 1.34 
HH has access to drainage 0.032*** 2.81 0.030*** 2.60 
HH received remittance 0.004 0.27 0.005 0.39 
Days spent in flood relief camp (displaced) 0.000 1.25 0.000 1.01 
Distance from District Capital 0.003 0.15 0.006 0.38 
Distance from Province Capital 0.008 1.24 0.000 0.04 
Index of Linguistic Fractionalisation  -0.037 -1.41 -0.032 -1.24 
Index of community-level infrastructure -0.003 -0.94 -0.003 -1.06 
Index of presence of state institutions at 0.001 0.91 0.001 0.67 
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community level 
Distance from nearest Army Cantonment 0.061*** 3.08 0.052** 2.37 
Topography: Inland Plain 0.065** 2.11 0.055* 1.65 
Topography: Coastal Plain 0.050 1.33 0.033 0.85 
Topography: Plateau 0.154*** 2.99 0.145*** 2.83 
Topography: Hills 0.095** 2.36 0.073* 1.73 
Topography: Valley 0.241*** 5.41 0.217*** 4.68 
Topography: Mountain 0.141*** 3.62 0.128*** 3.13 
Topography: Desert 0.039 0.83 0.052 1.02 
Former princely state (dummy) 0.032 1.58 0.014 0.71 
Nation Building District – At risk of 
radicalization 
0.008 0.55 0.028** 2.00 
Urdu  0.010 0.38 0.016 0.60 
Sindhi -0.029 -1.10 -0.018 -0.66 
Pushto 0.111*** 3.43 0.072** 2.06 
Balochi 0.053* 1.81 0.057* 1.93 
Hindko 0.106*** 2.78 0.108*** 2.92 
Saraiki 0.021 1.13 0.021 1.08 
Brahvi 0.034 0.85 0.030 0.74 
Other Language 0.018 0.48 0.020 0.53 
KPK -0.069** -2.24 -0.085*** -2.82 
Sindh 0.112*** 4.70 0.137*** 5.81 
Balochistan 0.172*** 6.94 0.170*** 7.09 
Conflict-affected sub-district (dummy) 0.006 0.48   
Nearest distance to Af-Pak border   -0.032*** -3.83 
N 7007  7007  
pseudo R2 0.2119  0.2162  
Marginal effects; t statistics in second column 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Among household characteristics, we see that adult males’ primary education, the 
number of members above age 14, households owning more than 12.5 acres of land, and 
access to drainage facilitiesare positively associated with gun ownership.  
Households in communities that are further away from army cantonments, and that are 
located in valleys, plateaus, hills, and mountains are more likely to own guns. Pushto 
and Hindko linguistic identity, and Sindh and Balochistan provinces are also positively 
associated with gun ownership (relative to Punjabi speakers, and the Punjab province, 
respectively). The coefficient on the dummy for a conflict-affected sub-district in 
specification 1 is not statistically significant. However, we see that distance to the 
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Afghanistan-Pakistan border (indicating both, lower availability of guns and lower 
exposure to conflict over the 2001-2010 period) has a negative relationship with gun 
ownership (proximity, therefore has a positive association).  
Finally we observe that the coefficient on the dummy for the KPK province is negative. 
This is contrary to some of the qualitative discussions and assessments of gun ownership 
in the province in 5.2.3.3. This is in large part probably because of the very high rate on 
non-response to the question on gun ownership in KPK, and possibly because those who 
own guns are in fact more likely to not respond to the question.  
Is non-response systematically linked with household and community characteristics, 
and is it partly explained by exposure to conflict? I use a simple probit model to assess 
the correlates of household non-response to the question on gun ownership. I find that 
households that chose not to respond to this question were more likely to have fewer 
male members, but also more male members with primary or higher education. They 
were also more likely to have access to drainage– much like the households that own 
guns, from table 7 above. Every household in Sindh responded to this question (and 
therefore dropped out of the probit estimation), whereas, as the descriptive statistics in 
Table 6 suggest, households in KPK were much more likely not to respond. While the 
coefficient on the dummy for a conflict-affected district is not statistically significant, I 
find that the distance from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has a significant, negative 
relationship, suggesting that areas closer to the border – which are more exposed to 
violence, and have easier access to guns – are more likely not to respond to the question 
on gun ownership. Interestingly, non-response has a strong positive relationship with 
the dummy for a Nation-Building District. These are districts identified by the 
Government of Pakistan as facing socio-economic backwardness and that are at a risk of 
growing radicalisation. The full results from the probit estimation are provided in 
Appendix 5.1.  
These associations suggest that non-response is not entirely random. In fact, apart from 
the fact that residents of KPK are more likely not to provide a response, it appears that 
some of the factors associated with gun ownership (table 6) are also associated with non-
response. This suggests that non-response may be more closely associated with gun 
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ownership (as against with not owning guns). It follows that the extent of non-response 
to the question on gun ownership is likely to result in an under-estimation of the 
prevalence of gun ownership.  
4.1.2 Correlates of the Community-level rate of gun-ownership 
I now identify the correlates of the rate of mean community-level gun-ownership rates. 
I model the average rate of households that own guns in a community (the share of 
households in the community that owns at least one gun) as a continuous variable 
censored between 0 (no household owns a gun), and 1(every household owns a gun), 
based on Long (1997). Of the 498 communities in the sample, in 230, no households 
owned guns, in one community every household owned a gun, in three communities no 
household responded to the question, and for 236 communities the share of households 
that owns guns lies between 0 and 1. I find that community-level rates of household gun 
ownership are positively correlated with the share of households that own 1.5 acres or 
more of land, topography characterised by plateaus, mountains and valleys, the 
community being part of a Nation-Building District, described in 5.4.1.1 above, and with 
proximity to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. On the other hand, Urban/rural status, 
distance from administrative capitals, the degree of linguistic fractionalisation and 
community-level infrastructure and the presence of state institutions have no significant 
relationship. The full Tobit estimation results are presented in Appendix 5.2.  
5.4.2 Effect of Cash Transfers on Gun Purchases 
I now examine whether the receipt of cash transfers, specifically the CDCP – Phase I 
flood relief cash grant of PKR 20,000, caused an increase in the propensity to acquire 
guns. In order to do so, I restrict the analysis to households that did not possess any guns 
before the 2010 floods, and then identify whether the receipt of the CDCP – I transfer 
increased the likelihood that the household purchased a gun sometime between the 2010 
floods and the household survey in December 2011 – January 2012. This approach will 
only be able to identify any causal effect of the flood relief cash transfers on the extensive 
margin of guns’ acquisition; lacking data on the number of guns owned by a household, 
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I am unable to identify whether households that had guns prior to the 2010 floods, used 
the cash transfer to acquire more guns.  
I first present simple probit estimates of the effect of CDCP – Phase I receipts on the 
likelihood of buying guns. In Table 7 below, columns 1 – 4 show the coefficient on the 
CDCP – Phase I receipt (dummy) on the likelihood of owning a gun at the time of the 
survey (for that part of the sample which did not own a gun before the floods), without 
any controls, and then sequentially adding province dummies, community controls and 
household controls, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 depict the coefficient from the 
estimation with full controls for the sub-samples of all no-conflict sub districts, and 
conflict-affected sub-districts, respectively.  
 
Table 8. Effect of CDCP – Phase I receipt of Extensive Margin of Gun Acquisition between July 
2010 and January 2012: Simple Probit estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     No-
Conflict 
tehsils 
Conflict-
affected 
tehsils 
CDCP – Phase 
I transfer 
received 
(dummy) 
-0.000 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 (-0.04) (0.42) (1.56) (1.15) (0.72) (0.52) 
Province 
Dummies 
- Y Y Y Y Y 
Community 
Controls 
- - Y Y Y Y 
HH Controls - - - Y Y Y 
N 6326 6326 6123 6031 3370 1899 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Community and Household controls same as those included in Table 7 
 
Table 8above shows no significant relationship between the receipt of the CDCP – Phase 
I transfer and the acquisition of guns, even after including controls, and in conflict-
affected and peaceful areas. Interpreting the coefficient on the CDCP – Phase I dummy 
above as a measure of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) would 
however, be inaccurate as the simple probit estimation would suffer from selection bias. 
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Households more likely to receive the cash transfer (the treatment) may also be less 
inclined or able to purchase guns due to many observable and unobservable factors.  
In order to reduce the extent of the selection bias to arrive at a more accurate estimation 
of the ATET, I use Propensity Score Matching. This technique allows me to eliminate any 
such selection bias arising from a wide array of observable factors that may be 
confounded with treatment status, as well as any unobservable factors that are closely 
associated with the observables on which I match cash transfer beneficiaries with non-
beneficiaries. Having described in detail, the procedure for generating a balanced 
Propensity Score based on the wide array of observables that determine selection in 
section 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.2.3, I now present ATET estimates of the CDCP – Phase I transfers 
on the likelihood of gun acquisition for the full sample, and then for no-conflict, and 
conflict-affected areas, respectively.  
Table 9. PSM ATET estimates of CDCP – I on the Extensive Margin of Gun Acquisition between 
July 2010 and January 2012 
 Full sample No-Conflict tehsils Conflict-affected 
tehsils 
    
ATET    
CDCP – I  0.003 0.002 0.007 
 (0.95) (0.66) (1.46) 
N 6314 4203 2111 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Again, we see that the CDCP – Phase I cash transfer has no significant effect on the 
likelihood of guns’ acquisition among the population at large, in both conflict-affected 
and peaceful areas. This is not particularly surprising as flood-affected populations are 
very likely to use cash for rebuilding their lives, restoring assets, paying for medical 
expenses etc. Acquiring a gun may be a low priority for the general population in such 
a situation, and as table 9 above shows, even in conflict-affected areas.  
5.4.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Across Groups More likely to divert Cash 
Grants to Gun Purchases 
Aggregate treatment effects, such as those estimated in Table 8 above, may often mask 
heterogeneities across sub-groups of the population for whom treatment effects may be 
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more pronounced and significant. While households that are most affected by floods 
may use the flood relief transfers for rehabilitation, those households that are not much 
affected, or that have a greater capacity to limit and withstand flooding shocks, or those 
that face graver security threats and whose security needs may be more pressing than 
their material requirements, may be more likely to divert cash relief towards acquiring 
a gun.  
I therefore focus attention on households/groups that are not likely to have been much 
affected by the floods, those who have a better ability to face flooding shocks, and those 
that are likely to face security threats in a post-flood setting to examine if the provision 
of cash transfers to such groups can (unintentionally) result in increased gun acquisition. 
I specifically consider the following types of households: 
i. Households that faced no flood water exposure in their homes (even if others 
in their community were flooded). This is based on self-reported levels of the 
depth and duration of flood waters in the dwelling.  
ii. Households in communities that faced low levels of flooding on the whole 
(low exposure, and therefore lower material losses). This pertains to 
communities with a low Flood Exposure Index, i.e. < 1, as described in 
Chapter 6 (on Floods and Migration) 
iii. Households whose houses suffered no physical damage in the floods (again, 
low exposure, and material loss), based on self-reported house damages in 
the survey; and finally,  
iv. Farmer households with land holdings of 1.5 acres and above – who are better 
able to withstand flooding shocks (compared to the landless and marginal 
farmers), may lack the necessary cash to purchase guns without transfer 
receipts (as their wealth is in the form of large, immobile assets), and who 
may face greater security threats.  
In tables 10 – 13 below, I present the ATET estimates of the impact of the CDCP – I on 
the extensive margin of gun acquisition within the four sub-groups listed above, and 
across no-conflict and conflict-affected areas.  
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Table 10. PSM ATET estimates of CDCP – I on the Extensive Margin of Gun Acquisition 
between July 2010 and January 2012: Households that faced no Flood Water exposure in their 
homes 
 Full sample No-Conflict tehsils Conflict-affected 
tehsils 
    
ATET    
CDCP – I  0.009 0.023** -0.004 
 (0.68) (2.02) (-0.18) 
N 817 352 465 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 11. PSM ATET estimates of CDCP – I on the Extensive Margin of Gun Acquisition 
between July 2010 and January 2012: Communities with low Flooding Exposure (Flood 
Exposure Index < 1) 
 Full sample No-Conflict tehsils Conflict-affected 
tehsils 
    
ATET    
CDCP – I  0.010 0.000 -0.013 
 (0.69) (.) (-0.66) 
N 676 203 473 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 12. PSM ATET estimates of CDCP – I on the Extensive Margin of Gun Acquisition 
between July 2010 and January 2012: Households that reported No Housing Damages in the 
floods 
 Full sample No-Conflict tehsils Conflict-affected 
tehsils 
    
ATET    
CDCP – I  0.017 0.000 -0.054 
 (1.18) (.) (-0.97) 
N 267 153 114 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 13. PSM ATET estimates of CDCP – I on the Extensive Margin of Gun Acquisition 
between July 2010 and January 2012: Households with land holdings of 1.5 acres or higher 
 Full sample No-Conflict tehsils Conflict-affected 
tehsils 
    
ATET    
CDCP – I  -0.006 -0.010 0.083*** 
 (-0.84) (-1.23) (3.81) 
N 1193 838 355 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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From tables 10 – 12 above it appears that the CDCP – I transfers did not have any 
significant effect on the propensity to purchase guns among sub-populations that faced 
lower degrees of flooding exposure and damage, in both conflict-affected and peaceful 
areas (column 2 in table 10 being an exception, showing a small but surprising positive 
effect of the transfer on gun purchases among households that were not flooded and 
were in no-conflict areas). This suggests that the provision of cash to groups that are 
likely to have faced lower material losses due to floods, in general, is not likely to lead 
to any civilian militarization through the purchase of guns. However, we see in table 12 
that the receipt of CDCP – I transfers among large land owning households in conflict-
affected sub-districts increased the likelihood of gun purchase by 8.3%.  
Do security concerns explain why large land owning households in conflict-affected 
areas are more likely to use flood relief cash transfers to acquire guns?  
Large land owning households, who may be better able to protect basic consumption 
levels even when their homes and lands have been badly affected by floods and thus 
have less pressing material needs from a survival standpoint. Such households may have 
a higher relative preference for buying guns from the receipt of a cash transfer, not only 
because their material requirements are less pressing, but also because they may face 
higher security threats, including armed robbery, theft and looting (Semple, 2011). More 
likely to be made the targets of attack in conflict-affected areas, large land-owning 
households may use the infusion of cash to enhance their security by acquiring a gun. 
Furthermore, large land-owning households in Pakistan are often characterized by asset 
portfolios dominated by illiquid assets such as land. Despite having high levels of 
wealth, such households may have low levels of cash income, and may therefore acquire 
guns in the face of security threats only after any exogenous increases in cash holdings 
(through flood relief transfers).   
It is not possible to observe the specific sense of vulnerability, or the threats faced by 
such households. However, as many observers, including Semple (2011) have identified, 
living in flood relief displacement camps, both official and unofficial, presented 
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heightened security threats to several households. During the period of displacement, 
households felt vulnerable in the camps which in some cases experienced criminal 
activity including extortion, armed attack and robbery, as well as because they feared 
that their homes and properties back home were being looted while they were in the 
camps. Residence in a flood relief camp can therefore be seen as a factor that enhances 
household vulnerability, including for the large land owning households who may have 
more to lose, both in the camp (where they probably were able to bring more liquid 
assets with them), as well as in their communities where they risked the plunder of their 
homes and assets. I therefore examine if the positive effect of the CDCP – I transfer on 
gun purchases among large land owning households in conflict-affected areas varies by 
the duration of time spent by such households in displacement camps.  
Table 14. PSM ATET estimates of CDCP – I on the Extensive Margin of Gun Acquisition 
between July 2010 and January 2012: Households with land holdings of 1.5 acres or higher in 
Conflict-affected tehsils – by Flood relief camp status 
 All Conflict-affected 
tehsils 
Conflict-Affected 
tehsils: HHs did not 
live in flood relief 
camps 
Conflict-Affected 
tehsils: HHs lived 
in flood relief 
camps 
    
ATET    
CDCP – I  0.083*** -0.089 0.057*** 
 (3.81) (-0.93) (2.91) 
N 355 147 205 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 14 above suggests that the positive effect of CDCP – I on gun purchase among 
large land owning households in conflict areas is significant only among households that 
were displaced and lived (for any duration of time) in flood relief camps. There is no 
such effect for households that were not displaced (and therefore probably faced lower 
physical insecurity). While the decision whether or not to move a flood relief camp could 
itself be driven by unobservable characteristics that are correlated with cash transfer 
receipts and that also determine gun purchase, it is not intuitively clear what such factors 
may be. Apart from the possibility of such a variable (that I have not been able to 
countenance) driving the result of the association of displacement status and gun 
purchases, table 14 above provides some suggestive evidence that cash transfers can lead 
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to greater acquisition of guns in a manner explained partly by the insecurities associated 
with displacement and living in a relief camp. Specifically, this may happen when (i) 
households do not face grave material deprivations (as would be expected for 
households with large land ownings), (ii) they face higher security risks (indicated by 
living in conflict affected areas, and having undergone temporary flood-induced 
displacement in to flood relief camps), and (iii) may have relatively lower cash holdings 
with which to acquire guns (which makes the role of extraneous cash transfers, rather 
than income, critical in explaining why guns may be purchases out of transfer receipts, 
rather than income).  
5.4.4 Robustness Check 
I examine whether the results obtained above are robust to an alternate estimation of the 
covariate balanced propensity score. I do so by matching programme recipients with 
non-recipients only among the category of medium and large farmers (the sub-groups 
for which the cash transfer appears to have a positive and significant effect on the 
likelihood of gun purchases) who did not own guns prior to the 2010 floods. Further, 
while the previous CBPS estimation included a large number of covariates. I now use a 
more parsimonious specification, and test whether the results presented above also hold 
when (i) matching is done only within the category of large land-owning households, 
and (ii) using a more limited set of covariates. I match recipient and non-recipient large 
land-owning households on the following characteristics: rural/urban residence, 
household size, age of household head, number of males and females in the household 
who can read, farmland owned, pre-flood value of livestock, household flood exposure 
index, household social capital measure, and province of residence.  
The probit estimates of the calculation of the covariate balanced propensity score, and 
the graphical depiction of the kernel densities of the propensity score for beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries are presented in Appendix 6.3. I now present estimates of the 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated based on nearest neighbour matching using 
the Covariate-Balanced Propensity Score described above (matching each treatment 
household to five control households with the closest propensity score). I first present 
ATET estimates for all large land-owning households, in peaceful and in conflict-
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affected areas (table 14), and then examine whether any effect of the treatment is driven 
by households that were living in displacement camps (table 15), to examine if the results 
in Tables 13 and 14 are robust to matching based on a more parsimonious set of 
covariates.  
Table 15. PSM ATET estimates of CDCP – I on the Extensive Margin of Gun Acquisition between 
July 2010 and January 2012: Households with land holdings of 1.5 acres or higher – Only large 
farmer households not owning guns pre-2010 floods matched on a smaller set of covariates.  
 Full sample No-Conflict tehsils Conflict-affected 
tehsils 
    
ATET    
CDCP – I  0.011 0.012* -0.000 
 (1.60) (1.90) (-0.02) 
N 1193 838 355 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 16. PSM ATET estimates of CDCP – I on the Extensive Margin of Gun Acquisition 
between July 2010 and January 2012: Households with land holdings of 1.5 acres or higher in 
Conflict-affected tehsils – by Flood relief camp status – Only large farmer households not 
owning guns pre-2010 floods matched on a smaller set of covariates 
 All Conflict-affected 
tehsils 
Conflict-Affected 
tehsils: HHs did not 
live in flood relief 
camps 
Conflict-Affected 
tehsils: HHs lived 
in flood relief 
camps 
    
ATET    
CDCP – I  -0.000 -0.010 0.058** 
 (-0.02) (-0.29) (2.07) 
N 355 147 205 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Matching within a smaller population (large and medium land owning farmers who did 
not own guns prior to the 2010 floods) and using a more parsimonious set of covariates 
for matching, I find that overall, the CDCP – I does not significantly increase the 
purchase of guns, neither for the sample from all areas, nor in conflict-affected areas 
alone. However, when I examine treatment effects within conflict-affected areas by 
households’ displacement experience (as in Table 14), I find that the CDCP – I led to a 
5.8% increase in the likelihood of acquiring a gun among households with 1.5 acres or 
more of land owning who were displaced temporarily by the floods. Although these 
results are based on matching on a smaller set of covariates, this provides a confirmation 
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of the central findings in the main results: that the overlap of general material non-
vulnerability (indicated by large land ownership), and high physical vulnerability 
(indicated by living in a conflict-affected area and in displacement camps following the 
floods, and possibly enhanced by household wealth) can induce households to use 
exogenous increases in disposable income, via cash transfers, to purchase guns.  
5.4.5 A Note on External Validity 
The above results are based on a sample representative of the flood-affected areas of 
Pakistan in 2010, at the national and provincial levels. While much of Pakistan was 
affected by flooding in 2010, and thus comprised the sampling universe for the survey, 
the results here are snapshot only of the flood-affected areas of Pakistan.  
Secondly, disaster relief cash transfers, and the CDCP – I in particular are different from 
other types of cash transfers. The CDCP – I is a specific kind of cash transfer that was a 
one-time, lump-sum cash grant paid to beneficiaries who were chosen on the basis of 
very basic criteria– which creates a more diverse intended beneficiary profile, compared 
more tightly targeted programmes. This wider intended beneficiary profile, and the lack 
of conditionality creates the possibility of the diversion of transfers to groups that may 
have lower material deprivations, even in the aftermath of floods. The findings from the 
analysis of treatment effects of this programme therefore need not apply to means/Proxy 
Means-tested, more closely targeted programmes, or to conditional cash transfers.  
Thirdly, the amount of money transferred in the CDCP – I (PKR 20,000 per recipient 
household) was substantial enough to enable the purchase of guns. Other cash transfer 
programmes such as the Benazir Income Support Programme in Pakistan, provide 
smaller amounts of income support in cash (PKR 1,000 – 1,200 per month), which may 
make the diversion of funds for purchasing guns less likely (assuming a low preference 
for forgoing current consumption for accumulating money over months to buy guns).  
Yet these results speak to wider debates on the relationship between cash transfers and 
civilian militarisation. First, its focus on post-disaster aid addresses a wide audience 
interested specifically in complex emergencies and aid, distinct from regular social 
protection programmes. Also, this chapter has sought to identify potential routes 
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through which disaster relief and cash transfers can (unintentionally) lead to increased 
purchases of guns. The results suggest that for populations for whom material 
deprivations are low, but security concerns are high, unconditional cash transfers may 
be used to boost security – in the present case, through purchases of guns. This 
mechanism may be applicable across a number of empirical contexts.  
5.5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter sought to identify the extent and the correlates of household and 
community-level gun ownership in Pakistan, and then examine if flood relief cash 
transfer receipts, the CDCP – I , increased the propensity of household acquisition of 
guns.  
At the household level, I find that gun ownership is correlated with large land holdings 
and access to in-house drainage, the number of male members with primary or higher 
schooling, and with communities that are situated in plateaus, mountains and valleys, 
and that are further away from army cantonments. Households closer to the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border, who were exposed to higher levels of violent conflict over 
the decade of the 2000s and who also have closer access to locally produced guns and 
those smuggled from Afghanistan, are more likely to possess guns. It appears that gun 
ownership is associated with higher wealth and social status.  
These results are based on available responses from a household survey, in which about 
34% of respondents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa did not respond to the question on guns. It 
appears that non-response, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is determined by many 
of the factors that are also associated with gun ownership, suggesting that non-response 
is likely to in fact mask gun ownership. The descriptive statistics on gun ownership (7.4% 
of all households possess at least one gun) is therefore likely to be an under-estimate.  
At the community level I find that the share of households that own guns has a 
significant association with the share of large land-owning households, topography 
dummies for plateaus, mountains and valleys, the dummy variable for Nation Building 
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districts – that are socio-economically backwards and face a risk of greater radicalisation, 
and proximity to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.  
On the relationship between cash transfer receipts and gun purchases, I find that there 
is no significant effect of cash transfer receipts on gun purchases, in both, conflict-
affected and peaceful areas. Overall, rolling out cash transfers does not appear to have 
increased the rate of civilian gun ownership at the extensive margin.  
Disaggregated analysis, however, shows that for households with land holdings of 1.5 
acres and above (indicative of higher security threats, lower pressing material 
deprivations, and lower liquidity), and residing in conflict-affected sub-districts, the 
receipt of flood relief cash transfers significantly increased the likelihood of buying a gun 
(by households that did not possess guns until the 2010 floods) by 8.3%. This effect of 
the cash transfer appears to be related to the experience of living in a flood relief camp, 
which I interpret as a sign of heightened security concerns. I conclude that the among 
wealthy households who face low material deprivations, have lower holdings of cash 
and other liquid assets, and who may face security threats in terms of attacks, thefts, 
looting and extortion, cash transfers may be used to beef up their (assurance of) own 
security by acquiring guns. This result suggests one possible mechanism through which 
aid may unwittingly increase civilian militarisation (although this is not observed at the 
aggregate level): for the wealthy who may be materially well of but face (or perceive) 
physical dangers, the marginal utility from security goods such as guns may be more 
attractive than that from other assets or heads of expenditure. The exogenous infusion 
of cash, through disaster aid relief, then only provides the necessary liquidity to 
increases the expenditure on security goods, translating into higher likelihood of 
wealthy households acquiring guns.  
The findings provide a few preliminary insights for policy. First, the large unconditional 
cash transfer-based flood relief programme in Pakistan did not lead to any increases in 
civilian gun purchases on the whole. Unconditional cash transfers therefore can be used 
effectively to provide post-disaster relief, without an exaggerated fear of them leading 
to higher civilian militarisation, through recipients’ purchases of guns. However, I also 
find some indicative evidence of the transfers increasing the propensity to buy guns, 
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among land-wealthy households in conflict-affected areas. In order to circumvent such 
a possibility in future interventions, policy must address two aspects. First, given that 
the higher likelihood of large land-owning households in conflict-affected areas using 
cash transfers to acquire guns is in fact caused by security concerns, particularly security 
concerns in flood relief camps, the government must ensure that basic law and order is 
maintained even in a post disaster setting. This could potentially deter the need for the 
private provision of security and enable even the wealthy recipients to use cash transfers 
for making productive investments instead.  Secondly, the targeting of cash transfers can 
be made tighter in conflict-affected areas to potentially exclude some wealthy 
households, who may not be much worse off, materially, without the transfers – if the 
aim is to ensure that aid money does not increase civilian militarisation.  
This analysis is based on data which suffers from certain limitations. The high rate of 
non-response to the question on gun ownership, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
and the absence of data on the number of guns owned by households before/ after the 
floods are critical limitations. The high-rate of non-response in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
province may itself be an outcome of perceived security threats – a factor that can 
potentially motivate gun purchases. It is likely therefore that many non-response 
households may in fact have acquired guns – before or after the floods. Even if non-
response households were more likely to possess guns (than not, as suggested by 
Appendix 5.1) it is not clear whether they were acquired before or after the 2010 floods. 
Therefore, it is not clear whether the exclusion of such a high number of households 
from the sample due to non-response is likely to result in an upwards or downwards 
bias in the ATET (a significant, positive ATET among large landowning households in 
conflict-affected areas, and who resided in flood relief camps). Secondly, the absence of 
data on the number of guns possessed by households before/ after the floods can 
potentially underestimate any positive impact of flood relief on gun purchases as the 
analysis misses out households who purchased additional guns following the 2010 
floods. Thirdly, the numbers of households that acquired guns since the 2010 floods is 
relatively small (at 99). All these factors mean that the findings and conclusions from the 
analysis, discussed below, should be treated with considerable caution. The results 
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should also be used as starting points for future research that is based on more detailed 
and complete information on gun ownership in Pakistan.   
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Chapter 6. On the Off-Chance: Flood Anomaly and Short-term 
Migration in Pakistan 
 
ABSTRACT: While many studies have focused on the occurrence and intensity of natural 
disasters as triggers of migration, the effect of the frequency and predictability of natural 
disasters has been largely ignored. I exploit variation in the community-level intensity 
of exposure during the 2010 floods in Pakistan and develop a proxy measure for the 
likely past exposure to flooding shocks. I find that, controlling for the intensity of 
flooding exposure, more anomalous flooding reduces the household and individual 
propensity to migrate in the year following the floods. This result is consistent with the 
idea that populations that face recurrent flooding are more inclined, prepared, or able to 
migrate when hit by a flood than populations facing more anomalous flooding. As a 
consequence, migration is more likely to be used after a disaster in commonly hit areas. 
The results are robust to the inclusions of an array of controls, including access to flood 
relief transfers. 
“Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to 
me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know 
we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know 
there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns 
-- the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the 
history … it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.” 
Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, 12 February, 200275 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Migration is an important and a commonly observed coping strategy for households 
affected by natural disasters and other shocks (Sen, 1981; Fafchamps, 2003; Black et al., 
2011; Bohra-Mishra et al., 2014; Gray and Bislborrow, 2013; Hunter et al., 2013; Marchiori 
                                                          
75 Defense.gov News Transcript: DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, United States 
Department of Defense (defense.gov)". At: 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636  
189 
 
et al., 2012). A large number of studies (reviewed extensively by Belasen and Polachek, 
2013; Drabo and Mbaye, 2011) show that both short and long-term migration increase in 
response to natural disasters and that household members’ education, access to social 
networks and the availability of cash and credit for financing migration enable 
households and individuals to migrate in the aftermath of natural disasters.  
Migration responses to natural disasters therefore depend partially on the availability of 
resources that households can, intentionally or otherwise, be prepared to deploy when 
disaster strikes (Stark and Bloom, 1985). The importance of such explicit preparation or 
the pre-positioning of resources, or of the higher ability of some households to expend 
such resources highlights the role of household agency in migration responses to shocks, 
rather than viewing migration as a direct and unmediated consequence of natural 
disasters. It follows then, that the anticipation of disasters can enable households to be 
better prepared to respond, including through migration, at their onset and as they 
unfold. To the extent that anticipation and preparedness depend on the past exposure 
to, or the recurrence of such shocks, ceteris paribus communities and households with 
lower past exposure to shocks such as flooding may have a lower propensity to migrate 
in its eventual aftermath, compared to communities and households that face such 
shocks more often. While studies have focused on the relationship between shock 
severity and migration, the migration effects of shock rarity has not received as much 
attention. 
This is a glaring gap for both analytical and policy reasons. First, it implies that we do 
not sufficiently understand any underlying heterogeneity in the level of adaptive and 
risk-mitigating abilities between populations with varying historical exposure to some 
shocks. This is particularly important when such adaptive capacities are developed in 
response to, or from the experience of prior shocks. The recurrence of some shocks may 
also alter households’ subjective and relative preference of coping strategies. In other 
words, the perceived welfare benefits of pursuing a particular coping strategy may itself 
be determined by the level of shock-anticipation, which in turn is based on past 
exposure.  
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From a policy perspective, recognising the more constrained ability of households to 
respond to a completely unforeseen shock can enable governments and other actors to 
focus specific attention to areas affected by more unprecedented shocks. In a setting 
characterised by an unprecedented shock, public policy must additionally account for 
households’ lower preparedness, and therefore ability to respond on their own, through 
self-insurance and group-based insurance mechanisms76 that are more common in areas 
of recurrent shock exposure. Further, an understanding of how the relative preference 
of alternate coping strategies may vary in areas with high/low frequency of shocks can 
suggest variations in the design of public policy interventions. For example, in areas of 
recurrent drought where populations are more likely to be more mobile and have well-
developed seasonal migration patterns, aid can be disbursed centrally at locations where 
households are likely to migrate to, rather than in source villages. In other areas that are 
reeling under completely unprecedented drought however, households may not be able 
or willing to leave their homes and may need to be reached in their villages, and 
programmes such as in-village public works may be more suitable compared to in 
villages where populations are more likely to move out. Recognising such differences in 
coping response across areas with varying histories of flood exposure can therefore 
enable better targeted and more effective policy responses to support households that 
are coping with loss and damages.  
Against such a background, we should expect that controlling for the degree of flooding 
exposure, households and individuals with low past experience of floods will be less 
prepared and possibly also less inclined – and therefore less likely to migrate in the 
aftermath of floods. Since the propensity to migrate also varies by households’ and 
individuals’ demographic, occupational and educational characteristics, and between 
rural and urban areas, it is also important to consider whether the effect of past flood 
exposure on migration decisions varies across demographic and rural/urban groups.  
Finally, it is not clear whether ceteris paribus, and conditional on migrating at all, whether 
the degree of flooding anomaly may cause individuals and households to migrate to 
nearby areas as they may lack the wherewithal to undertake longer distance migration, 
                                                          
76 Which,  in turn, are based on some positive (even if incomplete) expectations of disasters 
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or alternatively it may cause them to migrate further away. The latter may be the case 
when populations that are otherwise reticent and unable to migrate do decide to do so, 
undertake more drastic and long-distance movement. Alternatively, it could be because 
areas with more recurrent flooding have over time, been better able to develop and 
identify nearby places to migrate to in the aftermath of floods, to avoid long-distance, 
and therefore costly and more insecure  (owing to greater distance from an uninhabited 
or unsupervised home and hearth) episodes of migration mainly to escape flooding.  
No studies, to the best of my knowledge, have examined these questions, or more 
broadly, the effects of the degree of shock anomaly on post-shock migration decisions.  
The academic literature has focused on disaster risk at the expense of uncertainty – a 
concept defined and explored in some detail later, representing the degree to which 
shocks are familiar (or alternatively more unknown) to households, depending on past 
exposure. I seek to address these conceptual and empirical gaps in the literature. 
Exploiting variation in the community-level extent of flooding intensity as well as in 
likely past exposure of such flooding during the massive 2010 floods in Pakistan, I 
attempt to distinguish the effects of flooding intensity and flooding anomaly on 
household migration decisions.  
In this chapter, I define migration as any movement(s) by (an) individual member/s of a 
household to a destination outside their community for a period of one month or longer 
(including those who may have returned after at least one month away) since June 2010 
(the onset of the floods).  
Further, I define flooding anomaly as the extent to which the 2010 floods were likely 
to be of a surprise (as against of a routine) nature, in terms of the departure from the 
likely flooding exposure in the past.77 I also posit that more anomalous flooding 
represent a greater degree of uncertainty as households would be less familiar with 
the risks and coping responses associated with anomalous adverse events compared 
to more recurrent ones. With this working definition in mind, I examine how household, 
                                                          
77 I describe how I operationalise this definition and measure the extent flooding anomaly in Section 6.4, in 
detail 
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and individual level short-term migration respond to both, flooding intensity and 
flooding anomaly and set out to answer the following questions:  
(i) Controlling for flooding exposure, how does the degree of flooding anomaly 
affect household and individual migration? 
(ii) For which groups of households and individuals (rural/urban, occupational 
and demographic categories) are migration decisions more responsive to the 
degree of flooding anomaly? (In other words, are the effects of flooding 
anomaly on migration heterogeneous across groups?)  
(iii) Does the degree of flooding anomaly affect the choice of migration 
destination (rural/urban, and in terms of distance from community of 
origin)?  
I also attempt to examine what factors may explain how more anomalous flooding affects 
post-flood migration. 
I find that the degree of shock anomaly, hitherto ignored, is indeed an important factor 
in the understanding on natural disasters and migration. I develop a unique means to 
proxy the likely past exposure to floods, and therefore the degree of flood anomaly in 
2010. I then use a probit model to examine the effect of flooding anomaly and flooding 
severity on the propensity of households and individuals to migrate at any time during 
the year following the onset of the 2010 floods. I find that while flooding severity 
increases household and individual migration, flooding anomaly reduces migration at 
both levels. This negative effect is particularly driven by rural, landless and owner-
cultivator, and male-headed households, but does not vary across individuals’ gender, 
age and educational characteristics. The findings are robust to controlling for access to 
flood relief transfers, province-specific factors, and a range of household and 
community-level controls, including pre-flood characteristics that determine the degree 
of flooding exposure and flooding anomaly. I speculate that the recurring exposure to 
shocks enabled households to anticipate their onset and pre-position material and non-
material resources that can enable migration; the absence of such exposure left 
households facing anomalous flooding less prepared and also possibly less inclined to 
migrate when the floods did strike. I find some descriptive clues to suggest that instead 
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of migrating, such households were more likely to rely on remittances and debt to cope. 
Beyond its visible, strongly negative effect on the propensity to migrate alone, flooding 
anomaly can therefore potentially also determine the relative (and indeed revealed) 
preference of alternate coping strategies. These findings illustrate how household 
responses to natural disasters may vary by the extent of uncertainty of shocks, 
represented by how anomalous such shocks may be.  
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 reviews the literature on the links 
between natural disasters and migration. Section 6.3 introduces the context of the 2010 
floods in Pakistan. Section 6.4 describes the data sources and outlines the identification 
strategy, including the construction of indices used to measure flooding exposure and 
flooding anomaly. Section 6.5 presents empirical results for questions i – iii and Section 
6.6 concludes with a summary of the findings.  
6.2 Natural Disasters and Migration: The Evidence so far 
 
6.2.1 Migration as a Coping Strategy 
A vast number of studies has examined how households adapt and alter their economic 
behaviour in response to risk, adopting a combination of strategies. Fafchamps (2003) 
propounds a classification based on the timing of the strategies pursued, and how risk 
is shared; classifying strategies as risk reducing (ex-ante), self-insurance (through 
accumulation and sales of assets) and risk-sharing (within a group).  
Following the theoretical classification of risk coping strategies outlined by Fafchamps 
(2003), migration, in particular, can be seen as a means of both, reducing exposure to 
shocks, for example by migrating out of areas (in times) where the incidence of shocks 
is high/expected (e.g. Indian workers migrating to Myanmar during the Indian 
monsoons: Satyanarayana, 2001), or alternatively as an ex-post risk coping strategy, 
where migration is undertaken for wage employment to compensate the loss of income 
due to the occurrence of the shock. In the latter case households and individuals may 
undertake temporary or longer-term migration to secure household consumption and 
well-being levels in the aftermath of shocks. Sen’s (1981) seminal work on famine 
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discusses how the 1973 drought in Ethiopia, led several male members of households to 
migrate in search of wage employment. Migrating in order to increase labour income, or 
seeking wage employment is also a possible strategy in response to idiosyncratic shocks 
in the agrarian context. For instance, Kochar (1999) shows that in rural India labour 
market participation allows for risk mitigation following weather shocks. Some types of 
migration that follow a natural disaster may in fact help households reduce their 
continuing exposure to sources of duress. People may often migrate in order to wait out 
the effects of the natural disaster and possibly return when the worst phase is over, even 
if the situation has not returned to the previous normal (Belasen and Polachek, 2013). In 
other cases, migration after a natural disaster can help diversify household income (Stark 
and Bloom, 1985), particularly if land, assets or other sources of income have been 
destroyed by the disaster to create new economic opportunities following a loss.  
Migration can also arise from a risk-sharing motive, whereby households divide 
members across space to enable some members to help others when they are differently 
subject to shocks (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). Typically, in many rural households 
some family members migrate to urban areas, both within the country and abroad, or to 
plantations or mines, and support family members left behind in the villages of their 
origin. The role of remittances in enabling households to diversify income, hedge risk, 
and smooth consumption has been examined in great detail by several scholars (De and 
Ratha, 2012; World Bank, 2006; Alderman and Garcia, 1993; Adams and He, 1995). Even 
as remittances may not fully compensate the losses suffered by recipient households as 
a result of shocks (as shown by Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), the support they extend to 
recipient households is critical. This effect of remittances remains an important 
motivation for migration, in the immediate aftermath of shocks, and also as a broader 
strategy to insure against future shocks. 
The salience of migration as a strategy to cope with natural disasters is amply 
underscored in the empirical literature. Based on a meta-analysis of existing studies, 
both causal and descriptive, Belasen and Polachek (2013) conclude that natural disasters 
lead to short-term, and potentially longer-term out-migration. They also find that studies 
suggest that rural populations are less mobile in the aftermath of natural disasters.  
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6.2.2 Factors that link Disaster Exposure and Post-Disaster Migration 
A review of the literature on natural disasters and migration suggests that several factors 
mediate the link between natural disasters and migration. These include:  
6.2.2.1 Intensity: The effect of natural disasters on migration depends not only on the 
incidence of natural disaster exposure, but also the intensity of exposure. Gray and 
Muller (2012) and Meze-Hausken (2006) find that in the case of Ethiopia household 
migration increased with the intensity of drought. Drabo and Mbaye (2011) find that 
migration increases with the intensity levels of meteorological disasters (mainly storms), 
and with the extent of damages caused by hydrological disasters (floods, wet mass 
movements, drought and wildfire).  
6.2.2.2 Income and Wealth: The ability of households to migrate in response to natural 
disasters depends on the levels of their income and wealth. Episodes of migration, even 
when short-term and proximate, incur a certain cost which many poor households may 
not be able to afford. For example, Findley (1994) finds that despite recurring and severe 
drought in Mali, the poor did not migrate in very large numbers as they lacked the 
resources to do so. On the other hand, Kugler and Yuksel (2008) find that Hurricane 
Mitch caused even poor households in the Honduras to migrate. Similarly Halliday 
(2006) finds that in the case of El Salvador, natural disasters and agricultural shocks led 
to increases in out-migration of poor agriculturalists to the US. The later effect alludes to 
the greater need for poor households to migrate when faced with hardship, somewhat 
as a last resort. In such cases the non-poor can afford not to migrate, even as they are 
better placed to finance an episode of migration. This suggests a non-linear relationship 
between household income and the propensity to migrate in the face of shocks. The 
possible non-linearity also speaks directly to two seemingly opposing strands of the 
literature on migration as a means of adaptation and coping; while some (Barnett and 
Jones, 2002; IOM, 2007) view migration as a positive adaptation strategy, others (Oliver-
Smith, 2009) view it as a maladaptive practice which reflects the failure/limits of 
household coping.  
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6.2.2.3 Education Levels: The ability to migrate also depends on households’ non-income 
endowments, particularly in the form of education. Previous studies have found that 
education increases the ability of individuals to migrate, and that natural disasters are 
likely to trigger brain-drain in developing countries through increasing the out-
migration of high-skilled people (Drabo and Mbaye, 2011).  
6.2.2.4 Access to Social Networks: McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) show that migration 
depends on access to finance through wealth only in communities with small migration 
networks, but is less important in communities with larger migration networks, thus 
emphasising the salience of social networks even when accounting for wealth 
differentials in determining migration. Munshi (2003) finds that social networks 
significantly improve the employment outcomes of Mexican migrants in the US, and 
more broadly on occupational mobility of communities in India (2011). In Pakistan, 
social networks have been shown to be particularly important for 
individuals/households to be able to migrate and access jobs (Gazdar, 2003; Haas, 2010).  
6.2.3 Disaster Risk v/s Uncertainty and Migration  
Fafchamps (2003), while distinguishing between high and low frequency risks, notes 
that other things being equal (including the intensity of the risk, upon realisation), high 
frequency risks are more dangerous than low frequency risks. This, however, is not 
immediately clear as households may often anticipate, and therefore be better 
prepared/able to minimise losses arising from more regularly occurring risk factors, 
compared to low frequency (and therefore lesser anticipated) events. Gallagher (2014) 
shows that insurance take-up spikes in the year following floods in the US, and 
gradually subsides thereafter. He explains this as a result of a Bayesian learning process 
under which some agents either do not observe the entire past history of floods (if they 
recently migrated to the area, or are too young to remember), or quite simply, they 
forget. Agarwal et al. (2008) also find that learning, in their case through add-on fees on 
credit card payments, is not monotonic, and that “learning displays a strong recency 
effect.” These studies suggest that more frequent exposure to shocks reduces the 
likelihood of forgetting ways to survive and cope, and thus can enable households to 
remain better prepared to respond to recurring shocks. On the other hand, adaptive 
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capacities that may have been developed as a result of exposure to a shock in the past 
may be forgotten or lost over time in the absence of shock recurrence.  
The academic literature makes a useful technical distinction between risk and 
uncertainty (as far back as Knight, 1921). Dercon (2003) characterises risk as the ‘known 
unknowns’, i.e. threats that people can have some expectation, even past experience of, 
which allows them to employ strategies to mitigate the impact of such risks. Uncertainty 
on the other hand, includes those occurrences that people could never have possibly 
foreseen, and therefore constitute the ‘unknown unknowns’. Uncertainty in this chapter 
therefore is not synonymous with risk – as it often is confused in colloquial use, 
measured by the variance of flooding exposure over time, for example. Instead it 
represents the extent to which the risk of flooding shocks are known to households – 
based on likely past exposure to floods, and proxy-measured by the extent to which the 
2010 floods were anomalous or routine, at the community level. The Ellsberg Paradox is 
central in this discussion as it points to agents’ preference for taking risk in gambles 
where the odds of succeeding are known, compared to those where the odds of success 
are unknown (Ellsberg, 1961). The Ellsberg paradox alludes to the operation of 
‘ambiguity aversion’ (or uncertainty aversion), according to which, agents prefer known 
risks to unknown risks (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; Schmeidler, 1989; Epstein, 1999, 
Etner et al., 2012). Ambiguity aversion has been shown to underlie many decisions that 
people make. Alary et al. (2013) show that ambiguity aversion has the same effect on 
agents as pessimism does under subjective expected utility theory, and therefore 
increases the incentive to take up insurance. Mukerji (1998) argues that ambiguity 
aversion also explains incomplete contracts in inter-frim relations. Ghirardato and Katz 
(2000) develop a model to explain voters’ selective abstention in multiple elections. The 
development economics literature, however, has not sufficiently engaged with how 
ambiguity aversion, in the case of unfamiliar shocks, can affect individual and 
household choices.  
Returning to the specific case of natural disasters shocks and migration, households may 
not be able to deploy strategies to limit the onset and effects of an essentially completely 
unanticipated shock. While in reality most natural disaster shocks are somewhere along 
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the spectrum ranging from completely identifiable (and recurring, or periodic) risk to 
states of perfect uncertainty, the empirical literature on the effects of and responses to 
natural disasters has mainly focused on disaster risk. This relatively higher academic 
emphasis on disaster risk, in terms of households’ abilities to anticipate and mitigate 
against it, as well as public policy interventions that can help households in doing so, 
has eclipsed the potentially important role of disaster uncertainty in affecting household 
behaviour. 
In the following sections I describe how I seek to measure flooding anomaly (which 
indicate the extent to which the flooding shock was uncertain), and subsequently show 
how more anomalous flooding in fact reduces post-flood migration in the context of the 
2010 floods in Pakistan.  
6.3 Background to the 2010 Floods in Pakistan 
 
Pakistan experienced its most severe flooding in recorded history in 2010, which started 
during the monsoon season in July-August 2010. This was caused by exceptionally 
heavy rainfall, which inundated much of the Indus river basin, and also led to severe 
flash flooding in many areas not directly linked with major river systems. An estimated 
one-fifth of the total land area of Pakistan (796,095 square kilometres), spread across its 
four large provinces: Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The volume 
of rainfall in Pakistan as a whole was 87% above normal in the year 2010; this was much 
higher for the province of Sindh (where it was as high as 270%). The flooding began with 
exceptionally heavy rainfall in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province and gradually moved 
south through Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan; along the Indus river valley. The official 
death toll due to the floods was about 2,000. However, according to Government of 
Pakistan estimates, about 20 million people were affected by the floods through 
displacement and damages to land, property and livestock.  
While the level and intensity of flooding in 2010 were significantly higher than 
previously recorded in Pakistan’s recent history, it is important to note that there was 
considerable variation in the nature of flooding across the country; on four distinct 
counts: 
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1. Source of flooding: the 2010 floods in Pakistan were caused due to both, torrential 
rain and flash flooding, mainly (but not only) in the northern areas of the country, as 
well as the flooding of river waters in the Indus and Swat river basins. Much of the 
riverine flooding was in fact caused by the backwash of heavy rainwater from the 
northern regions. At the community level, flooding may have been caused either by 
torrential rains, or due to the inundation of rivers and the breaking of banks and 
barrages, or in particular cases, by a combination of rain and riverine flooding.  
2. Intensity of Exposure: While a large part of the country was affected by the 2010 
floods, the extent to which areas communities exposed to flood waters differed 
considerably, depending on a combination of meteorological, geographical 
(location-related) and topographical factors that vary immensely across the territory 
of a country as large as Pakistan.   
3. Nature of Household-level Exposure: The nature of flooding exposure also varied 
considerably across communities and areas in Pakistan. While some areas, 
particularly in the Northern and higher altitude regions, and areas affected by flash 
flooding, were, on average, subject to higher levels of floodwater inundation, the 
entry and drainage of such high levels of water was also rather fast. In contrast areas 
in the South, at lower altitudes and affected more by riverine flooding may have had 
lower levels of floodwater in general, but possibly for a longer duration of time. The 
extent of flood exposure, therefore, should not be measured only with a measure of 
either the depth or the duration of floodwaters at the household/community levels, 
but through some combination of these two dimensions, to make comparisons of 
flood exposure more meaningful. 
4. Extent of past exposure: While the 2010 floods in Pakistan were, as a national 
phenomenon, unprecedented in its recent history, at the local level the degree of 
prior exposure to floods varied considerably. Notably, areas close to the Indus and 
other river basins are used to some degree of flooding on a recurrent basis (even 
though 2010 may have been much higher than the usual). In contrast, the 2010 floods 
also hit places that had never been flooded over long periods of time, particularly in 
areas that were hit by torrential rain. For example, some communities of Sindh that 
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were flooded by rains in 2010 were in fact situated in desert areas where the levels 
of rainfall have historically been very low.  
 
6.4 Data and Identification Strategy 
 
I use a simple probit model to estimate the impact of flooding severity and flooding 
anomaly on the propensity of household and individual migration in the aftermath of 
the floods. I use self-reported household survey data on the extent and duration of 
floodwater in the house to construct an index of household-level flood exposure. I use 
the index of flooding exposure as an independent variable to determine the causal effect 
of flooding exposure on migration outcomes, which I also show to be robust to the 
inclusion of pre-flood household and community controls, including pre-flood 
characteristics that determine flood exposure. As I measure flooding exposure at the 
community level, I attempt to capture the direct and indirect effects of flooding severity 
that is common to all households within the community.  
Similarly, I develop a measure of flooding anomaly based on deviations (in 2010) from 
the 29-year average rainfall at the community-level, as well as the communities’ distance 
to major rivers (as two dimensions of flood prone-ness or recurrence – described in detail 
in 6.4.3 below). As with the Index of Flooding Exposure, I show that the negative effect 
of the Flooding Anomaly index on household and individual migration is robust to the 
inclusion of a wide range of controls, specifically including pre-flood characteristics that 
determine the extent of flooding anomaly.  
 
6.4.1 Data Sources 
 
6.4.1.1 Household data: For my analysis I use the baseline cross-section of the CDCP 
Impact Evaluation dataset (OPM, 2013). This dataset is representative of all flood-
affected areas of the four major provinces of Pakistan: Punjab, Sindh, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. The dataset comprises 7802 households across 498 
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primary sampling units, including 448 rural, and 50 urban communities. The survey for 
the baseline was conducted during December 2011 – February 2012, after the rollout of 
the first phase of the CDCP flood relief transfer.78 The survey comprised detailed 
questionnaires for male and female respondents at the household level, and a detailed 
community-level module. Notably, the survey included questions of household and 
individual migration, flood exposure at the household level, the receipt of flood relief 
transfers as well as a wide range of individual, household and community –level 
characteristics.  
 
6.4.1.2 Meteorological Data: In addition to self-reported data at the household level on 
flooding exposure collected in the household dataset described above, I use data from 
the National Aeronautical and Space Agency (NASA)’s Prediction of Worldwide Energy 
Resource (POWER) data resource, available online79 to obtain daily precipitation records 
from 01 January 1981 to 31 December 2010. The NASA POWER data resource has been 
made available through the NASA Langley Research Center POWER Project and was 
funded through the NASA Earth Science Directorate Applied Science Program 
(methodology explained in NASA, 2015). These records are available at the 0.5 degree 
level (i.e. at grids of the 0.5 x 0.5 degree resolution) and are matched to the household 
survey data using GPS coordinates for the community (using the community-level 
simple mean of sample households’ latitude and longitude recordings to arrive at a 
single observation for the community). Recent studies have used NASA POWER data 
on precipitation for Pakistan, including Mueller et al. (2014) and Kosec and Mo (2014).  
6.4.1.3 Proximity to Rivers: In order to measure communities’ proximity to rivers -which 
proxies for recurrence of flood exposure – I calculate the distance between the 
community and the nearest (major) river. GIS Data on the location and course of rivers 
was obtained from the Pakistan Rivers shape file made available online80 by the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA 2012) – Pakistan Office. 
                                                          
78 The cross section serves as a baseline for Phase II of the CDCP transfers; it, however, contains retrospective questions on the 
receipt of CDCP Phase I transfers that I use for my analysis. 
79 At http://power.larc.nasa.gov/cgi-bin/cgiwrap/solar/hirestimeser.cgi?emai  
80 At http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan/datasets  
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Distances between the community and the nearest river included in the shape file were 
calculated using QGIS geo-processing software.  
6.4.2 Measurement of Flooding Intensity and Anomaly 
I exploit variation in the intensity of flooding and the degree of flooding anomaly in 
Pakistan to identify their distinct effects on household and individual migration. I first 
describe how I construct indices to measure flooding intensity and flooding anomaly at 
the community-level. In 6.4.3, I proceed to examine if these indices are significantly 
related to pre-flood community characteristics.  
 
6.4.2.1 Index of Flooding Exposure:  
As the entire household sample comprises flood-affected villages (the sampling universe 
being the list of all flood-affected villages in the four large provinces of Pakistan), I proxy 
variations in the intensity of flooding by developing an index of flood exposure at the 
household (and subsequently community) level, using the self-reported depth and 
duration of floodwaters in the home. Guiteras et al. (2015) have shown that self-reported 
data on flooding experience is problematic for accurately depicting flood exposure, 
compared to objective satellite data on flooding. This, they suggest, is because it suffers 
from recall bias, as well as cognitive bias such as reference dependence which means 
that households report whether or not they have experienced flood based on their long-
term reference for flooding, which in turn is likely to result from adaptation. By this 
reasoning, households more periodically exposed to flooding should be less likely to 
self-report flooding incidence.  
In the Guiteras et al. (2015) case, however, the measure of flooding is only based on the 
extensive margin, i.e. households’ report of whether or not they were affected by (in their 
case) the 2004 floods in Bangladesh. Such an assessment is indeed likely to be influenced 
by the past experience of flooding and the resultant difference in reference levels for a 
household to judge whether or not it was flood-affected. In contrast, I argue that an index 
of flooding exposure based on objective measure of floodwaters’ depth (in feet) and 
duration (in days) in the home, as in this chapter, is less affected by subjective judgment. 
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Further, the standard used by Guiteras et al. (ibid.) to assess the accuracy of self-reports 
is satellite data, which only (again) indicates whether or not a particular area is flooded, 
and not the extent of flooding – which is the focus of the present analysis. 
The household survey dataset includes questions on the depth and duration of 
floodwaters in the house. Del Ninno et al. (2002) develop a household-level flood 
exposure index for the 1998 floods in Bangladesh using similar information on 
floodwater depth and duration. I use the formula developed by these authors as a 
starting point for my own analysis. First, the self-reported depth of floodwater (in feet) 
and its duration (in days) are assigned scores based on class intervals developed by the 
authors. The depth and duration scores assigned are shown in Table 1 below: 
Table 1. Depth and Duration scores81 for Flood Exposure 
Depth of 
Floodwater in the 
House (feet) 
Depth Score 
Assigned82 
Duration of 
Floodwater in the 
House (days) 
Duration Score 
Assigned83 
0 0 0 0 
1 1 0 – 7 1 
2 2 8 – 14 2 
3 3 15 – 30 3 
4 4 31 – 60 4 
5 5 > 60 5 
> 6 6   
 
I develop a slightly modified version of a flood exposure index compared to that 
developed by del Ninno et al. (2001). Whilst del Ninno et al. use a simple additive index 
of the depth and duration scores, and also include a score for flooding in the households’ 
agricultural plots, I restrict the analysis to flood exposure within the household (owing 
                                                          
 
82 In the case of depth respondents were asked to round off responses to the closest integer value of depth in feet. 
83 This was assigned exactly as in del Ninno et al. (2001).  
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to data limitations and also to prevent any noise in the measure of flood exposure due 
only to the fact that many households do not possess any agricultural land). I then 
develop a household level Flooding Exposure Index, given by the following formula: 
FEIhh = loge [1 + (DepthScore X DurationScore)] 
… (1) 
Even as the 2010 flooding in Pakistan at the aggregate level was an unforeseen, 
unprecedented and massive shock, the household-level exposure to flood waters, in 
terms of both depth and duration, may be affected, at least partly by household pre-
flood well-being, wealth and shock-absorptive capacity. For example, well-off 
households may have better roofs/construction material, and drainage access which 
could reduce the depth and duration of floodwaters in the house, thus causing the Flood 
Exposure Index to be an underestimate of the objective flood exposure. Any resilient 
behaviour shown by such households may therefore be wrongly attributed to a lower 
flood exposure, whereas the reality is that pre-flood wealth/well-being/resilience 
capacity may be responsible for both, a lower Flood Exposure Index, as well as the (post-
flood) household outcome demonstrating resilience.  
In order to circumvent/reduce this problem, I use the community-level average of the 
Flood Exposure Index, to reflect more accurately the common (average) extent of natural 
disaster exposure. The community-level Flood Exposure Index, 𝐹𝐸𝐼𝑐 is given by the 
formula: 
𝐹𝐸𝐼𝑐  =   
∑ 𝐹𝐸𝐼ℎℎ
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝑛
 
… (2) 
Where n is the number of sample households in the community, c; and FEIhh is the 
household-level Flood Exposure Index defined in (1) above.  
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Fig. 1. Kernel density estimate of community-level Floodwaters’ Depth Score, 
Floodwaters’ Duration Score and Flooding Exposure Index (𝐹𝐸𝐼𝑐) 
 
 
6.4.2.2 Flooding Anomaly: Measuring the degree of flooding anomaly or rarity requires 
estimating the frequency and regularity of past exposure. A higher deviation of flooding 
exposure from the long term trends of flooding represents greater degree of 
unanticipated shock, which Guiteras et al. (2015) refer to as “novelty value”. For the 
households in the current sample, while there is data on flooding exposure in 2010 (as 
described in 6.4.1.1), there is no historical or long-term data on the household, or 
community-level incidence of flooding. In the absence of such data, I therefore attempt 
to proxy the deviation (in 2010) from the likely average exposure (and susceptibility) to 
flooding in the past.  
The historical exposure to flooding is a function of both, rainfall levels, and exposure to 
riverine flooding. Guiteras et al. (2015) rightly note that rainfall shocks are an insufficient 
proxy for flooding, and this is particularly true for the 2010 floods in Pakistan that saw 
flooding arise due to torrential rain, the flooding of rivers, and the breaking of barrages. 
I therefore develop a proxy measure for the degree of flooding anomaly at the 
0
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community level, based on the premise that for a community that experienced flooding 
in 2010, (i) the farther the community is to a river, and (ii) the higher the rainfall in 2010 
relative to the historical average, the more anomalous were the floods likely to be (also 
invoked by Maystadt et al., 2014). The proxy Index for Flooding Anomaly is based on 
observable data on two dimensions: 
i. Deviation from historic rainfall levels: Using NASA satellite data I measure 
how much the rainfall in 2010, particularly the four Southwest Monsoon months 
(June – September) when the bulk of the flooding occurred, deviated from the 
long-term (over the 29 preceding years) mean for the same period. NASA rainfall 
data are available at the 0.5 degree resolution for each day over the period 
beginning 01 January 1981, and this grid-wise time series was mapped to each of 
the sample communities. This allows constructing a simple index of rainfall 
deviation in 2010. The measure of rainfall deviation is given by:  
𝑹𝒇𝑫𝑬𝑽𝑰𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵    =    
𝑹𝒇𝟐𝟎𝟏𝟎− 𝑹𝒇𝟖𝟏−𝟎𝟗
𝝈(𝑹𝒇𝟖𝟏−𝟎𝟗)
 
 … (3) 
Rf 2010 is the average daily rainfall during June – September, in 2010 
Rf81-09 is the average daily rainfall during June – September, over 1981 – 2009, and 
σ(Rf81−09) is the standard deviation of daily rainfall during June – September, 
over 1981 – 2009 
ii. Distance from Rivers: The underlying assumption with using the nearest 
distance from major rivers as one dimension of flood anomaly is that flooding is 
more recurrent in areas closer to rivers. This is a simple measure of distance 
between the community and the closest river calculated using QGIS.  
For rainfall deviation and distance from rivers, I standardise measures and them add 
them up to arrive at a simple proxy Index for Flooding Anomaly.  
𝑭𝑨𝑰 =  𝒁𝟏(𝑹𝒇𝑫𝑬𝑽𝑰𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵 ) +  𝒁𝟐(𝑹𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝑫𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆) 
… (4) 
Where FAI is the Flooding Anomaly Index, which is defined to be the sum of: 
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Z1, the standardised measure of the deviation of rainfall in the community in 2010 from 
the preceding 29-year average, and; 
Z2, which is the standardised distance of the community from the nearest (major) river 
Fig 2. Kernel densities of Standardised Rainfall Deviation (2010 v/s 1981-2009), 
Standardised Distance from Rivers and Flooding Anomaly Index 
    
6.4.3 Identification: Pre-Flood Determinants of Flood Exposure and Flood Anomaly 
Indices (to subsequently include as controls)  
Any estimation of the effect of community-level flooding severity and flooding anomaly 
on migration outcomes must consider the likely effect of several factors that determine 
flooding exposure and the extent of flooding anomaly in the first place. Factors such as 
education levels, access to social networks, proximity to administrative centres, wealth 
and infrastructure may simultaneously determine the extent to which households and 
communities experience flooding (or were able to limit its severity), as well as their post-
flood ability to migrate. Similarly, the recurrence or rarity of floods before 2010 may itself 
affect communities’ and households’ endowments of education, wealth, social 
connectedness etc., as well as affect the ability to migrate in the aftermath of the 2010 
flooding. Flooding Exposure, and the extent of Flooding Anomaly are themselves 
0
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determined by (or correlated with) a combination of pre-flood characteristics. Not 
controlling for these would bias the econometric estimation of the causal effects of 
flooding exposure and flooding anomaly on migration outcomes, as any observed effects 
of these two variables on migration may in fact be caused by their determinants.  
In order to identify the pure causal effect of flood exposure and the extent of flooding 
anomaly on migration, i.e. net of the effect of pre-flood characteristics that determine 
these two variables, I first identify the determinants of flooding exposure and flooding 
anomaly. I then include these determinants as controls in the regressions that estimate 
the effect of flooding anomaly and flood exposure on migration. I find that my results 
are robust to the inclusion of these pre-flood controls.  
I regress the Flood Exposure and Flooding Anomaly indices (separately) on a number of 
pre-flood community characteristics including adult education levels, pre-flood 
household wealth indicators, topography features, access to basic services in the 
community including drainage and electricity, social connections outside the 
community, intra-community linguistic fractionalisation (as a proxy of cohesiveness), 
community institutions and infrastructure, and distance from administrative centres. 
The results from the OLS regressions are presented in tables 2 and 3 below, followed by 
a brief discussion on which pre-flood characteristics emerge as significant determinants 
of the two indices. 
Table 2. Determinants of Community-level Flood Exposure: OLS Regression Results - 
Dependent Variable: Flood Exposure Index 
 Coefficient t-statistic  
Urban 0.129 0.99 
Share of Adult Females with 
Primary Education 
0.833* 1.96 
Share of Adult Males with 
Primary Education 
0.403 1.23 
Share Adult Females with 
Secondary+ Education 
0.692 1.48 
Share of Adult Males with 
Secondary+ Education 
-0.185 -0.78 
Share HHs with Electricity -0.220* -1.70 
Share HHs with Drainage -0.185 -0.97 
Share of Female-headed HHs -0.476 -1.28 
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Average No. of Rooms per HH -0.367*** -4.44 
Share of HHs with Non-
agricultural enterprise 
0.200 0.93 
Share of Landless HHs 0.384** 2.52 
Share of Rentier Landlord HHs 0.273 0.59 
Share of Adult Males in the 
community 
-0.536 -0.72 
Average no. of social contacts 
outside community per HH 
-0.062*** -3.28 
Distance to province capital 0.130*** 2.91 
Distance to district capital 0.040 0.35 
Index of Presence of State 
Institutions 
-0.046 -1.32 
Index of Community 
Infrastructure 
0.002 0.07 
Index of Linguistic 
Fractionalisation 
0.132 0.88 
Topography: Inland Plain 0.122 0.36 
Topography: Coastal Plain 0.271 0.72 
Topography: Plateau -0.444 -0.98 
Topography: Hills -1.109*** -2.82 
Topography: Valley -0.329 -0.77 
Topography: Mountain -1.407*** -3.70 
Topography: Other -0.568 -1.18 
Punjab 0.022 0.12 
Sindh 0.568*** 3.60 
Balochistan 0.724*** 4.75 
Constant 2.385*** 4.16 
N 497  
R2 0.551  
t statistics in second column 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 2 above shows that flooding exposure is higher among communities that are 
further away from provincial capitals, have higher share of landless households and 
adult women with primary education. Higher average numbers of social connections 
outside the community, and rooms in the house (a marker of wealth), and greater 
community-level access to electricity are associated with lower flood exposure. Among 
topographic factors, hilly and mountainous areas have lower flood exposure. Other 
factors including adult male education, the prevalence of female-headed households, 
community rural/urban status, linguistic fractionalisation, community-level 
infrastructure and presence of state institutions do not appear to determine community-
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level flood exposure.  
   
Table 3. Determinants of Community-level Flooding Anomaly: OLS Regression Results 
- Dependent Variable: Flooding Anomaly Index 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
Urban 0.064 0.32 
Share of Adult Females with Primary Education 0.543 0.82 
Share of Adult Males with Primary Education -0.316 -0.62 
Share Adult Females with Secondary+ 
Education 
-0.057 -0.08 
Share of Adult Males with Secondary+ 
Education 
-0.330 -0.90 
Share HHs with Electricity 0.461** 2.30 
Share HHs with Drainage -0.648** -2.17 
Share of Female-headed HHs -0.919 -1.59 
Average No. of Rooms per HH 0.433*** 3.37 
Share of HHs with Non-agricultural enterprise -0.196 -0.59 
Share of Landless HHs -0.096 -0.41 
Share of Rentier Landlord HHs -0.648 -0.90 
Share of Adult Males in the community -0.306 -0.26 
Average no. of social contacts outside 
community per HH 
0.019 0.63 
Distance to province capital 0.640*** 9.20 
Distance to district capital -0.230 -1.31 
Index of Presence of State Institutions -0.076 -1.41 
Index of Community Infrastructure -0.046 -1.33 
Index of Linguistic Fractionalisation 0.338 1.45 
Topography: Inland Plain -0.021 -0.04 
Topography: Coastal Plain -0.755 -1.29 
Topography: Plateau -0.237 -0.34 
Topography: Hills 0.304 0.50 
Topography: Valley -1.060 -1.60 
Topography: Mountain 0.602 1.02 
Topography: Other 1.380* 1.85 
Punjab -1.833*** -6.51 
Sindh -2.463*** -10.04 
Balochistan -1.510*** -6.37 
Constant 0.013 0.01 
N 497  
R2 0.495  
t statistics in second column 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Most pre-flood community characteristics do not appear to have a significant association 
with the index of flooding anomaly. Communities witnessing more anomalous flooding 
are more likely to be further away from provincial capitals, have higher rates of 
electricity access and average number of rooms in the house, and also lower average 
access to drainage. However, they are no more likely to differ in terms of topography, 
community infrastructure and state presence, adult education levels, land ownership 
patterns, enterprise ownership, social connections outside the community, intra-
community linguistic fractionalisation and the prevalence of female-headed households.  
As we see in tables 2 and 3 above, a few (but not most) pre-flood characteristics 
determine the flood exposure and flooding anomaly indices. I include the full list pre-
flood variables (in tables 2 and 3) as controls in the estimation of migration outcomes in 
section 5. This would ensure that the observed effect of the Flood Exposure and Flooding 
Anomaly indices on migration is not conflated by any effects of the wide range of pre-
flood community characteristics, some of which I find to be significant determinants of 
the indices themselves.  
A few studies have explored the effects of cash transfers on migration and how these 
may vary for different groups and under alternate conditions. Angelucci (2013) finds 
that poor households with access to Mexico’s Oportunidades cash transfer programme 
are more likely to migrate to the US compared to a control group, indicating that the 
poor are indeed budget-constrained in migration decisions. This effect operates likely 
through the greater availability of loans from local (informal) lenders to households in 
receipt of the recurring Oportunidades transfers. Further Angelucci (2004) shows that 
the conditionality of transfers affects recipient households’ migration decisions as 
unconditional transfer receipts cause increases in migration to the U.S., whereas 
conditionality linked to school subsidies deters short-term migration. Mesnard (2009) 
finds that the Familias en Accion cash transfer programme in Colombia was able to 
prevent migration and encouraged people to stay in their villages. However, as the level 
of civil conflict intensified, access to the programme enabled households to migrate 
outside, suggesting that cash transfer programmes can affect the propensity to migrate 
both positively, and negatively.  
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While there is mixed evidence on the effects of cash transfers on migration, it is 
important to consider that any effects of flooding anomaly on migration may in fact be 
due to differential access to flood relief across areas with more /less anomalous flooding. 
This may be because areas with recurrent flooding may have better capacity to roll out 
flood relief programmes, resulting in better access to cash transfers. This may, in turn, 
cause higher migration viz. areas with lesser institutional history of flood relief and 
therefore lower coverage of relief. This is not likely to be a very strong factor in Pakistan 
because despite some areas witnessing floods more regularly, as 2010 was the first time 
such a cash based flood relief transfer was implemented in the country. The threat of 
institutional memory and familiarity with flood relief conflating the effect of flooding 
anomaly should therefore be low. However, to ensure that the causal effects of flooding 
exposure and the degree of flooding anomaly on household and individual migration 
are not confounded by any selective access to public transfers, I control for access to the 
two large state-run cash transfer programmes: The Citizens Damage Compensation 
programme (CDCP – Phase I transfers), and the Benazir Income Support Programme 
(BISP). I include dummy variables that denote receipt of cash transfers through these 
two programmes at the household level.  
To summarise, the causal identification for this chapter is based on the proposition 
that after controlling for a wide range of observable pre-flood economic, 
administrative, social and geographical factors – some of which have a direct effect on 
the extent of flooding severity and flooding anomaly – the Flooding Exposure Index 
and the Flooding Anomaly Index can be treated as independent variables to 
determine causal effects on the propensity to migrate. While I control for a wide range 
of observable characteristics that can be potential confounders, I lack a natural or 
quasi-experiment that can overcome any effects of selection on unobservables. I 
address this limitation by calculating the extent of selection on unobservables, 
relative to the selection on observables that would be required to nullify the results 
that I present in section 5 below (following Altonji et al., 2004, Miguel and Bellows, 
2009, and Kosec, 2014). I am reassured that only a very high ratio of selection on 
unobservables to the selection on the extensive set of observables that I control for 
can nullify my results.  
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6.5 Results 
 
6.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
I first examine the prevalence of migration in the year following the 2010 floods. The 
survey questionnaire, administered about one year after the floods asked questions on 
whether or not any members had migrated since the floods, and whether they had 
returned to the household or were still away. Column 1 Table 2 below shows the (survey-
weighted) share of households that reported at least one member having migrated since 
the floods, whereas the second and third columns show the share of households with 
any migration that reported at least one member having returned (i.e. returnee 
migrants), and the share of households among those with any migration where at least 
one member was still away from the household (i.e. still a migrant), respectively. I 
present estimates of the household-level prevalence of migration at the national and 
provincial levels.  
Table 4. National and Provincial estimates of household migration – Any, Return and 
Continuing 
 
HHs with any 
member having 
migrated since 
2010 floods 
HHs with any 
return migrant^ 
HHs with any  
migrant still 
away^ 
National 57.96% 97.26% 8.59% 
Punjab 61.25% 96.37% 11.95% 
Sindh 84.93% 100% 2.59% 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 25.59% 91.72% 11.92% 
Balochistan 44.68% 99.65% 0.70% 
^ Among households with any migration at all 
Table 4 above shows that the majority of households residing in flood affected areas (the 
sample universe) undertook some migration following the floods. The provincial 
estimates range from a low of just over 25% in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to as high as 85% 
in Sindh. Secondly, we see that for most households, migrants returned home at some 
point within the year. The share of households with members having migrated since the 
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floods and who continue to live away from the household after a year is very low in 
Balochistan and Sindh (at 0.7% and 2.6%, respectively), and over 11% for Punjab and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This suggests that migration in the year following the 2010 floods 
was essentially temporary and short term, with only a very small share of households 
with members who continue to reside in the migration destination a year on. This is also 
visible in the estimates of individual-level migration presented in table 5 below.  
Table 5. National and Provincial estimates of Individual* migration – Any, Return and 
Continuing 
 Individuals aged 
13 and above 
having migrated 
since 2010 floods 
Individual 
migrants having 
returned since 
migrating^ 
Individual 
Migrant Still 
Away^ 
National 52.92% 97.97% 2.03% 
Punjab 55.51% 97.19% 2.81% 
Sindh 80.78% 99.41% 0.59% 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 21.04% 95.91% 4.09% 
Balochistan 43.43% 99.85% 0.15% 
*All individuals aged 13 and above 
^ Among households with any migration at all 
 
The estimates of household and individual level migration do not appear to be 
drastically different at the national and provincial levels. This may be because in the 
short run after the floods, families may have been likely to migrate together. Table 6 
below presents the population estimates of the share of household members aged 13 and 
above who migrated at all following the 2010 floods.  
Table 6. Share of Household Members aged 13 and above that migrated at all 
Share of Household Members aged 13 and above 
that migrated at all % of Households 
0 42.04% 
> 0 and < 0.25 1.33% 
> 0.25 and < 0.5 2.45% 
> 0.5 and < 0.75 2.17% 
> 0.75 and < 1 1.84% 
1 50.17% 
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Table 6 above shows that for the vast majority of households, migration involved all or 
no members, with only a very small share of households (7.79%) where migration was 
undertaken but at least one but not by all members aged 13 and above. Table 7 below 
presents the national and provincial estimates of the share of households where all 
members (aged 13 and above) migrated, among households that reported any migration 
at all. 
Table 7. National and Provincial estimates of Households with Members* Migrating 
En-masse^ 
 Households where all members Migrated 
National 86.56% 
Punjab 84.22% 
Sindh 93.15% 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 80.42% 
Balochistan 88.00% 
*All individuals aged 13 and above 
^ Among households with any migration at all 
 
Tables 6 and 7 above indicates that for the vast majority of households with any migrants 
at all, migration involved all family members (over 86% nationally). The strategic 
breakup or splitting of household members across the native community and migration 
destinations therefore does not appear to be a dominant strategy. Migrating households 
may of course have chosen different durations of stay (and consequently times of return) 
for different members. The survey questionnaire, however, does not contain details of 
the duration of migration or the dates of departure/return of individual migrants to 
allow a deeper examination of household strategies with regard to the timing and 
duration of migration and return and how this may vary across individual members.  
As stated in the introduction, in this chapter migration is defined as any movement(s) 
by (an) individual member/s of a household to a destination outside their community 
for a period of one month or longer (including those who may have returned after at 
least one month away) between the onset of the 2010 floods and the time of the survey. 
As tables 4 – 7 show, the bulk of the migration observed in the dataset using the above 
definition is of a short-term duration (as any movement over one month is defined as 
migration), and typically involves the movement of the entire household. The levels and 
type of migration observed are very closely related to the definition of migration 
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employed – which is distinct from that used in the wider literature on migration. The 
relatively shorter duration of time spent away from the community for an individual/ 
household to be identified as a migrant in the dataset (one month, compared to six 
months/ one year in other studies) compels the present analysis to focus more on short-
term movements, presumably including those meant only to wait out floods (as most 
migrants returned home). The wider literature on migration however, focuses more on 
longer duration movements, motivated by reasons such as employment, education, 
marriage, and distress-induced relocation that typically involve some but not all 
household members, and is not characterised by such early return to origin 
communities. As a result of the definition of migration employed in the survey 
questionnaire, and due to the absence of data on the duration of migration, the focus of 
this chapter is overwhelmingly (though not exclusively – as a few members do indeed 
migrate for longer durations) on a distinct, possibly less common, and definitely under-
studied form of migration: short-term movements, typically of entire families.  
Given that migration in the year following the 2010 floods was largely short-term and 
that conditional on having migrated, a very high majority of migrants returned home 
within the year, in the following sections of this chapter I focus only on the propensity 
of households/individuals to migrate at all. I do not examine the effects of flooding 
exposure and flooding anomaly on the decision to return home or to continue to reside 
in the migration destination, conditional on migrating at all. Further, since the largest 
share of households that reported any migration at all comprises households where all 
members (aged 13 and above) migrated, I do not examine differences in the nature of 
household migration decisions i.e. en-masse v/s strategic split. Instead I measure the 
household propensity to migrate simply as whether or not any member of the household 
migrated in the year following the 2010 floods.  
6.5.2 The effects of Flooding Intensity and Flooding Anomaly on Household and 
Individual Propensity to Migrate 
I now examine the effects of flooding intensity and the degree of flooding anomaly on 
the propensity of household and individual migration. This is represented by the 
following two estimation equations: 
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𝑌ℎ𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝐸𝐼)𝑐  +  𝛽2(𝐹𝐴𝐼)𝑐 + 𝛽3𝑋ℎ𝑐 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑘 +  𝜀ℎ𝑐   … (5) 
Where 
 𝑌ℎ𝑐 is the likelihood of any member in household h in community c undertaking any 
migration since the 2010 floods 
FEIc is the Index of Flood Exposure at the community level, as described in 6.4. 2 (Eq. 2) 
FAIc is the Index of Flooding Anomaly at the community level, as described in 6.4. 2 (Eq. 
4) 
X is the matrix of household /community-level control variables.  
P represents the matrix of k Province dummies 
 
Similarly, Equation 6 below represents the estimation of individual migration decisions: 
 
𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝐸𝐼)𝑐  +  𝛽2(𝐹𝐴𝐼)𝑐 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑐 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑐   … (6) 
Where 
 𝑌𝑖ℎ𝑐 is the likelihood of individual i, in household h, in community c undertaking any 
migration since the 2010 floods 
FEIc is the Index of Flood Exposure at the community level, as described in 6.4. 2 (Eq. 2) 
FAIc is the Index of Flooding Anomaly at the community level, as described in 6.4. 2 (Eq. 
4) 
X is the matrix of individual/ household /community-level control variables.  
P represents the matrix of k Province dummies.  
 
Tables 8 and 9 below show the probit estimates of the effect of flooding exposure, and 
the extent of flooding anomaly on the likelihood of household and individual-level 
migration, respectively. Following the discussion in section 6.4.3, I focus on the results 
in column 4 as the main causal estimate of the effect of the two indices on the propensity 
and households and individuals to migrate, as the inclusion of controls is essential to 
control for potential confounders.  
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Table 8. Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Household Migration: Probit Estimates (Any Household Member migrated = 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index 
0.235*** 0.212*** 0.202*** 0.196*** 
 (26.85) (17.11) (13.92) (13.60) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.03015*** -0.02672*** -0.03135*** -0.03019*** 
 (-3.60) (-3.02) (-3.40) (-3.28) 
     
Province dummies - Yes Yes Yes 
Community 
Controls 
- - Yes Yes 
Household Controls - - - Yes 
N 7802 7802 7786 7767 
pseudo R2 0.2071 0.2407 0.2978 0.3079 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors clustered at the PSU (community) level 
Community Controls: Urban/Rural, topography, occupational characteristics, distance from administrative 
headquarters, social connectedness outside the community, intra-community linguistic fractionalization, 
community-level presence of infrastructure and state institutions, community-level adult education 
characteristics, community access to electricity, drainage, sex ratio 
Household controls: Household size, Age of head, members’ education levels, Farmland ownership, 
Number of rooms in the house, pre-flood livestock value, number of males, number of members over 14, 
household main occupation and enterprise ownership, female-headed (dummy), flood-induced 
displacement status, receipt of CDCP – I and BISP transfers, measure of social connections outside 
community 
 
Table 9. Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Individual^ Migration: Probit Estimates (Individual Member migrated = 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index 
0.246*** 0.223*** 0.203*** 0.193*** 
 (59.92) (36.98) (25.62) (24.08) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.035*** -0.031*** -0.041*** -0.037*** 
 (-8.77) (-6.34) (-7.33) (-6.59) 
     
Province dummies - Yes Yes Yes 
Community 
Controls 
- - Yes Yes 
HH + Individual 
controls 
- - - Yes 
N 30697 30697 30623 30554 
pseudo R2 0.2317 0.2628 0.3215 0.3311 
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Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
^ Estimated for all individuals aged 13 and above 
Standard Errors clustered at the household level84 
Controls: In addition to the community and household-level controls listed in table 8, I control for 
individual characteristics – Age, Gender and Educational Attainment (categories) 
 
Tables 8 and 9 above clearly show that, across specifications, flooding exposure has a 
strongly positive and highly significant effect on the likelihood of household and 
individual migration, in line with findings from the wider literature discussed 
previously. A unit increase in the flooding exposure index increases the likelihood of 
household migration (i.e. by at least one member), as well as an individual’s migration 
by about 19%. Further, the Flooding Anomaly Index has a highly significant, negative 
effect on the likelihood of household and individual-level migration. A unit increase in 
the Flooding Anomaly Index reduces the likelihood of household migration by 3% and 
an individual’s migration by 3.7%. The migration response to floods therefore depends 
significantly on the extent to which the community has been susceptible to flooding in 
the past, and therefore, arguably to the extent of people’s familiarity with flooding 
shocks. Lower likely familiarity with floods reduces migration after their onset. As stated 
in 6.5.1, it is important to recall that the effects described above pertain to only a sub-set 
of migration that is observed globally: short-term movements (in most cases of complete 
households) in response to floods, and are therefore not generalizable beyond this 
subset.  
In the results above, and for the remainder of this chapter I show causal effects of the 
(composite) Index of Flooding Anomaly on the Migration outcomes of interest. Recall 
that the Flooding Anomaly Index is a simple sum of the standardised measure of rainfall 
deviation, and the standardised nearest distance to a river, as described in section 6.4.2.2. 
I present results for the probit regression that includes these two constituent indices of 
flooding anomaly separately for the above and for subsequent tables, in Annexe 6.1. I 
find that in almost all cases the direction, level of significance, and even the magnitude 
                                                          
84 Although the Flood Exposure and Flooding Anomaly indices are measured at the community level, for 
individual migration I cluster standard errors at the household level due to the higher intra-cluster 
correlation of individual migration within households (0.878), than within PSUs (0.547). I checked that the 
results remain significant even if I cluster at the PSU level.  
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of the effect of these two dimensions of flooding anomaly on migration outcomes is 
roughly the same (with the magnitude of coefficients on the standardised distance to 
rivers slightly higher), suggesting that the effects of flooding anomaly are driven by 
both, deviations in rainfall, and distance from rivers.85  
6.5.3 Selection on Unobservables 
In the results in tables 8 and 9 above, we see that the effect of the degree of flooding 
anomaly on the household and individual propensity remains largely unchanged even 
after controlling for a wide range of observable characteristics. Following Altonji et al. 
(2005), Miguel and Bellows (2009), and Kosec (2014), I calculate the ratio of selection on 
unobservables to the selection on observables to estimate the extent of any omitted 
variable bias arising due to selection on unobservables. Essentially, I estimate the 
magnitude of omitted variable bias that needs to be present to explain away the entire 
effect of the Flooding Anomaly Index, by examining the extent to which, controlling for 
flooding exposure, the OLS coefficient of the Flooding Anomaly Index changes after 
adding controls. This ratio is denoted by  
?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆𝐶
?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑁𝐶− ?̂?𝑂𝐿𝑆𝐶
 where C signifies Controls, and 
NC, No Controls.  
Using the values of OLS coefficients in columns 1 and 4 of Tables 8 and 9 to calculate the 
ratio described above, I find that the selection on unobservables needs to be at least 755 
times and 18.5 times the selection on the wide range of observables to completely offset 
the effect of the degree of flooding anomaly on household and individual, respectively. 
This is significant because it suggests that although lacking an experimental set-up that 
can eliminate the problem of selection on unobservables, only an exceedingly high level 
of selection on unobservables – relative to the selection on the wide range of observables 
controlled for – can wipe out the causal effects of flooding anomaly on migration 
observed in tables 8 and 9. That I control for a very wide range of factors including 
household and individual characteristics (demographics, education levels, pre-flood 
wealth, access to services, occupational categories) province-specific characteristics, 
                                                          
85 See Annexe 6.1 for results using sub-indices as regressors, instead of the composite Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
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community characteristics (topography, occupational characteristics, distance from 
administrative headquarters, social connectedness outside the community, intra-
community linguistic fractionalization, community-level presence of infrastructure and 
state institutions) and individual age, education and gender for the individuals’ 
specification only makes it all more unlikely for selection on unobservables to explain 
away the results.  
6.5.4 The Effects of Flooding Anomaly on Household and Individual Migration across 
Groups 
6.5.4.1 Household Migration 
Tables 8 and 9 above have shown that higher flooding anomaly reduces the household 
and individual-level propensity to migrate. I now examine this aggregate effect across 
sub-groups of the population, specifically across rural/urban, land ownership and 
demographic categories, as shown in tables 10, 11 and 12, respectively. 
 
Table 10. Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: 
Rural v/s Urban 
 Total Rural Urban 
    
Flooding Exposure 
Index 
0.196*** 0.194*** 0.255*** 
 (13.60) (12.92) (7.90) 
    
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.030*** -0.024*** 0.018 
 (-3.28) (-2.58) (0.77) 
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in 
table 8 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 7049 684 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 11. Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: 
Land Ownership Status 
 Total Landless 
Households 
Own-land 
cultivating 
Households 
Rentier 
Landlord 
Households 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index 
0.196*** 0.181*** 0.223*** 0.242*** 
 (13.60) (12.12) (10.99) (6.46) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.030*** -0.029*** -0.028** -0.005 
 (-3.28) (-2.96) (-2.07) (-0.20) 
     
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed 
in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 5208 2198 357 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 12. Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: 
Demographic Characteristics 
 Total Female 
Headed 
Households 
Age of Household Head 
  Below 40 40 – 59 60 and 
above 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
0.196*** 0.212*** 0.201*** 0.186*** 0.216*** 
 (13.60) (9.39) (11.21) (11.12) (11.02) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
-0.030*** 0.031 -0.039*** -0.027** -0.014 
 (-3.28) (1.58) (-3.27) (-2.57) (-1.07) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 720 3147 3220 1400 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level | * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Tables 10 – 12 above suggest that while all sub groups of the population are more likely 
to migrate in response to greater flooding exposure, the negative effect of flooding 
anomaly on the household’ propensity to migrate does not operate for all types of 
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households. Specifically, urban households, landlord households (who rent out their 
lands for others to work on), female-headed households and households where the head 
is aged 60 and above are not affected by more anomalous flooding in terms of their 
propensity to migrate. This may possibly be because even in areas that have more 
recurrent flooding, these groups of households may be less mobile or prepared/inclined 
to migrate, and are therefore no different from such households in areas of anomalous 
flooding in terms of the preparedness and disposition to migrate. On the other hand, 
more mobile groups – such as landless and own land-cultivating households, male-
headed households and younger households may be more likely to better anticipate and 
prepare to migrate in the eventuality of a flood in areas of recurrent flooding, but not in 
areas where flooding is a one-off. In other words, the effect of flooding anomaly on 
dampening migration is possibly driven by the relatively higher preparedness of the 
more mobile households to migrate, in areas witnessing more anomalous flooding. This 
is a suggestive interpretation that cannot be scientifically tested at present, given the 
paucity of data on pre-flood anticipation, inclination and material and non-material 
preparation for migration across groups. Future research should examine why some of 
these groups’ household migration decisions are more responsive to flooding anomaly 
than others’.  
6.5.4.2 Individual Migration 
I now examine any differences in the effect of flooding anomaly on individuals’ 
propensity to migrate, across gender, educational attainment and age characteristics.  
Table 13. Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual 
Migration: by Gender 
 Total Male Female 
Flooding Exposure 
Index 
0.193*** 0.186*** 0.201*** 
 (24.08) (22.08) (23.49) 
    
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 (-6.59) (-6.48) (-6.08) 
    
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in Yes Yes Yes 
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table 9 
N 30554 15227 15327 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 14. Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual 
Migration: by Age Group 
 Total Age Group 
  13 - 25 26 - 40 41 - 55 56 and 
above 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
0.193*** 0.188*** 0.201*** 0.176*** 0.224*** 
 (24.08) (19.39) (19.74) (15.56) (15.36) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
-0.037*** -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.039*** -0.028*** 
 (-6.59) (-5.62) (-4.88) (-5.10) (-2.94) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 13016 7951 5749 3838 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 15. Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual 
Migration: by Education Level 
 Total Education Level 
  Illiterate Primary Secondary Higher 
Flooding 
Exposure 
Index 
0.193*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.193*** 0.159*** 
 (24.08) (21.73) (13.23) (16.05) (10.16) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly 
Index 
-0.037*** -0.043*** -0.019** -0.029*** -0.037*** 
 (-6.59) (-6.80) (-2.10) (-3.41) (-3.26) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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N 30554 19988 4210 4865 1490 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Tables 10 – 12 above clearly show that the effects of both, flooding exposure and flooding 
anomaly do not vary much across individuals’ gender, demographic and educational 
attainment characteristics. This shows that the effects of flooding anomaly on migration 
decisions depend on household level characteristics, particularly land ownership, sex 
and age of the head of household, and rural residence, and not on individual attributes. 
This is also largely because the type of migration analysed in this chapter is of a very 
specific nature (as described in 6.5.1, to be of very short-term duration and mainly 
comprising the movement of entire households) where household, rather than 
individual characteristics have greater explanatory power, which is unlike the correlates 
of other kinds of migration studies in the wider literature (such as in Rosenzweig and 
Stark, 1989). 
6.5.5 Choice of Migration Destination 
I model the choice of migration destination as shown by equation 7 below: 
𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝐸𝐼)𝑐  +  𝛽2(𝐹𝐴𝐼)𝑐 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖ℎ𝑐 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖ℎ𝑐   … (7) 
Where 
 𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑐 is the choice of migration destination (urban v.s rural estimated as a dummy for 
urban destination) of individual migrant i, in household h, in community c (And later, 
the distance between the migration destination and the origin community; represented 
as an ordinal category increasing from closer to farther) 
FEIc is the Index of Flood Exposure at the community level, as described in 6.4. 2 (Eq. 2) 
FAIc is the Index of Flooding Anomaly at the community level, as described in 6.4. 2 (Eq. 
4) 
X is the matrix of individual/ household /community-level control variables.  
P represents the matrix of k Province dummies.  
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I find that the degree of flooding anomaly has no effect on the choice of urban vis-à-vis 
rural destination, whereas flooding exposure decreases the likelihood of migrating to an 
urban area. This is evident in table 16 below which shows the marginal effects of the 
flood exposure and flooding anomaly indices from the probit estimation of the 
likelihood of migrating to an urban destination, relative to a rural destination, for the 
individuals that migrated at all, in the aftermath of the 2010 floods. Column 2 of Table 
16 shows the marginal effects of the two indices on alternate migration destinations in 
terms of distance from the origin community, based on ordinal probit estimates of 
successive categories of migration destinations. I compare the effect of the Flood 
Exposure and the Flooding Anomaly indices on the distance to the migration destination 
across four successive distance categories: within the district, within the province but 
outside the district, within Pakistan but outside the province, and abroad, for all 
individuals who migrated at all. I find that a greater degree of flooding anomaly 
increases the likelihood of more long-distance migration.  
Table 16. Marginal Effect of Flooding Indices on Choice of Destination: Probit Estimate 
–individual migrants 
 Urban Migration 
Destination 
Distance to Migration 
Destination 
 Probit Estimate  Ordinal Probit Estimate  
Flooding Exposure Index -0.038** 0.073*** 
 (-2.42) (5.44) 
   
Flooding Anomaly Index -0.011 0.045*** 
 (-0.97) (4.72) 
   
Province dummies Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in table 9 Yes Yes 
N 16490 16490 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
6.5.6 Possible Mechanisms linking Flooding Anomaly and post-flood Migration 
While a detailed analysis of the precise mechanisms that link flooding anomaly with 
post-flood migration is beyond the scope of this chapter (and the data resources available 
currently), I attempt to present some initial descriptive analysis that can provide some 
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suggestive evidence on how areas with more and less anomalistic flooding compared in 
terms of the resources and mediating factors that enable migration. As discussed in 
section 6.2, migration, including disaster-induced migration is facilitated by several 
factors such as access to social networks, household education, and resources (from 
savings, remittances, or on credit) to finance an episode of migration. The econometric 
results presented earlier control for household education levels and for the number of 
social contacts households have outside the village (which I assume did not change very 
much in the year following the floods, i.e. the post-flood observations of these variables 
are assumed to be strongly correlated with their pre-flood levels). Data on savings, debt 
and access to remittances, which also is only available in the post flood period, i.e. at the 
time of the survey, is possibly very different from pre-flood levels. This is because 
households are very likely to have used these financial transactions – borrowing, 
drawing down saving, and receiving remittances to cope with flooding shocks. 
Therefore, I am unable to include these variables in any econometric estimation as the 
post-flood levels of these variables is a likely outcome of flooding exposure itself.  
I therefore only examine descriptive statistics of these variables, averaged at the 
community level, to examine if the average community-level rates of indebtedness and 
access to remittances, and average amounts of money saved, owed and received as 
remittances varies considerably across terciles of communities by the flooding anomaly 
index. This could potentially provide preliminary clues for why communities witnessing 
more anomalous floods were less prepared, and therefore less likely to migrate after the 
floods. Alternatively any differences could indicate how these groups (of communities, 
by extent of flooding anomaly) differed in terms of their coping behaviour given that 
they were differently able/prepared to migrate.  This is a subject matter for future 
research to engage in greater detail. In table 17 below, I present the community-level 
mean post-flood values of some of these enablers/inhibitors of migration across terciles 
of the flooding anomaly index.  
 
 
228 
 
Table 17. Post-flood levels of Community-level Mean Savings, Remittances and Debt 
across Flooding Anomaly Index Terciles 
  
Lower 
Tercile 
Middle 
Tercile 
Higher 
Tercile 
Debt    
Any Outstanding Debt 0.77 0.83 0.84 
 [0.75,0.79] [0.81,0.85] [0.82,0.86] 
    
Outstanding debt to bank/formal 
financial institution 
0.03 0.04 0.06 
 [0.02,0.04] [0.03,0.06] [0.05,0.08] 
    
Outstanding debt to employer 0.05 0.05 0.03 
 
[0.03,0.06] [0.03,0.07] [0.02,0.04] 
    
Outstanding debt to micro-lender 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 [0.01,0.02] [0.02,0.03] [0.01,0.02] 
    
Outstanding debt to money-lender 0.07 0.07 0.05 
 [0.06,0.09] [0.05,0.08] [0.04,0.07] 
    
Outstanding debt to family/friend 0.43 0.45 0.5 
 [0.40,0.47] [0.41,0.49] [0.47,0.54] 
    
Outstanding debt to shop (goods on 
credit) 
0.45 0.45 0.43 
 [0.42,0.48] [0.42,0.49] [0.41,0.46] 
    
Outstanding debt to other lender 0.04 0.05 0.02 
 [0.03,0.05] [0.03,0.06] [0.01,0.03] 
    
Total Debt (PKR) 42,820 52,114 55,045 
 
 [38287, 
47353]  
 [47881, 
56346]  
 [50962, 
59127]  
        
Savings    
Formal Savings (PKR) 856 742 952 
  [43,1286]   [295,1189]   [421,1483]  
    
Informal Savings (PKR) 12,288 16,495 15,818 
 [9854,14722] [13413,19578] [13153,18483] 
    
Combined Savings (PKR) 13,041 16,736 16,444 
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 [10434,15647] [13466,20007] [13735,19153] 
        
Remittances    
Receiving any remittance 0.09 0.1 0.17 
 [0.07,0.10] [0.08,0.11] [0.15,0.19] 
    
Avg. Remittance Amount per HH 
(PKR) 
3,301 3,949 6,658 
 [2294,4309] [2751,,5146] [5317,8000] 
    
Share of remittances in Monthly HH 
Consumption Expenditure 
0.02 0.02 0.03 
 [0.01,0.02] [0.01,0.02] [0.03,0.04] 
    
Share of remittances in Monthly HH 
Consumption Expenditure (Only 
remittance receiving HHs) 
0.17 0.16 0.18 
 [0.14,0.20] [0.14,0.19] [0.16,0.20] 
 N  166 166 166 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
 
From table 17 we see that households in areas that witnessed low, moderate and high 
anomalous flooding do not differ substantially in terms of savings levels. We do, 
however, observe that households in the high anomalistic flooding category reported 
significantly higher rates of owing money to an external source, and have higher levels 
of debt at the end of the year following the floods. Further, households in the high 
anomalistic flooding category also had a higher rate of remittance receipts, and amounts 
of money received as remittance, on average.  
The descriptive statistics may provide some avenues for future research. First, the lower 
levels of debt and higher levels of migration in areas with higher likely past exposure to 
flood may suggest a link: in areas with higher anticipation of floods, households may be 
using migration as a means to reduce the extent of household debt incurred. In contrast, 
in the case of more unanticipated flooding, households may not be prepared or able to 
migrate out to smooth household income/consumption, and therefore rely on loans. 
Secondly, the higher share of households receiving remittances in areas of more flooding 
anomaly could be because remittances respond not only to shocks suffered by the 
230 
 
recipient household, but also to the extent to which such shocks are exceptional or 
unprecedented. This could in turn be because households hit by recurrent floods are, 
over time, less likely to invoke sympathy and financial help from friends/relatives, and 
therefore have to fend for themselves by migrating. In contrast households that are 
experiencing anomalous flooding, and are also less mobile, can only depend on help 
from households outside the community, through remittances. These hypotheses merit 
more detailed study in future research (The association between flooding anomaly and 
remittance receipts is also commented upon in Chapter 4).  
6.5.7 Robustness checks 
I perform additional robustness tests for the indices of flooding exposure and flooding 
anomaly and find that the main results are robust to the following specifications: 
i. The linear transformation of the Flood Exposure Index (FEI): Recall (from 
Equations 1 and 2) that the Flood Exposure Index developed and used in this 
chapter is defined as: FEIc  =   
∑ 𝐹𝐸𝐼ℎℎ
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝑛
 
Where FEIhh = loge [1 + (DepthScore X DurationScore)] 
As a robustness test I estimate the results using an alternate index of flooding exposure 
FEI1c = 
∑ 𝐹𝐸𝐼1
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝑛
 where, FEI1 = (DepthScore X DurationScore). 
I find that the main results (for household and individual level migration) are robust to 
this alternate specification using the linear transformation of the Flooding Exposure 
Index (shown in Appendix 6.1). 
ii. Including Depth and Duration Scores as separate regressors: In equations 1 and 
2 I develop the Index of Flooding Exposure as a combination of the depth and 
duration (of floodwater) scores. I additionally use the (community-level average 
of) depth and duration scores as separate regressors and find that the positive 
effects of flooding exposure on household and individual migration are driven 
by both, the depth and the duration of floodwaters in the house (results shown 
in Appendix 6.2). 
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iii. Household-level Flood Exposure Index: I find that the results presented in this 
chapter are robust to measuring flooding exposure at the household level, i.e. as 
FEIhh = loge [1 + (DepthScore X DurationScore)]. These results are presented in 
Appendix 6.3.  
iv.  I find that the results of the effect of the Flooding Anomaly Index, constituted by 
combining two sub-indices (the standardised index of rainfall deviation and the 
standardised community distance from the nearest river) on migration is not 
driven by any one of the sub-indices alone. Appendix 6.4 6.1 presents results of 
probit estimations where I include both sub-indices as separate regressors, 
showing that both exert a significant negative effect on migration.  
v. I also examine if the association between the Flooding Anomaly Index and 
migration is non-linear, by including the square of the FAI as an additional 
regressor in the estimations. I find that in most cases the effect of the FAI on 
migration is Linear as the coefficient on the FAI-squared term is not significant. 
These results are presented in Appendix 6.5.  
I also show that the effects of the Flooding Anomaly Index are robust to the inclusion of 
a wide array of controls, and following Altonji et al. (2005) and Miguel and Bellows 
(2009), show (in 6.5.3) that the level of selection on unobservables required to nullify 
these effects are extremely high. 
Finally, I show that the effects of the Flooding Anomaly Index are negative, significant 
and of similar magnitude for both, household and individual migration (sections 6.5.1 
and 6.5.2).  
6.6 Conclusions 
 
So far the literature on natural disasters and migration has focused on the role of disaster 
incidence and in some cases, severity, in determining short and long-term migration. 
The degree of shock uncertainty, represented by a measure of anomaly, or deviation 
from past shocks levels, and its role in influencing post-disaster decisions, in particular 
migration, has been understudied. This chapter attempts to make a key contribution to 
the literature on natural disasters and coping strategies. Specifically the chapter sets out 
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to understand how post-flood household migration depended on whether flooding was 
of a more routine, or alternatively of a surprise nature, during the 2010 floods in 
Pakistan. I develop and implement an innovative means to proxy the degree of flooding 
anomaly, based on likely past exposure to floods. Using this measure, I find that while 
flooding exposure per se increases the likelihood of household and individual migration, 
more anomalistic flooding in fact has a negative effect on household and individual level 
short-term migration. This connects with the earlier discussion on ambiguity aversion 
associated; it underlies the hesitation and inability to migrate in the aftermath of an 
unknown event (floods). For households and individuals who faced no or very low 
flooding in the past compared to 2010, the odds of success/survival by migrating are 
unknown, because they probably had no occasion to discover what migration entails. 
This is possibly why in areas hit by anomalous floods even otherwise mobile groups 
(youth, men, landless) were less likely to migrate.  
In other words, while short-term migration increases with the realisation of more 
intensive flooding risk, it decreases with the realisation of disaster uncertainty. This is a 
key contribution to the hitherto understudied role of the degree of novelty/anomaly of 
natural disasters in determining household behaviour. However, it should be noted that 
these effects pertain to a very specific type of short-term migration that is studied in this 
chapter, which largely consists of the movements of complete households (and not just 
specific individual/s) probably only to escape and wait out the floods. These results, 
while important for understanding short-term mobility and disaster response may not 
be generalizable to other, more commonly observed and studied forms of migration.  
Following the 2010 floods, affected populations in Pakistan undertook a very large scale 
of (at least) short term migration. This typically consisted of entire families moving out 
of their flood affected villages, and most members returning home within a year of the 
floods. More anomalous flooding led to lower rates of household and individual 
migration, particularly among rural communities, and among landless, own land-
cultivating, male-headed and younger households. These groups tend to be more mobile 
than say, older, female-headed and landlord households (whose migration decisions are 
not affected by the degree of flood anomaly). It could be the case that groups of 
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households that are less mobile or inclined to migrate are similarly immobile whether 
residing in areas of recurrent or anomalous flooding. However, in areas of more 
recurrent flooding mobile groups may have a higher expectation of flooding, and the 
consequent need to migrate, compared to areas with lower past exposure to floods. 
These groups may therefore invest more in the material and non-material enablers of 
migration to prepare for such an eventuality as and when it unfolds, and may not be 
strongly averse to migration as a means to cope. On the other hand, people in areas with 
lower historical exposure to floods may not have ever needed to make such investments 
and preparation. I hypothesise that such pre-positioning of material and non-material 
resources to deploy towards undertaking migration may be at the core of why more 
anomalous flooding reduces the propensity to migrate, particularly among population 
groups that are likely more mobile than others. Data constraints prevent me from testing 
this more formally. 
The results on the effects of flooding anomaly on migration are robust to controlling for 
access to flood relief transfers; selective or differential access to flood relief which may 
be used to finance post-flood migration does not conflate the strong negative 
relationship between flooding anomaly and migration decisions. I also find descriptive 
evidence that shows that areas of more anomalous flooding had, on average, higher 
access to remittances and higher rates of indebtedness in the post-flood period. This 
could suggest that remittances, particularly when motivated by altruism and risk-
sharing, respond not only to the severity of shocks that households witness but also how 
unprecedented (and therefore difficult to cope with) such shocks may be. The higher 
levels of indebtedness in communities facing anomalous flooding could mean that 
without the familiarity with migration as a coping response, and the necessary 
preparation to undertake it, such households had to rely more often on informal debt to 
cope – which is available in all communities and requires very low (if any) pre-
positioning of resources or networks. Future research should specifically explore if any 
causal links underlie such a hypothesis, and more broadly, the precise mechanisms 
through which flooding anomaly affects migration.   
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
 
This thesis has covered much ground on household behaviour at the intersection of 
natural disaster shocks, conflict, and public and private transfers, in the aftermath of the 
2010 floods in Pakistan. Chapters 3 to 6 have each engaged with specific microeconomic 
relationships at this intersection, which have hitherto not been studied in much detail, 
particularly in Pakistan. In the process I have attempted to make contributions to the 
academic literature on this topic along empirical and country-specific dimensions, as 
well as to policy debates.  
Empirical Contributions: Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis specifically engage with 
measuring and identifying the causal effects of micro-level conflict exposure on 
households’ access to transfers. This is based on a detailed mapping of conflict events 
data to the lowest level possible (the tehsil, in Pakistan), through the process described 
in Chapter 2.  
While contributing to the vast and growing number of studies on the empirical analyses 
of conflict at the micro-level in general, Chapter 3 also describes a unique empirical 
method to identify areas with the likely presence of rebel (Taliban) groups, which may 
not be the same as areas where violence occurs. This method is based on the analysis of 
residuals from the community-level estimation of girls’ primary schooling, to isolate the 
effect of Taliban presence as an unobserved, omitted variable that lowers girls schooling 
rates. Inspired by macroeconomic analyses of Total Factor Productivity growth through 
the ‘Solow residual’ (Solow: 1956, 1957), this technique, to the best of my knowledge, has 
not previously been used in the microeconomic analysis of conflict to identify rebel 
group presence.  
In Chapter 4, I use a microeconomic lens to study the relationship between conflict 
exposure and remittance receipts and find that my empirical results fill a gap in the 
literature, currently dominated by country-level studies.  
Chapter 5 alludes to the trade-off between material and physical security, and finds 
empirical evidence that speaks to this literature.  
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Finally, in Chapter 6 I develop an Index of Flooding Anomaly as a proxy measure of the 
level of uncertainty of flooding shocks, based on the likely past exposure of communities 
to floods. This helps me find empirical evidence for the effect of uncertainty on 
household migration, a subject that has received little theoretical and almost no 
empirical attention.  
Country-specific Contributions: Pakistan, while being a vast and varied country in 
which millions of people face multiple shocks and vulnerabilities, has generally not been 
studied in very much detail in terms of the intersection of vulnerabilities. Each chapter 
of this chapter attempts to contribute to remedying this paucity. Chapter 2 is based on 
the first ever systematic compilation and analysis of the conflict events timeline of the 
South Asia Terrorism Portal for Pakistan. This is a valuable resource that can help other 
researchers study micro-level conflict dynamics in Pakistan over the critical phase of its 
history between 2001 and 2010.  
While conflict in Pakistan received substantial attention in International Relations, 
Security Studies and Terrorism Studies disciplines, there is astonishingly no evidence on 
the microeconomic impact of exposure to conflict, on households and individuals (to the 
best of my knowledge). Studying conflict through a microeconomic lens is the biggest 
intended contribution (to the study of Pakistan) of this thesis. Chapter 3 provides a 
detailed assessment of how conflict affects access to two large cash transfer programmes 
run by the Government of Pakistan, a subject that despite being of much interest to 
scholars and policy practitioners in the country, is not informed by rigorous analysis.  
Finally, while the subject of gun ownership in Pakistan is hotly debated from drawing 
rooms in Lahore to the Pentagon, there is very little systematic evidence of the 
determinants or correlates of gun ownership in Pakistan. Despite being curtailed by very 
limited data, Chapter 5 attempts to examine what household-level factors are associated 
with gun ownership. It is hoped that these specific parts of the thesis will be of much 
interest and use to scholars of Pakistan across disciplines.  
Policy Implications: Several chapters of this thesis seek to answer questions relevant for 
policy, and therefore to government and international donor agencies. Chapter 3 
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specifically examines how conflict affects the performance of two large donor-funded 
and government-run cash transfer programmes, the Citizens Damage Compensation 
Programme and the Benazir Income Support Programme and cautions against the 
enthusiasm to use cash transfers as a means of achieving political ends. This is because 
cash transfers may themselves become the subject of rebel groups’ suspicion and attacks. 
Chapter 4 finds that households’ access to remittances is also reduced due to conflict, 
particularly among households without bank accounts who are more likely to rely on 
informal means of money transfer. Taken together, these two chapters point to the 
increasing isolation of communities affected by conflict from both public and private 
transfers. They also caution against the oversimplified assumption that money 
generated from outside conflict-affected areas can be infused, through public or private 
channels, into such communities without addressing the on-ground realities that are 
associated with conflict and also encumber the provision of transfers. By doing so, they 
also re-emphasises the centrality of effective governance through (among others) 
security, police and civil society reform to make other interventions, cash transfers and 
private remittances in this case, possible to rollout. Equally, the chapters suggest that 
any innovations in financial inclusion through the spread of Information Technology 
that can enable direct electronic transfers of funds may be able to circumvent at least 
some of the challenges that money transfers face in conflict-affected areas.  
Chapter 5 has important lessons for the likely unintended consequences of aid through 
civilian militarisation by the use of aid money for the purchase of guns. The chapter’s 
findings make a case for improving the public provision of security in displacement 
camps. Failing such provisions, materially well-off but physically insecure households 
may feel the need to buy guns for their own security. Finally, Chapter 6 makes a case for 
policy makers to consider not only the level of disaster exposure faced by households, 
but also how anomalous such disasters are likely to have been, as the latter factor may 
have a significant effect on the extent to, and ways in which, households can cope.  
Implications and Suggestions for Future Research 
This thesis has attempted to cover a wide range of topics within a fixed period of time. 
While it has benefited from access to a rich household survey dataset, detailed conflict 
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events timeline and satellite data, in some instances more detailed analysis has been 
curtailed by the paucity of additional data. Future research that is specifically aimed at 
the topics explored in this thesis should attempt to use and integrate such data for 
analysis. 
In this thesis I have created a conflict-events dataset for Pakistan from the South Asia 
Terrorism Portal that locates conflict events and fatalities down to the tehsil level. While 
this is the most micro-level conflict event dataset available yet, and as highlighted earlier, 
Chapters 3 – 5 of this thesis are perhaps among the first microeconomic analyses of the 
effects of conflict on households in Pakistan, future research would benefit immensely 
from the availability of conflict events data at more granular levels, such as the Union 
Council, or even village/ community. This may require dedicated collection of primary 
data of conflict events during household surveys, or a concerted effort to locate more 
precisely where violent conflict occurs.  
Chapter 4 shows that conflict exposure reduces household remittance receipts, as a result 
of the insecurity of informal financial transfers and a dampening of investment 
incentives, brought upon by conflict. However, the speculation on the effects of conflict 
on investment-driven remittances are indirect; derived from the assumed (and 
plausible) increasing likelihood of households in higher food consumption quintiles to 
use remittances to invest. Future research should specifically record the use of 
remittance receipts across consumption and investment heads, to examine the effects 
more precisely. A record of the source of remittances (domestic/ foreign) can also 
potentially help identify which types of remittances are most affected by conflict. 
While Chapter 6 shows that the level of shock anomaly matters to post-shock household/ 
individual behaviour, the analysis is based on the comparison of the 2010 floods with 
the likely exposure to flooding in the past, at the community level. This is because 
despite multiple attempts to locate data on the micro-level exposure to floods in the past, 
such data were not available. A systematic (and publically available) record of flooding 
history at the community or even Union Council level would enable the direct 
observation of the frequency of flooding occurrence in a community, and would be a 
resource worth investing in, for analytical and policy priorities alike.  
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Finally, data on the exact mode of payments used for receiving both public and private 
transfers can provide insights into the specific routes which the Taliban-affiliate groups 
are likely to block or threaten, which results in the financial isolation of households due 
to conflict (as shown in Chapters 3 and 4). Future research should also explore how 
armed group presence affects the demand and the supply of cash transfers in terms of 
the ability of households to seek, and that of the last-mile bureaucrat to deliver cash 
transfers. It is hoped that some of these pointers will enable a fuller understanding of the 
microeconomic dynamics in the context of complex emergencies in the future.   
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Appendix 2.3a: Chapter 3. Summary Statistics – Household Level Variables 
 Units Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N 
Dependent Variables       
Received CDCP - I Dummy (1 = yes) 0.613 0.487 0 1 7802 
Received BISP Dummy (1 = yes) 0.154 0.361 0 1 7802 
Independent variable       
Log (1+n) killings at tehsil level (Log killings) 1.104 1.762 0 6.480 7802 
Instruments       
Nearest Distance to Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Border 
Degrees 2.272 1.166 0.403 5.925 7802 
Controls       
HH size count 6.515 3.177 1 48 7802 
Urban dummy 0.094 0.292 0 1 7802 
No. males with primary Education count 1.261 1.414 0 13 7802 
No. females with primary Education count 0.572 1.019 0 12 7802 
No. of family members above 14 count 3.582 1.960 1 29 7802 
Value of Livestock (pre-flood) PKR 81297 125600.5 0 700000 7799 
Age of HH Head years 44.566 14.367 15 98 7802 
Total No. of Male members in HH count 3.308 1.925 0 24 7802 
Female Headed HH dummy 0.093 0.291 0 1 7802 
Landless HH dummy 0.670 0.470 0 1 7802 
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Rentier Land Lord HH dummy 0.047 0.211 0 1 7802 
Farmland Owned Acres 1.7 7.87 0 200 7785 
HH owns non-agricultural enterprise dummy 0.185 0.388 0 1 7802 
HH has access to drainage  dummy 0.283 0.450 0 1 7802 
Flood Exposure Index Continuous 2.204 0.932 0 3.42 7802 
Punjab dummy 0.298 0.457 0 1 7802 
Sindh dummy 0.280 0.449 0 1 7802 
Balochistan dummy 0.196 0.397 0 1 7802 
KPK dummy 0.226 0.418 0 1 7802 
Distance to District Capital degrees 0.452 0.281 0.01 1.94 7802 
Distance to Province Capital degrees 2.396 1.313 0.01 5.91 7802 
Index of Linguistic Fractionalisation Continuous [0,1] 0.217 0.230 0 0.74 7802 
Community Infrastructure Index Count  5.593 2.245 0 12 7786 
Community state presence index Count  4.890 4.453 0 32 7786 
Distance to nearest Army Cantonment degrees 0.642 0.354 0.01 1.36 7802 
Inland Plain dummy 0.864 0.343 0 1 7786 
Coastal Plain dummy 0.035 0.184 0 1 7786 
Plateau dummy 0.009 0.096 0 1 7786 
Hills dummy 0.023 0.151 0 1 7786 
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Valley dummy 0.015 0.122 0 1 7786 
Mountain dummy 0.037 0.189 0 1 7786 
Desert dummy 0.008 0.090 0 1 7786 
HH Bank Account dummy 0.108 0.310 0 1 7802 
Appendix 2.3b. Summary Statistics - Conflict and Cash Transfers: Community Level Analysis 
 Units Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N 
Dependent vars.       
Community excluded from CDCP - I Dummy (1= yes) 0.048 0.214 0 1 498 
Coverage Rate of CDCP – I  Continuous [0,1] 0.609 0.272 0 1 498 
Community excluded from BISP Dummy (1= yes) 0.259 0.438 0 1 498 
Coverage Rate of BISP Continuous [0,1] 0.153 0.151 0 0.688 498 
Independent Vars.       
Log (1+n) killings at tehsil level (Log killings) 1.110 1.763 0 6.480 498 
Instruments       
Nearest Distance to Afghanistan-Pakistan 
Border 
Degrees 
2.260 1.172 0.403 5.925 498 
Controls       
Share of HHs displaced in Flooding Continuous [0,1] 0.763 0.309 0 1 
498 
Flood Exposure Index continuous 2.184 0.946 0 3.424 498 
Urban dummy 0.092 0.290 0 1 498 
Share of female-headed HHs  Continuous [0,1] 0.094 0.098 0 0.600 498 
Share of Landless HHs in community Continuous [0,1] 0.668 0.244 0 1 498 
Share of Rentier landlord HHs  Continuous [0,1] 0.048 0.075 0 0.538 498 
Distance to District Capital degrees 0.333 0.472 0 1 499 
Distance to Province Capital degrees 0.449 0.281 0.013 1.944 498 
Index of Linguistic Fractionalisation Continuous [0,1] 2.385 1.313 0.011 5.915 498 
Community Infrastructure Index Count  0.218 0.231 0 0.742 498 
Community state presence index Count  5.611 2.256 0 12 498 
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Distance to nearest Army Cantonment degrees 4.932 4.527 0 32 498 
Inland Plain dummy 0.640 0.355 0.008 1.362 498 
Coastal Plain dummy 0.859 0.348 0 1 498 
Plateau dummy 0.034 0.182 0 1 498 
Hills dummy 0.010 0.100 0 1 498 
Valley dummy 0.026 0.160 0 1 498 
Mountain dummy 0.016 0.126 0 1 498 
Desert dummy 0.038 0.192 0 1 498 
Punjab dummy 0.008 0.089 0 1 498 
Sindh dummy 0.295 0.457 0 1 498 
Balochistan dummy 0.277 0.448 0 1 498 
KPK dummy 0.199 0.399 0 1 498 
At-risk district dummy 0.229 0.421 0 1 498 
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Appendix 2.4 Conflict and Remittances 
 Units Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N 
Dependent Variables       
Received Any Remittance Dummy (1 = yes) 0.119 0.324 0 1 7802 
Value of Remittances Received PKR 4951 24279 0 720000 7797 
Independent variable      7802 
Log (1+n) killings at tehsil level (Log killings) 1.104 1.762 0 6.480 7802 
Instruments      7802 
Nearest Distance to Afghanistan-
Pakistan Border 
Degrees 2.272 1.166 0.403 5.925 7802 
Controls      7802 
HH size count 6.515 3.177 1 48 7802 
Urban dummy 0.094 0.292 0 1 7802 
No. males with primary Education count 1.261 1.414 0 13 7802 
No. females with primary Education count 0.572 1.019 0 12 7802 
No. of family members above 14 count 3.582 1.960 1 29 7802 
Value of Livestock (pre-flood) PKR 81297 125600.5 0 700000 7799 
Age of HH Head years 44.566 14.367 15 98 7802 
Total No. of Male members in HH count 3.308 1.925 0 24 7802 
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Female Headed HH dummy 0.093 0.291 0 1 7802 
Landless HH dummy 0.670 0.470 0 1 7802 
Rentier Land Lord HH dummy 0.047 0.211 0 1 7802 
Farmland Owned Acres 1.7 7.87 0 200 7785 
HH owns non-agricultural enterprise dummy 0.185 0.388 0 1 7802 
HH has access to drainage  dummy 0.283 0.450 0 1 7802 
Flood Exposure Index Continuous  2.204 0.932 0 3.42 7802 
Flooding Anomaly Index Continuous [,] 0.000 1.379 -5.21 5.34 7802 
Social Capital Measure count 1.693 3.653 0 25 7802 
HH received CDCP – I transfer dummy 0.613 0.487 0 1 7802 
HH received BISP transfer dummy 0.154 0.361 0 1 7802 
Punjab dummy 0.298 0.457 0 1 7802 
Sindh dummy 0.280 0.449 0 1 7802 
Balochistan dummy 0.196 0.397 0 1 7802 
KPK dummy 0.226 0.418 0 1 7802 
Distance to District Capital degrees 0.452 0.281 0.01 1.94 7802 
Distance to Province Capital degrees 2.396 1.313 0.01 5.91 7802 
Index of Linguistic Fractionalisation Continuous [0,1] 0.217 0.230 0 0.74 7802 
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Community Infrastructure Index Count  5.593 2.245 0 12 7786 
Community state presence index Count  4.890 4.453 0 32 7786 
Distance to nearest Army Cantonment degrees 0.642 0.354 0.01 1.36 7802 
Inland Plain dummy 0.864 0.343 0 1 7786 
Coastal Plain dummy 0.035 0.184 0 1 7786 
Plateau dummy 0.009 0.096 0 1 7786 
Hills dummy 0.023 0.151 0 1 7786 
Valley dummy 0.015 0.122 0 1 7786 
Mountain dummy 0.037 0.189 0 1 7786 
Desert dummy 0.008 0.090 0 1 7786 
HH Bank Account dummy 0.108 0.310 0 1 7802 
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Appendix 2.5 Aid and Gun Acquisition 
 Units Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum N 
Dependent Variables       
HH Owns a gun Dummy (1 = Yes) 0.109 0.312 0 1 7113 
No response dummy 0.088 0.284 0 1 7802 
HH Acquired a gun after 2010 floods dummy 0.013 0.112 0 1 7802 
Treatment Variable       
HH received CDCP – I  dummy 0.61 0.49 0 1 7802 
Independent Variables       
HH size count 6.515 3.177 1 48 7802 
Urban dummy 0.094 0.292 0 1 7802 
No. males with primary Education count 1.261 1.414 0 13 7802 
No. females with primary Education count 0.572 1.019 0 12 7802 
No. of family members above 14 count 3.582 1.960 1 29 7802 
Value of Livestock (pre-flood) PKR 81297 125601 0 700000 7799 
Age of HH Head years 44.6 14.4 15 98 7802 
Total No. of Male members in HH count 3.308 1.925 0 24 7802 
Female Headed HH dummy 0.093 0.291 0 1 7802 
Landless HH dummy 0.670 0.470 0 1 7802 
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Land ownership > 0 & < 1.5 acres dummy 0.063 0.242 0 1 7802 
Land ownership > 1.5 & < 12.5 acres dummy 0.168 0.374 0 1 7802 
Land ownership 12.5 acres dummy 0.027 0.161 0 1 7802 
HH owns non-agricultural enterprise dummy 0.185 0.388 0 1 7802 
HH has access to drainage  dummy 0.283 0.450 0 1 7802 
Received Any Remittance dummy 0.119 0.324 0 1 7802 
Duration of displacement due to floods days 51.901 55.511 0 365 7695 
Distance to District Capital degrees 0.452 0.281 0.013 1.944 7802 
Distance to Province Capital degrees 2.396 1.313 0.011 5.915 7802 
Index of Linguistic Fractionalisation Continuous [0,1] 0.217 0.230 0 0.742 7802 
Community Infrastructure Index Count  5.593 2.245 0 12 7786 
Community state presence index Count  4.890 4.453 0 32 7786 
Distance to nearest Army Cantonment degrees 0.642 0.354 0.008 1.362 7802 
Inland Plain dummy 0.864 0.343 0 1 7786 
Coastal Plain dummy 0.035 0.184 0 1 7786 
Plateau dummy 0.009 0.096 0 1 7786 
Hills dummy 0.023 0.151 0 1 7786 
Valley dummy 0.015 0.122 0 1 7786 
Mountain dummy 0.037 0.189 0 1 7786 
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Desert dummy 0.008 0.090 0 1 7786 
Former princely state (dummy) dummy 0.056 0.230 0 1 7802 
Nation Building District – At risk of 
radicalisation 
dummy 0.337 0.473 0 1 7802 
Urdu dummy 0.068 0.252 0 1 7802 
Sindhi dummy 0.348 0.476 0 1 7802 
Pushto dummy 0.190 0.393 0 1 7802 
Balochi dummy 0.040 0.196 0 1 7802 
Hindko dummy 0.014 0.117 0 1 7802 
Saraiki dummy 0.216 0.411 0 1 7802 
Brahvi dummy 0.019 0.137 0 1 7802 
Other Language dummy 0.008 0.088 0 1 7802 
Distance to Afghanistan-Pakistan 
border 
degrees 2.272 1.166 0.403 5.925 7802 
Conflict-affected Tehsil dummy 0.393 0.488 0 1 7802 
KPK dummy 0.226 0.418 0 1 7802 
Sindh dummy 0.280 0.449 0 1 7802 
Balochistan dummy 0.196 0.397 0 1 7802 
N  7802     
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Appendix 2.6a Floods and Migration: Household-level variables: Summary Statistics  
 Units Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Dependent variables 
Anyone in HH migrated since 2010 floods dummy 0.59 0.49 0 1 7802 
Any HH migrant since 2010 floods returned 
home 
dummy 
0.57 0.49 0 1 7802 
Any HH migrant since 2010 floods still away 
from home 
dummy 
0.03 0.18 0 1 7802 
Controls 
Household size count 6.51 3.18 1 48 7802 
Urban dummy 0.09 0.29 0 1 7802 
No. males with primary Education count 1.26 1.41 0 13 7802 
No. females with primary Education count 0.57 1.02 0 12 7802 
No. males with secondary Education count 0.65 1.01 0 8 7802 
No. females with secondary Education count 0.19 0.58 0 7 7802 
No. of family members above 14 count 3.58 1.96 1 29 7802 
Value of Livestock (pre-flood) PKR 
                    81,297  
                    
125,601  
0        700,000  7799 
No. of rooms in the house count 1.60 1.18 0 9 7802 
Age of HH Head years 44.57 14.37 15 98 7802 
Total No. of Male members in HH count 3.31 1.93 0 24 7802 
Female Headed HH dummy 0.09 0.29 0 1 7802 
283 
 
Landless HH dummy 0.67 0.47 0 1 7802 
Rentier Land Lord HH dummy 0.05 0.21 0 1 7802 
HH owns non-agricultural enterprise dummy 0.19 0.39 0 1 7802 
Farmland owned Acres 1.67 7.87 0 200 7785 
HH still displaced by flood dummy 0.01 0.12 0 1 7802 
Social Capital Measure count 1.80 4.85 0 130 7802 
HH received CDCP – I  dummy 0.61 0.49 0 1 7802 
HH received BISP  dummy 0.15 0.36 0 1 7802 
 
Appendix 2.6b Floods and Migration: Individual-level Variables: Summary Statistics 
 Units Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Dependent variables       
Individual migrated after 2010 floods dummy 0.539 0.499 0 1 30697 
Migrant back home after migrating since 2010 
floods 
dummy 
0.983 0.129 0 1 16539 
Migrant still away from HH after migrating 
since 2010 floods 
dummy 
0.017 0.129 0 1 16539 
Migration Destination = Urban dummy 0.296 0.456 0 1 16539 
Migration Destination: within district dummy 0.526 0.499 0 1 16539 
Migration Destination: within province, outside 
district 
dummy 
0.365 0.481 0 1 16539 
Migration Destination: within Pakistan, outside dummy 0.106 0.307 0 1 16539 
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province 
Migration Destination: abroad dummy 0.002 0.042 0 1 16539 
Controls       
Age Years 33.1 16.7 13 96 30697 
Male dummy 0.498 0.500 0 1 30697 
Highest level of education completed: Primary  dummy 0.138 0.345 0 1 30697 
Highest level of education completed: Secondary dummy 0.160 0.366 0 1 30697 
Highest level of education completed: Tertiary/ 
Graduate 
dummy 
0.049 0.216 0 1 30697 
Highest level of education completed: 
Postgraduate 
dummy 
0.007 0.082 0 1 30697 
 
Appendix 2.6c Floods and Migration: Community-level variables – I: Summary Statistics 
 Units Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Explanatory Variables       
Flood Exposure Index continuous 2.184 0.946 0 3.424 498 
Flooding Anomaly Index continuous 0.001 1.384 -5.211 5.335 498 
Controls       
Prop. Adult males with primary Education in 
community 
continuous [0,1] 
0.077 0.083 0 0.5 499 
Prop. Adult females with primary Education in 
community 
continuous [0,1] 
0.149 0.114 0 0.710 498 
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Prop. Adult males with secondary Education in 
community 
continuous [0,1] 
0.066 0.095 0 0.429 499 
Prop. Adult females with secondary Education in 
community 
continuous [0,1] 
0.295 0.195 0 0.944 498 
Share of HHs with electricity continuous [0,1] 0.798 0.297 0 1 498 
Share of HHs with drainage continuous [0,1] 0.284 0.329 0 1 498 
Share of female-headed HHs in community continuous [0,1] 0.094 0.098 0 0.60 498 
Avg. no of rooms per HH in community count 1.604 0.444 0.875 4.25 498 
Share of non-Agricultural Enterprise owning 
HHs in community 
continuous [0,1] 
0.184 0.188 0 1 498 
Share of Landless HH in community continuous [0,1] 0.668 0.244 0 1 498 
Share of Rentier landlord HH in community continuous [0,1] 0.048 0.075 0 0.538 498 
Share of own-land cultivating HHs in community continuous [0,1] 0.284 0.235 0 1 498 
Share of Adult Males in community continuous [0,1] 0.503 0.047 0.294 0.614 498 
Average no. of social connections per HH outside 
community 
count 
1.829 2.045 0 16.438 498 
Index of Linguistic Fractionalisation continuous [0,1] 0.218 0.231 0 0.742 498 
Community state presence index count 2.054 1.309 0 6 497 
Community Infrastructure Index count 5.608 2.257 0 12 497 
Distance to Province Capital degrees 2.385 1.313 0.011 5.915 498 
Distance to District Capital degrees 0.449 0.281 0.013 1.944 498 
Inland Plain dummy 0.859 0.348 0 1 497 
Coastal Plain dummy 0.034 0.182 0 1 497 
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Plateau dummy 0.010 0.100 0 1 497 
Hills dummy 0.026 0.160 0 1 497 
Valley dummy 0.016 0.126 0 1 497 
Mountain dummy 0.038 0.192 0 1 497 
Desert dummy 0.008 0.089 0 1 497 
 
Appendix 2.6d Floods and Migration: Community-level averages of HH-level variables: Summary Statistics 
 Units Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Share of HHs with any Outstanding debt continuous [0,1] 0.814 0.142 0 1 498 
Share of HHs with Outstanding debt to bank/ 
formal financial institution 
continuous [0,1] 0.047 0.073 0 0.4 498 
Share of HHs with Outstanding debt to employer continuous [0,1] 0.041 0.091 0 0.688 498 
Share of HHs with Outstanding debt to micro-
lender 
continuous [0,1] 0.020 0.049 0 0.313 498 
Outstanding debt to money-lender continuous [0,1] 0.066 0.113 0 0.938 498 
Share of HHs with Outstanding debt to family/ 
friend 
continuous [0,1] 0.463 0.231 0 1 498 
Share of HHs with Outstanding debt to shop 
(goods on credit) 
continuous [0,1] 0.445 0.200 0 0.938 498 
Share of HHs with Outstanding debt to other 
lender 
continuous [0,1] 0.036 0.075 0 0.5 498 
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Average Total Debt (PKR) PKR 
               
49,893  
               28,595  0   173,867  499 
Average value of Formal Savings PKR 
                     
848  
                 3,085  0      33,713  499 
Informal Savings (PKR) PKR 
               
14,867  
               18,029  0   133,333  498 
Combined Savings (PKR) PKR 
               
15,407  
               18,902  0   141,571  498 
Share of HHs Receiving any remittance continuous [0,1] 0.1189 0.1218 0 0.6875 498 
Avg. Remittance Amount per HH (PKR) PKR                 4,636                   7,924  0 69,375 498 
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Appendix 3.1. IV Estimates of effect of Conflict on Access to Aid: Distance from 
nearest official border crossing as IV for conflict [log (1+n) killings at sub-district 
level] 
Table A3.1.1 Conflict instrumented by Distance to the nearest official border crossing on 
Afghan-Pakistan Border: IV First-Stage Results 
 Households as unit^ 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Distance to nearest official 
border crossing on Af-Pak 
border 
-0.671*** -0.272*** -0.191*** 
 (-63.85) (-14.28) (-9.97) 
Province dummies  no yes yes 
Controls no no yes 
    
N 7802 7802 7767 
    
Partial F-statistic 184.27 25.59 9.56 
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3432 0.4708 0.5647 
^Standard errors clustered at community level 
Table A3.1.2 Access to Aid: IV Probit Estimates – Marginal Effects 
 CDCP - I BISP 
Log (1+n) killings -0.530*** -0.562*** 
 (-3.12) (-4.28) 
Controls Y Y 
Province Dummies Y Y 
N 7767 7767 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.1.3 Access to Aid: Princely States Mechanism (IV Estimates) – Marginal 
Effects 
 CDCP BISP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log (1+n) killings -0.530*** -0.320* -0.562*** -0.501*** 
 (-3.12) (-1.68) (-4.28) (-3.73) 
     
Princely states 
dummy 
 -1.097***  -0.392** 
  (-4.62)  (-2.31) 
N 7767 7767 7767 7767 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A3.1.4 CDCP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates) – Marginal Effects 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female 
Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Log (1+n) 
killings 
-0.530*** -0.064 -0.175 -0.200 -0.074 
 (-3.12) (-0.30) (-0.06) (-0.98) (-0.22) 
N 7767 3313 3552 3576 3289 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.1.5 BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates) – Marginal Effects 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female 
Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Log (1+n) 
killings 
-0.562*** -0.421*** -0.790*** -0.347** -0.192 
 (-4.28) (-3.02) (-4.79) (-2.49) (-0.68) 
N 7767 3313 3552 3576 3289 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.1.6 CDCP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates) – Marginal Effects: Excluding Balochistan 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary 
Enrollment Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban likely 
not present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Taliban likely 
not present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings 0.195 0.297** -0.240 0.172 0.266 
 (1.53) (2.02) (-0.81) (1.15) (0.71) 
N 6246 2741 2872 2974 2639 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A3.1.7 BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates) – Marginal Effects: Excluding Balochistan 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary 
Enrollment Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban likely 
not present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Taliban likely 
not present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings -0.258** -0.181 -0.499** -0.096 -0.617** 
 (-2.35) (-1.60) (-2.00) (-0.89) (-2.51) 
N 6246 2741 2872 2974 2639 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.1.8 IV probit estimates of the total absence of CDCP – I and BISP in the 
community– Marginal Effects 
 CDCP - I BISP 
Log (1+n) killings 0.210* 0.702*** 
 (1.92) (5.93) 
N 497 497 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.1.9 IV Tobit estimates of the community-level rates of coverage: CDCP – I and 
BISP – Marginal Effects 
 CDCP - I BISP 
Log (1+n) killings -0.287** -0.213** 
 (-2.04) (-2.30) 
N 497 497 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Dependent variable censored between 0 and 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 3.2. IV Estimates of effect of Conflict on Access to Aid: Proportion of 
Pashtu speakers at community level as IV for conflict [log (1+n) killings at sub-
district level] 
 
Table A3.2.1 Conflict instrumented by proportion of Pashtu speakers: IV First-Stage 
Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Proportion of Pashtu 
speakers 
3.26*** 2.29*** 1.74*** 
 (89.27) (38.56) (24.08) 
    
Province dummies  no yes yes 
Controls no no yes 
    
N 7802 7802 7767 
Partial F-statistic 264.97 39.30 20.16 
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5053 0.5439 0.5899 
^Standard errors clustered at community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.2.2 Access to Aid: IV Probit Estimates – Marginal Effects 
 CDCP - I BISP 
Log (1+n) killings -0.222** -0.170** 
 (-2.26) (-2.10) 
Controls Y Y 
Province Dummies Y Y 
N 7767 7767 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.2.3 Access to Aid: Princely States Mechanism (IV Estimates) – Marginal 
Effects 
 CDCP BISP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log (1+n) killings -0.222** -0.216** -0.170** -0.168** 
 (-2.26) (-2.14) (-2.10) (-2.10) 
     
Princely states 
dummy 
 -1.104***  -0.370*** 
  (-5.19)  (-2.66) 
N 7767 7767 7767 7767 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A3.2.4 CDCP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates) – Marginal Effects 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female 
Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Log (1+n) 
killings 
-0.222** -0.037 -0.256* -0.077 -0.304* 
 (-2.26) (-0.30) (-1.92) (-0.64) (-1.92) 
N 7767 3313 3552 3576 3289 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.2.5 CDCP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates) – Marginal Effects: Excluding Balochistan 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female 
Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Log (1+n) 
killings 
-0.090 0.053 -0.200* 0.058 -0.320** 
 (-1.26) (0.54) (-1.92) (0.66) (-2.41) 
N 6246 2741 2872 2974 2639 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.2.6 BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates) – Marginal Effects 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female 
Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Log (1+n) 
killings 
-0.170** -0.181* -0.127 -0.249*** -0.027 
 (-2.10) (-1.85) (-1.13) (-2.62) (-0.20) 
N 7767 3313 3552 3576 3289 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A3.2.7 BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates) – Marginal Effects: Excluding Balochistan 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female 
Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Log (1+n) 
killings 
-0.170** -0.181* -0.127 -0.122* -0.051 
 (-2.10) (-1.85) (-1.13) (-1.70) (-0.48) 
N 7767 3313 3552 2974 2639 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.2.8 IV probit estimates of the total absence of CDCP – I and BISP in the 
community – Marginal Effects 
 CDCP - I BISP 
Log (1+n) killings 0.110*** 0.250 
 (2.95) (1.18) 
N 497 497 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.2.9 IV Tobit estimates of the community-level rates of coverage: CDCP – I and 
BISP – Marginal Effects 
 CDCP - I BISP 
Log (1+n) killings -0.091** -0.054** 
 (-2.25) (-1.98) 
N 497 497 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Dependent variable censored between 0 and 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 3.3. IV Estimates of effect of Conflict on Access to Aid: Nearest distance 
to Afghanistan-Pakistan border as IV for conflict [dummy for conflict-affected sub-
district - tehsil] 
Table A3.3.1 Conflict-affected sub-district instrumented by nearest distance to 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border: IV First-Stage Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Conflict-affected tehsil 
(dummy) 
-0.219*** -0.101*** -0.053*** 
 (-54.27) (-14.41) (-7.53) 
    
Province dummies  no yes yes 
Controls no no yes 
    
N 7802 7802 7767 
Partial F-statistic 315.38 20.12 4.87 
Prob. > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0278 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2740 0.3112 0.4355 
^Standard errors clustered at community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.3.2 Access to Aid: IV Probit Estimates – Marginal Effects 
 CDCP - I BISP 
Conflict-affected tehsil (dummy) -1.952*** -1.916*** 
 (-3.72) (-3.53) 
Controls Y Y 
Province Dummies Y Y 
N 7767 7767 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Table A3.3.3 Access to Aid: Princely States Mechanism (IV Estimates) – Marginal 
Effects 
 CDCP BISP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Conflict-affected 
tehsil (dummy) 
-1.952*** -1.196* -1.916*** -1.491*** 
 (-3.72) (-1.93) (-3.53) (-2.98) 
     
Princely states 
dummy 
 -1.232***  -0.632*** 
  (-4.27)  (-2.77) 
N 7767 7767 7767 7767 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A3.3.3 CDCP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates) 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female 
Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Conflict-affected 
tehsil (dummy) 
-1.952*** -0.215 -2.371*** -0.953 -0.828 
 (-3.72) (-0.25) (-5.56) (-1.18) (-0.49) 
N 7767 3313 3552 3576 3289 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table A3.3.4 BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates) 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female 
Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Conflict-affected 
tehsil (dummy) 
-1.916*** -1.383*** -2.172*** -1.224** -2.443*** 
 (-3.53) (-2.60) (-2.99) (-2.12) (-3.76) 
N 7767 3313 3552 3576 3289 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.3.5 CDCP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates): Excluding Balochistan 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female 
Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Conflict-affected 
tehsil (dummy) 
0.353 1.077** -0.898 0.565 0.108 
 (0.86) (2.11) (-1.62) (1.00) (0.15) 
N 6246 2741 2872 2974 2639 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A3.3.6 BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates): Excluding Balochistan 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female 
Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
Residuals of Primary 
Enrollment Gender Gap 
Estimation 
  Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Taliban 
likely not 
present 
Taliban 
likely 
present 
Conflict-affected 
tehsil (dummy) 
-0.669** -0.653 -0.893 -0.199 -1.219** 
 (-2.00) (-1.59) (-1.57) (-0.49) (-2.03) 
N 6246 2741 2872 2974 2639 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.3.5 IV probit estimates of the total absence of CDCP – I and BISP in the 
community 
 CDCP - I BISP 
Conflict-affected Tehsil (dummy) 0.944 2.457*** 
 (1.54) (7.38) 
N 497 497 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.3.6 IV Tobit estimates of the community-level rates of coverage: CDCP – I and 
BISP  
 CDCP - I BISP 
Conflict-affected Tehsil (dummy) -1.272 -0.847* 
 (-1.55) (-1.75) 
N 497 497 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Dependent variable censored between 0 and 1 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 3.4. Estimation of Community-level Female Primary School Enrolment 
and Primary Schooling Gender Gap (M – F) rates 
 
 Community-level rate of 
female primary enrollment 
Community-level gender gap 
in primary enrollment (M – F) 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Urban -0.139 -1.50 0.025 0.26 
Prop: Adult Females with Primary 
Education 
0.426* 1.93 -0.028 -0.12 
Prop: Adult Males with Primary 
Education 
0.142 0.79 0.143 0.74 
Prop: Adult Females with Secondary 
Education 
0.093 0.38 -0.401 -1.54 
Prop: Adult Males with Secondary 
Education 
0.319* 1.92 0.262 1.46 
Average Monthly Per-Capita Adult-
equivalent expenditure 
0.000*** 2.69 -0.000 -1.14 
Prop: Households Still Displaced by 
flood 
0.076 0.31 0.203 0.78 
Prop: Punjabi 0.176 1.16 0.155 0.95 
Prop: Sindhi -0.006 -0.04 0.270* 1.74 
Prop: Pushtu 0.037 0.27 0.148 0.97 
Prop: Balochi 0.000 . 0.000 . 
Prop: Urdu 0.158 1.03 0.049 0.30 
Prop: Brahvi -0.272 -1.48 0.355* 1.79 
Prop: Hindko 0.132 0.56 0.062 0.24 
Prop: Saraiki 0.186 1.29 0.040 0.26 
Prop: Other Languages -0.130 -0.35 0.048 0.12 
Prop. Households receiving 
remittances 
0.083 0.70 0.152 1.19 
Prop. Households with electricity 0.190*** 3.98 -0.025 -0.48 
Prop: Female-headed Households 0.184 1.24 -0.340** -2.13 
Average no. of rooms per household 0.032 1.02 -0.030 -0.89 
Prop: Households owning non-
agricultural enterprise 
0.118 1.49 0.079 0.93 
Prop: landless Households -0.030 -0.53 0.004 0.06 
Prop: Landlord households (letting it 
out) 
-0.062 -0.36 0.115 0.63 
Average share of household 
members > 15 who have attended 
school 
0.471 1.57 -0.455 -1.42 
Average adult sex ratio of the 
household 
-0.057 -0.20 -0.244 -0.79 
Punjab 0.000 . 0.000 . 
Sindh 0.004 0.04 -0.200** -2.10 
Balochistan -0.140* -1.82 0.023 0.28 
Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa -0.067 -0.76 -0.076 -0.80 
Distance to province capital -0.038** -2.05 0.000 0.02 
Distance to district capital 0.038 0.93 -0.088** -1.99 
Index of presence of state institutions 0.018 1.46 0.010 0.69 
Index of Community infrastructure -0.005 -0.58 0.003 0.33 
Index of linguistic fractionalisation -0.039 -0.49 0.057 0.66 
Former princely states dummy 0.103 1.54 -0.060 -0.84 
Govt. girls primary school present in 
community 
0.008 0.26 0.037 1.10 
Govt. co-ed primary school present 0.037 1.17 0.006 0.17 
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in community 
Pvt. girls primary school present in 
community 
-0.000 -0.03 0.017 1.18 
Pvt. co-ed primary school present in 
community 
0.011** 2.17 0.002 0.46 
Govt. boys primary school present in 
community 
  -0.059 -1.60 
Pvt. boys primary school present in 
community 
  -0.025 -1.46 
Constant -0.205 -0.81 0.388 1.44 
N 439  439  
R2 0.519  0.124  
adj. R2 0.475  0.039  
F 11.62  1.45  
Prob. F > 0  0.0000  0.0434  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 3.5. Sub-samples based on residuals of the community-level gender gap 
in primary schooling  
I also examine residuals from the estimation of the community-level gender gap in 
primary schooling (simply measured as the difference in the shares of primary school 
age boys and girls enrolled in school at the community level) to proxy the likelihood of 
non-state armed group control.  
The underlying assumption is that after controlling for all plausible demand and supply-
side factors that determine the gender-gap in primary schooling at the community 
level86, the presence of Taliban-affiliate groups would increase the gender gap. As in the 
case with female primary enrolment above, I divide the sample into two sub-samples: 
(i) areas less likely to have the control of armed groups, with the residual 𝑣𝑐 < 0 87, and 
(ii) areas more likely to have armed non-state groups’ control, with positive residuals, 𝑣𝑐 
> 0. 
Table A3.5.1 CDCP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed Groups 
(IV estimates) based on Primary Schooling Gender Gap Residuals 
 Full Sample Residuals of Primary Enrollment Gender 
Gap Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings -0.512*** -0.262 -0.775*** 
 (-3.60) (-1.21) (-4.13) 
N 7767 3576 3289 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.5.2 BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV Estimates) based on Primary Schooling Gender Gap Residuals  
 Full Sample Residuals of Primary Enrollment Gender 
Gap Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings -0.444*** -0.353** -0.758*** 
 (-3.54) (-2.46) (-3.83) 
N 7767 3576 3289 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
                                                          
86 Including adult female educational attainment that controls for attitudinal drivers of the gender bias in 
primary schooling 
87 As Taliban control/ presence would, ceteris paribus, increase the gender gap, in this case positive 
residuals indicate the presence of such groups. In the case of female primary enrolment rates, the presence 
of armed non state groups reduced the value of the dependant variable.  
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Table A3.5.3 CDCP - I Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed 
Groups (IV estimates) based on Primary Schooling Gender Gap Residuals: Excluding Balochistan  
 Full Sample Residuals of Primary Enrollment Gender 
Gap Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely not 
present 
Log (1+n) killings 0.110 0.169 0.053 
 (0.89) (0.99) (0.17) 
N 6246 2974 2639 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.5.4 BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed Groups 
(IV estimates) based on Primary Schooling Gender Gap Residuals: Excluding Balochistan  
 Full Sample Residuals of Primary Enrollment Gender 
Gap Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings -0.201** -0.063 -0.481** 
 (-2.05) (-0.52) (-2.29) 
N 6246 2974 2639 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 3.6. IV probit coefficients from alternate sub-samples: Checking if likely/ 
less likely Taliban presence (based on Appendix 3.4) is a chance division  
1. CDCP – Phase 1 (all 4 provinces) 
Table A3.6.1 CDCP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed Groups 
(IV estimates) based on Primary Female Enrolment Residuals 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings -0.512*** -0.064 -0.760*** 
 (-3.60) (-0.27) (-6.03) 
N 7767 3313 3552 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Fig. A3.6.1 Distribution of IV probit coefficients of the effect of conflict on likelihood of 
receiving CDCP-I transfers from 1000 random combinations of communities into two 
sub-samples 
 
Table A3.6.2 Results from repeated random selection of communities into sub-samples 
 No. of Instances (out of 1000) Percentage 
f   <  -0.760 48 4.8% 
f’  <  -0.760 40 4% 
   
0
1
2
3
-.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2-0.760 -0.512 -0.064
x
f f'
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f   >   -0.064 2 0.2% 
f’  >   -0.064 3 0.3% 
   
f   <   -0.760 and f’  >    -0.064 0 0.3% 
f’  <   -0.760 and f  >    -0.064 0 0.1% 
 
2. BISP (all 4 provinces) – based on Linear Probability Model coefficients using the 
ivreg command in STATA 
Table A3.6.3 BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed Groups 
(IV LPM estimates) based on Primary Female Enrolment Residuals 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings -0.101** -0.084** -0.178 
 (-2.24) (-2.01) (-1.36) 
N 7767 3313 3552 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Fig. A3.6.2 Distribution of IV probit coefficients of the effect of conflict on likelihood of 
receiving BISP transfers from 1000 random combinations of communities into two sub-
samples 
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Table A3.6.4 Results from repeated random selection of communities into sub-samples 
 No. of Instances (out of 1000) Percentage 
f   <  -0.178 113 11.3% 
f’  <  -0.178 116 11.6% 
   
f   >   -0.084 345 34.5% 
f’  >   -0.084 365 36.5% 
   
f   <   -0.178 and f’  >    -0.084 105 10.5% 
f’  <   -0.178 and f  >    -0.084 112 11.2% 
 
3. CDCP – Phase 1 (excluding Balochistan) – based on Linear Probability Model 
coefficients using the ivreg command in STATA 
Table A3.6.5 CDCP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed Groups 
(IV probit estimates) based on Primary Female Enrolment Residuals: Excluding Balochistan 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings 0.043 0.118* -0.113 
 (1.02) (1.87) (-1.32) 
N 6246 2741 2872 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Fig. A3.6.3 Distribution of IV probit coefficients of the effect of conflict on likelihood of 
receiving CDCP-I transfers from 1000 random combinations of communities into two 
sub-samples (excluding Balochistan). 
 
Table A3.6.6 Results from repeated random selection of communities into sub-samples 
 No. of Instances (out of 1000) Percentage 
f   <  -0.113 0 0% 
f’  <  -0.113 0 0% 
   
f   >   0.118   65 6.5% 
f’  >   0.118 78 7.8% 
   
f   <   -0.113 and f’  >    0.118 0 0% 
f’  <   -0.113 and f  >    0.118 0 0 % 
 
4. BISP (excluding Balochistan) – based on Linear Probability Model coefficients 
using the ivreg command in STATA 
Here I present results from an IV regression estimation as the IV probit estimation failed 
to converge in several of the 1000 combinations of the sample based on a random 
grouping of communities into the two sub-samples. For comparison I provide IV 
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regression coefficients for the effect of conflict on BISP receipts for the full sample, 
excluding Balochistan and the sub-samples with more/ less likely Taliban presence.  
 
Table A3.6.7 BISP Receipts and Conflict: Linked through the Likely Presence of Armed Groups 
(IV regression estimates) based on Primary Female Enrolment Residuals: Excluding Balochistan 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
  Taliban likely not 
present 
Taliban likely 
present 
Log (1+n) killings -0.045 -0.039 -0.081 
 (-1.64) (-1.26) (-1.22) 
N 6246 2741 2872 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Fig. A3.6.4 Distribution of IV regression coefficients of the effect of conflict on 
likelihood of receiving BISP transfers from 1000 random combinations of communities 
into two sub-samples (excluding Balochistan) 
 
Table A3.6.8 Results from repeated random selection of communities into sub-samples 
 No. of Instances (out of 1000) Percentage 
f   <  -0.081 161 16.1% 
f’  <  -0.081 126 12.6% 
   
f   >   -0.039 417 41.7% 
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f’  >   -0.039 379 37.9% 
   
f   <   -0.081 and f’  >    -0.039 159 15.9% 
f’  <   -0.081 and f  >    -0.039 124 12.4% 
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Appendix 3.7. Conflict and Eligibility for BISP and CDCP – I 
 
Table A3.7.1 Effect of Conflict on Alternate Indicators of BISP Eligibility (IV Estimate) 
 Female-
Headed 
Household 
Female-
Headed 
Household 
Landless 
HH 
Landless 
HH 
with 
Female 
Head 
No. of 
Rooms 
in the 
House 
Proportion 
of HH 
members 
aged 0 - 12 
Value of 
(pre-
flood) 
Livestock  
  (without 
remittance) 
     
Conflict-
affected 
Tehsil 
0.090 0.080 0.062 0.076 1.355*** -0.031 15033.840 
 (1.26) (1.29) (0.30) (1.21) (2.79) (-1.03) (0.18) 
        
Log 
(1+n) 
killings 
0.023 0.021 0.016 0.020 0.349*** -0.008 3874.849 
 (1.24) (1.32) (0.30) (1.22) (3.29) (-1.06) (0.18) 
N 7802 7802 7802 7802 7802 7802 7802 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.7.2 Effect of Conflict on Alternate Indicators of CDCP I Eligibility in KPK, 
incl. District Dummies (IV Estimate) 
 HH Damage 
Index 
HH Flood 
Exposure 
HH Displaced 
due to flooding 
Duration of 
Displacement 
due to flooding  
     
Log (1+n) killings 0.060 0.109 0.056* -2.425 
 (1.34) (1.16) (1.75) (-0.37) 
N 1764 1764 1764 1764 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3.7.3 Effect of Conflict on village-level eligibility for CDCP - Excluding KPK (IV 
Estimate) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Log (1+n) killings -6.852 -0.948 -1.683 -559.292 
 (-0.25) (-0.22) (-0.25) (-0.24) 
N 384 384 384 384 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 4.1. Estimates of effect of Conflict on Access to Remittances: 
Distance from nearest official border crossing as IV for conflict [log (1+n) 
killings at sub-district level] 
 
Table A4.1.1 Effect of Conflict on likelihood of receiving remittances: Probit and 
IV probit estimates 
 Probit Estimates IV Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log (n+1) 
killings at 
tehsil level 
0.009*** -0.005 -0.003 -0.006* 0.154*** -0.220** -0.344** -0.488*** 
 (3.15) (-1.64) (-0.90) (-1.88) (6.18) (-2.02) (-2.00) (-3.38) 
Province 
Dummies  
 Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Community 
Controls 
  Y Y   Y Y 
HH 
Controls 
   Y    Y 
N 7802 7802 7786 7767 7802 7802 7786 7767 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Community Controls: Urban/ Rural, topography, distance from administrative headquarters, intra-
community linguistic fractionalization, community-level presence of infrastructure and state institutions 
Household controls: Household size, Age of head, members’ education levels, Farmland ownership, pre-
flood livestock value, number of males, number of members over 14, household main occupation and 
enterprise ownership, female-headed (dummy), Flood-Exposure Index, Flooding Anomaly Index, No. of 
Contacts outside village (Social Connectedness), Received state transfers through CDCP – I and BISP 
programmes (dummies) 
 
Table A4.1.2 Effect of Conflict on Amount of remittances received (in PKR): Tobit and 
IV Tobit estimates 
 Tobit Estimates IV Tobit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log (n+1) 
killings at 
tehsil level 
5354*** -2171 -1837 -3195* 17555*** -11223 -
117656*** 
-38496** 
 (3.22) (-1.17) (-0.87) (-1.89) (5.56) (-1.01) (-10.53) (-2.11) 
Province 
Dummies  
 Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Community 
Controls 
  Y Y   Y Y 
HH 
Controls 
   Y    Y 
N 7796 7796 7780 7761 7796 7796 7780 7761 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table A4.1.1 
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Table A4.1.3 Effects of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Remittance 
Receipts 
 Received Any Remittance Amount of Remittances 
Received 
 (IV Probit estimate) (IV Tobit estimate) 
Log (n+1) killings at tehsil level -0.488*** -38496** 
 (-3.38) (-2.11) 
   
Flooding Exposure Index -0.020 -3640.875 
 (-0.41) (-0.84) 
   
Flooding Anomaly Index 0.189*** 15545.088*** 
 (3.80) (2.62) 
N 7767 7761 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table A4.1.1 
 
Table A4.1.4 Formal/ Informal Modes of Money Transfer as a Mechanism  
 Any remittance – IV probit estimate Remittance Amount – IV tobit 
estimate 
 Full 
Sample 
No HH 
Bank A/c 
HH has 
Bank A/c 
Full 
Sample 
No HH 
Bank A/c 
HH has 
Bank A/c 
Log (n+1) 
killings at 
tehsil level 
-0.488*** -0.525*** 0.185 -38496** -42500** 28673.905 
 (-3.38) (-3.83) (0.31) (-2.11) (-2.30) (0.43) 
N 7767 6931 817 7761 6925 836 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table A4.1.1 
 
Table A4.1.5 Likely presence of TTP (affiliates) as a Mechanism linking Violent Conflict 
and the Likelihood of Receiving Any Remittances 
 Full sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
  TTP likely present TTP likely not 
present 
Log (n+1) killings at tehsil 
level 
-0.488*** -0.766*** -0.216 
 (-3.38) (-3.76) (-1.36) 
N 7767 3552 4215 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Controls as in Table A4.1.1 
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Table A4.1.6 Likely presence of TTP (affiliates) as a Mechanism linking Violent Conflict 
and the Amount of Remittances Received 
 Full Sample Residuals of Female Primary Enrollment 
Estimation 
 TTP likely present TTP likely not 
present 
Log (n+1) killings at tehsil 
level 
-38496** 67668 -12871 
 (-2.11) (0.87) (-0.83) 
N 7761 3547 4214 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Controls as in Table A4.1.1 
 
Table A4.1.7 IV estimate of Effect of Violent Conflict on likelihood of receiving any 
Remittances across Formal Bank Account Access and Likely presence of TTP 
 TTP likely present TTP likely not present 
 No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
Log (n+1) killings at 
tehsil level 
-0.760*** -0.233 -0.289* 0.629** 
 (-4.12) (-0.07) (-1.77) (2.45) 
N 3203 338 3728 466 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table A4.1.1 
 
Table A4.1.8 IV estimate of Effect of Violent Conflict on Amount of Remittances across 
Formal Bank Account Access and Likely presence of TTP 
 TTP likely present TTP likely not present 
 No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
Log (n+1) killings at 
tehsil level 
-76796 -34489 -21570 92717 
 (-1.20) (-0.09) (-1.32) (1.41) 
N 3198 349 3727 487 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table A4.1.1 
 
Table A4.1.9 Effect of Conflict on Likelihood of Any Remittance Receipt: Across Food 
Consumption Expenditure Quintiles 
 Full 
Sample 
Monthly per Adult-equivalent Food Consumption Expenditure 
Quintiles 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Log (n+1) 
killings at 
tehsil level 
-0.488*** 0.664** -0.701*** -0.652*** -0.195 -0.502*** 
 (-3.38) (2.45) (-4.12) (-4.29) (-0.58) (-3.50) 
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N 7767 1542 1558 1540 1550 1543 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table A4.1.1 
 
 
Table A4.1.10 Effect of Conflict on Amount of Remittances Received: Across Food 
Consumption Expenditure Quintiles 
 Full 
Sample 
Monthly per Adult-equivalent Food Consumption Expenditure 
Quintiles 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Log (n+1) 
killings at 
tehsil level 
-38496** 97156 -76435 -67774** -15423 -40551** 
 (-2.11) (1.17) (-1.49) (-2.10) (-0.49) (-2.01) 
N 7761 1553 1556 1551 1549 1552 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table A4.1.1 
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Appendix 4.2. Sub-samples based on residuals of the community-level gender gap 
in primary schooling  
I also examine residuals from the estimation of the community-level gender gap in 
primary schooling (simply measured as the difference in the shares of primary school 
age boys and girls enrolled in school at the community level) to proxy the likelihood of 
non-state armed group control.  
The underlying assumption is that after controlling for all plausible demand and supply-
side factors that determine the gender-gap in primary schooling at the community 
level88, the presence of Taliban-affiliate groups would increase the gender gap. As in the 
case with female primary enrolment above, I divide the sample into two sub-samples: 
(i) areas less likely to have the control of armed groups, with the residual 𝑣𝑐 < 0 89, and 
(ii) areas more likely to have armed non-state groups’ control, with positive residuals, 𝑣𝑐 
> 0. 
Table A4.2.1. Likely presence of TTP (affiliates) as a Mechanism linking Violent Conflict 
and the Likelihood of Receiving Any Remittances 
 Full sample Residuals of Primary Enrollment Gender 
Gap Estimation 
  TTP likely present TTP likely not 
present 
Log (n+1) killings at tehsil 
level 
-0.431*** -0.528*** -0.339** 
 (-3.37) (-2.58) (-2.21) 
N 7767 4191 3576 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A4.2.2. Likely presence of TTP (affiliates) as a Mechanism linking Violent Conflict 
and the Amount of Remittances Received 
 Full Sample Residuals of Primary Enrollment Gender 
Gap Estimation 
 TTP likely present TTP likely not 
present 
Log (n+1) killings at tehsil 
level 
-31,298** -33529 -26982 
 (-2.19) (-1.44) (-1.63) 
N 7761 4188 3573 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A4.2.3 IV estimate of Effect of Violent Conflict on likelihood of receiving any 
                                                          
88 Including adult female educational attainment that controls for attitudinal drivers of the gender bias in 
primary schooling 
89 As Taliban control/ presence would, ceteris paribus, increase the gender gap, in this case positive 
residuals indicate the presence of such groups. In the case of female primary enrolment rates, the presence 
of armed non state groups reduced the value of the dependant variable.  
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Remittances across Formal Bank Account Access and Likely presence of TTP 
 TTP likely present TTP likely not present 
 No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
Log (n+1) killings at 
tehsil level 
-0.538*** -0.107 -0.400*** 0.221 
 (-2.71) (-0.07) (-2.65) (0.56) 
N 3699 475 3232 340 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table A4.1.1 
 
Table A4.2.4 IV estimate of Effect of Violent Conflict on Amount of Remittances across 
Formal Bank Account Access and Likely presence of TTP 
 TTP likely present TTP likely not present 
 No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
No HH Bank 
Account 
HH has Bank 
Account 
Log (n+1) killings at 
tehsil level 
-31767 17073 -34704** 13231 
 (-1.47) (0.08) (-2.00) (0.32) 
N 3696 492 3229 344 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
Controls as in Table A4.1.1 
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Appendix 5.1. Household and Community correlates of Non-Response on 
Household Gun Ownership: Probit estimates 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient z Coefficient z 
Household Size 0.010*** 3.84 0.009*** 3.66 
Urban -0.008 -0.31 -0.002 -0.07 
No. of males with primary Education 0.011*** 2.62 0.012*** 2.77 
No. of females with primary 
Education 
-0.007 -1.59 -0.008* -1.75 
No. of HH members above 14 0.001 0.21 0.000 0.12 
Value of livestock before floods 
(PKR) 
-0.000 -0.05 0.000 0.40 
Age of HH Head -0.000* -1.69 -0.000* -1.76 
Total number of Male members in 
HH 
-0.015*** -3.51 -0.015*** -3.49 
Female headed HH (dummy) -0.016 -1.23 -0.016 -1.24 
Landless HH (dummy) 0.001 0.04 0.001 0.09 
Marginal farmer (<1.5 acres of land) -0.035 -1.59 -0.038* -1.67 
Medium Farmer (1.5 – 12.5 acres of 
land) 
0.004 0.22 0.004 0.21 
Large farmer (12.5 acres of land) 0.024 0.67 0.021 0.62 
HH owns non-agricultural enterprise -0.003 -0.28 -0.004 -0.34 
HH has access to drainage 0.030** 2.22 0.032** 2.43 
HH received remittance 0.022** 2.13 0.021** 2.08 
Days spent in flood relief camp 
(displaced) 
0.000 0.43 0.000 1.04 
Distance from District Capital 0.006 0.09 0.023 0.35 
Distance from Province Capital -0.028 -0.98 -0.008 -0.26 
Index of Linguistic Fractionalisation 
(community) 
-0.076 -1.10 -0.070 -1.09 
Index of community-level 
infrastructure 
-0.004 -0.43 -0.001 -0.15 
Index of presence of state institutions 
at community levels  
-0.001 -0.23 -0.000 -0.18 
Distance from nearest Army 
Cantonment 
0.109 0.96 0.034 0.29 
Topography: Inland Plain -0.057 -1.08 -0.047 -0.89 
Topography: Coastal Plain 0.000 . 0.000 . 
Topography: Plateau -0.232*** -3.00 -0.216*** -2.64 
Topography: Hills -0.047 -0.75 -0.025 -0.41 
Topography: Valley -0.093 -1.25 -0.067 -0.91 
Topography: Mountain -0.034 -0.45 0.004 0.06 
Topography: Desert 0.000 . 0.000 . 
Former princely state (dummy) -0.094 -1.16 -0.072 -0.99 
Nation Building District – At risk of 
radicalisation 
0.409*** 8.24 0.458*** 8.31 
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Urdu 0.026 0.45 0.020 0.34 
Sindhi 0.695*** 10.87 0.672*** 9.86 
Pushto 0.093 1.64 0.061 0.99 
Hindko 0.025 0.34 0.008 0.12 
Saraiki -0.006 -0.11 -0.009 -0.16 
KPK 0.576*** 11.62 0.556*** 13.97 
Balochistan -0.360*** -5.36 -0.230* -1.82 
Conflict-affected sub-district 
(dummy) 
0.034 1.18   
Nearest distance to Afghanistan- 
Pakistan border 
  -0.089* -1.81 
N 4854  4854  
pseudo R2 0.4815  0.4851  
Marginal effects; t statistics in second column 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
316 
 
Appendix 5.2: Correlates of the community-level share of households that own 
guns  
Table A.5.2. Correlates of the community-level share of gun-owning households: Tobit 
Estimates 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Urban 0.012 0.34 0.004 0.09 
Share of female-headed HHs 0.068 0.64 0.092 0.82 
Share of landless HHs  0.041 0.56 0.038 0.51 
Share of HHS with land owning > 1.5 acres 0.254*** 2.85 0.262*** 2.80 
Share of HHs that receive remittances 0.061 0.63 0.022 0.22 
Distance from District Capital -0.015 -0.46 -0.029 -0.81 
Distance from Province Capital -0.003 -0.23 0.013 0.98 
Index of Linguistic Fractionalisation  -0.003 -0.06 -0.032 -0.69 
Index of community-level infrastructure 0.001 0.13 0.003 0.55 
Index of presence of state institutions at 
community level 
0.003 1.21 0.004 1.36 
Distance from nearest Army Cantonment 0.033 0.88 0.042 1.09 
Topography: Inland Plain 0.078 0.66 0.079 0.63 
Topography: Coastal Plain 0.031 0.25 0.047 0.34 
Topography: Plateau 0.261* 1.80 0.274* 1.78 
Topography: Hills 0.192 1.49 0.234* 1.70 
Topography: Valley 0.392*** 2.95 0.409*** 2.87 
Topography: Mountain 0.273** 2.17 0.293** 2.18 
Topography: Desert 0.098 0.64 0.037 0.23 
Nation Building District – At risk of 
radicalisation 
0.067** 2.40 0.018 0.67 
Former princely state (dummy) 0.026 0.63 0.067 1.59 
Nearest distance to Af-Pak border -0.080*** -5.29   
Conflict-affected tehsil (dummy)   0.019 0.77 
Punjab 0.138** 2.44 0.047 0.84 
Sindh 0.391*** 6.71 0.210*** 4.43 
Balochistan 0.467*** 9.55 0.372*** 8.04 
Constant -0.272* -1.80 -0.404** -2.49 
N 494  494  
pseudo R2 0.8576  0.7852  
Marginal effects; t statistics in second column 
 (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
230 observations censored at mean_gun < 0  
1 observation censored at mean_gun > 1 
263 uncensored observations 
3 observations dropped due to non-response  
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Appendix 5.3. Robustness check: Alternate estimation of Covariate Balanced 
Propensity Score among households with > 1.5 acres of land and who did not own 
guns before the 2010 floods 
Table A.5.3.1 Estimation of Covariate Balanced Propensity Score Matching for CDCP – I 
Receipts. Probit Model Results. (Only households with > 1.5 acres of land and who did 
not own guns before the 2010 floods) 
Independent Variables Coefficient z 
 0.012 1.16 
Flood Exposure Index (HH) 0.158*** 4.32 
Rural 0.122 0.43 
HH has Bank Account -0.099 -0.85 
Number of Rooms in the House -0.053 -1.50 
Acres of farmland owned 0.004 1.03 
HH size 0.007 0.54 
Age of head of Household 0.014*** 4.78 
Livestock Value in PKR (pre Flood) -0.000 -0.90 
No. of males who can read in the HH 0.159*** 4.01 
No. of females who can read in the HH -0.009 -0.18 
HH social capital measure -0.002 -0.36 
KPK 0.457*** 2.80 
Sindh 0.709*** 6.52 
Balochistan 0.016 0.15 
Constant -0.900*** -2.63 
Number of observations 1193  
LR Chi-squared (37) 
131.24 
 
Prob. > Chi-sq. 
0.0000 
 
Pseudo R-squared 
0.090 
 
Details of Propensity Score 
 
 
Sum of Weight 
1193 
 
Mean 
0.698 
 
Std. Dev. 
0.149 
 
Variance 
0.022 
 
Skewness 
-0.296 
 
Kurtosis 
2.388 
 
 
The Covariate Balanced Propensity Score was calculated using the ‘pscore’ command in 
STATA 13 software. This resulted in creating an optimal 6 blocks; the CBPS ensures that 
the balancing property of the Propensity Score is satisfied in every block. Table 4 below 
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shows the inferior bound, and the number of treated and the number of controls in each 
block.  
Table A3.2 Nos. of Controls/ Treated in each Block for PSM 
Inferior of Block of Propensity 
Score 
Non-recipients 
(Control) 
Recipients 
(Treated) 
Tota
l 
0 1 0 1 
0.2 19 10 29 
0.4 141 169 310 
0.6 158 343 501 
0.8 36 212 248 
0.9 6 98 104 
Total 361 832 1,193 
 
I use nearest neighbour matching, matching each treatment observation with the five 
control observations that have the closest propensity score as per the procedure outlined 
in Quisumbing et al. (2011). Figure A3.1 below depicts the kernel density of propensity 
scores for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, indicating considerable overlap and 
common support between the two to enable meaningful matching across the parameters 
listed above.  
Figure A3.1. Kernel Density of Propensity Scores by Treatment Status (Only households 
with > 1.5 acres of land and who did not own guns before the 2010 floods) 
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Appendix 5.4 – Differences (on observable characteristics) between Households 
that acquired guns before and after the 2010 floods  
 Mean Difference (HHs that 
owned guns before 2010 floods – 
HHs that acquired them after) 
t 
   
No. of males with primary Education 0.00326 (0.01) 
No. of females with primary Education 0.00939 (0.29) 
No. of HH members above 14 -0.261 (-1.51) 
Value of livestock before floods (PKR) -0.145 (-1.19) 
Age of HH Head 0.0631 (0.28) 
Total number of Male members in HH -10372.0 (-0.58) 
Female headed HH (dummy) 1.360 (0.96) 
Landless HH (dummy) -0.0370 (-0.17) 
Marginal farmer (<1.5 acres of land) 0.0198 (0.87) 
Medium Farmer (1.5 – 12.5 acres of land) -0.0547 (-1.02) 
Large farmer (12.5 acres of land) 0.00952 (0.46) 
HH owns non-agricultural enterprise 0.0563 (1.19) 
HH has access to drainage 0.0123 (0.38) 
HH received remittance 0.0180 (0.40) 
Days spent in flood relief camp (displaced) -0.0212 (-0.47) 
Distance from District Capital 0.00451 (0.16) 
Distance from Province Capital -0.705 (-0.10) 
Index of Linguistic Fractionalisation  -0.0891*** (-2.62) 
Index of community-level infrastructure 0.0713 (0.71) 
Index of presence of state institutions at 
community level 
0.0516** (2.06) 
Distance from nearest Army Cantonment -0.239 (-1.05) 
Topography: Inland Plain -0.199 (-0.47) 
Topography: Coastal Plain 0.0375 (1.11) 
Topography: Plateau 0.0106 (0.23) 
Topography: Hills 0.000447 (0.03) 
Topography: Valley -0.0360*** (-3.56) 
Topography: Mountain 0.0125 (0.58) 
Topography: Desert -0.00206 (-0.10) 
Former princely state (dummy) 0.0101 (0.28) 
Nation Building District – At risk of 
radicalization 
0.00295 (0.54) 
Urdu  0.0130 (0.36) 
Sindhi 0.105** (2.54) 
Pushto 0.00554 (0.23) 
Balochi -0.0733 (-1.38) 
Hindko -0.0202 (-0.55) 
Saraiki -0.0444 (-1.15) 
Brahvi 0.0177 (1.33) 
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Other Language 0.0690** (2.05) 
KPK 0.0171 (0.70) 
Sindh 0.0310* (1.78) 
Balochistan 0.0387 (1.13) 
No. of males with primary Education 0.0447 (0.95) 
No. of females with primary Education -0.0599 (-1.13) 
No. of HH members above 14 -0.0235 (-1.00) 
HH received BISP Transfer -0.0379 (-1.09) 
HH received CDCP – I transfer -0.00849 (-0.16) 
N 777  
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 6.1. Causal Effects of Flood Exposure Index (Linear transformation) on 
Household and Individual Migration 
 
Table A6.1.1 Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Household Migration: Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index (linear) 
0.025*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 (19.31) (15.03) (11.38) (11.14) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.035*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.032*** 
 (-4.15) (-3.99) (-3.75) (-3.61) 
     
Province dummies - Yes Yes Yes 
Community 
Controls 
- - Yes Yes 
Household Controls - - - Yes 
N 7802 7802 7786 7767 
pseudo R2 0.2097 0.2411 0.2980 0.3081 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors clustered at the community level 
Community Controls: Urban/ Rural, topography, occupational characteristics, distance from 
administrative headquarters, social connectedness outside the community, intra-community linguistic 
fractionalization, community-level presence of infrastructure and state institutions, community-level adult 
education characteristics, community access to electricity, drainage, sex ratio 
Household controls: Household size, Age of head, members’ education levels, Farmland ownership, 
Number of rooms in the house, pre-flood livestock value, number of males, number of members over 14, 
household main occupation and enterprise ownership, female-headed (dummy), flood-induced 
displacement status 
 
Table A6.1.2 Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Individual^ Migration: Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index (linear) 
0.026*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (51.84) (37.94) (25.76) (24.07) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.040*** -0.037*** -0.042*** -0.037*** 
 (-10.70) (-8.24) (-8.11) (-7.18) 
     
Province dummies - - Yes Yes 
Controls - - - Yes 
N 30697 30697 30623 30554 
pseudo R2 0.2324 0.2630 0.3073 0.3217 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
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* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
^ Estimated for all individuals aged 13 and above 
Standard Errors clustered at the household level 
Controls: In addition to the community and household-level controls listed in table 8, I control for 
individual characteristics – Age, Gender and Educational Attainment (categories) 
 
Table A6.1.3 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: Rural 
v/s Urban 
 Total Rural Urban 
    
Flooding Exposure Index 
(linear) 
0.022*** 0.021*** 0.038*** 
 (11.14) (10.12) (9.55) 
    
Flooding Anomaly Index -0.032*** -0.026*** -0.008 
 (-3.61) (-2.96) (-0.40) 
    
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in 
table 8 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 7049 684 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 Table A6.1.4 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: Land 
Ownership Status 
 Total Landless 
Households 
Own-land 
cultivating 
Households 
Rentier 
Landlord 
Households 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index (linear) 
0.022*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.038*** 
 (11.14) (9.32) (9.42) (8.03) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.032*** -0.032*** -0.025* -0.007 
 (-3.61) (-3.41) (-1.90) (-0.33) 
     
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed 
in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 5208 2198 357 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A6.1.5 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: 
Demographic Characteristics 
 Total Female 
Headed 
Age of Household Head 
  Below 40 40 – 59 60 and 
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Households above 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
(linear) 
0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
 (11.14) (7.29) (9.21) (10.32) (8.91) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
-0.032*** 0.019 -0.039*** -0.029*** -0.016 
 (-3.61) (1.03) (-3.42) (-2.98) (-1.36) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 720 3147 3220 1400 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.1.6 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Gender 
 Total Male Female 
Flooding Exposure Index 
(linear) 
0.026*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (51.84) (22.57) (22.94) 
    
Flooding Anomaly Index -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.037*** 
 (-10.70) (-7.10) (-6.56) 
    
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in 
table 9 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 15227 15327 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.1.7. Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Age Group 
 Total Age Group 
  13 - 25 26 - 40 41 - 55 56 and 
above 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
(linear) 
0.026*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 
 (51.84) (18.98) (20.42) (15.75) (15.87) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
-0.040*** -0.040*** -0.034*** -0.039*** -0.029*** 
 (-10.70) (-6.18) (-5.32) (-5.46) (-3.27) 
      
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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dummies 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 13016 7951 5749 3838 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.1.8 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Education Level 
 Total Education Level 
  Illiterate Primary Secondary Higher 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
(linear) 
0.026*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 
 (51.84) (21.68) (11.05) (17.18) (9.89) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
-0.040*** -0.043*** -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.042*** 
 (-10.70) (-7.10) (-2.90) (-3.74) (-3.84) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 19988 4210 4865 1490 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.1.9 Marginal Effect of Flooding Indices on Choice of Urban Migration Destination: 
Probit Estimate – All individual migrants 
 Urban Migration 
Destination 
Distance to Migration 
Destination 
 Probit Estimate  Ordinal Probit Estimate  
Flooding Exposure Index (linear) -0.002 0.005*** 
 (-1.22) (4.07) 
   
Flooding Anomaly Index -0.010 0.044*** 
 (-0.87) (4.60) 
   
Province dummies Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in table 9 Yes Yes 
N 16490 16466 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 6.2. Causal Effects of Flooding Exposure sub-Indices [Community-level 
Depth and Duration (of floodwater) scores] on Household and Individual Migration 
 
Table A6.2.1 Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Household Migration: Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Duration Score 
(community-level) 
0.131*** 0.114*** 0.141*** 0.143*** 
 (15.98) (7.51) (7.39) (7.56) 
     
Depth Score 
(community-level) 
0.026*** 0.039*** 0.022** 0.018* 
 (3.19) (4.09) (2.18) (1.80) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.031*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.028*** 
 (-3.86) (-3.42) (-3.22) (-3.09) 
     
Province dummies - Yes Yes Yes 
Community 
Controls 
- - Yes Yes 
Household Controls - - - Yes 
N 7802 7802 7786 7767 
pseudo R2 0.2097 0.2411 0.2980 0.3081 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors clustered at the community level 
Community Controls: Urban/ Rural, topography, occupational characteristics, distance from 
administrative headquarters, social connectedness outside the community, intra-community linguistic 
fractionalization, community-level presence of infrastructure and state institutions, community-level adult 
education characteristics, community access to electricity, drainage, sex ratio 
Household controls: Household size, Age of head, members’ education levels, Farmland ownership, 
Number of rooms in the house, pre-flood livestock value, number of males, number of members over 14, 
household main occupation and enterprise ownership, female-headed (dummy), flood-induced 
displacement status 
 
Table A6.2.2 Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Individual^ Migration: Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Duration Score 
(community-level) 
0.132*** 0.108*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 
 (30.65) (14.42) (11.86) (12.04) 
     
Depth Score 
(community-level) 
0.030*** 0.048*** 0.037*** 0.031*** 
 (7.25) (9.79) (6.97) (5.90) 
     
Flooding Anomaly -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.039*** -0.034*** 
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Index 
 (-9.36) (-6.65) (-7.04) (-6.29) 
     
Province dummies - - Yes Yes 
Controls - - - Yes 
N 30697 30697 30623 30554 
pseudo R2 0.2324 0.2630 0.3073 0.3217 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
^ Estimated for all individuals aged 13 and above 
Standard Errors clustered at the household level 
Controls: In addition to the community and household-level controls listed in table 8, I control for 
individual characteristics – Age, Gender and Educational Attainment (categories) 
 
Table A6.2.3 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: Rural 
v/s Urban 
 Total Rural Urban 
    
Duration Score 
(community-level) 
0.131*** 0.138*** 0.196*** 
 (15.98) (6.74) (4.34) 
    
Depth Score (community-
level) 
0.026*** 0.019 0.035** 
 (3.19) (1.64) (2.21) 
    
Flooding Anomaly Index -0.031*** -0.020** -0.013 
 (-3.86) (-2.29) (-0.52) 
    
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in 
table 8 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 7049 684 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 Table A6.2.4 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: Land 
Ownership Status 
 Total Landless 
Households 
Own-land 
cultivating 
Households 
Rentier 
Landlord 
Households 
     
Duration Score 
(community-level) 
0.131*** 0.127*** 0.163*** 0.169*** 
 (15.98) (5.93) (6.27) (4.03) 
     
Depth Score 
(community-level) 
0.026*** 0.019* 0.015 0.044** 
 (3.19) (1.67) (1.06) (2.03) 
     
Flooding Anomaly -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.019 0.000 
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Index 
 (-3.86) (-2.92) (-1.54) (0.01) 
     
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed 
in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 5208 2198 357 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A6.2.5 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: 
Demographic Characteristics 
 Total Female 
Headed 
Households 
Age of Household Head 
  Below 40 40 – 59 60 and 
above 
Duration Score 
(community-
level) 
0.131*** 0.079** 0.157*** 0.137*** 0.118*** 
 (15.98) (2.21) (6.48) (6.96) (4.76) 
      
Depth Score 
(community-
level) 
0.026*** 0.059*** 0.007 0.019* 0.043*** 
 (3.19) (3.34) (0.54) (1.78) (3.12) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
-0.031*** 0.030 -0.038*** -0.024** -0.011 
 (-3.86) (1.57) (-3.26) (-2.36) (-0.92) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 720 3147 3220 1400 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.2.6 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Gender 
 Total Male Female 
Duration Score 
(community-level) 
0.132*** 0.118*** 0.114*** 
 (30.65) (11.71) (11.12) 
    
Depth Score (community-
level) 
0.030*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 
 (7.25) (5.06) (6.24) 
    
Flooding Anomaly Index -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
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 (-9.36) (-6.20) (-5.79) 
    
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in 
table 9 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 15227 15327 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.2.7. Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Age Group 
 Total Age Group 
  13 - 25 26 - 40 41 - 55 56 and 
above 
Duration Score 
(community-
level) 
0.132*** 0.108*** 0.143*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 
 (30.65) (9.04) (11.55) (7.87) (6.35) 
      
Depth Score 
(community-
level) 
0.030*** 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.051*** 
 (7.25) (5.04) (3.22) (3.91) (5.81) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
-0.036*** -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.025*** 
 (-9.36) (-5.40) (-4.72) (-4.85) (-2.69) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 13016 7951 5749 3838 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.2.8 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Education Level 
 Total Education Level 
  Illiterate Primary Secondary Higher 
Duration Score 
(community-
level) 
0.132*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.135*** 0.091*** 
 (30.65) (10.51) (6.70) (8.81) (4.20) 
      
Depth Score 
(community-
level) 
0.030*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 
 (7.25) (5.62) (3.49) (3.33) (2.97) 
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Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
-0.036*** -0.041*** -0.019** -0.027*** -0.036*** 
 (-9.36) (-6.45) (-2.11) (-3.28) (-3.25) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 19988 4210 4865 1490 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.2.9 Marginal Effect of Flooding Indices on Choice of Urban Migration Destination: 
Probit Estimate – All individual migrants 
 Urban Migration 
Destination 
Distance to Migration 
Destination 
 Probit Estimate  Ordinal Probit Estimate  
Duration Score (community-level) -0.009 0.030** 
 (-0.54) (2.08) 
   
Depth Score (community-level) -0.009 0.011 
 (-0.98) (1.31) 
   
Flooding Anomaly Index -0.011 0.045*** 
 (-0.99) (4.69) 
   
Province dummies Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in table 9 Yes Yes 
N 16490 16490 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 6.3. Causal Effects of Flood Exposure Index (Household Level) on 
Household and Individual Migration 
 
Table A6.3.1 Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Household Migration: Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index (HH level) 
0.167*** 0.135*** 0.114*** 0.111*** 
 (22.00) (16.70) (13.60) (13.60) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.045*** -0.031*** -0.041*** -0.038*** 
 (-5.32) (-3.62) (-4.53) (-4.30) 
     
Province dummies - Yes Yes Yes 
Community 
Controls 
- - Yes Yes 
Household Controls - - - Yes 
N 7802 7802 7786 7767 
pseudo R2 0.2097 0.2411 0.2980 0.3081 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors clustered at the community level 
Community Controls: Urban/ Rural, topography, occupational characteristics, distance from 
administrative headquarters, social connectedness outside the community, intra-community linguistic 
fractionalization, community-level presence of infrastructure and state institutions, community-level adult 
education characteristics, community access to electricity, drainage, sex ratio 
Household controls: Household size, Age of head, members’ education levels, Farmland ownership, 
Number of rooms in the house, pre-flood livestock value, number of males, number of members over 14, 
household main occupation and enterprise ownership, female-headed (dummy), flood-induced 
displacement status 
 
Table A6.3.2 Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Individual^ Migration: Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index (HH level) 
0.179*** 0.143*** 0.116*** 0.110*** 
 (44.84) (32.25) (23.37) (22.13) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.051*** -0.035*** -0.048*** -0.043*** 
 (-12.37) (-7.77) (-9.22) (-8.24) 
     
Province dummies - - Yes Yes 
Controls - - - Yes 
N 30697 30697 30623 30554 
pseudo R2 0.2324 0.2630 0.3073 0.3217 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
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* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
^ Estimated for all individuals aged 13 and above 
Standard Errors clustered at the household level 
Controls: In addition to the community and household-level controls listed in table 8, I control for 
individual characteristics – Age, Gender and Educational Attainment (categories) 
 
Table A6.3.3 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: Rural 
v/s Urban 
 Total Rural Urban 
    
Flooding Exposure Index 
(HH level) 
0.111*** 0.108*** 0.122*** 
 (13.60) (12.73) (5.53) 
    
Flooding Anomaly Index -0.038*** -0.031*** -0.005 
 (-4.30) (-3.53) (-0.20) 
    
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in 
table 8 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 7049 684 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 Table A6.3.4 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: Land 
Ownership Status 
 Total Landless 
Households 
Own-land 
cultivating 
Households 
Rentier 
Landlord 
Households 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index (HH level) 
0.111*** 0.113*** 0.098*** 0.132*** 
 (13.60) (12.20) (8.84) (5.43) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index 
-0.038*** -0.037*** -0.029** -0.020 
 (-4.30) (-4.09) (-2.13) (-0.88) 
     
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed 
in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 5208 2198 357 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A6.3.5 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: 
Demographic Characteristics 
 Total Female 
Headed 
Age of Household Head 
  Below 40 40 – 59 60 and 
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Households above 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
(HH level) 
0.111*** 0.101*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 
 (13.60) (6.36) (10.03) (12.05) (8.54) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
-0.038*** 0.016 -0.046*** -0.035*** -0.024* 
 (-4.30) (0.77) (-3.91) (-3.53) (-1.95) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 720 3147 3220 1400 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.3.6 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Gender 
 Total Male Female 
Flooding Exposure Index 
(HH level) 
0.179*** 0.107*** 0.114*** 
 (44.84) (20.56) (21.51) 
    
Flooding Anomaly Index -0.051*** -0.044*** -0.042*** 
 (-12.37) (-8.21) (-7.47) 
    
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in 
table 9 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 15227 15327 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.3.7. Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Age Group 
 Total Age Group 
  13 - 25 26 - 40 41 - 55 56 and 
above 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
(HH level) 
0.179*** 0.115*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.110*** 
 (44.84) (19.26) (16.16) (15.59) (12.51) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
-0.051*** -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.037*** 
 (-12.37) (-6.93) (-6.21) (-6.15) (-4.28) 
      
Province Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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dummies 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 13016 7951 5749 3838 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.3.8 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Education Level 
 Total Education Level 
  Illiterate Primary Secondary Higher 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
(HH level) 
0.179*** 0.111*** 0.095*** 0.122*** 0.094*** 
 (44.84) (20.17) (11.37) (16.50) (9.00) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
-0.051*** -0.049*** -0.027*** -0.034*** -0.045*** 
 (-12.37) (-8.18) (-3.19) (-4.27) (-4.14) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 19988 4210 4865 1490 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.3.9 Marginal Effect of Flooding Indices on Choice of Urban Migration Destination: 
Probit Estimate – All individual migrants 
 Urban Migration 
Destination 
Distance to Migration 
Destination 
 Probit Estimate  Ordinal Probit Estimate  
Flooding Exposure Index (HH 
level) 
-0.019* 0.016* 
 (-1.89) (1.82) 
   
Flooding Anomaly Index -0.010 0.044*** 
 (-0.93) (4.57) 
   
Province dummies Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in table 9 Yes Yes 
N 16490 16466 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 6.4. Causal Effects of Flooding Anomaly sub-Indices (Standardized 
Rainfall Deviation and Standardized Nearest Distance to River) on Household and 
Individual Migration 
 
Table A6.4.1 Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Household Migration: Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index 
0.237*** 0.210*** 0.202*** 0.196*** 
 (26.65) (16.84) (13.95) (13.62) 
     
Rainfall deviation 
(standardized) 
-0.014 -0.018 -0.038*** -0.039*** 
 (-1.07) (-1.08) (-2.64) (-2.71) 
     
Distance from River 
(standardized) 
-0.050*** -0.033*** -0.028** -0.025** 
 (-3.88) (-2.95) (-2.28) (-2.12) 
     
Province dummies - Yes Yes Yes 
Community 
Controls 
- - Yes Yes 
Household Controls - - - Yes 
N 7802 7802 7786 7767 
pseudo R2 0.2097 0.2411 0.2980 0.3081 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors clustered at the community level 
Community Controls: Urban/ Rural, topography, occupational characteristics, distance from 
administrative headquarters, social connectedness outside the community, intra-community linguistic 
fractionalization, community-level presence of infrastructure and state institutions, community-level adult 
education characteristics, community access to electricity, drainage, sex ratio 
Household controls: Household size, Age of head, members’ education levels, Farmland ownership, 
Number of rooms in the house, pre-flood livestock value, number of males, number of members over 14, 
household main occupation and enterprise ownership, female-headed (dummy), flood-induced 
displacement status 
 
Table A6.4.2 Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Individual^ Migration: Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index 
0.247*** 0.221*** 0.203*** 0.193*** 
 (59.76) (36.38) (25.73) (24.16) 
     
Rainfall deviation 
(standardized) 
-0.020*** -0.020*** -0.032*** -0.031*** 
 (-3.83) (-2.85) (-4.09) (-3.95) 
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Distance from River 
(standardized) 
-0.054*** -0.040*** -0.046*** -0.040*** 
 (-9.48) (-6.92) (-7.18) (-6.28) 
     
Province dummies - - Yes Yes 
Controls - - - Yes 
N 30697 30697 30623 30554 
pseudo R2 0.2324 0.2630 0.3073 0.3217 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
^ Estimated for all individuals aged 13 and above 
Standard Errors clustered at the household level 
Controls: In addition to the community and household-level controls listed in table 8, I control for 
individual characteristics – Age, Gender and Educational Attainment (categories) 
 
Table A6.4.3 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: Rural 
v/s Urban 
 Total Rural Urban 
    
Flooding Exposure Index 0.196*** 0.193*** 0.259*** 
 (13.62) (12.96) (8.01) 
    
Rainfall deviation 
(standardized) 
-0.039*** -0.036** -0.009 
 (-2.71) (-2.52) (-0.17) 
    
Distance from River 
(standardized) 
-0.025** -0.017 0.030 
 (-2.12) (-1.34) (1.41) 
    
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in 
table 8 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 7049 684 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 Table A6.4.4 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: Land 
Ownership Status 
 Total Landless 
Households 
Own-land 
cultivating 
Households 
Rentier 
Landlord 
Households 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index 
0.196*** 0.181*** 0.220*** 0.238*** 
 (13.62) (12.12) (10.91) (6.47) 
     
Rainfall deviation 
(standardized) 
-0.039*** -0.033** -0.049** -0.045 
 (-2.71) (-2.08) (-2.46) (-1.16) 
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Distance from River 
(standardized) 
-0.025** -0.026** -0.019 0.017 
 (-2.12) (-2.10) (-1.14) (0.56) 
     
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed 
in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 5208 2198 357 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A6.4.5 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: 
Demographic Characteristics 
 Total Female 
Headed 
Households 
Age of Household Head 
  Below 40 40 – 59 60 and 
above 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
0.196*** 0.212*** 0.200*** 0.185*** 0.216*** 
 (13.62) (9.30) (11.19) (11.13) (11.00) 
      
Rainfall 
deviation 
(standardized) 
-0.039*** 0.031 -0.052*** -0.032** -0.028 
 (-2.71) (1.16) (-2.61) (-2.01) (-1.41) 
      
Distance from 
River 
(standardized) 
-0.025** 0.031 -0.034** -0.024* -0.006 
 (-2.12) (1.31) (-2.32) (-1.79) (-0.35) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 720 3147 3220 1400 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.4.6 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Gender 
 Total Male Female 
Flooding Exposure Index 0.193*** 0.186*** 0.201*** 
 (24.16) (22.19) (23.54) 
    
Rainfall deviation 
(standardized) 
-0.031*** -0.029*** -0.034*** 
 (-3.95) (-3.56) (-3.95) 
    
Distance from River -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.039*** 
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(standardized) 
 (-6.28) (-6.30) (-5.68) 
    
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in 
table 9 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 15227 15327 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.4.7. Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Age Group 
 Total Age Group 
  13 - 25 26 - 40 41 - 55 56 and 
above 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
0.193*** 0.188*** 0.201*** 0.177*** 0.224*** 
 (24.16) (19.41) (19.82) (15.68) (15.39) 
      
Rainfall 
deviation 
(standardized) 
-0.031*** -0.037*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.023* 
 (-3.95) (-3.74) (-2.71) (-2.61) (-1.78) 
      
Distance from 
River 
(standardized) 
-0.040*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.046*** -0.032*** 
 (-6.28) (-5.03) (-4.79) (-5.13) (-2.83) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 13016 7951 5749 3838 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.4.8 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Education Level 
 Total Education Level 
  Illiterate Primary Secondary Higher 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
0.193*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 0.194*** 0.160*** 
 (24.16) (21.80) (13.19) (16.25) (10.30) 
      
Rainfall 
deviation 
(standardized) 
-0.031*** -0.038*** -0.032** -0.000 -0.025 
 (-3.95) (-4.29) (-2.42) (-0.00) (-1.35) 
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Distance from 
River 
(standardized) 
-0.040*** -0.047*** -0.012 -0.046*** -0.045*** 
 (-6.28) (-6.50) (-1.08) (-4.32) (-3.27) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 19988 4210 4865 1490 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.4.9 Marginal Effect of Flooding Indices on Choice of Urban Migration Destination: 
Probit Estimate – All individual migrants 
 Urban Migration 
Destination 
Distance to Migration 
Destination 
 Probit Estimate  Ordinal Probit Estimate  
Flooding Exposure Index -0.039** 0.069*** 
 (-2.48) (5.10) 
   
Rainfall deviation (standardized) -0.018 0.045*** 
 (-1.33) (3.80) 
   
Distance from River (standardized) -0.006 0.050*** 
 (-0.45) (4.43) 
   
Province dummies Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in table 9 Yes Yes 
N 16490 16490 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix 6.5. Causal Effects of Flood Exposure Index, Flooding Anomaly Index and 
Flooding Anomaly Index-Squared on Household and Individual Migration 
 
Table A6.5.1 Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Household Migration: Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index 
0.237*** 0.212*** 0.203*** 0.198*** 
 (27.14) (16.90) (13.74) (13.47) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index (FAI) 
-0.033*** -0.028*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (-3.27) (-2.60) (-3.33) (-3.28) 
     
FAI-squared 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.89) (0.33) (0.51) (0.76) 
     
Province dummies - Yes Yes Yes 
Community 
Controls 
- - Yes Yes 
Household Controls - - - Yes 
N 7802 7802 7786 7767 
pseudo R2 0.2097 0.2411 0.2980 0.3081 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard Errors clustered at the community level 
Community Controls: Urban/ Rural, topography, occupational characteristics, distance from 
administrative headquarters, social connectedness outside the community, intra-community linguistic 
fractionalization, community-level presence of infrastructure and state institutions, community-level adult 
education characteristics, community access to electricity, drainage, sex ratio 
Household controls: Household size, Age of head, members’ education levels, Farmland ownership, 
Number of rooms in the house, pre-flood livestock value, number of males, number of members over 14, 
household main occupation and enterprise ownership, female-headed (dummy), flood-induced 
displacement status 
 
Table A6.5.2 Effects of Flooding Exposure and the degree of Flooding Anomaly on Any 
Individual^ Migration: Probit Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index 
0.246*** 0.222*** 0.202*** 0.192*** 
 (59.49) (36.18) (25.26) (23.81) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index (FAI) 
-0.035*** -0.029*** -0.039*** -0.035*** 
 (-7.85) (-5.40) (-6.54) (-5.94) 
     
FAI-squared -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.06) (-1.41) (-1.30) (-1.17) 
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Province dummies - - Yes Yes 
Controls - - - Yes 
N 30697 30697 30623 30554 
pseudo R2 0.2324 0.2630 0.3073 0.3217 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
^ Estimated for all individuals aged 13 and above 
Standard Errors clustered at the household level 
Controls: In addition to the community and household-level controls listed in table 8, I control for 
individual characteristics – Age, Gender and Educational Attainment (categories) 
 
Table A6.5.3 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: Rural 
v/s Urban 
 Total Rural Urban 
    
Flooding Exposure Index 0.198*** 0.195*** 0.250*** 
 (13.47) (12.78) (7.72) 
    
Flooding Anomaly Index 
(FAI) 
-0.033*** -0.024** 0.039 
 (-3.28) (-2.50) (0.85) 
    
FAI-squared 0.002 0.000 -0.013 
 (0.76) (0.20) (-0.73) 
    
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in 
table 8 
Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 7049 684 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 Table A6.5.4 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: Land 
Ownership Status 
 Total Landless 
Households 
Own-land 
cultivating 
Households 
Rentier 
Landlord 
Households 
     
Flooding Exposure 
Index 
0.198*** 0.181*** 0.227*** 0.243*** 
 (13.47) (11.81) (11.19) (6.59) 
     
Flooding Anomaly 
Index (FAI) 
-0.033*** -0.028*** -0.047*** -0.015 
 (-3.28) (-2.86) (-2.60) (-0.47) 
     
FAI-squared 0.002 -0.000 0.008* 0.004 
 (0.76) (-0.11) (1.86) (0.43) 
     
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Controls – as listed 
in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 5208 2198 357 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A6.5.5 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any HH Migration: 
Demographic Characteristics 
 Total Female 
Headed 
Households 
Age of Household Head 
  Below 40 40 – 59 60 and 
above 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
0.198*** 0.209*** 0.202*** 0.186*** 0.218*** 
 (13.47) (9.06) (11.09) (10.97) (11.01) 
      
Rainfall 
deviation 
(standardized) 
-0.033*** 0.038* -0.042*** -0.027** -0.021 
 (-3.28) (1.84) (-3.10) (-2.46) (-1.38) 
      
Distance from 
River 
(standardized) 
0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.000 0.004 
 (0.76) (-0.76) (0.58) (0.13) (0.99) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 8 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7767 720 3147 3220 1400 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the community level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.5.6 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Gender 
 Total Male Female 
Flooding Exposure Index 0.192*** 0.185*** 0.200*** 
 (23.81) (21.83) (23.25) 
    
Flooding Anomaly Index 
(FAI) 
-0.035*** -0.035*** -0.036*** 
 (-5.94) (-5.76) (-5.62) 
    
FAI-squared -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (-1.17) (-0.88) (-1.35) 
    
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in 
table 9 
Yes Yes Yes 
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N 30554 15227 15327 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.5.7. Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Age Group 
 Total Age Group 
  13 - 25 26 - 40 41 - 55 56 and 
above 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
0.192*** 0.187*** 0.200*** 0.175*** 0.224*** 
 (23.81) (19.15) (19.50) (15.31) (15.28) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
(FAI) 
-0.035*** -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.028*** 
 (-5.94) (-4.84) (-4.57) (-4.48) (-2.97) 
      
FAI-squared -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.000 
 (-1.17) (-1.01) (-0.87) (-1.35) (-0.04) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 13016 7951 5749 3838 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.5.8 Effect of Flooding Exposure and Flooding Anomaly on Any Individual Migration: 
by Education Level 
 Total Education Level 
  Illiterate Primary Secondary Higher 
Flooding 
Exposure Index 
0.192*** 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.160*** 
 (23.81) (21.50) (13.03) (15.83) (9.93) 
      
Flooding 
Anomaly Index 
(FAI) 
-0.035*** -0.042*** -0.018* -0.026*** -0.039** 
 (-5.94) (-6.40) (-1.73) (-2.65) (-2.56) 
      
FAI-squared -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (-1.17) (-1.43) (-0.82) (-0.86) (0.22) 
      
Province 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls – as 
listed in table 9 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 30554 19988 4210 4865 1490 
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Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table A6.5.9 Marginal Effect of Flooding Indices on Choice of Urban Migration Destination: 
Probit Estimate – All individual migrants 
 Urban Migration 
Destination 
Distance to Migration 
Destination 
 Probit Estimate  Ordinal Probit Estimate  
Flooding Exposure Index -0.040** 0.077*** 
 (-2.51) (5.73) 
   
Flooding Anomaly Index (FAI) -0.011 0.051*** 
 (-0.95) (4.89) 
   
FAI-squared -0.004 0.012*** 
 (-0.91) (3.12) 
   
Province dummies Yes Yes 
Controls – as listed in table 9 Yes Yes 
N 16490 16490 
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses 
Standard errors are clustered at the Household level 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
